UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
3 1761 00012188 9

HANDBOUND
AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF
TORONTO PRESS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/miscellanies05newmuoft

N86401 m l Colchester 81 89 I (46)

MISCELLANIES:

CHIEFLY

ACADEMIC.

BY

FRANCIS W. NEWMAN,

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON,

ONCE FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD,

HONORARY FELLOW OF WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

M. R. ASIATIC S.

VOL. V.

LONDON:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., LTD.
1891.

84671 16/11/07

AC
8
N4
v. 5

NOTTINGHAM:
STEVENSON, BAILEY, AND SMITH, PRINTERS.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
One Side of Plato	1
On Pindar	12
On the Northern Elements of Latin	20
On Sir G. Cornewall Lewis's Two Volumes of Inquiry into Early Rome	32
The Relations of Professional to Liberal Knowledge	51
Modern Latin as a Basis of Instruction	67
On Forms of Government	83
Epicureanism, Ancient and Modern	99
The Authorship of the Odyssey	115
Strivings of Greece for Union	142
The Moral Character of Roman Conquest	158
Contrasts of Ancient and Modern History	178
Moral Estimate of Alexander the Great	249
Modern Science Religious in the long run	275
On the Weakness of Roman Empire	281
On the Relation of the Supply of Food to the Laws of Landed Tenure	304
The Political Side of the Vaccination System	321
Religion at the Bar of Ethics	331
Preamble to Shakespear's Richard II.	343
From the Opening of Virgil's "Æneid"	355

ONE SIDE OF PLATO.

PREFACE.

In March, 1839, I consented, under a too ambitious title (Greek Philosophy), to write an article for the *Eclectic Review*. Practically I wrote about Plato only what I myself had read, and about Aristotle as known to me at Oxford. Concerning Aristotle, whom I continue to esteem, I yet see no adequate reason for reprint. In the dialogues which Plato puts into the mouths of other men, I felt and feel it hard to be sure how much is Plato's own. Yet from Aristotle when he ascribes *this* and *that* to Plato personally, there is no appeal. This gives a firm footing, and teaches what I here entitle *one side* of Plato.

To make certain arguments clearer, I have here introduced verbal changes or slight amplification. I have omitted my Analysis of Plato's "Protagoras;" not that I believe it to be historical, but because I see reasons for thinking it, with the Euthyphron, to be perhaps rather a spicy exaggeration of Socrates, than invented for him entirely by Plato. After such a lessening of bulk, I finish off with sharper words than fifty-one years ago I could have hoped the Editor to allow. 1890.

"Plato and Aristotle were the wisest of men."

"Whoever studies Plato is standing on holy ground. So Heathens always felt: so even Christianity confessed."

Such sentiments are rather startling; and more than we had expected from our High Church contemporary, although we know that to many Greek Christian Fathers Plato was a sort of

prophet. We know also that beautiful gems are collected by those who know how to pick from him: it is at the same time certain that for wise selection out of diffuse writings, previous wisdom is needed,—a wisdom (may we whisper in parenthesis) higher than Plato's own.

That Plato, as a mere theologian, was pre-eminent among eminent Greeks, is easy to receive on modern testimony. *It will not be called in question by us here:* but as a mere theologian, he surely cannot be important to a Christian reasoner. He went to school in Oriental Philosophy, but had a deep taproot native to Greece. Thales and Pythagoras, not to refer to Empedocles, must have joined tradition and legend to active thought. Pythagoras also looked abroad for philosophy. Plato was deeply impressed by Pythagorean dogma, and exhibits a vehement tendency to *à priori* methods, in contrast to Aristotle, to Socrates, and probably to Thales. "Ipse dixit" (the Master has said it), was sufficient with a Pythagorean. If Plato be supposed to speak in Platonic dialogues, he betrays a childish reverence for the letter of Pindar and Simonides. But the passion for Geometry, the earliest of Sciences, peculiarly captivated him.

This was the first Science cultivated by *Demonstration*, which means, *Complete* Proof. Plato may have hoped that it would supersede the mere dogma of Pythagoreans. Much sound progress had been made in Geometry earlier than Socrates; but this sturdy thinker was alienated from all superhuman science (*τὰ δαιμόνια*) by the mutual refutations of the too rapid speculators. The practical value of Geometry was well known in the Athens of Pericles; indeed the grossly false satire of Socrates in the "Clouds" of Aristophanes may indicate that the elements of Astronomy also were becoming a staple of education for aristocratic youth. Certainly in the next generation Plato took up Geometry with enthusiasm, and with a panegyric which passed all bounds. He is said to have written up over his gate: "Let no one enter, who is untaught in Geometry," as though it were indispensable to all who might seek instruction in his philosophy. To his followers accordingly the Science was indebted for some notable additions. Among them are named the celebrated problems of Trisecting an Angle, and what we now call "Extracting the Cube Root," *geometrically*. To solve these by rule and compass certain new curves were imagined. The geometrical method of *Analysis* is ascribed to Plato himself.

It may seem paradoxical to assert, that the successes of the Greeks in Geometry were a false light, damaging to their philo-

sophy: at least we think it so acted on Plato, who seems always to import the sphere and the triangle into moral thought. The sphere was his perfect form.

Two words run through his philosophy, at first sight identical, yet with him not identical, εἴδη and ἰδέαι. From the latter comes our English *idea*. But with Plato "ideas" are the primitive patterns of all existing things. We learn that Samuel Taylor Coleridge, when asked what Plato meant by ideas, replied that he had *once* thought he understood, but he dared not try to explain them now. To such a task, we cannot claim to be equal; yet we may trace the lines of thought which led Plato on.

Geometry begins from Definitions; so therefore in Plato's view ought all true Science. Even three centuries later Cicero in his treatise on Morals lays down the same principle; but the commentators complain that he does *not* so begin. His good common sense overpowered traditional theory. Though Astronomy was in every detail a science of Observation, yet these details were *connected* by Geometry, and the whole becomes more perfect, the more completely it is reduced to Geometrical form. This may have enticed Plato into the delusion that Observation being necessarily inaccurate, is of very inferior importance, and that *à priori* mental auguries are its real and sound foundation. He could not foresee, what, in spite of rude instruments, Alexandrian astronomers attained. But that Plato went wrong in so obvious and open a science may seem wonderful.

How does this affect Philosophy? The first or an early result was, his dazzling doctrine of Eternal Truth. The properties *demonstrated* to belong to every Triangle are unchangeable in Time and Space, whatever its size or shape. They are true in the remotest world. They were true in the remotest age. They will be true *through all Eternity*. Every such property is also independent of the substance of the Triangle, remaining the same, whether it be copper or iron, wood or stone. It cannot be established, nor refuted by sight or touch. Our gross organs neither can draw nor can appreciate mathematical lines. Sense would mislead us, but Intellect guides us to an infallible conclusion. How magnificent! how spiritual! how worthy of the noblest mind,—in short, how divine! is this study of everlasting realities. Plato inferred the emptiness and uncertainty of the Senses, which could only give a rotten basis for Science, and were inadequate to put imagined Sciences *to test*:—surely, a monstrous error. Science (according to him) established that the Planetary Orbits were circles: any other form was impossible,

since of all curves the circle is the most perfect. If any one, like Kepler, had set about measuring the orbit of Mars, and uttered a suspicion that this planet moves in an Ellipse, he would have seemed to Plato a DOLT, for giving credit to fallible sense. It is as absurd (he would say) as though any one, instead of applying intellect to demonstrate that the three angles of every triangle are equivalent to two right angles, were to essay it by measuring or weighing several actual triangles. The sensible results can only at best be particular, and never can be trustworthy. Evidently to trust to the senses is ludicrous in one aspiring to Philosophy.

Enough has here been written to make intelligible to the reader, how an undue straining of Geometry might warp his philosophy: yet this is only a beginning, With timidity we pass to his Forms, Shapes, Classes, or *Ideas*, doubtful what is our best English, and knowing that to expound them duly and fully is a very delicate problem. Yet perhaps we may approximate to his reasoning.

If a proposition concerning Circles or Triangles be eternal, the *ideas* of Circles and Triangles must be eternal; for without an Idea of them, how can there be any property? and the like may be said of all geometrical figures. Here the Ideas existed before this globe, and are the patterns of which our sensible objects are a rude imitation. This irregular globe of Earth is an illshaped copy of the Eternal sphere, a mortal semblance of the immortal, a sensible representation of the invisible and divine. How massive a store of sounding rhetoric do these notions provide for an eloquent man! But what things did he make Eternal, in the future, as in the past? Certainly God, Certainly Ideas, are eternal; also (if we rightly gather the doctrine), Matter, though imperfect, is eternal. Elsewhere, as in his Phædrus, all *life* (all living things?) are eternal. Only God and Ideas (or Primal Forms) are perfect, being immaterial and known by mind.

Aristotle pointedly disowns Plato's cardinal doctrine, and simply refutes it by saying (if we translate him by English vocables) that every *abstract* noun is invented to express dependence on a *concrete* noun,—a thing or person, of *which* it is a property. Thus Whiteness expresses the property of some White *Thing*. To us there is no mystery except what Plato himself makes. If we ask, "*Is anxiety* older than living things?" any moderately thoughtful boy will confidently reply, "If no one is alive to feel Anxious, there can be no Anxiety." Or, generalizing, "Is virtue, Is Moral Excellence eternal?" our reply, is of course, "Virtue is co-*eval* with Virtuous Beings:" if no virtuous Being

exist, to say that "Virtue exists" is absurd and false. If Plato choose to dogmatize as to the processes of thought which passed through the mind of the Supreme Power before he created such living things as should need to learn Right and Wrong, we should say that a philosophy which pitches from aloft is sure to fall before it can reach solid earth. Erudition and Eloquence never deserve a hearing unless well balanced by common sense. Such might be the remarks if anyone but Plato indulged in such speculation. Yet we seem hardly to have done more than glance at his easy omniscience: for he evidently imagines that,—

The divine Being, who is the Highest and Purest Intellect, never could dwell on that which is evanescent. Nothing but Truth will find a place in his mind, and nothing is to be called True that changes from moment to moment, and has no stability or consistency. That alone is *true*, which is *eternally* true; such are the propositions of Geometry: these therefore are worthy of Divine study. Those who aim to approximate to the divine, must purge themselves from Sense, so often delusive, and must trust to the pure soul, which studies Ideas and Beauty, which also of all within us is most divine.

The Beauty of the Heavens of course attracted such a Geometer, who strangely overlooked that nothing but *eyesight* teaches us their steady rotation, their beauty, their sublimity. It had been discovered that the Sun's movement in the Ecliptic was less regular than the Rotation of the Stars; the planetary orbits were supposed to be all in the same plane, a fact which aided Pythagoras in his notable anticipation of Copernicus. Plato, finding in the heavens Uniformity, Diversity, and Matter (three things sufficient to make up a Universe), perhaps was satisfied without *further* Observation, so distasteful to one who disparaged Sense. Professor Baden Powell, in his History of Natural Philosophy, has observed that the Greeks went astray, chiefly through the confusion of Sciences. Pythagoras eminently did so, in his pre-Copernical argument, as detailed to us by Aristotle, for it mixed Astronomy with Ideas of Nobleness and Courtly Etiquette. Plato did it more deeply and widely in making Geometry so prominent in Morals. A specimen of what he teaches in the Timæus is better laid before the reader in a close translation of one passage out of many. It deals with primitive Creation. God begins by creating an *under*-god:

"Such was the whole process of reasoning, bestowed by God on the god who was to be brought into existence and for such reasons did he make him to be a smooth body and level everywhere

and equal from the centre, and entire and perfect, out of perfect bodies. And having put a soul into the middle of him, he extended it all through him, and even on the outside covered his body with it, and set him up as a single heaven, alone and isolated, circle rolling on circle; by native virtue capable of finding companionship in his own self, and needing nothing from without, but well acquainted with, and friendly enough with, his own self. From all these things, it was a happy god whom he begat."—TIMÆUS 12.

Similar monstrosities were propagated in the Stoic branch of Plato's followers, whose doctrine that all the planets and stars and the blue Vault itself are blessed gods, inflamed the atheistic antagonism of the Epicurean school, and drew forth bitter gibes against round, rolling, and restless gods.

It is true that Plato assigns the notions to Timæus: but if on this account they are not to be accepted as his own, then no opinions are his: he always evades his own responsibility by putting everything, into the mouth of another. Generally he palms them off on Socrates. We advance nothing new: what Plato elaborately urges is understood to have been seriously approved by Plato. Indeed all the Greeks accepted the great dialogue on the Perfect Republic as Plato's own, and stigmatized it as his Laconism, though he puts it into the mouth of Socrates. But they knew that Socrates did not teach or approve anything so unnatural.

The doctrine of Forms or Ideas may be presented in another development, as follows. If we compare two pieces of stone that are nearly of one size and shape, we may at first sight call them Equal; but closer examination says, Not quite! Our notion of Equality does not come from *them; for*,—it is not in them. However often we repeat the trial, we never find two strictly equal. Our idea of Equality never comes from the actual sight of things equal: therefore the idea comes to us *à priori*, never from sense; *we must always have possessed it*. He satisfied himself also (we dare not try to explain *how*) that the idea was not infused at the moment of birth; it must have pre-existed earlier than each individual; earlier than the human race; indeed from all eternity. By similar reasoning the idea of White and Black, of Good and Bad, of Beautiful and Ugly, in fact (in English dialect) every Adjective, existed from all eternity, without needing to inhere in any Substantive. Does any modern writer of approved sobriety endure this doctrine? To condemn it, is to avow Plato's singular unwisdom.

That Greek Philosophy should run on the rock noted by Prof. Baden Powell, is the more notable, since from the time of Pericles at least a copious vocabulary of Sciences and Arts had arisen, with accuracy pedantic and ludicrous. We see the tendency even in the Socrates of Xenophon. In Aristotle the Arts and Sciences are marshalled in subjection to one supreme, viz., Politics, which he calls Architectonic. But perhaps this very idea of a suzerain aided the error which we see as confusion. No Greek was startled by such a question as: "Whó then is to have the use of domestic implements, if (the science of) Economics is not?" Pythagoras is said to to have found such analogy between the Seven planets (an enumeration which *we* do not follow) and the Seven notes of the Gamut, as suggested the idea of Celestial Harmony. Plato founds a wonderful argument on mere Greek Grammar,—viz., his own distinction of φέρεται (is being carried) from φερόμενον ἐστιν, where we, dull scholars, cannot guess at any distinction at all.

So far, it is hard for a plain Englishman to find anything *instructive* in Plato's philosophy, and (likely enough) the blame may be laid on the stupidity of the English interpreter. But we pass to Plato's MORALITY; not to brilliant gems that are triumphantly quoted, not to abstract generalities, hard to embody, but to practical morals *as embodied by himself*. Here we are on humble solid ground, where an ordinary moralist may and ought to speak firmly. Here also he strives for the geometrical principle of beginning from a Definition, even in morals, and thence proceeding by Deduction. The evidence of this may be felt, even where it is not distinctly avowed; but distinctly in the opening of the Menon he makes Socrates say, that he is so far from knowing whether Virtue is communicable by teaching, that he has not yet learned how to define Virtue, and where he does not yet know what is the *essence* of a thing, how can he know its properties?

The dullest of us moderns will reply that the essence of a thing or class is the most obscure and hidden, but the properties of a thing or class are the most obvious, and are naturally first known. Such common sense ranked probably with Plato as common stupidity. As far as we can understand he aimed at a conception of Virtue, *not by his inward* conscience, not by experience of life, much less by the united consent of the vulgar,—(*that consent of many nations*, which Hesiod with Aristotle's applause called a voice of God)—but by studying the perfection of forms, that is, by cultivating susceptibility to some sort of beauty. The word Beautiful with

him supersedes the word Right. Does not this neglect of the personal conscience and the human conscience enthrone a mere aristocratic Taste? His argument for the Sphere will not encourage our Artists to trust his *taste* in other topics such as Morals. The Sphere, says he, is of all shapes most perfect, because it is most similar to itself, and likeness *is ten thousand times more beautiful than unlikeness.* Who of us can refute such a reasoner? Well, the effort followed to find in Morals some anology to this perfection; something equable, smoothly well balanced, harmonious, unchanging; *this* would be the true Beauty, *this* would be Virtue. One would have thought that, at least to every Christian, the study of Right and Wrong from this basis was a prodigious and fatal blunder, nor do the results as depicted to us by Plato himself, suggest any other thought. We cannot wish our readers to accept from us an opinion, to what general result the dialogues in Plato tend morally. It is better to avail ourselves of the admissions of his zealous eulogist, who was quoted at the beginning of this article. After reciting the magnificent *aim* which guided Plato's pen,

> "to purify the morals of the Athenian youth, to
> "elevate the standard of morality, to lay a firm
> "foundation for a new national character, to cleanse
> "the Augean stable of Grecian *democracy*,

(as if Athens had ever been as brutal in violence, or as cruel and perfidious to her slaves, as aristocratic Sparta to her Helots)

> "to open a new world of thought and feeling, as
> "yet hidden beneath Polytheism,"

this warm admirer adds, that a right understanding of this *aim* "offers the only explanation of the innumerable mysteries and anomalies which meet us in every page of his works, which have made many men to abandon them in despair, some to play with them as a complicated enigma, others to ridicule them as unintelligible chaos, a whole succession of philosophic schools to claim him as the champion of their scepticism, and even Cicero himself to declare that Plato never hazards an assertion, but argues for both sides, and then leaves the reader in doubt."

The last sentence from Cicero may be plausibly rebutted, by saying that the speaker in Cicero is attacking unawares not Plato, but the real Socrates; as in the cruel dialogue, in which he flatters, leads astray, puzzles, and humiliates the conceited young Euthyphron; yet, after failing to drive him into impieties by

his subtle arguments, refuses to the young man a single step towards Truth; but conveniently shirks by pleading his own ignorance; then ends as he began, by sarcastic, insincere praise. A few such dialogues, if real, would quickly make Athenians young and old hate him, if from opposite causes.

Our own opinion in this matter may be of little worth, yet we will frankly give it. Aristotle's censure of Socrates' *Irony* (that is, his pretended ignorance), and Xenophon's confession that Socrates was believed to do nothing but pull down received moralities, together convince us, that this was nearly his practice. Plato did not invent the "Vice" of εἰρωνεία for him, though possibly he caricatured it, as in the dialogues called Euthyphron and Protagoras, which we regard as highly disgraceful to Socrates, *if true*. Nothing so pernicious is ever imputed to him in Xenophon.

But to exhibit *what* is the morality which Plato approves, and the *quality* of his moral reasoning, we must dwell on one dialogue, in which all the Greeks confessed that he avowed his own personal conviction; that is, his Model Republic. It is an elaborate effort in ten long books. When application was made to him by the Arcadians and Thebans to aid them in remodelling their laws, we are told, he refused, because they would not submit to Community of *Property*, as devised by him in his Republic. This was one main principle. But a second is, Community of *Wives!* A third is, the imaginary community of *Children*, for no mother is to be allowed to know what children are her own!! This (he says) is to lead all citizens of about the same age to believe themselves brothers and sisters. Further the community is to be cross-divided, not only into two sexes, but also into fighters and non-fighters. Why?—he himself condescends to tell us. Male and Female Hounds hunt in the same pack: the Females do not stay at home to look after the puppies: *therefore*, neither ought women, as such, to be excluded from the national army.

But will not those who have weapons and are accustomed to their use, tyrannize over those who are deprived of them? Oh no! for they will be *educated* so well, that they will know the gold of the *Soul* to be so much superior to the vulgar gold, that any tyranny will be out of the question.—In this regimen no man will be even allowed to choose his favourite poets: Homer is to be banished from the Model State. Nay, neither may anyone listen to such Music as pleases his own taste: the Male and Female *Rulers* are to settle all such matters.

It is not requisite to go further into detail, though the morality, as Christians judge, does not improve: but so very gross is his notion of the tenderest human relations, that he is not ashamed to lay down, that after a young man attains his highest swiftness he must "breed for the city" (γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει); as a male animal in a herd, void of distinctive affection, ignorant of, and reckless of his own progeny.

If we are to judge of the tree by the fruit, is Plato to be exempt from such judgment? Rather, ought we not to form augury as to the quality of his practical religion from the conduct which he advises within his own community?

Horace, the Roman Satirist, may seem in sexual morals to be lowest of the low: yet he stands high above Plato in his theory. He lays down as notorious, that the beginning of Civilization is the sanctification of Marriage. Previous to this, is only Savagery: the relation of the sexes is simply Bestial, *not* Human, till Sacred Love builds up *the* FAMILY, a thing which Plato anxiously forbids! But: "Whoever studies Plato is standing on holy ground" says his very Christian eulogist. "He aims *to purify the morals* of the Athenian youth."

It is difficult to believe that any Christian can read Plato's scheme for ennobling and purifying society without a great revulsion of feeling: yet somehow,—very few dare to *utter* their thoughts. One may be quoted, the celebrated Malthus. Restrained as he is in general, while yet fearing excess of population, he flatly calls Plato's remedies for it, "execrable." Nor do we happen to know any ANCIENT writers who allude to Plato's Model Republic with approval.

When a philosopher expounds in detail what precepts would be high virtue in a legislator, and what obedience would be virtues in citizens, is it reasonable that his exposition should leave our interpretation of many grand propositions from him unaffected? If a Thug proclaimed that "Virtue is our highest duty to God," we might for a moment applaud: but when we learned that Virtue with him included "strangling and robbing innocent travellers" we should certainly less relish any grandiloquence of moral teaching from him.

Nor is that all; but if the foul absurdities of this Model Republic never came from Socrates (on which we can appeal to Aristotle), is it not a grave libel and slander to have imputed their silly defence to him. Socrates in Xenophon always has his feet on solid earth: he is a sort of Benjamin Franklin: but the Socrates of Plato is a wonderfully different character. The

remark would admit of much development, which could not here be in place. To us it seems an audacious and deeply reprehensible deed, to palm upon Socrates the barbaric and tyrannical immorality of Plato himself. It is defended by the argument, that it was no deception, since it was *notoriously* false. Then at least it was an insult wholly undeserved. The suspicion also may justly arise, that various Christian Fathers, dazzled by the brilliancy of fiction, were seduced into the same *disregard of truth*. Plato became to them an adequate justification for falsely imputing to any renowned teacher such utterances as they in their private wisdom might think conducive to edification. So small a matter as accuracy of sublunary facts, it seems, did not deserve the high title Truth: therefore neither was such Falsehood to be censured.

ON PINDAR.

[Shortened from the Eclectic Review, 1845.]

There are many names of past times, renowned for genius in various branches, whose reputation rests solely on the testimony of their own age. There are others, whose remains are indeed extant, but seldom or never are read with an unprejudiced mind; since the concert of eulogies sounded forth pre-occupy or abash the modern student. Among the former is Archilochus, the inventor of Iambic verse; among the latter we may rank Pindar, the great poet of Thebes. Most of us gain our earliest opinion of him from the epithets and panegyrics of Horace, and take for granted that this "Dircæan Swan borne by the copious breeze" is incapable of singing anything pedantic, flat, stiff, and incoherent. We fancy him to rush in impetuous torrent through lawless dithyrambic verse, and to pour forth nothing but the sublimest strains of a raptured bard. Far be it from us to question that Pindar is a poet of great power, and has passages of vivid splendor. But we do pointedly assert, that his extant poems are not at all equal to his fame; that they show rather what he might have done, than satisfy us as to what he has done; that a large portion of them are not of what we popularly call a Pindaric character; that there is in them a deep taint of pedantry, of prosaic feebleness, and plenty of trash; that instead of being carried along in a gush of emotion, he often shows a painful difficulty in finding anything at all to say. This last matter is to us a pervading fault, and deserves to be particularly explained.

The extant poetry of Pindar, all but a few fragments, consists of songs to glorify the victors in several Greek games, chiefly chariot-racing, wrestling or running on foot. To an Englishman it might seem that the great difficulty in treating such topics would be, to give them variety. A single Ode on a horse-race might be thought neither unpleasing in itself, nor alien from an Epic and elevated style; however destitute of moral and thoughtful elements; but to continue to put forth ode upon ode on such monotony, we might deem ruinous to a fine genius. The remarkable fact is, that Pindar escapes the difficulty by cutting the knot. He never writes upon his professed subject, but carves out some

bye-work which could never have been conjectured. In all his Odes remaining to us we do not remember a single passage which sets vividly before the eyes the picture of a horse galloping, or of man straining against man. It is not difficult to cull from our own poets, pictures of much beauty allied to these topics. Thus in Scott's "Marmion,"

Fast as shaft may fly,
Bloodshot his eyes, his nostrils spread,
The loose rein dangling from his head,
Housing and saddle bloody red,
Lord Marmion's steed rush'd by.

In all Pindar we doubt whether fuller description of a galloping horse can be found, than a tame word in his first Olympian Ode, "the horse yielded his body without spur to the race." Rather than vivid and impetuous, he often rests upon a few ornamental and pompous epithets, as: "the flower of storm-footed steeds."

Having thus unceremoniously discarded his obvious material for song, he must invent something, and we need not wonder that he was often at a loss. He has nevertheless a cut and dried method of his own for conjuring up a topic. He searches into the ancestry of the victor for some god or nymph; in default of this, his city or tribe is made to yield some fragment of "Auld lang syne." The foundation of the city may have some heroic tradition, or the chief family of the tribe may have gained other victories. The poet feels at liberty to intrude his own personality; perhaps he reveres a hero who has a chapel in the city of the victor, or something still more familiar. The nobler his legend, the worse is such display of self-conceit, and the sally is sometimes obscure even to a contemporary Greek, as: "My mother's mother was a Stymphalian, the blooming Metopa, who gave birth to horse-smiting Theba (a nymph), whose lovely water I drink." If this means merely "I am a Theban," his mode of stating it, is certainly original. Naturally a Pindaric ode generally consists of disjointed pieces. Instead of a single noble flight, as that of the eagle or the pigeon, we have a succession of minor spurts, like the flitting of a sparrow. Incoherence is sometimes made more clumsy by grandiloquence intended to carry off what is prosaic or mean at the joining of mythological effusion. He does not, like Homer, rise and sink reasonably with his subject; but struggles to be grand, when the pettiness of the thought forbids. Occasionally he gives a string of maxims, or wise sentiments, like a chapter of Proverbs stuck into a triumphal Psalm: or he will chant in good dithyrambic a list of the many

prizes gained by his hero. On homely ideas he flings harsh metaphors as if to wipe off the aspect of bald prose. Thus he tells us, the victor has also borne away at Pellanè *a remedy for cold breezes;* which is explained to mean "a cloak." Instead of saying that "he is incited to sing," he phrases it: "I have on my tongue the semblance of a shrill hone, which draws me to fair flowing blasts." Forsooth, the hone was wanted to *sharpen* his tongue. Even many of his better ideas lose their force by his artificial entanglement of words. He feared, it seems, to speak like other mortals, plainly on a plain topic. Thus in opening his first Olympian, he has a string of comparisons which a poet less ambitious might express simply.

> Among the elements Water is best:
> Gold excels among metals.
> The Sun is chief among the stars,
> And the Olympian is the noblest of public games.

But how does he pass it off on us?

> Water is best; and Gold, as in the night a shining fire, excels in man-exalting wealth:
> But if thou longest to sound aloud of contests, O my dear heart,
> No longer regard any other star more than the Sun through vacant ether,
> Nor let us proclaim any Contest to be higher than the Olympian.

His artificial structure distracts us, and darkens his meaning. The Olympic game is gold among metals and gold is a fire in the night. Till we reach the Sun amid stars, Olympia is not mentioned; but Water and Gold and Fire in the Night have already faded from our memory, and are wasted upon us. Not that this specimen adequately represents his complexities hard to interpret. Here it suffices to insist, that nothing is more contrary to the fact, than to compare him in general to a gushing stream: this is only when a wild legend dominates him. Grandiloquence cannot make a thought soar, nor artifice enhance its living force. Elaborate mosaic work may indeed sparkle, or even flash a surprise. His editor Heyne never grudges the praise, "docte extalit," that is, "he has *elevated* the thought learnedly."

It is impossible to approach a faithful translation of Pindar without seeming to the English reader to mar him by unskilful handling. With this avowal we produce a literal translation of one entire Ode, not selected, but opened on at random. Certainly many are much finer, but many also have far worse blots.

Nemea II.

To Timodemus an Athenian, son of Timonoüs.

That from which the Homeridæ, singers of triumphal Odes, generally begin; Jupiter their argument. This man also has received a foundation of victory in the sacred contests, first in the much-hymned grove of Nemean Jupiter.

It is still due from him, if along his father's road straight-escorting Time has given him as an honor to mighty Athens, often to cull the most beautiful flower of the Isthmia and to gain victory in the Pythia, being son of Timonoüs. And it is quite appropriate,

That Orion should not go far off from those mountain-nymphs the Pleiades. And surely Salamis is able to rear a warrior. In Troy Hector heard Ajax. Thee too, O Timodemus, the daring courage of the Pancratium shall exalt.

It is an old saying that Acharnians are brave. But in contests the Timodemidæ are eminent. At the side of high-ruling Parnassus they carried off four victories, but by the Corinthians,—

In the vale of brave Pelops they have already been wedded to eight chaplets, and seven in Nemea: but those at home are too many to count, in the game of Jupiter, whom, O citizens, celebrate ye in song, on the glorious return of Timodemus. Lead off, with sweet-tuned voice.

Here, we see Timodemus afforded nothing legendary, nothing mythical; so the poet was paralyzed. His father was a good boxer; his family had gained many small prizes; his parish had a stout militia. To hammer out of these facts an Ode which deserved to be studied two thousand years later, was too hard a task. We seem quite unfair. Still he did not need to vex us by all the abruptness and obscurity of the third stanza. Athens had already much for a poet to celebrate, but we presume, Theban patriotism forbade that topic, for the Thebans sided with Persia!

In celebrating his friend and host the first Hiero, lord of Syracuse, a warrior successful by land and sea, fond of the society of learned men, patron of Æschylus, of Simonides, and others, Pindar appears to have had a grand subject. He does name one naval victory drily and in a single line; he does call him virtuous, which meant generous in his banquets; he does tell us in one Ode that he knew how τὸ μαλθακὸν ἔρξαι, which alas! our English miserably brings out as "how to do the genteel thing:" but Hiero was a living, not a legendary potentate, and in fact furnished

no poetical "stuff." In the second Pythian, he overruns Hiero with sermonizing, under which the sage editor Heyne seems nearly to have lost patience. We could not inflict on the reader the last fifty lines, which Heyne civilly hints would have been better suppressed. But the first Olympian, to the same Hiero, has met general admiration. Perhaps we cannot do wrong in adducing it.

To Hiero, whose gig won the prize.

α As water among elements, gold among metals, the sun among stars, such is the Olympian among contests; whence by skill of bards the oft-repeated Hymn is flung to and fro to sound the praise of Jupiter, (bards) who have reached the wealthy, blessed hearth of Hiero,

ά Who sways the sceptre of justice in fruitful Sicily, culling the choicest flowers of virtue, and brilliant with the prime of music. Come! snatch the Dorian harp from the peg, if the glory of Olympia and of [the horse] Pherenicus [*i.e.* the Conqueror] have inspired sweetest thoughts; when he yielded his body without spur along the bank of Alpheius, and raised to success

Α his Syracusan master, a king who exults in horses. His glory also shines in the brave colony of Lydian Pelops, of *whom Neptune was enamoured*, when Clotho took him from the cauldron and he had a shoulder of ivory. Surely marvels are many, and fables adorned with painted falsehood deceive human minds.

β And grace which fashions all delight to mortals, bringing honor after it, makes even the incredible seem credible: but the test of truth is in later days. It is safer for men to speak honorably of the deities. I therefore, O son of Tantalus (*i.e.* O Pelops) contrary to former poets, assert, that when Jupiter in his turn gave a feast to the gods at the city of Sipylus, Neptune carried thee off,

β′ being subdued by desire, and on golden horses transported thee to the lofty halls of Jupiter: whither in later time came Ganymedes also for Jupiter on the same business. And when thou wast not to be found, one of the spiteful neighbours said that thy limbs had been cut up with a knife and thrown into boiling water, had been distributed among the tables, and had been eaten.

β But I am at a loss to call any of the blessed gods gluttonous (literally, belly-mad). I shrink from it. Evil-speakers meet with punishment. But if any mortal man was honored by the wardens of Olympus, Tantalus was he, but he could not digest his high fortune. By pampered insolence he captured an

over-powering pest, which Jupiter hung over him, a stubborn stone. Ever anxious* [to evade its menace?] he goes astray from tranquillity.

γ He is fourth with three others who endure perpetual calamity, because, when admitted to the table of the gods, he stole for messmates of his own age the nectar and ambrosia wherewith [the gods] had made him immortal. But if any man hopes his deed to escape a god's notice, he mistakes. Therefore they sent down his son Pelops to take rank among common men: and when a manly beard began to darken his chin, he set his heart upon a marriage ready [for suitors]

γ′ to get the noble Hippodameia from her father Œnomaus of Pisa. And drawing near alone in the darkness of the hoary sea, he shouted to the loud roaring lord of the trident, who at once appeared close at his side. To him said he; "If O Neptune, the sweet indulgences of Venus claim from thee any favour, come now chain for me the brazen spear of Œnomaus, and speed me to Elis on swiftest car and advance me to victory; since he has slain thirteen suitors and delays the wedding

Γ of his daughter. Great peril admits not of a coward. But since die we must, why should one pine out an ignoble old age, void of glory. I therefore will undertake the risk, and do thou give me success." So spake he, and not in vain. The god adorned him with the gift of a golden chariot and winged horses that knew not weariness.

δ He conquered the mighty Œnomaus, and the maiden for his consort, and she bare him six chieftain sons, devoted to virtues. Now funeral blood-offerings are paid at his crowded tomb, where he lies by the current of Alpheius near the altar of pilgrims. His glory also shone afar in the course of Olympia, where swiftness of foot and strength of sinew contend, and the victor for the rest of his life enjoys honored repose,

δ′ at least as to contests. But a good which is perpetual is for mortal man the highest. I however must crown him [*i.e.* Hiero!] with equestrian tune of Æolian song, nor do I expect to sing praise to any stranger sager or stronger. God watches over thee, O Hiero, and unless he fail thee, I hope soon to celebrate a nobler victory [not of a gig, but]

Δ of the four-horse car, finding a topic of song at the sunny hill of Saturn near Olympus. For me at any rate the Muse keeps

* The able editor Heyne, seems here to doubt the soundness of the text.

in store a keen shaft. But each is great in his separate way, and the top of all is mounted by kings. Look not round for aught beyond. Mayest thou continue to walk aloft, and may I, as long, associate with victors, being prominent everywhere among the Greeks for poetical skill.

Few of the Odes have been more celebrated than this, and it is quite a fair specimen. Hiero had no more to do with Pelops than had every victor at Olympia, but Olympia lay in the peninsula which bore the name of Pelops. That sufficed for obtruding the silly legend, which he tries to improve, but only makes it worse: it may be immodest to point at his novel fancy too closely. When Pelops is exhausted, he at last comes back to Hiero.

Pindar is so full of short maxims, that perhaps we cannot wonder at later Greeks quoting him as a moral authority. What was his notion of celestial morality, this first Pythian may suggest. On the other hand his dogma on the Origin of the Gods, is concisely told in the opening of the 6th Nemean ode. "The origin of Men and of Gods is one and the same, and we both have breath *from one mother*. The sole difference is in Power, or Endurance, . . . and yet we in some respect are like the Immortals, either in great mind or in nature."—How in *nature*, he does not explain.

The first Pythian, also to Hiero, is set off by a splendid description of the earliest eruption of Mount Etna, which kindled the imagination of Æschylus also. But the 4th Pythian will probably be esteemed his grandest. He gets on the topic of Jason and the Argonauts, and runs on this theme for near 450 lines.

Our general conclusion is that the magnificent Greek language within his grasp and his splendid command of it, were greatly damaged by his monotonous task and its feeble topic, horses, mules, men running on foot, besides brutal tusseling. The *Pancratium* joined wrestling, kicking and biting: even gouging out the eye can hardly have been forbidden. His Dirges for the Dead remain to us only in fragments, and may have been really grand: but since these fragments seem to have been saved only by their beauty, we cannot safely infer that what has perished was equally fine.

Every scholar feels fascination in the splendor of Pindar's Greek, and this surely dazzled his compatriots: but our books do not furnish us with real Greek *criticisms* of Pindar. Indeed, high as he may seem to stand with Plato, it is as a *moralist* not as a poet. In the case of Horace, we have warning that veneration

was prompted by want of sound knowledge. He speaks of his impetuous "dithyrambs" free from law: yet it is clear that Pindar's metres (of which the most important is well known to us in the Greek Tragedians) are the reverse of *lawless*. In all his extant odes the stanzas agree most exactly. In the Tragedians we think it valuable to have correspondence in Strophe and Antistrophe, an agreement of two stanzas: but in Pindar there are not merely two, but four, six, eight or more, and all the "Epodes" correspond: not a syllable fails the test. Each stanza must have been as carefully composed to a given piece of music as in the Irish Melodies of Thomas Moore. Thus Horace's description is really panegyric from ignorance. How mean is the substance of the poetry, does not concern him. The wilder and sillier the legend, the more may it seem to draw out the poet's splendor, as in the IXth Pythian where Apollo carries off the maiden Cyrēnē, who disdained feminine occupation, but with javelins and falchion loved to fight by night with savage beasts, *whereby she gave much safety to her father's herds.* The poet says, the god pointed her out to Cheiron where she, *without* spear and alone, was fighting with a lion. Of course she who can boldly meet a lion, is helpless before a god. The absurd tale, perhaps invented by the poet, seems actually to kindle him, and draw out the magnificence of his Greek. The more he can forget his real topic (the Victor of the games) the more does he carry us away, and force us to admire the splendor of his verse, in spite of our deep contempt for its matter.

ON THE NORTHERN ELEMENTS OF LATIN.

[In substance entirely from the CLASSICAL MUSEUM, 1849—but re-written with slight allusion to the UMBRIAN.]

THE OLD THEORY presumed, that Latin was in part *derived* from Greek, in part had a barbarous element. Niebuhr asserted that the Greek portion chiefly concerned gentler things and institutions. Dr. James Cowles Prichard, who first claimed for the Keltic languages a place in the Indo-European family, denied any fundamental derivation of Latin from Greek. I gladly avow my debt to his luminous and comprehensive work (Physical History of Men) which is a vast mass of erudition. I agree with him, that Latin and Greek are not offspring and mother, but only sisters or cousins. All Italy has imported something from Greece; also Latin (I proceed to urge) has been acted upon *from without* by neighbouring Italians, as neither Prichard nor my colleague Professor T. Hewitt Key are willing to admit.

Pliny names the occupants of the little Latium in the following order: Aborigines, Pelasgians, Arcadians, Siculians, Auruncans, Rutulians. The first name is a confession of total ignorance.—Concerning the "Pelasgians" it has been said, that Niebuhr began a discussion in disgust and despair, and ended in serene dogmatism. [1889. Here I content myself with stating, that in my studies of "Æschylus" I maintained (under the "Supplices") that the Pelasgi in historical Greece had Dodona for their sacred centre, and Molossia, Chaonia and all Epirus for their chief home. The modern Skipetari, called by us Albanians, by the Turks Arnauts, live on this very soil, and *primâ facie* are their descendants. In Homer's Iliad they were the allies of Priam, hostile to the Achaians.] The "Arcadians" allude to the tradition of Evander. The Siculi must not be confounded with the Sikeliots, Greek colonists of Sicily, who are supposed by O. Müller to have imbibed into the Sicilian Greek the Latin words *mutuum*, *lepus*, *patina*, *carcer*, *cubitus*, *catinus*, *campus*, *nepotes*. (Νεποδες is in the Odyssey, as well as in Theocritus). Prichard infers that the Siculi must have been of the ancient Latin stock. Barely beyond Latins were Etruscans, Umbrians, Æqui and Volsci (perhaps Rutulians), Auruncans, else called Ausones; finally Opikes *other-*

wise Osci,—a people who reached along the Apennine and its eastern slope from the North to Apulia and over to Campania; with Œnotria and Magna Græcia to the South.

The principal language of proper Italy, (in which Etruscan is not counted) was Oscan, which Livy attests to be unintelligible to a Latin; and when we set eyes on it in the extant inscriptions, this is obvious and certain, though we discern easily that it has relations to Latin. The Iguvine inscriptions show the same fact concerning the Umbrian, though its *declensions* strongly remind one of Latin; so does the verb, though incomplete. In these relics an older and a later dialect appear, of which both have received political infusion from Rome, and some religious words from Greek. Umbrian and Oscan have in common the peculiarity which reminds us of Attic and Ionic Greek, in having changed initial Qu of the Latin Relative and Interrogative into P; and the same change takes place in the numerals *four* and *five*. It is remarkable on first acquaintance, with the Welsh on the one side, and the Erse or Gaelic on the other, that the same change is there also found. These Keltic people dwelt in the Milanese beyond the Padus, also in ancient Gaul, in Britain and Ireland; but Dr. Stratton of Aberdeen (in a MS. lent me by my revered friend Dr. Prichard) displayed a long list of Gaelic words visibly akin to those of Latin. Thus the congeners of Latin lie even beyond Italy, and what is undeniable, the more distant tongues, Gaelic and Erse, are closer to Latin than is Welsh, although no one can here impute the likenesses to the action of the Roman Empire on the barbarian.

In my belief the great sea of languages, which 4000 years ago heaved from Rhegium to the Orkney Islands, was no tranquil frozen mass, crystallizing everywhere independently. Every tribe had its own specialities, of which a sufficient indication is, that the two most distant in Ireland and Scotland, worked out a grammatical system different from that of Wales. In early ages, the inhabitants of the north always coveted the southern climes; but southern people never volunteered a movement northward. Each successive migration heaped together uncongenial tribes at the southern end, and while gentle undulations alone affected the northern mass, the waves of language, in approaching their southern barrier, were shortened into breakers, and may be expected to exhibit to us ruptured forms. Hence the comparative purity and extremely ancient character of the Welsh and Gaelic. My colleague Professor T. Hewitt Key, who to great industry adds eminent originality and resource, who never can be read

without instruction, goes beyond Prichard in maintaining the purity of our Latin from foreign admixture. A single instance will show the nature and grounds of my difference from him. In analyzing the noun Repudium, he deduces its verb Repudio from the root Pello, alledging that the l has been changed into d. He supports this by Greek Δακρυ and Latin Lacruma, which the Teutons made into Tagr; English, Tear. The change from one language into another foreign to it is often violent, especially if a sound common in the one is strange to the other. But an L is as easy to a Latin as any D. Latin dislikes aspirates, and certain initial combinations, such as Welsh Ll; but I do not easily believe that *within the limits of the Latin language*, Pello would change to *Pudio*. If we tried to persuade an intelligent Chinese that our adjective Paternal is formed by the English from the noun Father, he would reply: "Nay; Paternal must be imported from abroad; it cannot be home-grown." So I say concerning Repudium. And since it is a word of the Ecclesiastical Court, which in Regal Rome became Sabine, we must provisionally assume that while Repello is pure Latin, Repudio is pure Sabine. This type of reply belongs to not a few other cases.*

Unless all the traditions concerning Numa are causeless fictions, we must expect all words connected with Sabine supremacy in Rome (which probably disguises a conquest) to be Sabine,—a language of which we know few words. This people may have spoken a dialect of the Umbrians; yet the modern Gaelic seems to come nearest to the religious, political, and even military words of Latin, and the account of the first Sabines with gold *torques* (collars? necklaces?) remind one both of the Gauls as described by Romans, and of the Highland Scots in our histories. May we not further compare the *septs* of the Scots and Irish to the *clans* so prominent among the Sabines?

That words may be nearly identical in Latin and in some other tongue, Umbrian, Oscan, Gaelic, or Welsh, we all agree; but whether in such case they are equally native in all, is an open question. The aid to its solution is twofold; first, by considering the consonants involved; secondly, by comparing the two families. Examples will clear this remark. Latin has Letum, oftener spelt Lethum, against grammatical rule. The word at once *looks* foreign. It stands alone in Latin: nothing indicates that it is home-grown. A second word Clades cannot have been the root of Lethum, nor in reverse. But Clades reminds us of κλαω, θλαω and English *slay*. That the Welsh

Ll changes by a mutilated enunciation into kl, fl, pl, sl, has been illustrated by the Rev. Mr. Garnett, who refers Clades to the Welsh, and compares Klati, the Slavonic for *slay*. Now in Welsh we find an organic family, Llaw, a hand (Gael. Lamh *palma*); Llabi, to slap, clap; Lladd, to slay; Llai*th*, slaughter; Llae, to be slain. The *th* in Lethum is accounted for by final *th* in Llaith; the Cl in Clades, by Ll in Llaith. Thus the Welsh family accounts at once for the two isolated words in Latin, nay with Palma, παλάμη. I cannot hesitate to pronounce that here is an instance in which some tribe of the Welsh has thrown the words Clades and Lethum into Latin. This does not mean that the Latins went to Wales, nor the Welsh came to Latium. The tribes *may* have rubbed together in journeying up the Danube, or an Italian tribe near Latium *may* have been cardinally Welsh.

So much as one illustration. For a second, different in kind, I take the word Fenestra, *a window*, which beyond all dispute was carried into Wales from Italy in the way of commerce. Yet it is in Latin a word quite isolated. What can have been its root? Well: the English may help us. A *window*, must originally have meant merely a *wind-hole;* which suggests that *Fen* must be a lost root, representing πνε of Greek. Now in Welsh, beside the word *Fenestra* for a window, the dictionaries give us the following [Ff in Welsh means single F of English]: Ffun, breath, spirit; Ffan, air; Ffyned, a breathing; Ffynel, an airhole; Ffynatr, a chimney. Thus we have a native Ffynatr side by side with an imported Ffenestr. How does this concern a Latin scholar? Thus. It displays to him Ffun, breath or air, representative of πνε, as the true root of Fenestra. Further, it shews him the improbability that the root, retained in Welsh, should be native to Latin and yet wholly lost. More probable it seems that Fenestra should at an early period have been flung into Latin from some Welsh tribe, perhaps with the original sense of an airhole or chimney. (Caminus, rather meant a *stove* than a chimney.) Does it not seem that English Fun comes from Welsh? Funnel is so accepted by Webster.

Let us pass from Fenestra to three other Latin words; Fas, lawful and right; Fascis, a bundle, and its diminutive Fasciculus. No one sees connection here. But in Welsh we have Ffas, a band; Fasg, a bundle, faggot; *dimin.* Fasgall; Ffasg, to bind; Ffasgiad, a binding. No one will doubt of the Welsh Fasg, Fasgell being identical with the Latin Fascis, Fasciculus; and here the Welsh root Ffasg *to bind*, with Ffas a band, teaches what Latin does not teach: what Latin *Fas* meant primitively,

viz., something *binding*. The Latin has retained only the secondary sense; which we know to be common with an imported word.—Similarly the Latin has *Curia*, only for Court of a Judge or Guild; while modern French has *Cour* for both the primitive and the secondary senses of *αὐλή*. I infer that the *Sabine* Curia also had both senses, and so had the old *Gaulish* Curia: but when the Sabine word passed into Rome it lost the primitive sense. Again: Gorge in modern sense retains the physical sense Throat, which it could not get from Latin *Gurges*, water deep enough *to swallow* you. However, Gurgulis being a throat, Gurges may have meant a throat with the Prisci Latini.

The reader ought to note, that initial V in Latin (sounded W) was apt to be GW in Welsh, F in Irish; and the G was dropt in composition. Thus Latin Vir, Anglo War, was Gwir or Gwr, Gaelic Fir; Vinum was Gwin and Fion; Ventus, wind, was Gwynt. Miles a soldier, has no close relation in Latin to Mille, though we may suspect one from Centurio and Centum. The Welsh words are Milwr and Canuriad. Milur is Mil-gwr, apparently "a man of a thousand." But as to the sense of Uriad, Welsh scholars are diffident. We stop short in insisting that Milwr and Canuraid were *not* imported from Latin.

Above it was stated that Latin words likely to have been Sabine are nearer to Erse and Gaelic than to Welsh. It is worth while to go into some detail. I write E for Erse, G for Gaelic, W for Welsh.

First, the Numeral system in this Keltic branch is closer to Latin than is the Welsh.

I.—

Unus	W. un, G. aon	Sex	W. chwech, G. se
Duo	W. dau, G. de	Septem	W. saith, G. seachd
Tres	W. G. tri	Octo	W. wyth, G. ocht
Quatuor	W. pedwar, G. keithir	Novem	W. nau, G. navi
Quinque	W. pump, G. koig	Decem	W. dêg, G. deich

The Qu of Quatuor and Quinque becomes P in Umbrian and in Oscan equally as in Welsh. Thus Pontius and Pompeius mean the same as Quinctius. (Indeed that Pontifex originally meant Pompifex seems to me almost proved by the Umbrian.) That in the Relatives and Interrogatives these two languages have P, not Qu, has already been here noticed.

Among Romans it was agreed that their name Quirites was derived from the Sabine *spear* Quiris. This in modern Gaelic is pronounced Quir, though written Coir. So G. Curaid, *warrior*,

is pronounced Quiraid, no doubt the real Sabine word. But the Welsh has Ber, Per, for English Spear, Spit (Latin, Veru). The Qu in Quirites gives a hint, that Sabine was somewhat nearer than Oscan and Umbrian to Latin; nay, encourages my fancy, that the Sabines were virtually the same people as the Gaels of Scotland, and taught the Romans the name Galli for the great neighbour Kelts. With other short vocabularies new thoughts will arise.

II.—

Tellus, E. teallûr
Mare, G. muir
Terra, W. G. tir
Sŏlum, W. syl
Mons, G. monadh
Cœlum, or Cælum, G. Ceal, *death, heaven* the *hidden* world — ἀιδης
Fons, W. fyunon, E. fiouns
Amnis, G. amhain, W. afon
Lacus, G. loch
Palus, G. poll, W. pwl, Eng. pool
Stagnum, G. stang
Puteus, pydew
Sol, W. heul, G. *probably* seul
Luna, G. luan
Lux, G. leus
Aurora, W. gwawr
Hortus, G. gort
Vicus, W. gwic

Bopp has alledged that Aqua and Aequor are connected. The Anglo S with the Keltic seems to prove it. W. Aig, the sea; Eigam, ocean; G. Eigaan, Eigeal, abyss, ocean; A.S. Aeg, Eg, Saeg, see; and Eag, Eah, Ewe, water; Egor, the sea, water. I infer that French eau is old Gaulish, not a corruption of Aqua. In the Romaunt Gospel of John by Gilly, Ayga and Aygua stand for Water.

III.—

Triticum, W. tredd
Hordeum, G. eorna
Secale, G. seagal
Faba, G. faob
Pisa, G. peasrach
Grana, G. gran
Equus, G. each
Mulus, W. mul
Asina, W. asen *fem*
Asellus, G. asal, *Germ.* esel, from Latin?
Dama, G. damh, *ox* or *stag*
Bos, W. bu, G. bo *pl*, U. buf
Taurus, W. taru, U. toru
Vitulus, U. witulo
Taurus, W. bittolws
Pellis, G. peall
Lac, G. bliochod
Foenum, W. flwyn
Divitiae, W. defaid, sheep; defoed, wealth
Caper, G. gabr U. caper
Aries, *pl.* G. reite, W. hyrdd, U. erirte
Hœdus, W. cidus
Agnus, W. oen, G. wen, U. habina?
Porcus, U. porco, W. porch, U. si, *pl.* sif
Grex, G. greigh

The three words Porcus, Aper, Verres, seem to be variations from a common root, yet the diversity suggests confusion of three languages as strongly as Lawful, Loyal and Legal. W. Porch, *Umbrian* Porco, *Ang. S.* Berga or Bearh, *Lat.* Verres, *Eng.* Barrow,

Boar, *Dutch* Beer, *Germ.* Eber, *Lat.* Aper. Indeed Lac (milk) is less primitive than Gaelic Bliochd, *milk* connected with Bleach, whiten.

Observe that rustic words agree with Keltic, better than with Greek. So generally, also Divitiæ in Latin has lost its primitive sense, which is kept in the Gaelic. The same fact recurs with Præda, where the double sense of Welsh Praidd, reveals its relation to Prædia. A Gaelic dictionary, side by side with Welsh, immensely multiplies these relations, almost implying that the two Keltic tongues are a coarse original out of which the Latin is finely carved, avoiding harsh sounds.

IV.—Compare some words connected with war.

Arma, G. arm, W. arf
Gladius, W. cledd, cleddyf; Glaif, *billhook*; Engl. glaive
Lamina, W. llafn, G. laun
Pilum, W. pilurn
Scutum, W. ysgwyd, G. sgiath
Arcus, *Armoric* goarog
Parma, W. parfais
Lorica, W. llurig, G. luireach
Balteus, G. balt
Torquis, W. torch (yet Latin root Torqueo)
Murus, W. mur
Moenia, W. maen, *a stone*
Vallus, W. gwal
Spolia, G. spuill
Gloria, G. gloir
Telum, G. tallpu, *Eng.* tool
Miles, W. milwr, G. milet
Turma, W. torfa, *troop*
Caterva, W. catorfa
Catapulta (borrowed by the Greeks) E. cattapulte, *battle-sling*
Sagitta, E. saighead, saighiot (Sciot ?)
Catena, W. cadwen
Carcer, W. carchar
Castrum, W. cader, caer
Galea, E. galia, helmet
Hasta, Hastile E. Astos, Astal W. Aseth

While it is always possible that *some* military words have been borrowed by Welsh or Gaelic, in many cases it is improbable, and these I must point out: 1. In Welsh Arf (for Armh), a tool; Arfaeth, a design; Arfer, a manner; are not like imported words. 2. Cledd and Glaif, seem to be native. 3. Lamina has support in λειος, lēvis; that is all: but in W we have Llae, an expanse; Llaf, that which extends; Llafn, Llaen, a blade; Llaned, smooth; Lefn, even, flat. Even the Ll is against this coming *from* Latin. Lefnyn, a slab; Lyfn, λιπαρος, glaber; and many more. These suggest that Planus, Palma, Latus, are of one family, *though the broken state* of the Latin disguises it. 4. Responding to Pīlau is a whole family in Welsh; Pelo, staff, wand; Pill, stem of tree; Piler, pillar; Pillio to peg, to shaft; Pilurn, a javelin. In short, we discover that Latin Pilum, like ὀρπαξ, primitively meant a *virga*,

thence a javelin. This explains Pilum a pilaster. But in Latin the roots of Pilum, Pilus, Pila, Pilu, are confused; besides Pila, a pestle, from Pinso. 5. Dr. Arnold derives Scutum from Greek σκυτος, which I think is a false light. It is a square *shelter* which we call shield; and Keltic Sgiath means (1) a wing, (2) shelter, protection, (3) a shield. Scutum is the θυρεον of Greek,—the Sabine shield, opposed to the Etruscan Greek ασπις, clypeus. 6. Saighead, whence our Shot? appears the obvious *source* of Sagitta. Since Sgath, to cut, and Sgaiteach *sharp*, point to Sgath as the origin of our Scathe, Scythe, with root identical with Seco, Latin would surely have had Sacitta or Scitta (as in Scindo), *if it had not here imported* g *from Keltic*. This is the *primâ facie* view. 7. Arcus in Latin stands alone. Welsh Gwarnog means *a yoke;* in Armoric, a bow (a twist? a semicircle?) with Gwargam, a hunching of the shoulders; Gwarr, nape of neck; Gwarun, *cervix?* Rev. Mr. Garnett suspects our Queer, Greek γυρ and Latin *curv* to have their origin from Gwarr. 8. Though Torquis was probably native in Latin, the family in Welsh has every aspect of being native in Keltic also. The family of Mar is richer in Welsh than in Latin. 9. Vallus, a stake, with Vallum a palisade, marks a Latin development. Yet in the sense of Wall it seems native in Teutonic and Keltic. 10. Gloir is not Welsh, but it was not likely to be carried to the Gaul in the course of trade. 11. A little more attention is due to the word Telum, which will remind us of the English tool. It does not necessarily mean a missile. Cicero used *esse cum telo* to mean, having a hidden dagger. In illustration of Telum, I cite from Erse, Tall, a cooper's adze, Talla-im, I cut, Talea, bravery, Talam, feats of arms. Compare French Tailler, to cut; and from French Tailler, English Till. Professor Th. H. Key by discussion on Colo and Culter, persuades me that Till primitively means cut, trim, prune, which explains Telum and Tool. 12. Turma in Latin is isolated and specific; but Tyrfa in Welsh has the same breadth of meaning as its English derivative Troop, and besides has a numerous family; just as if Turma were imported from the Keltic. Catorfa in Welsh is explained as composed of *Cad*, battle, with Tyrfa. In Latin, Caterva is unaccountable. 13. Again, Catapulta is not explicable from καταπελτα: the Greek is an enigma: but the Erse Cattapulta from Cad, Catta, *battle*, and Tabhal, *sling*, may satisfy us. 14. Castrum is interpreted by Professor Key, ingeniously, not convincingly, to mean *an axe!* a thing that *cuts*, from caedo! Movere castra, he says, first meant, to remove the axes, that is, the camp *tools*, whence castra passed

over into the "camp!" But with most of us it is clear from the diminutive Castellum, a *fort*, that Castra meant fortifications. In Welsh Caer is common for a Castle; also Cader, stronghold, Cadyr strong, Cadwn a shield, Cadu to guard, keep, look to. Latin Castrum, shortened from Cadustrum, might well mean a guard post, or fortress; if the Latin came from the Keltic.

Of Sabine Latin *Quirites* has been noticed. To proceed with a small group, of political words, take:—

V.—

Cives	Senatus	Bulla	Pallium
Populus	Lex	Seculum	Trabea
Plebs	Jus, Fas	Finis	Ceremonia
Curia	Ritus	Ora	Tripudium
Cohors	Ordo	Toga	Amtruo
Tribus			

1. The Sabines, like Spartans, lived in unwalled villages, (Plutarch *Rome*) and had no πολις to give them the collective name of παλιται. Each called the other Civis meus; the Spartans collectively were οἱ ὁμοῖοι the Equals. Comrades or Fellows is a plausible rendering of Cives, and Welsh gives us Cyf, a prefix of mutuality; *Gaelic*, Conh, suggesting Con, σὺν. W. Cyfu, to agree, to fit one another; Cyfiaw, equalize; Cyfais, collateral; Cyfael, of the same party (Lat. Civilis? Welsh f sounds as our v; old Latin v as our w). Cyfaill, a comrade, alter idem; Cyfall, matched; Cyfalle, conjux. So copiously does the Welsh illustrate the Latin. 2. The root Pobul for Populus abounds in all the Keltic vocabularies, and in Erse, like old Greek δῆμας, means also the *land* socially, as Tribu sometimes in Latin and Trifu always in Umbrian. English politicians of the last century familiarly said the Country to mean the rustic population at large. So Populus probably meant (1) the Country, (2) the People. (Thus Populari for waste the *Country?*) 3. Plebs and πλῆθος are fitly compared; yet neither is the source of the other. Rather λαος is the correlative of Plebs. The Pl and the A point to a Welsh Ll (χλ). Compare Armoric Lliaus which might easily imply Sabine Llêvs, degenerating into Plebs. But in Welsh itself is a form Plwyf. 4. Above it was observed that Curia in Latin never means a courtyard, and cannot have originated French Cour, Erse Court. Cwrt in Welsh means also a circular mound, suggesting as root the Cur of Erse, Greek and Latin; besides γῦρ. 5. Some French dictionaries derive Cour from Latin Cohors. But in old Latin this word was Chors, (1) a hencoop, (2) a band of soldiers, each from root Gird. A hencoop is

an enclosure, equally as Hortus, G. gort and χορτοι in Euripides for dwellings. Also Chors militum, a *girth* of soldiers, easily takes the sense of a *band*. 6. Tribus Sappinia of Livy means *ager* Sappinius; and Trifu in the Iguvine inscriptions clearly means *ager*. This disproves the arbitrary derivation of Tribus from τριττυς. Gaelic uses Treubh for a tribe or clan. But no further elucidation is needed, than that Tribus (the ager) came to mean the resident citizens. 7. The word Senatus is important. Gaelic has for it Seneatadh, with Sean, *old*. But Welsh has *Hên* for old, like ενος in ancient Greek. It is remarkable that Latin has Senex for the masculine, but drops S for the feminine in Anus, as though two pronunciations were contending, as in Ionic Greek συς and ὑς. But the Gaels know no Roman Senate in Britain to bid them to use the word Seanadh. 8. Lex is not referable to Latin *Lego* "to gather." One may rather connect it with Gaelic Lagd, German Lagen, English Lay; but here the Erse Dlighe embarrasses us. We know of no tendency to change L into Dl. The clumsier must be the older. The Erse family is so complete, and the words Dligvad, *separation;* Dlocd, *a strainer, a colander*, mark the sense of the root so sharply to κρινω, I sift out, that Dlig seems necessarily the root in all the Keltic tongues. Then the probability is, that Latin Lex is from an old root Dleg. Here we are taken aback by unexpected diversity in the Gaelic, which explains Dligh to *owe*, Dleas, *duty;* and with an equally full family has no word for κριτης, judge, magistrate. Both agree in Dlighe, ordinance, law. As Greek γνοφος, δνοφος, ζοφος interchange, the first consonant being indistinct through want of a vowel following, so in Erse and Gaelic Dl replaces Welsh Ll, as easily as may Pl, Bl, Kl, or in Greek Tl. 9. Fas, Jus. Fas has been noticed above. Jus is correctly referred by Key to a root Diur. (His *Dicus* seems needless.) Gaelic *Dior* is interpreted meet, proper, decent. Greek δεον meets us half-way. Evidently Dior or Diur is older than Jor or Jus. "Fas" is what the *conscience* imposes, "Jura" are proprieties imposed in the Constitution; Lex is a Statute. That Jus should take the secondary sense of what *belongs* to one, is only natural. Observe how English Becoming varies from German Bequemen to Bekommen, and Latin Proprius differs from English Proper. Compare also προσηκον. 10. *Ritus* has no fellow but *Iiite*. They might seem a duplicate system of Rectus and Recte. Rather, Ritus, *Armoric* Rhaith is ῥήτρα, and Gaelic Ràite, a saying, a proverb. These point to ῥησις, ῥῆμα. 11. Amtruo, traditionally rendered I dance, Prichard well explains as Ambi-

verto, from Welsh Amtroi. The word is from a verse of the Salian priests.

Aquila is not Greek, nor explicable as Latin, yet because it is Augural, may be suspected to be Sabine. Allow a few guesses. W, asgel, a wing; G, asgel or achlais, armpit; *low Latin* ascella, wing. Imagine an old Keltic Asquil, hence Asquilaich, large Fowl. From Asquil I imagine English Quill, a word of unknown source, and of course French Aisle, Aile. Asquilaich, shortened into Quilaich, might be a Cock. It *is so* in Gaelic, only spelt Coileach. Asquilaich might make in Latin Aquils, and adjective Asquiles, Ales, winged.

Augur is a political word; Auspex belongs to private life. I think they are Sabine and Latin. The latter, like Etruscan Greek haruspex (ἱεροσκοπος) needs no comment. I cannot believe that Augur comes from verb Gero; but Cura, *care*, is Welsh as well as Latin, and initial C becomes G in Welsh composition. Augur is legitimately resolved into Avium Curator, as Amgoed, *woody*, from Am and Coed. Yet perhaps *Auk* rather than *Avi* was Sabine. French Oie, *goose*, is supposed to come from Avis, thus: Avis, Avica, Auca, Oiè. But Aviea is invented. I rather think Auk (English) is old Gaulish for *waterfowl*, Icelandic Alca? but Ducange says that in low Latin Auca is any female bird. From it comes Aucella a bird, and Italian Uccella. Thus Auch may well have been Sabine for *a bird*.

Lepsius counts sixty-one words which the ancients have marked as Sabine. But twenty-seven are names of deities. We distinctly understand Salus, Fors, Fides, Flora, Sol, Luna, Lucina, Terminus, Novensiles. Eight out of these nine are as truly Keltic as Latin; for Sol is in Welsh certainly Heul, and in Gaelic probably Seul. Terminus is explicable in Keltic as Tér Maen, terrae lapis. Six more I can explain as Keltic. Catus sharp, Cumba a litter, Herna a rock, Irpus a wolf, Nero strong, Terenus delicate, Catus *sharp* has W. root, Catau to *cut*, Cumba, litter, goes with Lat. Cumbo. Greek κύπτω is not quite the same: but Gaelic has Cub to crouch, stoop, Cuba a bed, Cubachuil a bed-nook (cubi-*cul*um?) With Keltic Cùba the Sabine Cumba allies itself. Carn as a rock or stoneheap is Keltic. Initial C passing into Ch would easily generate the Sabine. As for Irpus, wolf, perhaps it is Scandinavian, for Erpr is Icelandic. Ang. S. has Eorp, which may be old British. The Welsh Dict. unexpectedly gives Arfaid as a rare word for a wolf: indeed Gaelic Arpag for any very ravenous creature, carries us to Greek. Some tell us that Irpus is Lupus in disguise! At present I rank

Sabine Irpus as Scandinavian. Nero is referred to Welsh Ner, a lord: indeed in Umbrian Nerf, princes. Terenus is almost Greek. Sabine Alpus, *white*, is also Umbrian.

Fifteen words in Lepsius, called Sabine, I have not found in Keltic; but of these Trabea, a striped robe, reminds one of English stripe.

On the whole Latin seems prodigiously nearer to the Gaelic, Erse and Welsh than to any other known tongue. A fuller list of Gaelic words would only add to the proof. But the reader may ask, How high in time does what we now accept as Welsh carry us? It seems to be the language, not of Roman Britain, variously modified by the Latin, but of that transmitted by the tribes which resisted Romans, Saxons and Normans until the days of our Edward I. Our Welsh dictionary has words introduced by ecclesiastics, but has very little to show other traces of influence from the South.

ON SIR. G. CORNEWALL LEWIS'S TWO VOLUMES OF INQUIRY INTO EARLY ROME.

[From the Eclectic Review, 1855.]

It has been said, that a great book is a great evil; this may be true, yet it is sometimes a great necessity. In our tranquil judgment, all that was really needful in the present volumes might have been equally well said in one-tenth part of the length; yet the world in general would not so have judged. When a man of genius and learning writes a huge book, full of erroneous and delusive theories, which can be sufficiently confuted in a mere pamphlet, the prejudices of men will not accept such a confutation, but insist on a bulky work as the reply. The literary duel must be fought out with equal weapons on both sides. Had Sir G. C. Lewis put the substance of these 1100 pages into 100, Niebuhr, if still alive, would probably have thought it enough to reply, that the writer was a "superficial blockhead;" and the public would argue,—"Niebuhr must no doubt be right, for he is a man of genius; his opponent probably cannot appreciate him,—and at any rate he has shown no learning which can compete with Niebuhr's wonderful erudition." But when a great work, like the present, appears, filled with marks of diligent research, with elaborate notes and exhaustive text,—then the manes of Niebuhr receive sufficient honour by encountering such a champion. Even to be overcome in the encounter is not inglorious. Besides, it is not worth a bookseller's while to press the purchase of a mere pamphlet. Such a brochure is apt to drop still-born. Even if it have a great run, the author is well off if he does but lose a few pounds. On the contrary, two respectable-sized volumes may bring pecuniary reward alike to the zealous bookseller and to the meritorious author; and at the same time, such a book *mole suâ stat.* It obtains its deserved place on the shelves of public libraries, and becomes a κτῆμα ἐς ἀεὶ as a witness to truth. So important is it to have material as well as spiritual weight!

Those considerations nearly reconcile us to the elaborate and intrinsically tedious nature of the volumes before us, which do not appear to deserve the charge anticipated in the introduction of being "either presumptuous or superfluous." In our youth, we waded through the distressingly difficult volumes of Niebuhr, with a constant sense of discouragement and perplexity at being unable to appreciate his arguments. This we dutifully ascribed to our own ignorance. To our extreme surprize, we found him magisterially passing sentence on the works of authors which have perished, describing their excellences or defects, sometimes with severe remarks, and displaying a most marvellous acquaintance with the sources from which this or that piece of information was gathered by an extant author. One who finds himself unable to follow Niebuhr's reasonings intelligently, is still apt to fancy it is useful and necessary elaborately to digest all his results. When Dr. Arnold came out so strong in allegiance to the surpassing discernment of Niebuhr, a new load was added to the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, which, though it could not wholly hinder a student from thinking for himself, has forced many a one to let out only in whisper and in hesitation his grave distrusts. For fifteen years at least, no man could bluntly express disbelief of Niebuhr without ruining his own credit, except indeed a very few eminent persons, who all along were, on occasions, frank and outspoken. In the retrospect, we cannot but think that a serious disservice has been done to students by forcing upon them the painful and difficult process of "getting up" Niebuhr's volumes, while an ever-increasing chorus of scholars proclaims that Niebuhr undertook an *impossible* problem —viz., positively to reconstruct a lost history; and that he has done it, not merely arbitrarily, but by methods, to adopt which is an elaborate practice in the art of bad reasoning.

In writing this, we do not intend to express agreement with the practical conclusions of Sir G. C. Lewis, concerning which we have many words; nor do we intend to say that Niebuhr's works have not, *on the whole*, advanced ancient history. We sincerely judge that they have; but we believe their benefit has been entirely for historians and professors, not for young students, to whom we are disposed to regard his writings concerning the early age of Rome as rather pernicious. But Niebuhr was a man of great imagination, great memory, great power of combination. He threw his heart into his subject with passion,—as indeed did Mitford; but with far more learning than Mitford. The effect produced by his living voice was much greater than that of his

writings, as is manifest in the zeal and love of his immediate pupils. Germany had already reared scholars, who were not, like Italian antiquaries, mere children of vast memories and fine taste, but men who inquired freely, and who asked not only what did ancient writers assert? but also, how much of it was true? But none of them had such passionateness as Niebuhr, or so intense a belief that truth was attainable; and though his immediate attainment was only a phantom, and his resentment against those who did not bow to this idol was an unseemly bigotry, yet this passionateness, joined to his vast learning, had a kindling and electric effect. He did not communicate any great *results* to his pupils (one or two perhaps may be rescued from Sir G. C. Lewis and Rubino), nor any new *method* which can be for a moment approved; but he did communicate to those of them who dedicated their lives to literature his own insatiable thirst for knowledge, and much of his aptitude for combination, and a most ambitious grasp of every subject. His influence has reached far beyond the limits of Roman antiquity. In fact, he was by no means the first to discern the uncertainty of the early Roman history. Perizonius, De Pouilly and Beaufort had elaborately maintained this, and had rejected many narratives as incredible. Niebuhr however treated the modest *uncertainty* in which they were satisfied to abide, as a superficial scepticism, and assumed for himself the problem of reconstructing the history, while fully aware that he had often no better source than his own conjectures. Sir G. C. Lewis writes concerning this as follows:—

"There is no doubt that long habit, combined with a happy talent, may enable a person to discern the truth, where it is invisible to ordinary minds possessing no peculiar advantages. This may be observed, not only in historical researches, but in every other department of knowledge. In order, however, that the truth so perceived should recommend itself to the convictions of others, it is a necessary condition that it should admit of proof which they can understand. Newton might have perceived by a rapid and intuitive sagacity the connection between the fall of an apple and the attraction of the earth to the sun; but unless he could have demonstrated that connexion by arguments which were intelligible and satisfactory to the scientific world, his discovery would have been useless, except as a mere suggestion. In like manner we may rejoice that the ingenuity and learning of Niebuhr should have enabled him to advance many novel hypotheses and conjectures respecting events in the early history, and respecting the form of the early constitution of Rome. But unless he can support those hypotheses by sufficient evidence, they are not entitled to our belief. It is not enough for a historian to claim the possession of a retrospective second-sight, which is denied to the rest of the world; of a mysterious doctrine, revealed only to the initiated. Unless he can prove, as well as guess; unless he can produce evidence of the fact, after he has intuitively perceived its existence, his historical system cannot be received."—Vol. i. p. 14.

In our article on the "Life and Letters of Niebuhr" ("Eclectic Review," June, 1852, p. 665), we ourselves briefly noticed this very point, entirely agreeing with Sir G. C. Lewis. We said:—"To go into details is impossible; but we may and must say, that Niebuhr totally mistook the duties of a historian. He supposed it was his place to dogmatize, and *make no attempts to convince the understanding of his reader*, and, if any one made objections, reply that he is an ignorant blockhead and evidently incompetent to judge." It is indeed peculiarly difficult for a reader of Niebuhr to find out what part of his assertions needs, and what does not need, proof; for he quietly narrates his own theory as if it were attested by some ancient authority, and alledges that we have the "express testimony" of Dionysius, or some one else, when nobody but himself can find anything of the sort in the passage to which his foot-note refers. He also talks so familiarly about what the ancient annalists recorded, that the reader little suspects that their very existence is a doubtful hypothesis of Niebuhr's own. Sir G. C. Lewis is fully justified in protesting here against adopting hypothesis as fact; nevertheless, we think the doctrine by which he tries to establish pure unhypothetical history must annihilate all history whatsoever. In fact, our difficulty in reviewing the work consists in this, that the reader will not easily believe our representations concerning Sir George to be correct.

That there was no attempt among the Romans at *a continuous history* before Fabius Pictor, a contemporary of Hannibal, is universally admitted. Sir George quotes Livy and two passages of Dionysius in proof, and lays stress on the latter (vol. i. pp. 37, 81, 196) as of first-rate importance, and as totally disproving Niebuhr's belief in the existence of family memoirs, annals, and chronicles. To us they appear to have no such tendency. Fabius was the first systematic historian,—*παλαιότατος τῶν τὰ Ῥωμαϊκὰ συνταξαμένων:* how does this prove him to be the first who noted down contemporary occurrences? Such a phrase as "a man who *compiled* the Roman affairs," never could be used of one who merely committed to writing notices of passing events, or of his own life. Yet Sir George actually brings these passages (vol. i. p. 196) as sufficient disproof of Niebuhr's belief, and speaks of him as *setting them aside on mere conjecture.* Niebuhr may be right or wrong in his belief of such memorials, but such belief is no more inconsistent with Fabius being the oldest compiler of Roman history than Sir George's own belief; for Sir George makes concessions quite surprizing. He employs

the bulk of his treatise, from chapters vii. to xiii. inclusive, to prove his case; and deduces (vol. ii. p. 488) that "the extant narrative, for the first 472 years, *was not originally framed by contemporary historians*," . . . . which the reader will fancy to mean, *was not originally noted down by a series of contemporary chroniclers*, inasmuch as no historian can live through five centuries, and be contemporary with them all: hence it is difficult to see what else can be meant than the absence of all written contemporary memorials; yet he continues thus:—"but was derived by writers posterior to the events related, though prior to the extant historians, partly from oral traditions, and *partly from written documentary sources, the nature of which is imperfectly reported.*" There is a comprehensive phrase! The extant narrative of nearly five centuries was derived (it seems) by Fabius and Cincius, partly from oral traditions, and *partly from written documentary sources*, about which Sir George does not know much; not whether they were not all contemporary with the events, as we certainly know some to have been. But if there were contemporary documents, what else is the man who wrote them but a contemporary chronicler, annalist, or historian? Evidently in so far as the after history was based on these documents, it is as authentic as any history in the world. The documents may have been few, and in consequence the true history discontinuous and fragmentary; but (except by misinterpretation) not less true and less certain on that account. And this appears to us to be Sir George's prevading fallacy; he treats a fragmentary history as essentially fabulous. If he reply, that oral tradition has mingled fable with truth, and that as we have not the original documents, we can no longer disentangle the truth, we admit the difficulty; but it is not confined to the early history: it infects all history; and *it is the duty of criticism to attempt the separation.* Are we to forget that the exploits of the two Scipios in Spain, in Livy's Hannibalic War, have been discredited since Sir Walter Raleigh's criticism? that Thirlwall, and other very eminent modern Greek historians, reject the Peace of Cimon? that Gibbon has rejected the stupendous Persian victory of Alexander Severus? Oral tradition is liable to err; but so is that which we call history, even that which at first sight seems well attested. As to the Roman written documents, Sir G. C. Lewis admits (as everybody must admit) that alphabetical writing was known and was used from the time of the kings,—that international treaties were in the earliest times carved in brass, and came down to later ages,—that Fabius found a continuous list of annual magistrates, more

or less complete and authentic, ascending to the commencement of the consular government,—that from the burning of the city there was extant a series of meagre official annals, kept by the chief pontiffs,—that many texts of laws, including the Laws of the Twelve Tables, were preserved, together with notes of ancient usages and rules of customary law, both civil and religious, recorded in the books of the pontiffs (to which indeed Dionysius, says he, refers as containing *ancient stories* also; Dionys. i. 73: G. C. L. vol. i. p. 89): finally, what is perhaps of great importance, though slightly passed over, he admits that the decrees of the senate were from the very beginning written and carefully kept, and (when it was found that the officers garbled them, in order to cheat the people) they were, from after the Decemvirate, deposited in the temple of Ceres, under custody of the plebeian ædiles. Sir George acknowledges that Livy mentions a written record of a decree of the senate, 442 B.C. (vol. i. p. 142); which was fifty-five years before the Gaulish conflagration. At any rate, after the burning of the city, damp and worms were the chief causes of destruction to the decrees of the senate.

To us it appears that these concessions lead to Beaufort's position as the just one; nor does Sir George's reference to Greek history, which occupies his last chapter (69 pages) seem to prove anything else. His conclusion is (vol. ii. p. 551), that "a *connected account* of the affairs of the principal Greek States begins about a century before the birth of Herodotus; and that a *continuous narrative*" begins from the subjection of the Ionian Greeks to Lydia. Ascending higher, we have first uncertainty, confusion, and at last nearly total darkness. True: but what is this to the purpose? First, a connected account is not identical with a true account; for, as we have said, a fragmentary history, based on contemporary monuments, may be true (seriously, we cannot find whether Sir George consciously means to deny this); next, it is not pretended that the Greek traditions, which plunge us into uncertainty, confusion, and darkness, rested on carved monuments and official registers like those of Rome. The entire chapter seems to us gratuitous and misplaced. He has just told us that at Rome there *were* such monuments and registers, only he does not *know* whether and when and how far they were used, and therefore treats it as mere hypothesis (p. 491) to suppose that even if Fabius learned of the expulsion of Tarquin the Proud from oral tradition, he yet "in reducing it to writing *was assisted by some documentary materials* which served to fix the outlines of the transaction."

We may shortly state his position in the following words:—I admit that there were numerous early written memorials at Rome,—how many I know not; I admit that the memory of a past time is not necessarily lost, *if* "oral tradition be fixed and assisted by official record and private documents," &c. (vol. ii. p. 492). I cannot deny that Fabius *may* have rested this or that account on some memorial coeval with the event, but I can never *know* that he did: I have nothing but internal evidence (which is mere conjecture and hypothesis) to help me to guess when he did and when he did not; hence I have no materials for solid judgment; I conclude that all is uncertain, that all criticism is vain, and no more books should be written. We must give his actual words:—

"All the historical labour bestowed upon the early centuries of Rome will in general be wasted. The history of this period, viewed as a series of picturesque narratives, *will be read to the greatest advantage in the original writers, and will be deteriorated by reproduction in a modern dress.* If we regard a historical painting merely as a work of art, the accounts of the ancients can only suffer from being retouched by the pencil of the modern restorer. On the other hand, all attempts to reduce them to a *purely historical* form, by *conjectural omissions*, additions, alterations, transpositions, must be nugatory. The workers on this historical treadmill may continue to grind the air, but they will never produce any valuable result."—Vol. ii. p. 566.

This is rather cruel of Sir George. He writes a work of 1100 stout pages on the early Rome history, and then implores other people to write no more on the subject. It a little reminds us of Queen Clytæmnestra, who, as Æschylus tells, hewed down her husband with an axe, and then piously prayed that the house might in future be free from intestine murders. Did Sir George not foresee, that as murder produces murder, so a big book of controversy produces another big book? Well! but we accede to his doctrine, that by no conjectural omissions can we reduce the earliest Roman story to a *purely historical* form, if this mean that in no case can we arrive at certain truth. Only (we must retort) that is no reason why we should not make (what he calls) "conjectural omissions." May we not omit the miracles which presaged the future greatness of Servius Tullius? Is it "an arbitrary hypothesis" that these miracles are credulous inventions? We think he will grant to us, that they *certainly are not* true; but he will not say, it is *as* certainly untrue that Servius instituted the comitia of the centuries, and divided Rome into four tribes or parishes. We think then he has no right to lay down so strongly that internal evidence is no ground for rejecting one part of a tale positively, and retaining another part,—retaining it, not as certain, but probable, or possible.

If we rightly understand Sir George's canon, it would lead us to results far beyond those which he seems to contemplate. It is not the habit of the ancients to inform us systematically of their sources. They had no foot-notes and references. How seldom does even Tacitus tell us whence he learnt this or that! how seldom Plutarch, or Dionysius himself, who means to be most scientific. If we know that a man has *no* sources of information, we of course reject his evidence as a whole; but if we know that he had *many* sources, we do not reject his statements barely because he does not tell us on each occasion what he learned from what. Most witnesses mix up their own hypotheses and inferences with dry fact, and leave us without external means of discriminating; yet many of such witnesses are highly useful, if *due criticism be used.* Sir George appears to us to be making, unawares, a protest against ALL discriminating criticism.

Nor can we concede to him that the narrative ought to be read in the original writers; in fact, we should draw precisely the opposite conclusion from the doctrines which he presents to us. First indeed we might ask—Is no one to read the tale of early Rome who cannot read it in Latin or Greek? Are there to be no cultivated persons, male or female, in England, who do not find it expedient to study these difficult languages? But, dropping this topic, why may we not rather argue as follows?—"*All the historical labour bestowed upon the early centuries of Rome will in general be wasted.* It is THEREFORE highly inexpedient for the young student to devote his valuable hours to read ten long books of Livy, and the eleven extant books of Dionysius to say nothing of Diodorus and of certain lives in Plutarch, and the fragments of Appian and Dion Cassius. It is the part of the judicious modern historian *to shorten* this vast mass of writing into a very narrow compass, proportioned to its slight value. The ancients, who believed all of this to be genuine history, did not grudge elaborate study; but we who cannot so accept it, must naturally decline to wade through lengthy narratives, many of which are undoubtedly fictitious."

And here we have to speak of the distinction drawn by so many writers, and particularly insisted on by Rubino, between the constitutional history of Rome and the narratives of wars and adventures of celebrated persons. The former is maintained by Rubino to have a far higher degree of credibility than the latter. The laws and treaties were in great measure consigned to writing at a very early period; and even where they were handed down by a merely oral doctrine, were connected with permanent

institutions—were kept alive by the proceedings of the senate, the courts of justice, and the popular assembly, and were carefully passed on by statesmen and priests to their successors. The latter, on the other hand, were for a long time left to the exclusive keeping of popular tradition; and from their nature were exposed to the embellishments of fancy, and to the distortions of national and family pride. Hence the reasons which prove that the later Romans were destitute of an accurate knowledge of the events and circumstances of their early ages, apply almost exclusively to the personal class of traditions, not to those concerning the constitution. Such is Rubino's argument. Sir G. C. Lewis, who is in antagonism, not to Niebuhr only, but also to those who have headed reaction against Niebuhr, differs so vehemently from this, as to avow precisely the opposite judgment. We acknowledge the clearness and force of his argument, though we think it admits of adequate reply:

"No such broad line can be drawn between the history of a constitution and historical events, as this distinction appears to assume. Unless we are more or less informed respecting the events of the history of any country, we cannot follow the progress of its constitution. For example, if we take England during the seventeenth century, we cannot treat its constitutional changes *in vacuo*, and as abstracted from all public transactions and occurrences. The constitutional history of England during that period cannot be understood, unless we are informed as to the nature of the struggle between Charles and the Parliament; the characters of the leaders of the contending parties; the grounds of the civil war and the manner of its outbreak; its progress and final issue; the king's execution; the Protectorate; and, lastly, the restoration of kingly government under Charles II.... Without knowing the events and facts, we cannot know that constitutional forms retain the same meaning. The forms of a government may be preserved intact, while its essence and operation have undergone a radical change. They may become a mere mask behind which the real face is concealed. Among a people like the Romans, who attached great importance to legal forms, and to the connexion of religion with the state, it was peculiarly likely that constitutional changes, demanded by the altered state of society, and by the increased power of new classes of the community, should be effected with little apparent departure from ancient usage. A constitutional history, written without a knowledge of events and actions and of the forces silently operating through society, might represent Augustus Cæsar as the mere annual magistrate of a free commonwealth, or might suppose that the relation of Queen Elizabeth and Queen Victoria to their respective parliaments were identical."—Vol. i. p. 126.

We accept the challenge here held out. Let it be supposed that the history of the Emperor Augustus were lost, except a few decrees of the senate and people, in which we read such honours as the following: 1. That Caius Cæsar Octavianus shall receive the titles of Augustus and Chief of the Senate and Imperator, with power to assemble the Senate though he hold no

magistracy and a right to lay five propositions before the Senate in priority to the annual consuls. 2. That Cæsar shall possess for his life the power of Censor, of Tribune of the Plebs, and of Chief Pontiff. That the provinces be divided into Senatorial and Imperatorial; and that Cæsar as Imperator shall appoint his lieutenants to the command of the armies in the Imperatorial provinces; and shall hold this power for the next ten years. —Three such documents fill but a few lines, and might survive on a tablet of brass in an age which had no paper or linen books, and which could not write a *history* of Augustus. Surely Sir G. C. Lewis must admit to us, that such dry decrees would at once suffice to prove that Rome had undergone a total revolution and that Augustus was a military despot, although retaining the old republican titles. Nor only so; but we say, the imagination of man would so stimulate memory, and the short written documents would so bridle imagination, that oral tradition, in a nation without literary habits, might faithfully retain, for many ages (in fact, so long as the habits and ranks of society, and the old hereditary families survived), a pretty accurate outline of the Cæsarean revolution. All the same applies to Charles I. or to Tarquin. If no documents had survived concerning the English War of the Parliament, except the Petition of Right, and the Warrant for Beheading Charles Stuart, it appears to us certain that these would have sufficed to retain a generally correct oral tradition of the nature, progress, and issue of that great quarrel, in any or all of the great noble families of England, for two, three, four or more centuries. And in this method, we cannot doubt, the outlines of the early Roman history were retained. During the republic, an approximately correct chronology was kept up in the list of the consuls. The chronology of the regal period is an invention of theory, and the number of kings (in our opinion) wholly uncertain. The history tells of those only, each of whom happens to have had his name attached to some monument, or (in the case of Romulus and Numa, if these are real) by its being typical of a race and dynasty. Sir G. C. Lewis seems to us to misrepresent Rubino as thinking constitutional history can ever be *wholly* disentangled from public events. He says justly that we need to know "more or less" of public events to interpret the constitutional facts. "More or less" means the broad outlines of the national life; and this is just what we actually have, and what Sir George acknowledges *may* have been retained by monuments and by tradition conjoined. It is never to be forgotten, as regards such broad facts as the distress

of the people from debts, the call for agrarian laws, invasions of Æqui and Volsci, &c. . . . . that we do not, after all, *know* that the statements were *not* registered by a contemporaneous writer. —Sir George says, we cannot prove that they were: we reply, he cannot prove that they were not.

Sir G. C. Lewis is a learned man, and we cannot presume to think that any of our topics can be otherwise than familiar to him; in fact, he states with much energy and clearness the mutual action of oral tradition and of documentary memorials; but as all cannot be familiar to the reader, it may be useful here a little to enlarge. To fix attention, we will select a single case. In Dionysius (iv. 26) we read as follows:—"From the moneys contributed by all the Latin cities, Servius built the Temple of Diana on the Aventine, and wrote out the terms of the treaty between them all, and made enactment concerning the feast and the common celebration. And that no time might obliterate them, he set up a brazen pillar, and carved on it the decree of the congress, and the names of all the cities that took part in it. This pillar *remained till my time* in the Temple of Diana, having characters in such Greek letters as ancient Greece used."

Let us imagine what a contemporary of even Dionysius, and of course all earlier ages, was able to read. It must have been something considerably longer than the following, though antiquity did not indulge in protocols and lawyerlike verbosity:—"Servius Tullius, King of Rome, offers on the part of all the Romans alliance with all the cities of the Latins; to count the same as friend or as enemy, and to have good and faithful commerce everywhere between Romans and Latins, and redress by law for injuries. The Latins accept the alliance. The names of their cities are herewith inscribed. To commemorate the treaty the Romans and the Latins have at joint expense built this temple to Queen Diana."

A short *text*, such as this, would be commented on by oral tradition; and it affords various fixed points to fasten tradition down, and bridle its flightiness and its tendency to gradual change, growth, and perversion. It yields a small number of positive facts, which are as trustworthy to the hundredth generation as to the second. Such are—1. That there was a king of Rome named Servius Tullius; 2. That Rome under him dealt in public treaty as on a par with the Latin cities collectively; 3. In fact, the Latins yielded primacy to Rome, in agreeing that the temple be built at Rome, and the inscription set up there;

4. The treaty virtually united Rome and Latium into a single military power; 5. It made Rome the head and centre of that power, since no single city of the Latins could compete with her, when she competed with them collectively.—Surely we need not press how the memory of the character and events of Servius's reign must have been stimulated by the existence of such a document. We will not venture on any general doctrine, that the human memory is more tenacious in countries which make little use of writing; for we think this depends upon *motive* and developed tendencies. But we know that the ancient Romans were intensely attached to precedent; and they are the first people known to us who with family surnames had a hereditary policy; which strongly suggests a careful constitutional and historical teaching from father to son.

"A nation which held so strictly to legal and constitutional precedent in the administration of public affairs and to an established course of practice, must have possessed an accredited, if not an authentic and true tradition respecting its past transactions; respecting its former successes, dangers, and reverses; respecting its great men and their great deeds; respecting the origins of the political forms; the military regulations, and the religious institutes round which their patriotic feelings clustered, and which, in their belief, were the sources of their power and greatness. The leading families of the state, in whom the high and important offices, civil and religious were almost hereditary, who furnished a succession of consuls, prætors, censors, quæstors, and pontiffs, to the Roman people, and who successively contributed members to the dignified Roman Senate, were doubtless the depositaries of a traditionary belief respecting the past ages of the city."—Ib. p. 83.

Thus the historical consciousness was not merely born; it was active and eager. The Roman nobility lived *in* and *for* their polity; the knowledge of the past was with them the foundation of morals, the source of power, the means and strength of administration. Law and Morals were alike historical; and can we doubt that historical teaching was cultivated and historical monuments valued? After books of continuous history had been produced, these were read, and the brazen pillars and linen books were comparatively neglected; but before systematic books were written, Sir George, we think will allow, that young men who aspired to become senators, would necessarily read all public documents of antiquity, including decrees of the senate, and glean up oral comments upon them. "Who was this Servius?" would each young Roman, after reading the treaty with the Latins, ask his father. "He was the last good King of Rome; a Latin by birth, and highly acceptable to the Latins; he it was who established the now existing folk-mote of the militia, though it was temporarily destroyed by the usurper and tyrant who

murdered him." If this reply was true, surely it is one which oral tradition (aided by the treaty) was competent to preserve, not for two generations only, but for as long time as there was no social revolution and breach of continuity in Rome itself.

But let it further be remembered, that while even one such monument as this of Servius would greatly aid tradition, it would hardly be the only one, and we know it was not. Sir G. C. Lewis admits that the treaty of Tarquin the Proud with the Gabii, and of the same with the Sabines, existed till the days of Horace. Every such additional document, *where the historical effort has developed itself*, is of ever increasing importance in fastening down tradition; just as two fixed points give to a body more than double the fixity of one fixed point, and three fixed points make a mechanism actually immovable. Documents which are neglected, of course go for nothing; but in patrician Rome, no important document of antiquity could be *neglected*, though it was sometimes purposely *falsified*, to damage the plebeian order. Thus even allowing to Sir G. C. Lewis that there were no written family memorials, biographies, partial chronicles, other than the pontiff's books; allowing further (though we hold this most unreasonable) that *all the decrees of the senate* had perished before the days of Fabius; still, oral tradition, based on public monuments, was by no means a despicable source of knowledge.

Sir George knows all these topics as well as we do; he himself furnishes both facts and arguments, and then draws precisely the opposite conclusions from us.

"It is impossible to say we have been able to discover any solid or stable foundation for the history. . . . . The narrative is principally composed of events which we can trace to no *determinate* source. We can scarcely *place our finger on any fact*, and affirm with reasonable confidence that it was taken from the Annales Maximi of *such a year*, that it was derived from the memoirs of *such a family*, or from the funeral orations of *such a man*, that it was founded on *such a ballad* or poem, or on an oral tradition preserved in *such a district*, in *such a college* of priests, in *such a line* of public officers, or in *such a family* or *gens*. *If*, therefore, we require that a historical account *should rest on the testimony of known and assignable witnesses, whose credibility can be scrutinized and judged*, we shall find ourselves compelled to WITHHOLD OUR BELIEF from the history of Rome, down to the landing of Pyrrhus in Italy."—Ib. pp. 264, 265.

We have at last, after long floundering through these volumes, got our eye fixed on the sentence which sharply marks the point where we and Sir George part company. "*If we require*,"—he says: but we do not require it. We cannot require it without rejecting contemporary narrative; for instance, without rejecting

the accounts in Thucydides, or in Tacitus, who are esteemed the most anxiously correct historians of antiquity. We open Thucydides at random, in order to test a passage by Sir George's canon. We read:—"The Bœotians instantly sent for darters and slingers from the Melian Bay; and since, after the battle, 2,000 heavy armed Corinthians, &c. came to help them; they marched against Delium, and attacked the fortifications," &c.

Hereupon we ask. Was Thucydides in person at Delium at that time? He does not say so, and if any modern suspects that he was, it is an *unsupported hypothesis*, in our opinion improbable. Who then told Thucydides of the facts? Is the witness *known and assignable?* Produce him, that we may *scrutinize and judge of his credibility.* May he not have been a liar? &c. But you cannot produce him. You cannot *lay your finger* on a single incident in the siege, and say, Thucydides learned it from *such* a general, from *such* a spy, from *such* a deserter, from *such* a sailor, from the note-book of *such* a foot traveller, of *such* a merchant, &c.

Sir George of course will reply, that we must *assume* Thucydides to have used his means of information diligently and wisely, although he does not tell us distinctly *who* were his informants on each separate occasion; that human witnesses are not immortal, and could not be produced, so as to enable us to judge of their credibility; that it suffices for us to know *in general* that Thucydides *had* means of knowledge, and to presume that he was willing and able to avail himself of those means; that we are free to criticize his works, to judge of his capacity, but must not claim to rehear his witnesses;—a claim which obviously overthrows all history. This is true: but it is Sir George's own canon which enacts the overthrow.

No contemporary author of antiquity gave his authorities in detail; and we are always satisfied to accept them in the lump. But do therefore no errors arise? Are all narratives of contemporaries equally trustworthy? Surely we discriminate one narrator from another, testing their trustworthiness in various ways, by external or by internal evidence. All the same applies to narratives of earlier events. Lapse of time is not the sole difficulty in the way of ascertaining truth, nor are the safeguards against error different in principle whether time or space be our difficulty. A speech printed in a newspaper, and attributed to an English minister in Parliament, is unhesitatingly believed at the ends of the earth, though the reporter, the press, the very name of the journal, happen to be unknown. The same speech, if attributed to the same man in the Privy Council, will be

disbelieved, *until* it be shown how the reporter got access, and other collateral proof be given. Just so Sir G. C. Lewis disbelieves speeches recorded by Livy (or Fabius) in the Carthaginian senate, though Fabius was a contemporary. We thus see clearly that the main condition for credibility of *details* lies in a *general* belief that sources of knowledge are open to reporters. Without this, we not only do not give credence (as, to a history of affairs in the moon), but we do not even criticize. Sir George remains in this same posture, unless, farther, we know what particular original witness guaranteed each particular statement. *How*, for instance, did Fabius know that Tarquin the Proud did not die on the throne of Rome? In what particular family was there an oral tradition to this effect? On what particular written memorial was this grounded? Was it positively asserted in some decree of the senate which Fabius had read? We cannot answer: we *know* absolutely nothing: there is therefore nothing even to criticize, says Sir George. This, we avow, annihilates all history whatever. We maintain, that where intelligible sources of truth are conceded to have been open, a narrative is *primâ facie* admissible for criticism, and may in the result be firmly believed, even if we can in no one instance lay our finger on a fact, and state on what particular information it was first recorded.

Every student of the early Roman history feels a strong conviction that it is a real world, not a fiction, with which he is dealing. To have *invented* such a history would have been an achievement of first-rate genius. To use Sir George's own phrase, the inventor must have been a "Roman Defoe," endowed with a perversely applied faculty, aiming to overthrow precedent, law, tradition, everything in which a Roman nature prided itself, by obtruding on his countrymen ingenious fiction. In vol. ii., p. 444, speaking of the controversy between the dictator Papirius and Fabius his lieutenant, Sir George writes: "The whole of this remarkable transaction is narrated by Livy in great detail. It contains nothing improbable, and it is highly characteristic of the Roman notions respecting the maintenance of military discipline; but as it *could not* have been recorded by any contemporary historian" [annalist? chronicler? memorialist?] "we are at a loss to know from what authentic source Livy could have derived his circumstantial account." *Could not!* This is rather strong, when all that he has a right to say is,—We have not been informed from *what* contemporary writing it was derived. Perhaps Niebuhr might reverse the argument by saying: "So circum-

stantial an account obviously *must* have come from an old annalist contemporaneous to the event." But neither would we justify that inference. A continuous narrative impressing the imagination and illustrative of Roman discipline, may well have been traditional, and amplified in later times. A far stronger argument for Niebuhr in proof of "memoirs" is based on the petty isolated facts which we often meet in the pages of Livy, exactly such as are chronicled in an almanac, but such as no rhetorical historian invents, and no enthusiast could believe himself inspired to state. Niebuhr is wrong in *resting* anything at all on his hypothetical annalists; but the more we think of Sir George's decisive *disproof* of their existence, the more it surprizes us, from one who lays down positively that Dionysius was aiming at truth. This historian complains (i. 6) that Fabius and Cincius, who "wrote accurately the events at which they were present, ran summarily over the ancient events;" which is Dionysius's reason for giving those ancient events at great length. Yet Sir George (vol. i. pp. 37, 81, 196) produces the passage as proof positive that Dionysius knew of no written sources for history earlier than Fabius. Hence Dionysius is made to say: "Since Fabius has written in so meagre a style, and *I have no other materials than the work of Fabius*, I propose to narrate the history in full." Surely, Niebuhr may reply, the truer view of Dionysius's argument is: "Since Fabius, hurrying to his own times, *has neglected to use many written documents which still exist*, I intend to *avail myself of these* to fill out the history." This would be the right interpretation, if Dionysius were Hallam. But we do not think he understood what are the conditions of truth: we believe rhetoric to have been his chief aim, and that, like Niebuhr, he trusted his own insight to reconstruct in fulness a history preserved only in outline. To us the passages in Dionysius seem to be wholly neutral, neither proving nor disproving Niebuhr's "annalists."

If we know a tale to have been worked up out of a poem, the rule is absurd which directs to drop whatever is marvellous and believe all the rest. The residue thus obtained has no more *primâ facie* title to be accepted as history, than the marvels which we have dropped. But when a tale has been made up like that of early Rome, by a studious effort to recover the past, even if from mere traditional explanations, orally transmitted, of treaties and monuments, *it is, à priori, probable* that there will be some truth in it. Hence, when that part which ministers to national or patrician arrogance or to the love of the marvellous

is dropped, it is not unreasonable to esteem the residue,—not indeed as ascertained truth, but as an approach to truth, which is to be received until disproved. We have tried to find a point of reconciliation with Sir George in a rigid interpretation of the word *history*. He wants to get rid of *hypothesis*. He is sarcastic against the word *perhaps*. He aims at actual certainty. But he will never get it thus. Every human utterance which intends to state fact is blended with inference: the very judgments of sense are full of inference. Speculation and hypothesis domineer in the reports of the most simple-minded. The word *perhaps* honestly warns the reader not to mistake a speculation for a fact; and after all, to know that a speculation *is* a speculation, secures that it shall not deceive, even if it be erroneous. Nothing could be more unendurably slavish than to *commit to memory* the old Roman tales without believing them, and without speculating how much of them is credible; without venturing on "conjectural omissions" or "hypothetical reconciliations." To set young people to such work, would be ingenious torment. Much better were it to burn all the books at once. We do not read them as beautiful poems; but first, because the Romans believed them, and we are thus aided in understanding their minds; next, because we think that they contain *some* historical truth. "How much?" is of course more or less hypothetical, whether Sir George likes it or not. Nor only so; but the memory refuses to retain a load of wholly isolated events. We must be allowed to string them together by some hypothesis; and this, however unproved, we say is harmless, so long as its nature is distinctly remembered.

But Sir George forbids our revising the moral judgments of antiquity! Here again, we think his reaction against Niebuhr and the whole modern school to be extravagant. Livy tells us that a Roman Knight, Spurius Mælius, hoping to become elected to the consulship, distributed corn freely to the people in time of dearth. The aristocracy took the alarm, and appointed a dictator to control him. The dictator sent his master-of-the-horse, Servilius, to command Mælius to come before him. Mælius, not relishing martial law, refused, and invoked the judgment of the people; whereupon Servilius killed him on the spot, and the dictator justified the deed. Since it was not pretended that there was any difficulty in arresting Mælius and bringing him to trial, if he was engaged in a conspiracy to make himself tyrant, the moderns regard this imputation as an after-invention of the patricians to justify an atrocious murder; especially since the

imputation is intrinsically improbable, and is made absurd by Livy's addition that the tribunes were in the plot. Yet, because all the ancient writers uniformly treat Servilius as a patriot, Mælius as a criminal, Sir George C. Lewis tells us that we must not think of reversing their decision in the deficiency of our information. Nay, but the facts, *as deposed by them*, show their judgment to have been perverted,—here, as so often beside,—by unjust patrician sympathies.

But while we resist what appears to us an extravagant prohibition on the part of Sir George, we here also see the extreme in Niebuhr, and indeed in Arnold, from which he is justly receding—viz., the omniscience with which they seem to decide concerning the moral characters in that early era, and the passionate censure in which the former indulges. When we consider how hard it is to learn certainly the character and motives of living statesmen in our own country, the accurate acquaintance of Niebuhr with early Romans seems to us to border on the ridiculous. Sir George indeed appears to laugh in his sleeve at Niebuhr's knowing whence this and that ancient historian had gained his information. We also commend the following sensible remarks to the reader's attention :—

"With respect to the indifference about remote antiquity which Niebuhr attributes to Polybius, it may have arisen from a belief that all labour in investigating it will be lost; and it is certain that if he had attempted to penetrate the obscurity which enveloped the primitive history of the Italian nations, his endeavour would have been fruitless. The history had not been written, and the traditionary memory was long since extinct. This censure of Polybius for not informing himself about the history of a period for which no authentic materials existed, may be compared with a similar censure cast on him by Dr. Arnold for his ignorance of geography [the geography of the Alps]: the fact being, that geography had, in the time of Polybius, been very little cultivated; that there were no accurate maps or geographical treatises; and that no means existed of acquiring an accurate idea of the geography of any country. It was, therefore, just as impossible to Polybius to be a good geographer as to be a good astronomer or a good chemist."—Ib. p. 130.

Let us now endeavour to sum up the distinct positions assumed at different stages in this whole subject.

The first is, to believe everything which was written by antiquity ; and when ancient writers contradict one another, to revere both alternately, and try to believe both.

The second, to believe all that is narrated unanimously, but select by our own preference, or by some kind of criticism, where there is variety.

The third, to take the additional liberty of rejecting whatever is miraculous, or otherwise strongly opposed to *à priori* probabilities.

The fourth, to inquire what evidence was present to the first writers, and to reject whatever they tell beyond the sphere in which we think they had information.

The fifth, to examine the internal growth of society and of the constitution, and on the *assumption* of internal congruity and continuous development, allow of speculative remarks or judgment, negative and positive, which tends to bind the history together; but at the same time carefully and sharply separating between ancient statement and modern speculation.

The sixth, to demand to know on what *particular* evidence each *particular* statement was made by ancient writers; and on finding it is impossible to answer, pronounce that all belief is groundless, all speculation vain, all preference of one part to another gratuitous, all historical writing a grinding of the air, all moral criticism a foppery: *yet*, exhorting people to read (and remember?) on the subject, the ample volumes of the ancients.

We stop short in the fourth and fifth stages; Sir G. C. Lewis would bring us into the sixth. Niebuhr practically modifies the fifth as follows:—

Fifthly, on the *assumption* of a peculiar development discerned by Niebuhr's insight, and by divining strange misinterpretations of lost writers made by Livy and Dionysius, to reconstruct the history speculatively, and take all possible pains to make the reader unaware, *when* he is reading ancient statement, and *when* modern speculation.

Sir G. C. Lewis has not, in our opinion, added anything of argumentative importance to what many have written against Niebuhr; but as a *protest*, his work has much moral weight. It will be felt in England. It will not (as he wishes) hinder the writing of the early Roman history; but it will lead to writing it far more concisely and less ambitiously than by Niebuhr and Arnold.

THE RELATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL TO LIBERAL KNOWLEDGE.

[Delivered at University College, October 12th, 1859.]

Professions rise with the division of labour, whether the labour be mental or manual. In the great organized monarchies of the oldest time,—in Egypt, India, and China, the separation of professions was established most sharply; but how far they simultaneously aimed at liberal culture, we cannot say; or at least concerning India, I must look to a learned colleague for information. Aristocracies, no doubt, everywhere aim at *refinement*, which is perhaps the essence of that which we call Liberal Art,—the *Artes Humaniores:* and in a less advanced people the refinement aimed at is that of bodily grace and courtly manners, rather than accomplishments properly intellectual. The Persians of the great Cyrus, as the aristocracy of their empire, are said to have placed noble education in learning to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak truth. The Lacedæmonians placed it in attaining grace in wrestling and skill in all martial exercises. To speak generally, Aristotle defines "Aristocracy" as that form of government in which the *educated* bear rule; and we know that the education of Greek aristocracies was that of the public palæstra. It does not appear that they incorporated into their idea of gentlemanly refinement anything more severely intellectual than simple music, with singing of poetry and dancing; and according to Polybius the neglect of these softening accomplishments precipitated one small people of Arcadia into horrible atrocity. I suppose that the old Athenian phrase, *οἱ καλοκαγαθοὶ* (the fine gentry), may be freely translated into the Latin of a certain Oxford Foundation Statute, *bene nati, bene vestiti, modice docti in arte musicâ.* But, as far as I am aware, the systematic attempt at properly *intellectual* cultivation, which should be liberal, as distinguished from professional, began with that miscellaneous body of accomplished men, whom the Greeks called *Sophists;* and it is probable that democratic institutions gave the immediate impulse to their activity. Whatever introduces a

large number of citizens into political importance, generates a demand for very miscellaneous information and very various powers of mind. There is no Jack-of-all-trades so versatile as a statesman, especially in a young and growing community; pre-eminently if, as Athens, and afterwards Rome, it is gaining imperial authority. A statesman needs that which is strictly called *capacity*, or the power of taking in much and quickly. He needs a strong and broad grasp of every question that he touches. Profound knowledge in any one science is superfluous to him; but he must know enough of each to be able to use wisely the skill of other men, to receive their information intelligently, appreciate their relative abilities, selecting and digesting for practical use so much as the public exigency requires or admits. In a democratic state some power of exposition is also necessary; and young Athenians, who were ambitious of political leadership, aspired to be eloquent on any and every subject. The teachers who undertook to assist them in gaining the much coveted power of fluent speech, were of course aware that their instruction was very superficial; but this was unavoidable. Political History had scarcely begun to exist. Force ruled without disguise in every known empire. Politics, as the science of the organization of states, founded upon the associative instinct in man and on the internal relations of society, was perhaps first imagined by Aristotle. Political Economy was at least as superficial with Aristotle himself as with the most flippant of the Sophists. Jurisprudence had no professors, though all the materials of it probably existed from the great activity of the law-courts. Morality, as a science, was quite in chaos. The Sophists (as we call them, though the collective term, as Mr. Grote has usefully warned us, is one of convenience only) probably understood as well as Plato, that the liberal culture at which they ought to aim was a harmonious development of the whole mind; and they did aim at this, according to their abilities, though with most imperfect aids. The gymnastic exercises of the Greeks which promoted a noble development of the body, bore an analogy to the cultivation of the *mind*, too obvious to be overlooked. It was observed that professional runners and dancers were strong in the legs, but disproportionately so, being too feeble in the arms; professional pugilists were powerful in the arms, and deficient in the legs. A skilful wrestling and fencing master would secure that each part had its commensurate exertion, so as to attain symmetry; in which was found alike beauty and service for war. So, for the functions of society, whether in the

strictly political arena, or in social and neighbourly co-operation, we need well balanced faculties (on which Good Sense seems to depend),—miscellaneous information, which of course is everywhere superficial,—delicate sensibility, which will wound no one needlessly or unawares,—and an expansive mind, open to learn from every side, and ready to impart. Aristotle everywhere, I believe, shews a very clear discrimination of Professional from Liberal cultivation. As one instance, in speaking of music, he says, that it should be practised up to the point which will develope the feeling for good music, but not so far as to attain professional skill, which (says he) is vulgar. In short, while professional knowledge consists in the deepening, sharpening, and completing the study of *one* subject or *one* branch of thought, and generally for *immediate* practical ends, liberal knowledge is first conceived of as the culture of *all* the faculties proportionably by very various exercise, and by the supply of very miscellaneous material, for *indirect* and *unforeseen* practical ends, the mind itself being more thought of than any outward result.

It would be out of place here to dilate on the causes which made Athenian greatness transitory, and Athenian eloquence the art of plausibility. Neither Socrates nor Plato, however desirous of deepening liberal study, could effect it, while the special sciences themselves, and especially Political Morality, were in so crude a state. It is probable that Socrates wished all political power to be confined to those who had been trained to statesmanship; which he conceived of as a specific art, like that of a pilot or a shipbuilder; and Plato deliberately desired that the state should be despotically governed by an oligarchy of permanent functionaries. But political speculation could not become comprehensively human by disdaining experience: and by committing himself to write an elaborate scheme on a Utopian Republic, this most celebrated of philosophers gave to the Sophists a splendid revenge for his attacks on them.

Two centuries—three centuries past, and Rome in her turn demanded liberal culture, and looked to Greece to supply it. Eloquence at the bar, in the senate, and before the people, was still the desideratum, as at Athens; but many things combined to give Roman accomplishment a more manly cast: indeed the Athenian was now stigmatized by the diminutive term *homo Græculus*, even when profoundly learned. The young Roman had to begin by acquiring the Greek language, a process which we know to be of great value to the mind itself, especially to those acute intellects which delight in reasoning for reasoning's

sake, and are bold to pursue principles into all their consequences. Such minds are liable to be entangled by the subtlety of language, unless forced to study every imperfection of the tool with which they work. No national mind open to our study was perhaps more acute than that of Athenian Greece, yet none was more egregiously guilty of verbal controversy; from a large part of which they might, I think, have been saved, if Greece had not too much disdained barbarians to make the learning of any foreign language a part of elementary education.

But in truth, there were besides plentiful reasons which saved the young Roman from the mental dangers of the young Athenians, whom Socrates accosted. At home he inherited traditional systems which forced all his energies to work under pressure, and forbad flighty and fanciful schemes of thought. Politics with him was not indeed a *science*, but it was an hereditary *art*, the rules of which were so transmitted in the senate, by the study of the *mos majorum*, that every possible political problem was presented to him with very narrow practical limits. At the same time Roman jurisprudence, pursued continuously for several centuries by a succession of acute minds, furnished a mass of raw materials for science which in many parts had crystallized into coherent order. Eloquence at Rome was not addressed prevailingly to the ignorant and to the young, who always had the majority of votes at Athens. The senate and the high juries were men of noble rank, of middle age and upwards, and contained the most accomplished men of the nation. The popular assembly generally listened with most deference to the speakers who were highly esteemed in senatorial circles. At the same time, in the three centuries between the days of Pericles and the Gracchi, great accessions had been made to literature and science. Not only had Thucydides written Political History, and Aristotle amassed political information; but Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Macedon had risen and fallen. The great Persian empire and the military dynasties which succeeded it, equally with the astute and violent tyrannies of Sicily, had run their course, and had instructively shown the self-ruin of dynastic injustice. A diligent Greek literature had registered all the facts in detail; and even the native Phœnician histories had been translated. Carthage had left to Rome the lesson, not to risk national existence on armies of foreign mercenaries. To Cicero, Politics was a study based on multifarious experience, and pervaded by the deepest moral analogies. So also Morals itself, in the hands of the successors of Socrates, had attained, as *science*, a stability which will never

be surpassed. Acute metaphysicians, then as now, disputed concerning certain foundations of moral thought, as indeed they do concerning the axioms of Geometry; but the reality of Duty was not seriously impugned by the most sceptical of the Academicians; and the two great schools of Zeno and of Aristotle had worked out a scheme of human morality in all main points agreeable to one another and to that which we now recognize as right and obligatory. It was impossible for a Roman to follow Aristotle on the weakest side of his moral system,—that of denying barbarians to have the rights of men; for the Roman was himself one of these barbarians. Altogether, whatever the violence of Roman political dealing, scientific morals became more comprehensively *human*, and thus more humane, in Cicero than in Aristotle. In more abstract science, the Stoics had elaborated Grammar, which had no existence in the days of Pericles. To all modern students of Greek the abrupt change of style from Sophocles and Thucydides to Euripides and Xenophon shows strikingly how quickly the practical lessons of the "Sophists" cleared the muddy stream of Attic composition. But even to Aristotle grammar was at most an Art. Whether the Stoical cultivation of it as a Science was of any benefit to Greece, I am not competent to say: but I presume that it facilitated, the application of grammar to foreign languages, as, to Latin. Again, Greek mathematics had culminated into astronomy at Alexandria, and gave to the later Roman republicans far firmer conceptions of the order and even of the magnitude of the universe than were attainable to Socrates. In fact the accuracy of the Alexandrian astronomers made the objections of Socrates to physical science quite untenable, while they equally exploded the gratuitous assumption of the Epicureans that a *disorderly* and not an *orderly* chance domineers in the whole structure of the heavens and earth. I think even a casual reader of Aristotle and of Cicero must be struck by the contrast of tone between the two, whenever the subject of *Chance* is touched. Such a remark as the following, which to Aristotle was natural and plausible, would be quite out of date in Cicero. "There are four causes of events, Mind, Nature, Force, and Chance." Not even in modern days, can one find a more decisive conviction that *order* reigns in the universe, and that Nature and God are one cause, not two, than is frequently to be discerned in the writings of Cicero. I think the change must be imputed to the development of astronomy in the course of three centuries. And the history of this science is so valuable an illustration of my present subject, that I must dwell on it for a moment.

Rightly to conceive the vast importance of the perfecting of one physical science in ancient times, and especially the science of the Sun and Planets, we must remember that ancient religion was developed out of Physics, not out of Morals. It did not at all startle a Greek, to reflect that divine action (according to the religion of his country) was not agreeable to human morality. Poetical speculators had taught him that the earliest gods were Titans, the personification of brute force and hugeness. These had been displaced by the higher intelligence of Zeus or Jupiter; yet even this nobler divinity was conceived of rather as a sagacious despot, living in majestic self-enjoyment, than as a Creator or benevolent Ruler. In the *irregular* action of the elements, chiefly or even alone, the power of Jupiter was supposed to be manifested; so that to an Aristophanes it seemed nothing but a concealed Atheism to refer thunder and lightning to the operation of orderly physical causes. Even the Stoical school of Greece struggled to the last to maintain the godhead of the separate planets, while rationalizing the local religions into a general Providence. But, in spite of partial inconsistencies, Alexandrian astronomy enlightened the most open minds as to the unity of God, the harmony of his universe and the fixed character of his laws. Thoughtful men had previously well discerned, that to admit a divine mind at all, is, to believe its serene superiority to those perturbations which make men vicious. Then, as now, there was plenty of room for Pantheism,—and even for Atheism in some intellects; but if these doctrines were to command any respect, they needed to put on a nobler form, and to recognize Order, Law, Rule, where formerly Disorder had been imagined. Epicureanism at Rome was no longer a philosophy, but in general a mere decent cover for unpatriotic indifference or mean self-indulgence, with apathy to all progressive knowledge which went beyond Epicurus: hence not even the genius of a Lucretius could commend it to any earnest mind. All the highest thought of the Roman intellect took a form akin to Stoicism, and erred rather on the side of changing Providence into Fate, than of admitting the theory of Chance. Of course a host of superstitions vanished of themselves from the minds of cultivated men, as soon as a belief in fixed Order pervading all things, was attained. Here (if I rightly connect cause and effect) we see a striking instance of the consequences to general Liberal culture entailed by the advance of the single science of Astronomy.

Equally striking is the weakness displayed by the professors of

Astronomy itself, when isolated in a land bereft of moral science. Egypt, from the earliest to the latest days, has been the country of magic; and we may safely infer a general weakness of mind in such a community. A public which from childhood has believed in every kind of divination, and looks with mysterious fear on the powers of the conjuror, is so open to believe in the occult influence of planetary conjunctions, that astronomy was sure to supply materials for astrology; and the astrologers themselves, while practising on public credulity for their own gain, cannot always have attained to a disbelief of their own science. It is a specious caricature of the doctrine of Universal Order, to represent human actions and accidents as determined by planetary movements: and the universal tendency of each science, as of every kingdom, is to overstep its own limits and encroach on its neighbour's domain. We need not here insist on the fact, that the arguments of abstract mathematics are inapplicable to practical life, nor advert to the opinion so strongly pressed by some, that mere mathematicians are peculiarly liable to credulity in subjects not mathematical. Whatever weight may be assigned to such topics, it is more to my purpose to press, that (it would seem) *no science can be perfected in isolation*. For it takes up but one part of the human mind, and cultivates that peculiarly; but as it cannot really subdivide the mind, or get rid of its weak sides, that weakness will be felt, the moment the science attempts to deepen its own roots, to enlarge its basis and strengthen its vitality. A single science, thus isolated, must probably soon attain its fullest growth, and become a dead system, to be transmitted by routine. In fact, we may well believe that those in whose hands Astronomy turned into Astrology were seldom men who had reflected deeply and fruitfully on the great principles and essential logic of Astronomy. To them it was probably less of a Science than an Art—a curious fabric of rules for practical calculation—which could of course be used for superstitious divination as readily as a pack of cards. Thus, while each separate development of sharply defined truth yields a contribution of the highest value to general cultivation, we need the simultaneous activity of several branches of truth to sustain the healthy operation of the whole mind. We need also a diffused knowledge of these in the community to sustain soundness in public opinion, and prevent the perversion of the separate sciences into Black Arts and Professional Secrets.

Nor is this all. We may here, without becoming fantastic, press a political analogy. An empire, surrounded by feeble neighbours, which cannot resist its ambition, generally wastes

its force on unsated conquest, and neglects that internal development out of which alone permanent strength can proceed. So a science which has already performed some great exploits, if it stand alone, unchecked by other sciences, conceives the ambition of conquering domains which cannot belong to it, and exhausts its own energies on futile schemes,—as Astronomy in divining the secrets of future human events—whereby the real development of the science from within is naturally, if not necessarily, checked; and, of course, the public reverence for it is gravely impaired in the minds of the most thoughtful. Thus, as each state, and each man, finds a healthy control in the association of fellows and equals, so also does each branch of study, each profession.

After the overthrow of the Roman empire, when society had to be reconstructed from its first elements, Education went through phases substantially like to those which I have recounted. As fast as baronial or royal splendours developed an aristocratic associated order, the demand for a certain *refinement* established itself—they called it *chivalry*—consisting chiefly in bodily skill and grace, and courtesy towards men and women of their own order. The accomplishment of the knight and the gentleman was in large measure such as we now think frivolous; the knowledge expected of him was perhaps an acquaintance with heraldry, with etiquette, and with fashionable forms of speech; nearly as now, I believe, in Persia, in Siam, and many parts of the East. In general, we must admit that in a certain stage the cultivation esteemed liberal, is apt to be factitious and conventional. Mussulman Viziers have been highly celebrated for the beauty of their Arabic handwriting, which does not seem to us more important for a statesman than to fence well or to dance well. But here let me put in a word of apology for the pursuit of refinement and elegance. True gracefulness generally results out of *strength economizing itself*. This is manifest in the case of the graceful rower, runner, swimmer, in the movements of the cat or of the horse; and, if time allowed, it might be shown how the analogy extends to high art and to science. I fearlessly appeal to my mathematical colleagues, whether in their most abstract researches the cultivation of symmetry and elegance does not tend to the advance at once of the study and of the student. Strength and simplicity being at the bottom of all true beauty in action, far more faculties are cultivated in the study of elegance, than at a superficial view is imagined. I never have approved, and I do not approve of the exclusive, overstrained and generally premature effort after the composition of Latin verses, in many of our

public schools; yet I think it an entire mistake on the part of the utilitarian public to overlook the faculties usefully cultivated by those youths who, going beyond mere imitative trick, attain vigour in the art. The prevalent fault everywhere is, to set up some artificial and narrow standard of beauty, which sometimes is no more like to the true and natural beauty, than the court-dresses which we may all see upon Madame Tussaud's waxwork are like to the draperies of Flaxman; or, I will add, no more like, than the phraseology once called *Euphuism* in the English Court, resembles the manly periods of Shakespeare.

But I must farther admit, in partial defence of the Middle Age accomplishments, that sometimes the course of history itself forces factitious knowledge into accidental importance; and liberal culture becomes temporarily artificial, precisely because it ought to be, in the best sense, popular. For instance, to have a certain acquaintance with the religion, or it may be the mythology, of the nation in which we dwell, belongs to liberal knowledge, because ignorance of it unduly cuts us off from understanding our neighbours' minds. Hence, an Englishman in India may find it desirable to learn something of Indian religious fancies, which here seem very superfluous. When we go to the bottom of this, we may perhaps find it to involve the very same principle on which we cultivate our old classics in Europe, while no one will recommend the Latin language or the Greek mythology as a general study to Hindoos.

It seems to me, that any excessive leaning of liberal culture to conventional refinement is naturally corrected by the rise of positive science with professional aims. If the science deals in realities and can be appreciated by the popular mind, it quickly rebukes empty fantasies and recalls liberal impulses to more practical ends. In the Middle Ages of Europe, of which I was beginning to speak, there was a long attempt on the part of abstract science (whether to be called logical or metaphysical, I do not precisely know), to assume the monarchy of the human mind. The few who in recent times have given themselves to a profound study of those writers whom we call collectively the Schoolmen, generally agree in high praise of their acuteness. Yet the history of Europe appears to testify that, as in their own science they were unable to establish any agreement in results or methods, so too they failed to infuse any valuable corrective into the flimsiness of courtly education. At the latter fact perhaps no one will wonder, who observes of how little importance the Schoolmen made elegance and beauty—how they

barbarized every language the moment they touched it, and became unintelligible to all beyond the professional circle, even when treating subjects in their own nature popular—I mean, the deeply moving questions of theology and morals. It is notorious, that even the Reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, in proportion as they were learned, partook of the same defect. I suppose it will be admitted, even by those who attribute most to the religious struggle of the Reformation, that, at least for a full century past, the more solid tendency of the *Artes Humaniores*, in modern Europe, is due chiefly to the corrective power exercised by the disciples of Galileo, Newton, and Adam Smith.

But some of my hearers may ask, whether, in contrasting professional to liberal culture, I do not imply that that which is professional is not liberal. This needs a distinct answer:—and here it is. Professions are not originally and inherently liberal; but they may be, and ought to be, liberalized in their advancement. And they seem to me to become liberal, (1) by calling in the resources of the whole mind: (2) in particular, by infusing into their own work some sense of order and of beauty; (3) as either result or cause, inspiring the student with enthusiasm and love; (4) by nourishing sympathy and reverence for *all* Truth and *all* Beauty found in other collateral pursuits. I must dwell for a moment on each of these points.

I said, "First, by calling in the resources of the whole mind." This phrase is somewhat overstrained; and yet not so much as might at first appear. While a science is in embryo, as a mere empirical or hereditary art, it probably makes very narrow demands on the faculties; it may be even a manual art. This is extremely obvious in the case of a surgeon, or, I will say, the dentist; yet it is not less true of the navigator, nay, nor of the primitive priest, whether he was a North American medicine-man, an Etruscan sooth-sayer, a Sabine *augur*, an Oscan *popa*, a Greek ἱερεύς or μάντις,—in short, a sacrificer of cattle or observer of birds, interpreting omens by routine. When embryo knowledge first endeavours to break the shell which confines it, and expands into a nobler life, we may discern two different lines of development. In the one case, the chrysalis bursts into a butterfly, and flutters through an elegant, gaudy, short life of premature and baseless speculation, of which the earliest Greek philosophy is a type. In the other case, the art, knowledge, or skill struggles into a professional science, as was the case with Greek surgery, or English law, or the European military art. Its end being then as

directly practical as in the case of shoemaking, to effect the end satisfactorily on each separate occasion is its only paramount aim. To cure the patient, to save the interests of the client, to attain the victory, are, in the several cases, of more importance than any general principles or sentiments. Practical success being the object, and utility the highest praise of the profession, all theory is justly regarded as superfluous which does not tend to success. Those practitioners who command what is thought success in their own day, are then generally slow to believe that this much coveted success will ultimately be promoted by investigations which seem to them highly remote from the practical object. It seems to be of necessity, and not to be censurable, that in each practical profession a large part of the successful and able men are so conservative of the past, and so suspicious of mere theory as to weigh with a heavy force of inertia against all novelty of principle. In the military art, there is many an old Fabius to oppose a young Scipio. But, to cast our eyes back on either of the professions, which I have named—who, five hundred years ago, could have dreamed of the amount of science which now enters into each? The most able practical navigator is no longer the mere skilful pilot and shipmaster, but is a man on whom the various accomplishments of Humboldt, if they could be attained, would not be practically thrown away. The surgeon is still an operator; but his action is guided by a cultivation of faculties once thought wholly unpractical. I say then, that a profession becomes more and more liberal, in proportion as it is less and less narrowed to certain lines of thought, and more and more needs every side of the mind.

Secondly, with every practical development a vast mass of experience and information accrues; to remember which, and turn it to use, a certain *digestion* of the same into an orderly form is almost essential. In nothing, I believe, is the academic teacher of a practical profession of more service, than when he fuses into *order*, perhaps even into *beauty*, the crude heaps of ever-accumulating facts which seem ready to swallow up or choke the student, not less in medicine or in chemistry than in law. The human memory does sometimes show a wonderful tenacity even of unconnected fact; but its task is exceedingly lightened when order, proportion, and grace arise out of chaos: and the same fusing power of genius which invests ugliness with beauty, not only refines and liberalizes its own art and the student, but also facilitates acquisition and deepens practical knowledge.

Thirdly, I say, a profession is liberalized when it inspires the

student with enthusiasm and love for itself. This is true of the meanest occupations. It is a fundamental fact of the human mind, solacing the toil of plodding millions, that Love is the great refiner of the soul, ennobling no less than purifying. The old domestic, who lives to serve and loves the service, throws beauty into the humblest actions, and performs every function the better for loving to perform them; and while mere mercenary self-abasement is often humiliating, and even servile, the ministrations of love are intrinsically liberal. Some indeed have said, that this is the difference of the Artist and of the Artizan, that the Artist is an Artizan who loves his work for the work's own sake. If any of you desire to excel in any branch of knowledge, the first matter is, that you pursue it for its own sake, as loving it. Of course, as soon as anyone throws his *heart* into his work, he will throw into it all the faculties of his mind also; and this may in itself sometimes fulfil the intellectual conditions which tend to make it liberal—namely, if he be a man of much capacity and wide knowledge. But it must be admitted, it more frequently is otherwise. The cultivator of some special branch of knowledge or of art may have an enthusiasm for his own pursuit which makes it honourable; and yet, from the limited range of his thought, his mind may be narrowed by its very devotion; and its action will then become less fruitful from losing not only the guiding analogies of kindred subjects, but also the suggestive stimulus which experience of very opposite character might have applied.

Fourthly, therefore, we desire in the Professional man a sympathy and reverence for other pursuits besides his own. It is *il*liberal, when one science is positively jealous of the advance of another, and has a secret suspicion that the two are natural enemies. But neither is it liberal, when mutual sympathies are deficient. In fact this absence of sympathy, even when partial, is generally a mark of ignorance; and when it is pervading, it constitutes narrowness of mind and ensures some form of bigotry. Such narrowness, such bigotry are counteracted mainly in two ways; by a wide basis of education in youth, and by a wide contact with human affairs in adult life. The man enthusiastically devoted to his special profession, and even absorbed by it, is apt by the very fact to meet only that side of human life which touches his profession; hence for him in particular it is important not to have had an originally narrow range of study. Herein lies the great difficulty, and the source of the prevalent defect, of self-educated geniuses. They revolve in their own too narrow circle, and persuade themselves that the interests of the universe are

comprized within their own horizon. Such men may have the kindling element of liberal study, and a part of its refinement; but they have not the expansiveness nor the symmetry of mind which it imparts.

Peculiarly, as I suppose, to obviate this narrowness—to ensure some breadth and variety of solid knowledge, and impart some versatility of taste and power, Collegiate Instruction is valued. So strong has the popular feeling been, as to the essential dependence of its benefit on the cultivation of *all* the sciences within the same walls, that it seems impossible to get rid of the erroneous etymology, which deduces the title University from its teaching Universal science. I confess I think that this etymology, however erroneous, is prompted by a sound instinct. At the risk of seeming myself to be illiberal, I will say, that (looking to the modern acceptation of the word *College*, and all the associations it has assumed) I think it an abuse of words to entitle an institution a College, where the time allowed for study is so short, that hardly can the elements of even one subject be thoroughly acquired, and much less is it possible to cultivate all sides of the mind. We have ourselves been attacked upon the very same grounds. Many who hear me must well remember, that when these walls were first erected, it was a favourite objection from Oxford and Cambridge that this institution could not be a University (a name which it then accepted), since, by omitting the study of Theology, it disavowed the claim to teach Universal Science. I do not wish now to reopen a controversy which may be thought exhausted and dead; but my argument itself leads me to make one remark in its own justification. It is this. While I believe that Theology is destined to be a true science, and (one may add) the highest of sciences, it is at present deficient in one important practical condition of academical science—namely, the fundamental concord of its professors. Notoriously, it was this which forced the founders of this institution to resolve not to have any Chair of Theology, lest it involve the claim to have several hostile chairs, and the right of dictating to the several holders what they should teach. But such dictation subverts the very basis of science, and makes all pretence to fundamental inquiry a pernicious illusion. Hence Theology was excluded, not by the nature of the subject, but because the chaotic state of the public mind concerning it refused freedom to the teacher. If ever the religious atmosphere of England shall be pure enough and calm enough to allow, without jealousy and panic, a Professor of Theology in Oxford, who is neither directly nor indirectly

subjected to any imposed creed, all the original reasons, and (I suppose) every just reason, against the teaching of Theology within these walls also, will have vanished.

To teach or learn *universal* knowledge is of course an absurdity. All that can be meant is, that it conduces to largeness of mind to have studied the foundations of knowledge in the most important branches, especially such as are in their nature peculiarly contrasted. To have studied one foreign language remarkably unlike our own; one branch of pure mathematics, one physical science, one moral science, must better conduce to versatility and expansiveness, as also to symmetry of mind and to real power, than to have been always absorbed in a single subject. But, that a young man may be able to take in and digest a variety of knowledge in a moderate time, it is almost essential that the knowledge be presented in a didactic form—that is, in a dogmatic form; and this may rather narrow, than enlarge the mind, if *results*, instead of *processes* and *lines of thought* be submitted to it. In proportion as each professional science attains its own perfection, its elementary parts assume a form adapted for general and liberal instruction. Its high practical results may be pre-eminently popular, exciting the applause of the crowd like magical performances or divination or fireworks; but the benefit to the mind is not from these, but from insight into its *ways and means*. From this quarter it is that the special professions,—having been liberalized by the love of truth, by well ordered digestion, by contact and sympathy with one another, and having been duly restrained to cultivate their own domain by mutual respect,— contribute each their important quota towards a broad and solid basis of liberal education, and towards that sound state of public opinion which refuses to become the dupe of quackery, whether it assume the old form of astrology and magic, or that of some modern delusion. There is indeed a natural sympathy and mutual support among sham sciences, equally as among the genuine; for when the barrier against unwise credulity is once thrown down, the mind which has received one system of error is generally greedy to embrace a second. But though an entire soundness of public opinion is not yet attained, we are happily in that stage in which we may hope that at least the raw materials of future science are being accumulated by those who, like the astrologers or alchemists of past days, pursue some futile object.

Great progress has already been made towards breaking down what is in most nations the commonest of illiberal errors,—the

disparaging of knowledge which does not instantly and visibly bear practical fruit. If metaphysical science is still undervalued among us, it is *not* (I am persuaded) on this mean and untenable ground; but because of the lamentable fact, that its professors, like the theologians, have so long appeared to the public as engaged in civil war: hence a general distrust of its scientific pretensions, which can only be dispelled gradually. But the splendid instance of astronomy and pure mathematics has for ever established the wisdom of valuing general truth for its own sake, long before we know of any practical applications. It might even seem, that the deeper the root and the richer the produce, the more hidden is the relation likely to be between the two. That the noblest growths ripen their fruit slowest, is a truth long ago familiar; and if there is a backward part of the public which ill appreciates this, at any rate it has established itself well in the minds of all our academic men of science.

Perhaps this may suggest to me the topic of most importance now to press on young men who are about to study for a professional career. Liberal cultivation no longer seeks for refinement exclusively, but to develop and strengthen all the faculties of the mind. Erudition without force of understanding, is a real embarrassment. No one is so dull, so feeble, so unpractical, as a man who has more learning than good sense. What shall I call him? a David in Saul's armour? Nay, but rather, a Claudius on the throne of the Cæsars. To apply ample materials wisely, requires not merely good common sense, but uncommon sense; which, if with a few it be a gift of nature, yet is either earned or perfected not by specific professional study, but by general equable development. As a general at Balaklava, poor in the midst of abundance, choked with his own stores, helpless to use his resources,—such is the student who crams his memory with the discoveries of great minds, but neglects to develop in himself those powers by which the discoveries were made. Farther, if he would use his treasures, he must attain the art of order and arrangement, so as to have them always at command; and above all, he must be able to bring into one focus all the scattered light which may conduce to a sound judgment on each practical question. It is perhaps the same power of mind which looks through the varying symbols of abstract science, and seizes the thing signified behind, and that which looks through the superficial symptoms into the fundamental points of any practical case. I will not dogmatize on this. But I do say, that in an arduous profession, where effort must be sustained for many

years before any great success is won, to be a few years behind in knowledge of a specific and technical kind, is of small importance, in comparison with the advantages of possessing higher mental qualifications. And here let me remark, that as Oxford and Cambridge have taken some lessons from us, it may be time that we learn a lesson from them. They have discovered that fair play must be given to the various branches of knowledge, and that the effort to force all minds to march through a single narrow path, leads to straggling, desertion, and terrible losses in the rear. They have greatly enlarged the choice of sciences and subjects; and no young man can now excuse his idleness by saying that he has no taste for the particular study forced on him, and he will never be able to excel in it. But they have *not* enticed their students to commence strictly professional study at an earlier age. They are doubtless aware that variety of thought and versatile ability are best gained by a broad culture fitly called liberal; and that the mind thus prepared will afterwards show increased energy, when concentrated on some practical profession. The educated public, moreover, is not blind nor unjust. It sees that refined accomplishment not only is no hindrance, but is an aid to professional success, if specific professional study follow it; hence the favour shown to academic distinction; hence also a prevalent desire in our barristers, physicians, and clergy, that a previous literary degree should be even artificially encouraged. But the object is frustrated, if purely professional study is allowed to begin too early. Finally, I may add: the young man who is enabled to prolong his general education, and to cultivate knowledge and talent less obviously essential to the profession which he will ultimately embrace, not only provides best for professional success in the end, but becomes a more accomplished *man*, better furnished for his duties as a citizen and as a member of society. He finds no chasm to separate his lines of thought from those of the liberally educated, but is able to sympathize with all the forms of science, to understand and to learn from the most opposite quarters. This is a principal fruit of a well-chosen and persevering collegiate course; and in it we may find liberal and professional knowledge harmoniously combined.

MODERN LATIN
AS A BASIS OF INSTRUCTION.*

[From The Museum, No. IV., Jan., 1862, Edinburgh.]

It cannot be denied that the mental relations of the nineteenth century towards Greek and Latin literature differ widely from those of the sixteenth. At the earlier era that literature was the noblest existing, and was the only material for high education. Whoever aspired to be educated learned the two languages, not for their own sakes, but as keys to a literature otherwise inaccessible. But in the course of three centuries, the moderns, lifted above the ancients on vantage-ground, have far surpassed their teachers. The new literature of at least three nations, built upon new science, has a solidity and accuracy with which Greeks and Romans cannot possibly compete. Hence the inevitable result, that even with the most active-minded men, who really mastered Greek and Latin in their youth, it is a rare thing to study any part of the literature in their manhood. Neither statesmen nor magistrates are addicted to the systematic perusal of Tacitus, Livy, or Cicero; much less to extend their reading of Aristotle, Plato or Polybius, Demosthenes or Euripides, beyond what they read at college. The enormous fecundity of each year pours out a mass of literature with which no one can keep up, and makes it difficult to find time for the thorough study of our own great writers recently departed—Hallam, Mackintosh, Burke, and many others. In such a state of things it would be untruthful and absurd to say that the British youth *collectively* learn, or ought to learn, the Latin or the Greek language for the sake of the literature.

I am aware that in England, Germany, and even in France, it is avowed by the best judges, that no one attains the highest education of the day, who is not master of the Greek as well as of the Latin language. This verdict I have no thought of contesting; indeed I thoroughly believe it, as applied to Europeans. But two remarks are here suggested. First, That a main reason with us for learning these languages, and especially Latin, rises out of our *history;* a sufficient mark of which is, that no one recommends the natives of India to make these languages the

* I may be allowed to mention that these pages were written before the Second Number of *The Museum* had appeared.

basis of high education. Secondly, In considering the general question of school teaching, we are concerned with boys and men in general, not with those who are to have the highest education accessible, which is indeed incompatible with any early and complete immersion in practical life, however noble and honourable. From the vastness of modern knowledge, and from the exigencies of professions and trades, it is certain that the very great majority will terminate their Latin and Greek studies with their collegiate or school-reading. Hence the common utility of these languages now ends in themselves, and is independent of the literature, except to theologians, antiquaries, and professed men of letters.

This total change of relation between ourselves and the classical literature would of itself demand reconsideration of the modes used for the acquisition of the languages. But, while asserting this, I am not ignorant that no fundamental change could be effected except in the course of a long time. Schools, like national polities, have their roots in the past, and move on by a force of routine which may be guided or modified, but cannot be thwarted. If in what follows I seem to suggest radical alterations, let it be understood that I am aware how little *immediate* change is possible to individual teachers; and how often eccentricity may be a mischief hurtful to pupils. Still, a thorough knowledge of right principles, even when we cannot apply them, must in the long-run tend to practical improvement.

The examinations conducted all over the country, under the influence of Oxford and Cambridge, are already doing what they intended,—to put the screw upon private schools; but with some results which they probably did *not* intend. To produce pupils who will pass the examination with credit is becoming essential to the success of the schoolmaster in his trade, and the immediate danger is that of perfunctory teaching. In whatever book an examination is to be conducted, that book (I am told) is selected as the special and almost the exclusive topic of study. The complaint was made to me lately, by a highly intelligent under-master of a school, that the pupils who are to be examined occupy a most unreasonable proportion of the masters' time, and yet have less time themselves for each separate subject than before. A boy who has to learn a book of Cæsar is put to it (as I understand) *forthwith*, and the whole effort is narrowed to it. I do not at all assert that this is universal, but my experience of a like tendency in the examinations at London University makes me jealous of it.

Let it be considered how far such a method would recommend itself in a real and practical case. Suppose for instance, a

Frenchman to present himself to us, with the request that we should teach him English, in order that he might be able to read our literature. Even if he were to specify certain modern authors, as Hallam, Carlyle, Walter Scott, and Tennyson, we should not forthwith take one of these as the text-book, furnish him with grammar and dictionary, and, while the pupil was yet in the mere rudiments, exact of him to construe and translate. But we should reply to him: "Well! you wish to read this and that *writer:* I will teach you the *language* first, afterwards you will be able to read what you please; or whatever difficulties in detail remain (such as often meet natives themselves), will more easily be solved." Instead of plunging him into complicated prose, or highly condensed and peculiar poetry, we should at first teach him everything which was easiest, shortest, and commonest, aware that to postpone difficulties is almost equivalent to removing them. Nor can this remark be set aside by replying that our problem is that of a dead, not of a living language. This circumstance, no doubt, immensely increases difficulty to the learner, by depriving him of a thousand means of learning; but so far from its being a reason for voluntarily plunging him into hard books, it is an additional reason for trying to confine him long and sedulously to easy books. We cannot attain the facilities of a living language; yet, the more we can assimilate our methods to the ease of the natural method of learning, the better for the pupil. That we cannot do this entirely, is due primarily to want of accomplishment in the teacher, who, having nobody to talk Latin and Greek to him, every day and on every subject, with the accuracy of natives, cannot possibly acquire anything approaching to the readiness and the certainty of a native.

Really and fully to know a language is indeed an immense attainment, so many styles does it embrace. To say nothing of technical words, known only within the precincts of particular arts, trades, sciences, professions; to say nothing of provincialisms and of slang, there remain polite talk, formal prose, diplomatic language, poetry, old poetry, old style of speech or books, and the language of children and servants. All of these must be discriminated. No educated man speaks to a child or a servant exactly as to his equal, and in speaking to his equal he sets the pitch of his diction according to the subject. To gain a delicate feeling of all these distinctions is a vast and arduous enterprize. In a dead language we in fact do not aspire to the whole of it. Most of us lessen the difficulty of our problem by limiting our ambition. Yet (confining the view to Latin) we have

at least to learn three kinds of style: 1. The simplest admissible, whether it be that of polite conversation, differing not much from Terence, or whether it be the epistolary. 2. The involved prose of Cicero or of Livy. 3. The poetical style, with its harsh dislocation of words. Now, inasmuch as *to take difficulties one by one* is of all things most important in all learning, it must be of great value to have an intimate acquaintance with the right order of words before we are embarrassed with a new order assumed by license. In fact, it would be well to learn, if possible, in the *natural* succession of difficulties; that is, as a Roman child learnt. What this order was we can pretty well judge. First, A very limited vocabulary of nouns and verbs was picked up, with a very complete stock of prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, numerals, and adverbs of time, place, and degree. Secondly, The few nouns and verbs were subject to very various inflexion, so that nearly all the grammatical forms became familiar in connexion with them, while the sentences remained very simple. Thirdly, Inversion of words in obedience to emphasis was learnt. Fourthly, The vocabulary was gradually enlarged. Fifthly, Poetical inversion was learnt. Sixthly, Sentences with more and more complication in the clauses were admitted. The last thing, I apprehend, was to understand condensed complication, such as Livy and Horace so freely employ. I do not say that exactly this order either was necessary or is desirable; but the natural principle is both obvious and important, *to learn idiom fundamentally by the often-repeated use of a limited stock of words, and by very simple sentences.* The words in daily use with a Roman child sufficed to give cardinal types of every sort of inflexion. The principal uses of even the subjunctive mood and of the infinitive were learnt, and can be learnt, in sentences which have *never more than two clauses.* In this respect, and in some others, it is certainly possible for us to come nearer to the natural order than our scholastic routine attempts.

How great is the superiority of the natural method, is indicated by the fact that it never strains the brain. Children may learn two languages, or even three at once; and this, if these are spoken to them by different individuals, without confusion, and without being less able to learn other things. Memory is aided, because imagination connects the words with a person, a scene, and events; and, little by little, the utility of speech calls forth active efforts in the learner. No abstract rules are given by nature, but endless examples; and infinite reiteration impresses phrases as well as words on the memory. These are precious

advantages, some of which we can partially attain, and used to attain in the old-fashioned mode of teaching, which has been abandoned as unphilosophical. Comparing the methods of teaching Latin, which are peculiarly modern, with those which they have to a great extent superseded, I confess myself in favour of the *principles* which underlie the older and generally despised routine. And this is the first point which I desire clearly to explain.

I assume that the learner is young,—is at a time of life at which memory is capacious and unpreoccupied, while the abstract powers and the judgment are very immature. The old grammars, I admit, contained some superfluous attempts at philosophic procedure, such as *definitions* of the cases, and of the subjunctive mood; but these were, I believe, generally left in suspense. They were learnt to be said, not to be understood, and therefore gave little trouble; if the pupil could say them off, no further question was asked. But in general the old method was one of repetition: *it dealt immensely in committing Latin to memory.* Ridiculous as was the system of giving to boys a Latin syntax in the Latin language, it at any rate did accustom them to the reiteration of a small number of words, expressed in very simple sentences, and conveying knowledge *of immediate utility.* In every grammar the classified examples to a rule are of much greater value than the rule itself, which they explain or even supersede. These, I presume, are in every case committed to memory, even in the most modern use of the grammar; though I have met advocates of the modern "philosophical" method, who maintain that the grammar should not be learned by heart, but be consulted at the pupil's pleasure as a mere book of reference. Such, no doubt, is the general use of a grammar which every grown man makes. While I nevertheless believe that at most schools the boys still learn grammar by heart, I venture to remark that the newer method of teaching, so far as known to me, has immensely lessened the *quantity* of Latin which is thus learned. At school I myself was taught in what would now be called a loose and unphilosophical way, but it was very effective. We learned to repeat great masses of Latin poetry, besides the grotesque "Propria quæ maribus," and "As in præsenti," with the Latin syntax. Moreover, we learned Latin vocabulary, both of nouns and of verbs; nor can I remember that we thought it slavish and stupid, as it might seem to an adult. I never meet with such a thing as a Latin vocabulary now, even as a book of reference; yet if well executed, it is very valuable as giving the specific differences of words which learners

wrongly imagine to be identical. I am not now advising that vocabulary should be learned, though I believe it imparted to us a readier command of words. We also learned by heart Latin dialogues, of modern composition, and all who rose to the highest class learnt, or heard and understood, from one to four plays of Terence. Of prose Latin we scrambled through great quantities in the course of several years; since every day brought its lesson, and no effort was made at any profounder explanation than that of "parsing." One day in every week every boy was subject to examination by the head-master as to all that had been learnt in the week; and perpetual repetition, with a minimum of assistance from a teacher, familiarized even dull boys with the facts of the language. Such teaching left them ignorant of the philosophy of the syntax and etymology, no doubt; but so are natives prevailingly ignorant; and surely it is best, especially for young minds, to learn the facts first: the philosophy is then easily superadded. I am jealous lest any try to make the philosophy come first. In the present day schools seem to me ambitious to do the work of college: one symptom of the tendency is the extensive disuse of committing masses of Latin to memory. Against this disuse I wish earnestly to protest. Nothing is easier to boys than such learning, even when the thing learned is uninteresting, or is in prose; yet, as I shall presently insist, means should be taken of making it interesting, and instructive, and rhythmical. Moreover, since we cannot talk Latin as we talk in a living tongue, we can the less afford to lose the partial compensation which is afforded by learning off whole pages of Latin writing.

Before further opening what I wish to recommend, I have a few words to say in defence of *modern Latin* as the basis of text-books: for here I encounter a great modern prejudice. Three centuries ago, when Latin was the medium of practical oratory as well as of writing, a great deal of teaching went on by word of mouth as well as by modern dialogues; but in recent years this has not only been discontinued, but has been visited with pointed censure. Elementary books pride themselves on exterminating all modern Latin, because (they say) "everybody but a native is liable to make small blunders: one cannot *trust* even the best of modern scholars." This has been said by very respectable authorities. I do not intend disrespect to them in saying that I think it to be an argument quite misplaced, inconclusive, and misleading. For I cannot imagine that any one who uses it would scruple to concede to me that an ancient Spaniard who

went to Rome to learn Latin, or even who learned it from a Roman crew and Roman settlers, learned it to great advantage as compared to ourselves. Consider then the practical position of a Spaniard who landed at the mouth of the Tiber when Cicero was in his prime. Even if he found some Roman scribe or freedman to give him lessons in grammar, it was not in this that he had the chief advantage over us, but in hearing Latin talked every hour of the day. But whom did he hear, and what? First, The talk of slaves, which is not likely to have come nearer to good Latin than the talk of African domestics in the West Indies to good English. Next, The talk of foreigners innumerable, who had picked up the tongue imperfectly, and without grammatical cultivation. Thirdly, He heard Italian provincials who were little else than foreigners, their fathers at least having talked Oscan or Etruscan as their mother-tongue. Fourthly, Men of genuine Latin birth, yet of lower than aristocratic rank, and wholly destitute of scholastic training. Considering the extreme difficulty of talking so complicated a language with grammatical correctness in any but the shortest sentences, we may feel certain that our Spaniard hour by hour would hear errors fully equalling (probably far surpassing) the worst blunders made in English by peasants of the counties whose speech deviates least from our standard tongue. I do not claim much for modern scholars, or for myself as an individual, in saying that such errors as alone we could commit in a book, deliberately written and printed, would be small and quite microscopic compared to those which were heard every hour in the streets and shops of Rome. But such errors never vitiate the tongue of the hearer unless they are fixed provincialisms consistently reiterated. The disadvantage of having to hear them is as nothing compared to the advantage of learning words and phrases *in great quantity*, and *in such connexions as impress the imagination and excite interest.* In short, in the natural and most effective mode of learning, a pupil is not taught everything perfect from the beginning. Very much of error is poured in upon him, which, if he imbibe, he has afterwards to unlearn; but if, in anxiety lest he should imbibe error, our Spaniard had stopped his ears to all but the few who spoke as Cicero and Brutus, he would have sacrificed all the advantages which he possessed over us, except in the rare case of his actually living as a friend, and socially an equal, in the bosom of an aristocratic family. Not but that even there the children, accustomed to talk with slaves, and untrained as yet in grammar, would let drop many a solecism.

It is therefore most unreasonable to object against modern Latin, that we cannot be sure of its being perfect, as though this were a sufficient reason for exploding it. Not a fraction of the English boys who learn the language can be expected ever to attain the same amount of knowledge in it as is possessed by all superior teachers; and however far short this may be of Ciceronian perfection, it would be a great thing to impart. If therefore a modern Latin literature were proposed as the elementary text-book for learners, the sole question which need be asked concerning its purity is—"Will it aid a pupil to learn the language as well as our superior scholars know it?" If, indeed, it gave no other aid than Cæsar, or Cicero, or Livy can give, then it would be gratuitous and unmeaning. But if it will lead more easily and rapidly, more pleasantly and usefully, to that point of attainment which will enable the reader at his pleasure to peruse either Cicero or Livy, then it will fulfil for us the same function as the talk of Roman slaves and provincials fulfilled to a Spaniard, and certainly with very far less risk of teaching error.

Men may, or may not, value the existing Latin literature. They may wish to read one or two choice parts of it,—selections of Virgil, Horace, Tacitus, Livy, Cicero; or they may desire to pursue the study extensively, or they may be quite indifferent to the literature as such, and care solely for the language. Whichever case may be supposed, but little of the literature can be actually read while the student is a pupil; and in every case, to learn the *language* while he is a pupil, whether for its own sake only or also for the literature, must be the chief effort, and, if attained, is surely the chief reward. Not that I have the least wish or thought of excluding from the *highest* class of an ideal school choice portions of the ancient writers; only, in the earlier stages of learning, I think they involve far too many difficulties, and therefore do not furnish the best steps towards an understanding of themselves.

Of course, I am aware that many persons extol the difficulties as an advantageous exercise of mind. To walk straight up the steep of a mountain is a great exercise of muscle, of heart, and of lungs; so great, indeed, that to go round by a road four times as long, which ascends gradually, not only tires less, but probably consumes less time. As in mountain ascents there is no danger of not getting enough fatigue, so in the learning of languages we need not fear deficiency of difficulties, the benefit of which to the mind I admit and maintain, provided always that they are taken separately. But in modern literature we are universally agreed

that the shortest way to the end is one in appearance roundabout: and I contend that the same thing is to be believed still more emphatically concerning ancient literature. The changes which have taken place in religion and in philosophy, in the organization of society, in geographical nomenclature, in the division of States, in mechanical and chemical art, in the habits of life, in law and in executive government, with all the allusions to history and mythology, present a thousand difficulties in ancient writings over and above those which are involved in the mere language. After the language is, up to a certain point, familiar, these very things are found to be interesting, because they impart information: but while the language is quite new, they exceedingly embarrass and impede. In the natural process of learning we guess what is meant, and are helped out by it, and even learn from the beginning by this alone; as when any one with gestures says in a foreign tongue, Come hither! or, Give me. When we cannot guess what is meant, we are slower in learning the tongue: hence whatever is thoroughly foreign in thought, and lies beyond the beat of our knowledge, impedes the learning. It is true that, by aid of a translation and ample notes, if they are read *before* the learner attacks a piece of ancient literature (suppose, a speech of Cicero), this source of difficulty may be removed; though many teachers (wrongly, as I think) would deprecate the process. But in that case a boy has to learn the laws and constitution and manners of Rome, and much of history, as well as to grapple with the language; and this, by lessening the quantity learned, must gravely retard his progress. One of the many great advantages, inferior to none other, of the natural method, lies in the enormous mass of words poured in upon the ear incessantly, *with reiteration before there is time to forget*. If we can dispense awhile with the effort needed for learning the facts of the old world, we may considerably increase the quantity of Latin learned, and thereby the better fix it in the memory.

Again, to take *interest* in Latin literature is perhaps a peculiar taste. To a powerful and well-prepared mind it is hard to say what may not be interesting. A Treatise on Formal Logic, on Mathematical Notation, on Criminal Law, on Prevalent Diseases, may have a high interest: so, too, have Tacitus, Cicero, and even Cæsar to some minds. But to the majority, to the uninformed and to the young, the greater part of these writers is extremely dull, and not least what is most read at schools:—the Gallic War, the Germania, the Cato Major, and the Laelius; also the Catalina of Sallust. Ovid always seemed to me stupid in the

extreme, even when it is not too difficult. Horace's Odes are, many of them, gems of perfection as regards mere language; but when their whole compass is so small, and they can be read in so very moderate a time by one already advanced in the language, nothing whatever is to be gained by prematurely encountering their very numerous difficulties, which must seriously lower their interest to the learner. Now, precisely because in dealing with a dead language we cannot supply that stimulus which utility gives to a living tongue (as, when we wish to ask a foreigner for something, or to impart or learn something of immediate importance), it is therefore the more urgent to secure other grounds of interest in the dead language,—such as is given by the perception of Beauty. So valuable is this, as often to outweigh the objection derived from the difficulties of poetry, when they are not extreme or too various in kind. For, that which the mind admires dwells on the imagination and inheres more easily in the memory; and to get a book, the substance of which interests the learner, is a great help to the acquisition of the tongue. On this ground, if I rightly remember, Professor Pillans has strongly advised Q. Curtius as a school book. That its interest gives it a high advantage over Cæsar, I readily believe, if the condensed style does not make it too difficult.

Having tried to remove *à priori* objections to modern Latin, I proceed to state in what way we may nearest approach to that order of learning, which (according to my own experience in several languages) gives to the learner the greatest command of the tongue in the shortest time, and with the shortest effort. I will add, that I am brought to the same conclusion from *one* modern language which I learned in the country, and from *two* other languages which I have never heard pronounced. Whether the language is learned scholastically or orally, the same order of learning seems to me the easiest.

I begin by very easy sentences, containing a full apparatus of pronouns (personal, possessive, interrogative, demonstrative), pronominal adverbs of place, time, manner, quantity, etc., joined in the first instance to no verb but the verb To Be (which in some languages indeed is often omissible). With these should be combined a select number of the commonest nouns. This is my idea of the earliest Delectus, which indeed may precede anything grammatical. When a language has no cases, prepositions may also be learned in the first stage: but in Latin, this must be a little delayed. What I have written might suffice: but many readers will feel it easier to read my own examples, than to make

examples themselves; I therefore add illustrations, omitting the English, which of course would be presented to a learner along with the Latin.

Hic ego sum.
Ubinam es tu?
Quis est hic vir?
Quænam est hæc mulier?
Quid est illud?
An tu es illic?
Hic non est illic.
Hoc est meum.
Ubinam est tuum?
Anne hoc est tuum?
Non meum est.
Ubi est liber meus?
Liber tuus est apud me.
Ille est pater meus.
Pater meus hic est.
Pater tuus foris est.
Mater mea domi est.
Tu meus es pater.
Ego tuus sum filius.
Unde tu es?
Quare tu hic eras?
An ille hic erat?
Num tu hic es?
Quando ille hic erit?
Hic nos nunc sumus.
Illic vos nunc estis.
Ibi illi nunc sunt.
Ubinam ille mox erit?
Num tu ibi eris?
Nunquam ego illic ero.
Quis pater tuus est?
Au hicce est pater tuus?

Quidnam horum est tuum?
Utrum horum est tuum?
Numquid horum tuum est?
Hi sunt nostri cives.
Hic est noster civis.
Fuit ille civis noster.
Vester civis illic erat.
Numquis est illic?
Aliquis est apud vos
Quis ergo ibi est?
Nemo hic est.
Omnino haud quisquam.
Nihil illic erat.
Hæc sunt mea.
Illa erant tua.
Omnia hic sunt nostra.
Mox erunt vestra.
Vestra sunt apud nos.
Mea sunt apud te.
Quot estis?
Quantum apud te est?
Qualis est hic vir?
Quale est hoc?
Quot erant illi?
Ut tu es, sic est ille.
Hoc est, sicut illud.
Hæc sunt, velut illa.
Tu es mihi tanquam pater.
Hic est alius.
Hoc est aliud.
Ille est alter.

The pronouns *sui*, *suus* can hardly be used in this stage, nor can *quispiam*, *iste*, and some others. When the principal pronouns are thoroughly learned, I apprehend that it will be expedient to proceed to learn all the personal pronouns, and *hic* and *ille*, *through all their cases*, and the declension of many very common nouns, in conjunction with these, or with possessives. I mean that while one boy would have to decline *hic equus*, *hujus equi*, *huic equo*, etc., another would say *meus pater*, *mei patris*, a third, *illud regnum*, *illius regni*, etc. This habit of connecting some pronoun with a substantive appears to fix its gender in the memory much better than is done by technical rules which rest on no principle.

This leads me to remark, that in French and German no error from a foreigner is thought more venial than mistake as to the gender of a noun. To attain a sound knowledge of words, and good idiom, are the cardinal virtues, which atone for all other defects. Surely it cannot be wise to reverse this judgment in Latin: to visit severely on boys everything which can be called a "grammatical" error, while we in mere despair are lenient towards error

in idiom. Of course there *are* grammatical errors which imply a total want of reading; as a mistake in the mode of conjugating the commonest verbs in the language, as to which there is no variety in the classics. But in other cases a grammatical error may be the least which can be committed. Indeed a scholar who disuses a language, and returns to it after awhile, finds that though its idiom is natural to him, and its sense clear, he is often embarrassed with many small doubts: he asks perhaps what is the gender of *cupido*, of *dies*,—knows there was some puzzle about it, and perhaps cannot remember what.

When the cases of a moderate number of nouns are known, small sentences should be constructed introducing principally the *imperatives* of verbs, and perhaps the whole present tense of *habeo*, joined with various prepositions and personal pronouns. I mean such as the following:—

Da mihi librum meum.	Habeo apud me nihil.
Duc me ad patrem meum.	Habet multa secum.
Mitte has epistolas.	Habent omnia apud se.
Fer opem mihi extemplo.	Habent nihil secum, etc., etc.

In a language which we need to *talk*, a full knowledge of all the numerals is wanted as early as anything else; but in Latin a moderate number at first suffices: say, the ten first cardinals and ordinals, with 20, 30, 40 . . . 90, 100, 1000. But these should become *very* familiar. After this, my own experience would suggest that a young pupil should actually learn off, but an adult (or one who learns with the heart and intelligence of an adult) should keep under his eye, and often refer to, a full table of the commonest adverbs and conjunctions, classified in some convenient way. Such are:—

Hic.	Quomodo?	Nunc.	Multum.	Prope.
Hinc.	Quare.	Tunc.	Parum.	Longe.
Huc.	Cur.	Jam.	Paullum.	Procul.
Illic.	Quamobrem.	Mox.	Parumper.	
Illinc.	Quapropter.	Dudum.	Vix.	
Illuc.	Quemadmodum.	Diu.	Fere.	Hodie.
Istic.		Nunquam.	Duntaxat.	Cras.
Istinc.	Tanquam.	Semper.	Tantum.	Heri.
Istuc.	Quamquam.	Pridem.	Modo.	Mane.
Ibi.	Is—qui.	Paulisper.	Nonnisi.	Vesperi.
Ubi.	Tot—quot.	Illico.	Pæne.	
Ubinam?	Tantum—quantum	Extemplo.	Valde.	Quum.
Ubi?	Talis—qualis.	Stătim.		Quando.
Unde.	Quisquis.	Continuo.		Simul ut.
Unde?	Quicunque.	Postea.		Simul ac.
Quò.	Non—quidquam.	Antea.		Ut primum.
Quonam?	Non—ullus.			Si quis.
	Nullus.			Si quando, etc.

All this first part of learning belongs to Preparatory Grammar, which should not attempt to be exhaustive, and should be such as mere memory is easily able to take in. But I proceed from this to the question of the first Reading-Book.

This I should wish to consist of easy dialogues, or letters conveying a narrative, on some topic in which the ancient world had nothing fundamentally different from what we now see and know. For instance, one of the talkers might give an account of a journey, or any story which conveys information. *The essential thing is, that no sentence should consist of more than two clauses*, and the participle and the infinitive mood should be carefully restricted to the simplest cases. (The verb *Dico*, followed by the infinitive, may be translated *Declare*, in order to keep the English infinitive, until the pupil is familiarized with the idiom: as, *Dixit se velle*, He declared himself to be willing. So, *Scio eum fecisse*, I know him to have done; *Scivi eum ire*, I knew him to go.) Any small tales, fables, mythi, of Germany, Greece, or England, that are about as long as a fable of Æsop, but are neither hackneyed nor stupid, would serve as good material. Perhaps some passages of Terence and other old classics, carefully selected, might also be found easy enough to be added. Nevertheless, I must pointedly add, that much that is called *idiom* in the old classics ought to be postponed as long as possible, because it involves needless difficulty. Terence and Cicero, the two greatest types, have plenty of these peculiarities, not needful to true pure Latin; which should be *withheld* until the pupil is familiar with the material and the essential peculiarities of the grammar.

Here also, the remark is in place, and I think is important, that *very short pieces complete in themselves* draw out effort from the learner much better than long compositions. Even with elder pupils in a college every new book is a relief: a large part of a class is tired by anything so long as even a book of Virgil, and is very glad of a change. An intelligent learner, for some time self-educated, told me that in spite of the great difficulties in Horace's Odes, their shortness had been an invaluable stimulus to the study. Every time the learner *finishes* something, he seems to have made a real step; and he pauses with satisfaction as one who is ascending a mountain rests and looks down from a piece of flat ground. I will not here spend more words on the topic, though I believe it deserves an attention which it has never yet received.

At the same time, specific words should be translated specific-

ally, and sentences should be rejected in which the English is thereby made too enigmatic. I mean, for instance, that *Unda* should be always rendered wave, and never water; *Vis* should be rendered force, and never strength; *Robur* should be rendered stoutness, and never strength, etc. Unless this is done, young students will almost infallibly carry off a false notion of the meaning and use of words.

But the more important question is, What should be learned by heart? For it ought to have both *intrinsic interest* and *moral excellence:* it ought to deserve to dwell in the imagination, and remain permanently in the memory. For this, it ought not to be merely morally harmless; the sentiments should be such as one can regard to be positively good and pleasing. Then again, it should have something of beauty; and, to aid the memory, something of rhythm. My notion is, that we ought to select a large number of elegant, easy, pleasing pieces of *English* poetry, each short and complete in itself,— all of which ought to be learned off, and with each of them its close translation into Latin poetical style, without metre, but with such rhythm as its correspondence to the English would easily suggest. The knowledge of the English would aid to imprint the Latin in the memory, and this would furnish the pupil with a great amount of Latin diction, by a process far more pleasing, not only than the learning of vocabulary, but also than the learning of Latin poetry, which is so often alien to our sentiment and judgment; besides that we should be able to avoid those extreme entanglements of words, which often make Latin poetry an enigma to the learner. I have made attempts myself in the following manner:—I employed two young persons to select pleasing pieces of English poetry, distrusting my own sole taste, and then translated them into Latin. Having put them into the hands of one who had not read much of Latin poetry, I requested to have all passages marked which were thought obscure.* By some such process, I think it would not be difficult to correct and correct, until the translations were extremely perspicuous. It afterwards occurred to me that Longfellow's Hiawatha, though by reason of the monotonous rhythm it is less suitable in English to learn by heart, contained excellent material for instructive Latin, if

* I have since published my Latin verse translations, and my version of "Hiawatha." I had for twenty years had in MS. my Latin "Robinson Crusoe," but had had from the public and from the literary press no such notice as to encourage me to publish it. Yet at last I did publish it in 1884.

occasionally abridged. This poem I accordingly translated; and, until something better shall have been thought of, I feel sure that a vast deal might be learned from it with more pleasure and ease than from poems which excite no interest in a pupil.* Further, it seems to me that we want what I may call a Latin novel or romance; that is, a pleasing *tale of fiction*, which shall convey numerous Latin words which do not easily find a place in poetry, history, or philosophy. Nothing has struck me as being so much to the purpose as an imitation of the story of Robinson Crusoe, which brings in much that is technical to special occupations, as in nautical affairs, carpentering, fowling, pottery, basket-making, agriculture, etc. But the main point on which I would insist is, that the style should be as simple as that of Terence, of course without its elliptical or allusive character. If any one had genius to produce in Terentian style Latin comedies worthy of engaging the minds and hearts of youth (for I can never read a play of Terence to a young class without the heart-ache), I should regard this as a valuable contribution.

Finally, I am disposed to believe that a learner gains much from seeing difficult pieces of English prose (or poetry) well translated into Latin, provided that the translation is very close to the original; but otherwise it does not instruct. Nothing else so clearly marks the diversity of the two languages.

My general persuasion is, that if during two years the usual proportion of school time devoted to Latin were employed on such a plan as I have indicated—*that which has been learned by heart being of course proved and checked by questionings and "parsings"*—in a third year the learner would find he had so grasped the material of the language, that with moderate effort any Latin author would be within his reach, except so far as the subject was intrinsically obscure. He would still need to learn peculiar usages of words, which, though common in some of the very best authors are undesirably ambiguous; not only nouns and verbs in plenty, such as *consilium*, *imperium*, *recipio*, etc., but what is worse, conjunctions, such as the *quum* in Cicero; or the use of *ut-ita*, for *quamquam—tamen* in Livy and Tacitus. Smaller peculiarities of style would make a dictionary occasionally needful; yet, I believe, a youth of average talent would find himself nearly independent of a teacher (as far as the mere language was con-

* I could corroborate this from experience, if I felt free to speak in detail of the case of one young lady, who was induced to study Latin by falling in with a MS. portion of my translation.

cerned) after the course which I have indicated. He would also be fully prepared in his third year to receive philosophical views both of etymology and of syntax, such as the modern grammarians develop.

It is for my reader to consider what weight there is in these considerations; and if he approve of anything which I have written, to give his moral influence in that direction whenever the practical occasion is offered.

ON FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

[Bristol, 1867.]

The popular classification, modified from that of the old Greeks, divides governments into royalties and republics; subdivides royalty on the one hand into elective and hereditary, on the other into despotic and constitutional. Republics are subdivided into aristocracies and democracies; and perhaps aristocracies again into close or oligarchical, and open or liberal. Some such nomenclature we must use for conciseness, although we may be thoroughly aware of its insufficiency. That governments bearing the same name often differ widely, must be notorious even to those who are not students of history. A superficial acquaintance with the newspaper must make us aware that constitutional royalty is not quite the same in Spain as in England. But to know that there are differences is one thing, and to know whither to look for the causes of difference, for the active forces, is another thing. To give some aid in this research, is my present object.

Let me begin with Monarchy.

Consider the position of an Arab chieftain. Whether his descent from a previous chieftain is or is not a decisive weight in accepting him as chief, yet, as he holds his post for life, he is really a king; a *regulus*, as Latins would say, if not a *rex*. His functions are, to be judge, and captain in war, and to guide the movements of the tribe for pasture, and for occasional agriculture or traffic. A boy or a woman or a weak man would not suit; hence the succession cannot be fixed; the elective principle must have some play. Towards the foreigner he is supreme, and his decisions are unquestioned. Even at home his rule might seem arbitrary, no written limitations or coronation oath being thought of, and no organs having been invented to check or punish tyranny. But his people are armed, they are homogeneous, and they are few. They are known to one another, they have close mutual sympathies. In such a condition, the tyranny of a chief against *one* is keenly resented by *all*. Old custom gives them an idea of notorious right. All feel themselves under the rule of law, and not of caprice; and for military necessity are willing that the law should be very severe. Thus they have as full a sense of internal freedom and of manliness as we can

have; and it is seldom that any real tyranny of a chief can last long, since his whole power depends on the good will of his tribe.

But let that happen, which has been commoner among Tartars than Arabs. Let one tribe conquer other tribes; let the conquering chieftain or his son and grandson become lord of many tribes, little known to one another, and having but feeble mutual sympathy. The pride of the monarch is swollen by the wide extent of his sway. The severities of war, necessary to constrain submission and retain conquest, habituate the conquering tribe to commit ruthless deeds without criticism or scruple. The restraints against injustice and tyranny are thrown down, as regards a majority of the subjects. Ere long, when a new generation has grown up under vassalage, the king finds that he could if the occasion arose, arm them against his own tribe; nor can his power to do this remain a secret. In this way a real despotism grows up, even though all the subjects be armed warriors, with no other home than a camp. Want of homogeneity in the subject races is here the cardinal point which has elevated the ruler above law and turned the people into mere vassals.

If this simple case be clearly understood, and duly fixed in the mind, it will furnish us with an easy key to the action of institutions far more complicated. In this connection I may observe, that there is a stone with which the Englishman often pelts the French. We say, that "they love equality more than freedom." I am not about to applaud the theory, which bids us long for a judicious despot; but I would suggest, that the phenomenon criticized by us in the French admits of another interpretation. To define political freedom is very hard, and therefore it is so hard to combine the efforts of multitudes for its attainment; but to suppress privilege is an idea distinct and intelligible, and the suppression is sometimes either a useful step towards freedom or an important instalment. Legislators cannot always go right; but the surest way to take the sting out of bad laws is, to insist that the mischief shall be universal. When their sting is felt by the legislators themselves, relief is not far distant. But let me appeal to a case nearer home than France. When William the Norman, having stept into the place of King of England, irritated the English into local revolts and conquered them in detail by his foreign troops, the Saxons were largely dispossessed and degraded, and could form no organization able to throw off their conqueror. The first relief came from quarrels between Norman princes, who were driven to bid for Saxon support; but no firm liberty was possible, until the Normans felt the King's

power very painfully, and fused their own cause into that of the Saxons. To make Norman and Saxon *equal before the law* was a first necessary step towards freedom. First, it saved the Saxon from much oppression in detail; next, it produced a homogeneous nation, all equally interested to resist encroachments of the King. To aim at equality as the first object in order of time, was consistent with esteeming freedom as higher in importance.

From the Norman and Saxon era, let us pass to the Ottoman empire. The Ottomans were a Turkoman or Tartar people, who, after conquering the area which we now call Turkey, took up all Mussulmans into the ruling race, but gave to Christians toleration only, and refused to them the right to carry arms. Being exempted from military service, and not severely taxed by the imperial government, the Christians might seem to have some advantage over the Mussulman. All such reasoning proceeds on happy ignorance of suffering under despotism. Except under ferocious madmen, such as history teaches us to have sometimes disgraced thrones and appalled mankind, the chief sufferings come to a subject people, not from the intended injustice of the supreme despot, but from the underlings of despotism, or from unequal law, and still more from the haughtiness of a favoured race. Where the superior race or order carries arms in daily life, and the inferior orders are forbidden to carry arms, the whole country is, as it were, permanently pressed down under an army of occupation. An armed race, under no military responsibility, thinks it has a natural right to command, to be insolent, and if insolently answered, to repay words with blows; and as the courts of law are sure to be in the exclusive possession of the ruling race, redress can only in very extreme cases be attained for the violences of arrogance. The subject race is hereby perpetually humiliated, perpetually reminded of its subjugation. To overthrow the privilege of the superior order, to introduce practical equality, is in itself of greater moment than to lessen the imperial despotism; nay, it may even be strictly beneficial to the subject races to *intensify* that despotism, if this be an essential prerequisite for crushing the privileges of an order. The Sultan's best intended edicts have hitherto proved ineffectual, because he cannot enforce them upon the Ottomans.

This will suffice to indicate how very much more complicated are the existing constitutions of the world than our nomenclature expresses. Where a people is not homogeneous, but is divided into castes or orders, two or three constitutions may co-exist. The rule of an old Egyptian king over the warrior caste was

comparable to that of our Henry II. over his barons great and small. The relations of the same King to the priestly or literary caste was perhaps not unlike that of William III. of England to his Parliament. But the lower castes were under threefold despotism,—the despotism of a king, the despotism of brigands, and the despotism of an aristocracy. Only it was softened by the fact of being a native despotism, and we may presume that hereditary religious law secured to the lowest people their scanty but well-understood rights. The king was to them a deliverer.

A topic which cannot come forward at all in a very small state, whatever its organic name, is of the utmost importance in a large state or rather empire; I mean the extent to which the management of revenue is centralized. The empires of the ancient Persians and of the modern Ottomans, with huge faults, had the merit of often leaving large local self-government to subject populations, either placing natives in authority over them, or leaving them to construct their own organization. To gratify the conquered by respecting their manners, laws and innocent habits, is of course good; but to reserve funds, sacred to the locality, for the repair of roads and bridges, aqueducts, canals and tanks, is even of vital importance. When an Indian community is annexed to the English dominion, and in consequence its upper classes are forthwith ejected in mass from high office, perhaps into beggary, this is hard to endure; but far harder is it to be deprived of a local treasury, so as to lose all power to keep up the machinery of their daily food. If, in consequence, the canals and roads fall out of repair, and the people suffer such famine as they could not suffer under a native tyrant, whose all they are, it matters little to them whether a Company or a Viceroy and his Council, an Empress or a Parliament, rule at the distant seat of Government. An English Parliament, to whom lies the appeal of Indian subjects against the British Executive, is not likely to lose a wink of sleep because a hundred thousand Indians are starved to death; and, in fact, it only learns of the danger when remedy is too late. No form of government, no good will, no energy in the central administration, can compensate for the frightful blunder of fusing the local revenues of an empire into one treasury.

Conquest naturally draws after it temporary distinctions of political right. A conquered people are seldom at once admitted into posts of power and trust. Even when disaffection is no longer feared, differences of language, of sentiment, or of moral character, may interpose difficulty, and generally make men

timid as to imparting power. We cannot criticize a ruling race while its exclusions are strictly temporary; that is, while it opens a door of access to power, and proposes equality of right as the early goal. Yet the bolder course has ere now proved itself the wiser. Admitted equality soon soothes the pang of defeat, and the vanquished become proud of belonging to a greater community. Even rude barbarian leagues have often swelled rapidly into astonishing power by adopting into absolute equality and cordial citizenship all whom they conquer, and all the discontented or aspiring who will join them. Thus the rude Ætolians of declining Greece displayed suddenly a strength unsuspected. Thus league after league of the wild Germans became formidable to the Roman empire. To the same principle, intensified by a fanatical impulse, must be ascribed the Mohammedan conquests of old on the area of Asia and North Africa, in more recent times over Central Africa. All who join them and accept the religion are at once themselves accepted as comrades and equals: this is the magic charm which welds together heterogeneous natures and wild men.

Transition is certainly apt to be difficult. To aid the transition from conquest into equality, the process followed by ancient Rome was notoriously so effectual that one or other modern nation might have been expected to follow it, especially England in her Indian empire. The Romans recognized several degrees of civil status. The highest, of course, was the Roman franchise; next to this, the Latin franchise; below this, the Italian franchise and that of the extra Italian provincials; then there was the right of the freedmen; and lowest of all, the wholly disfranchised slaves. There was a time when it would have been liberal and praiseworthy, perhaps expedient, to introduce on the area of British India a legal distinction between British and Indian citizenship, if, simultaneously, select persons or classes of the natives had been adopted into the British franchise, and a general method of entrance, with reasonable conditions, had been opened to personal merit and ostensible loyalty. But the English Parliament, againt the will of the East India Company, preferred to proclaim in 1833 the principle of legal equality. If this be real, it is certainly the grander, wiser and nobler method; but if it remain a mere name, it does but insult and irritate; it brands the ruling power with hypocrisy, and would make the wisest administration impotent to pacify discontent.

If we turn to the greatest monarchy and oldest society in the world, that of China, there we see a *wholly homogeneous* people,

although of several languages, not only without caste, but without an order of nobility, as nobility is understood by us. Office alone there gives nobility, and the office is attained by merit, according to their estimate of merit. My present business is to point out the great diversity between monarchy and monarchy, between despotism and despotism. First let us contrast China with Turkey. In both the monarch will be called by Europeans a despot; yet in both the despotism is sharply checked by antique precedent, at least as effectually as under our Plantagenets and Tudors. The monarch may deal rudely, or perhaps cruelly, with individuals, but cannot with impunity attack the public. And this is true of all homogeneous masses, as of France ever since the privileges of nobility have been overthrown. But while China and Turkey have so much in common, if we think only of the Sultan's rule over Mussulmans; the two powers are seen to be intensely different as soon as the relations of Mussulmans to Christians are comprehended.

Contrast despotic China with despotic Russia, and a totally new point of diversity appears. In Russia there is a nobility, possessed of vast masses of land. This is a point of which I have purposely said nothing. It is one of the greatest elements in politics, and is generally regarded as the foundation of aristocracy; yet so far is it from being in any opposition to monarchy, that it is very hard for it to exist except under the shadow of monarchy. It may indeed continue after monarchy has been destroyed; as happened in ancient Greece, in ancient Italy, and in the Southern States of the great American republic: and when it exists in a republic, as in early Rome, it may propagate itself by conquest. Notwithstanding these exceptions, aristocracy based on great landed estates, in the general history of the world, has little permanence except in conjunction with a monarchy which fosters it, and is fostered by it in turn. They cohere like a double star, and make a system essentially different from either separately. The difficulty which aristocracy has of existing without monarchy is in fact denoted by the modern acceptation of the term republic, which is practically identified with democracy. Aristocratic republics are so rare, that we almost forget their possibility.

Land being the element on which our life is passed, as well as the mine out of which our food is extracted, he who can controul the land cultivated by others, and the land on which others dwell, wields a political power; and when the estate is large, we may call it a regal power: nor, except as the delegation of a

regal power, does it seem possible to find a legal origin for large estates. Evidently an order of great proprietors has preoccupied a large fraction both of the royal power and of the national revenues. In siding with the people, it will be a most effectual check on the Crown, and may establish the public liberties, as it did against our Plantagenets; or in siding with the Crown against the people, as more often happens, it will press very heavily on a nation. Indeed the rights over land claimed and exercised by landlords are generally greater than those which the purest despotic power dares to exercise against a homogeneous people. In Russia, with which I am comparing China, we find a very paradoxical phenomenon. A monarch, able to follow a policy of his own, is generally disposed to raise up the commonalty as a balance against a powerful nobility. But the Russian Czars, without any necessity, under no constraint from the nobles,—of their own free motion, as far as I have been able to learn,—by a series of edicts called ukases, in the course of several centuries, gradually depressed the cultivators of the soil from freemen into serfs, and from serfs into slaves. The process was so gradual and stealthy, that the victims never understood it; and while groaning under the tyranny of their masters, looked fondly to the Czar as their only protector, not knowing that the edicts of the Czars alone had put them under that tyranny. By this strange process, probably without foreseeing how it would act, the despotic power of the Russian Emperor became too great for anything but assassination to controul: for the nobles could never dare to arm their dependents against him. The two elements, *territorial nobility* and *peasant serfdom* in Russia (I mean in Russia as she was, before our Russian war taught the Emperor the necessity of a free peasantry) gave to the monarchy a moral aspect quite different from that of China or of Turkey.

I proceed to show how Aristocracy changes its meaning and its practical workings while retaining its name. No better illustration can be wished than the old Roman republic will furnish. On the expulsion of Tarquin the proud, the patrician aristocracy became supreme, and the plebeians found themselves without legal organs and wholly defenceless. Being themselves the army of the State, they were not only formidable, but, when united and resolute, irresistible. Hence in a series of years they extorted concession after concession; yet found themselves still oppressed, still miserable, even when they could by an effort of will controul the legislation. In 130 years they discovered that the thing needful was, to secure half of the supreme Executive for their

own order; and from the day that this was attained, the whole history of Rome changed its course. This first period of the republic is that of *noxious aristocracy*, while the patricians, however often outvoted in the Legislature, kept the supreme Executive to themselves.—The second period, to speak roughly and avoid unnecessary detail, is that during which the Senate was elected by merit. This was the prime, the only flourishing period of Rome as a nation. It lasted less than a century and a half. Aristocracy then answered to its real name. It was not an order basing its power on land, but it was the "government of the best." Sismondi, a historian of a temperament nowise democratic, declares as a historical fact, that every aristocracy degenerates from the day that it becomes hereditary. It is hardly too much to say, that hereditary aristocracies are saved from contempt and ruin only by new creations. The Roman aristocracy in its prime was elective, not hereditary; yet the sons of nobles, emulating the industry and public spirit of their sires, were generally elected, and many a great family stood firmly aloft in successive generations,—quite as many in Rome as in modern England, if you compare their thousands to our millions. —But (you may ask) how was this selection of merit managed? Were the centurions and tribunes of the army forced to undergo a literary examination, in order to discover their patriotism, their public spirit, their promptitude, their justice, their freedom from class-prejudice, or their moral courage? Did examiners allot to them 100 marks for skill in the Oscan language, 150 for the Etruscan literature, and 300 for scanning and interpreting the songs of the Salian priests? Not at all. The Romans of that age went to work in a ruder way; but it proved effectual. A plebeian law, called the *Ovinia tribunicia*, was passed, without asking leave of the Senate, by which the Censors were to elect into the Senate men out of every rank (of officers), under oath* that they would pick out the best men they could find. Under this regulation the Roman Senate soon con-

* It is disagreeable to have to confess, that the passage of Festus is corrupt, from which alone we here derive our knowledge. The important word *jurati* (on oath) is obtained only by an emendation of *curiati*. Although the correction is conjectural, it carries conviction with it. In the edition of O. Müller, the words of Festus are:—

"Donce Ovinia tribunicia intervenit, quâ sanctum est ut censores, ex omni ordine optimum quemque *curiati* in senatu legerent." Read "*ju*rati in senatum legerent." The correction *jurati* was suggested first by Meyer. It is regarded as certain by Bellermann, and is in harmony with the oath which Zonaras says, was imposed on the Censors.

tained (as virtue was then understood) whatever of highest virtue the nation could furnish. The Senate commanded the absolute confidence of the nation; it claimed the most heroic sacrifices, and was promptly obeyed. Concord (with few exceptions) and energy reigned through the whole State, and Rome soon (alas!) became too powerful for all her neighbours. In the first period, aristocracy certainly rested on hereditary landed rights or claims, obscurely as we understand them. In the second period, the aristocracy was one of merit. It was a distinction for life, open to every deserving citizen. Utterly diverse as were these two systems, their diversity has no other titles than Close and Open Aristocracy. Under each system, the popular assembly was nominally supreme, and its "command" was law.

That great and terrible enemy of Rome, the Carthaginian Hannibal, on the field of Cannæ slew not only 40,000 Roman commoners, 2,500 knights, and more than 90 senators; he slew also the Roman constitution. At least, it is clear, that from this era the Censors ceased to interpret their oath as binding them to choose the best man, but followed a principle of routine which did not give at all the same results. To supply the huge gap made by Hannibal in the Senate, a special dictator was created, who had not moral courage or consciousness of knowledge adequate to his difficult task. With the high approbation of the public, says Livy, he elected 177 persons to fill the empty benches, by a mere mechanical examination of the names in the public books. Henceforth *merit* was interpreted to mean, the having held certain high offices, without any inquiry how they had been filled. The tumultuous populace, who under very various influences voted young soldiers into their first civil office, henceforth virtually elected them into the Senate. The aristocracy was still elective; yet from this day it was morally different. In fact, from this era the aristocracy tended once more to become practically close. Very few men of new families were henceforth elected. Nearly all the senatorial contemporaries of Cicero dated their family greatness as high as the second Punic war, and it was very hard for a Marius or even a Cicero to rise, against the efforts of the existing nobility.

At the same time I must not conceal, that soon after the overthrow of Hannibal a cause of degeneracy set in, so powerful, that it must probably in every case have overwhelmed all constitutional check. Roman generals, carrying arms into Asia, assumed a right ("in the public interest," of course it was said) of making WARS *at their own discretion;* and as the general was

sure to enrich himself and his friends by it, the Romans (as Gibbon satirically puts it) conquered the world in self-defence. The plebeians at first seldom relished it; but the spirit which is called patriotism cried out, "Now that we are in for the war, we must go through with it." In consequence, to borrow Michelet's emphatic words, the bones of the Roman plebeians whitened every shore of the Mediterranean, and the sons of the men whom they conquered stepped into their places with the name of citizens, while really clients of a princely oligarchy bloated with the plunder of prostrate nations. What shall we call the Government of Rome in this third era?

An Aristotle might reply, it is evidently an oligarchy, the perverted form of aristocracy. Yet the most beggarly of the citizens had equal votes with the highest and noblest, and their vote was supreme, whether to pass laws, or to elect magistrates up to the highest, and by such elections fill the Senate; also to declare war or peace, and dispose of the entire fortunes of the provincials: nay, says Polybius, by Jupiter! the vote of the common people can lessen the private fortune of Senators. Thus the State was in theory under the rule of perverted democracy, and in fact was swayed by an imperial aristocracy verging ever to oligarchy.

If time allowed, and we were able to go into the history of Venice, an entirely new phase of aristocracy would there open itself. But I hasten to a very few remarks on democracy. As conceived of by the ancients, a democracy could not act except on a small scale. In fact, Aristotle says that a polity (or organised constitution) cannot have so few as ten citizens, or so many as a hundred thousand. A democracy formed in a single city, where the poorest citizens assemble in folkmote to settle the highest affairs of State, at home and abroad, is very different from the more complicated organization which we see in Switzerland, with confederated cantons and representative government. Much more does it differ from the massive institutions of the great American republic, which is probably the most complicated political mechanism in the whole world. To secure a voice and a hearing for every interest, to obtain tranquil deliberation *after* hearing and *before* judgment, is the aim of the highest and best democracies. If this end be attained, the rights and the interests of the many are established, and from this the rich, the learned, the able, are in no danger of suffering. But when, as in the past has generally happened, the rich and the able (or, perhaps I ought to say the *crafty*) do their utmost to corrupt democracy, by bribery and by

drink, by hired ruffians and by intrigue; if democracies could not be crushed by violence, they might be expected to perish by contempt. Their vices are almost always chargeable on the cabals of oligarchs.

Time reminds me that I must pass to an important topic not yet touched on,—a topic essentially affecting every form of Government, yet not hinted at in their names. I refer to the existence of great colonies, as parts of an imperial polity. When colonies are formed over a continuous continental area, the problem of colonial organization is comparatively easy. It was pretty well solved by the Romans: it has been far more completely solved by the United States of America. The object is, to effect a real adherence and ultimate consolidation of every colony with the mother state, who supports the colony in infancy, imparts rights as fast as they can be used, and exacts duty as early as it can be fulfilled; until the colony, fully grown, is adopted into absolute equality and is finally incorporated with the mother. When the imperial institutions are so impartial and so flexible as to fulfil these conditions, the machinery suffers no strain, and the moral character of the government remains unchanged. But the case is widely different when the colonies are separated from the mother country or from the imperial centre by wide tracts of sea, and incorporation is difficult or impossible. Such were the colonies of Tyre and ancient Athens; such also those of Portugal, of Spain, of Holland and of England. Athens, with certain exceptions, left her colonies to shift for themselves from the beginning, neither giving protection nor expecting allegiance. Whatever grave objections may be urged against this, it at least did not derange or burden the mother city. But the conduct of modern Europe towards her transmarine colonies has been in every respect the opposite. Allegiance over them has been claimed, protection has been given, and with the protection a jealous exclusionism has been enforced. In fact, so soon as any country fell into a colonial position, by the absenteeship of its central executive, it has been liable to suffer a frightful drain of capital, together with the crippling of industry and other colonial degradation. The false political economy of past centuries taught that the use of extra European colonies was, to swell the mercantile navy and enhance the mercantile profits of the mother country. I have read that when the merchants of Cadiz complained to the Spanish Government that their wines were falling in demand, the Government replied by sending out an order to Mexico to root up all the vines in that colony. Our own Lord

Chatham, who stood forth as champion of our American colonies and condemned the attempts of the English Parliament to tax them, declared that he would not consent to the colonists manufacturing for themselves so much as a horse-shoe nail. To cripple their marine, under the idea that this would enlarge our own, was a fixed object of policy with English ministers of every school. Under the blighting influence of the commercial theories then prevalent, most European colonies felt bitterly aggrieved. So too Sicily, first under Spain, then under Naples, not as a conquered province, but as a royal inheritance, yet suffered under the blight of absenteeship. Time forbids me to press the still more striking case of Hungary under her Austrian dynasty. I may barely allude to the colonial position of Ireland, and to the avowed policy of William the third's English Parliament to cripple the manufactures of Ireland by way of benefit to the manufactures of England. My sole object in these references is, to insist that colonies are apt to break up the unity of a nation exactly as do foreign conquests: and that if our nomenclature were philosophical and perfect, it would take congnizance of the change. If it cannot, we must beware of fine names, as liable to hide fallacies; and remember that Constitutional Monarchy and Parliamentary Government may mean one thing to one part of an empire, and a very different thing to another.

But you may think it full time to ask me, on what more philosophical principle national constitutions can possibly be classified. I will sketch certain outlines in reply. The first class of organized communities is that in which personal will rules. This is the barbaric stage of crude despotism. It has nevertheless been perpetuated into civilized regions and ages by unhappy contingencies; as in despotic France, Spain and Russia; on a smaller scale in Italian princedoms; and worst of all, in systems of slavery. In contrast to the Rule of Personal Will is the Rule of Law. When law *is* righteous, to be subject to it is our highest benefit, our highest glory; and while we *suppose* it to be righteous, subjection to it nurtures our manliness, and in many respects trains us virtuously. But nations which profess subjection to law split here into two classes. The one class holds the law to be unchangeable, as having come down from the obscure and distant past. Such were the old theocracies; such the Turkish rule in modern days; such also the Chinese institutions, although not ostensibly religious. If the unchangeable law be simple, and no great interests uncontemplated by it have arisen, the nation neither needs nor can admit legislative organs: at most it has

doctors of law, whose duty it is to report traditional judgments or to interpret a received code. This I hold to be the second class of states. When the law has been skilfully adapted to the people (and this is sufficiently proved by their steady adherence to it from a distant past), it ensures for them a certain amount of well-being, so long as foreign nations let them alone, and while they do not try their own hand at conquest. It is by an instinct of self-defence that China and Japan have repelled the intrusion of Europeans. The Ottomans, living by themselves, would have been frugal and virtuous; but their institutions could not be so modified as to embrace Christians into equal citizenship. By conquering, they spoiled their own position. Institutions belonging to this second class, having unchangeable law, pay the penalty of being inflexible. In long time they fall out of harmony with the changed circumstances of mankind. In the third class of institutions it is pronounced that law *ought* indeed to be righteous and sacred, but is *in fact* only that approximation to right which fallible men have attained. Therefore it must not be unchangeable, but it must be susceptible of repeal or addition under strictly formal regulations. This is the reign of Secular, as opposed to Theocratic Law. We find Theocracies chiefly in Asia.

Through deficiency of historical knowledge, we can scarcely go higher into antiquity than the free States of Greece for examples of legislation by deliberations and solemn voting; yet this very thing seems natural to Europe, and therefore to man: for it grew up among the rude Italians, the ruder Gauls, the very barbarous Germans; and we find it in the Slavonic Bohemians and Tartar Magyars. Man, says Aristotle, is a political animal: and in the rudest tribes we often find germs of the highest political developments.

We are now apt to think of the theocratic or unchangeable system of law as belonging only to ages long past. Yet it avails but little to admit in the abstract that law is changeable, if in practice a long and cardinal part of the law is withdrawn from criticism, and is avowed to be unchangeable, just because it is very old. If a community has undergone but little internal change, even its oldest laws may still be very suitable; but if the condition of the people has largely changed, then the age of a law is no recommendation. Institutions expedient to guard against the despotism of a warrior king, while a nobility was struggling for the public liberties together with its own, may become noxious in a totally new conjuncture of affairs. Claims over land

which are endurable where land is plentiful and people few, may be unendurable where people are numerous and land scarce. Exceptional privileges, established in an era at which some worse dangers had to be repelled, may be manifestly indefensible when those dangers are past. A state in which there are privileged orders, whose privileges are treated as inviolable and as closed against inquiry and legislation, can hardly be referred to the third or European class: it rather belongs to the Asiatic, Chinese or Theocratic class, which attributes a divine sacredness to its oldest, and perhaps to its most mischievous institutions.

But, however important the *enacting* of good law, the impartial *enforcement* of law is more vital still. To gain fairness and intelligence in the tribunals is perhaps, of all the items which make up freedom, the hardest. The English have aimed at it through their jury-system. Yet through many a dreary page of English history the juries have been so put under terror and the judges so bent upon conviction, that the tribunals have been stigmatized as dens of murderers. Hitherto it would seem, that no human institution equals a *free* jury for defending the innocent. It is by no means so efficient for punishing the guilty. But with some diffidence I suggest, that we know almost nothing of a constitution, until we know what are its provisions for the administration of justice.

At the same time, *equality before the tribunals* is essential for all justice; and it is extremely difficult to attain this equality for *social* rights, if there be not full *political* equality. On this rock all systems which admit diversities of franchise are apt to founder. Exclusion of a race, a class, or a sex from political power appears inevitably to entail an inability to defend itself from social injustices. This it is which forces philanthropy to put on the garb of political partizanship, and claim power for the weaker classes of society, as for the negro freedmen of the United States, or for intelligent and delicate Indians of Bengal. This consideration probably decided our great Reform ministry of 1833 to insist upon the absolute political equality of Indians to English, excluding the Indians from only the two high offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-chief.

Again, in the study of a national constitution we do not know much of its practical working until we learn what are its laws of land, in what masses land is held by individuals, and what powers landholders have to legislate landed rights to themselves. Sometimes to know these things may at once pour a flood of light over the state of affairs. If we were to discover that in

Japan the great nobility, holding the land in large masses, had for six centuries wielded decisive uncontroulable power over legislation, while the cultivators had not even had a voice in the legislative assembly, much less a vote, we should at once confidently infer that the interests both of the peasants and of the public had been unscrupulously sacrificed. The unseen and unheard are sure to suffer, and the more gradual the enactments which confiscate their right, the more subtle and the more permanent is the mischief. It is not the powerful, but the weak, who most need legislative protection.

I have already alluded to the vital importance of inviolable local treasuries, so that the moneys gathered for road-tolls or works of irrigation should not be spent in war or wasted in court-display. This is in fact but one illustration of a great principle, which my limits forbid me to develop. An empire ought not to be like a sensitive animal body of the highest class which is killed at once by a wound in the heart or brain. Every part should be ordinarily self-supporting, with life and strength to spare; though each is reinforced by the common life of the system. Such an empire is rather like an Indian banyan, in which every great branch throws its own separate stem into the earth; and there striking root, draws for itself an independent nourishment, without interrupting its vital relations with the parent stock. It has been said by some, that each part of an empire should exhibit the central institutions in miniature. If this be impossible, yet at least every part should have an active political life, competent for self-support.

But it is time for me to sum up.

Assuming the rule of personal will to be left behind in the past, the topics to be primarily studied in a national constitution, as of far higher importance than any of the current names, are: —1. The *bonâ fide* openness of the institutions to legislative correction. 2. The apparatus for correcting defective law. 3. The equality of all persons before the tribunals. 4. The securities taken for the impartiality of the tribunals. 5. The laws of land. 6. The extent to which every locality has a self-sufficiency to sustain its own existence; to suppress violence and maintain its needful supplies. To tell us how many of these problems are well solved in a particular constitution, is to give us very valuable knowledge concerning it; but to tell us that it is a royalty or a republic, that it is Christian or Pagan, is almost to tell us nothing at all.

At the same time, historical experience hitherto converges to

the belief that none of these important topics can be permanently well treated without freedom of speech and press, free juries, and representative institutions; and that at the bottom of all must rest homogeneous political right.

For justice internally, for strength externally, for patriotism and national spirit, evidently the shell of a constitution is of less importance than that common interest which equality of right gives and exceptional privilege tends to destroy. France is a powerful country, under whatever government, and cannot be greatly misgoverned, because she is inwardly homogeneous, and conscious of a single nationality. Russia, though embarrassed by Poland, imperfectly emancipated herself, and not clear of difficulties from the Cossack Church, is tending rapidly to a condition of homogeneity on a still grander scale. The United States, if they successfully surmount the still contested struggle, and establish the coloured races in absolute equality with the white, will become greater than Russia and by far the first community in the world. But, for the fate of empires which are *not* homogeneous, we have but to recall such names as Assyria and Babylon, Persia and Macedonia; in which a dominant race enforced temporary supremacy over reluctant subjects, whom it never adopted into equality. Imperial Rome was wiser, though far from wholly wise, and never really large-hearted; yet she secured powerful support in every conquered country by her bestowal of the Roman franchise. Very imperfect as was the liberality, and terrible the serfdom and slavery, yet even so, she earned by it an astonishing cohesion in spite of feeble Emperors. In contrast we have recently seen how Austria,—from the heterogeneousness of her dominion and the ingenious folly by which she forfeited affection and all moral claims to allegiance,—crumbled before foreign attack. When an imperial bubble bursts, many will moralize, more will triumph, a few will pity; but their pity comes to the fallen with all the force of insult.

EPICUREANISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

[From Frazer's Magazine, November, 1871.]

Efforts at scientific thought began from the early Greeks with all the presumptuousness of inexperienced youth. They undertook with light confidence to resolve the highest problems in Astronomy, Geology, and Cosmogony, while ignorant of the surface of our own globe, and of the very elements of Chemistry, —a science which had not even a name. At the same time they were most rudely furnished with instruments for measuring and weighing, and had scarcely even an idea of their importance. In the midst of the contradictory theories hence arising, which led Socrates to renounce all physical research, one man of genius, Democritus of Abdera, developed a doctrine of atoms, founded on large conceptions of the Universe and on the universality of mechanical law. Pythagoras had already maintained the Sun to be the centre round which the Earth and Planets move; but neither of these great men rested on arguments convincing to the majority of their contemporaries: indeed those attributed to Pythagoras are moral and fanciful. On the other hand the moral system of Pythagoras was didactic, or rather dogmatic, being taught without reasons, like a religious or ceremonial law. In the celebrated formula, *ipse dixit*, ipse meant the Master himself, Pythagoras. Morals, as a Science, or as a system which aimed to be a Science, is not traceable by us higher than Socrates. Thenceforth there were two parallel streams of Greek philosophy; the older that of Physical Speculation, almost worthless; the latter that of Morals; but this latter ran in many channels.

In the retrospect, we see not how anything else could have occurred but enormous error and enormous diversity of opinion. Alike in politics, in religion and in morals terribly difficult is the transition from the puerile to the adult stage,—from the state of bondage to that of freedom. In political and religious struggles convulsions often occur too violent to be composed by any mediator, or softened by moral principle; nay, morality itself, and whatever passes for science, are then apt to be embroiled in the general chaos. What of this kind may have happened in far-off Asia concerns us the less, because it is hopeless to get any continuous record; but the very fact makes us more value our

knowledge of Greek opinion, which we see spread out before us with real continuity. The human mind, aspiring to truth and freedom, asked *the reason why* in all these high spheres at once. *Why* is a king or a polity to be obeyed? *Why* is a religion to be believed, or the existence of any Gods? *Why* is a certain course of action called moral and good? *Why* are certain doctrines, in this or that art or system, held to be true and proved? Also, when Socrates despaired altogether of Physics, and devoted his life to ground Morals more deeply, his method was that of interrogating everything, and pretending to know nothing. Who could then wonder if he established nothing? Of course he aimed to get rid of rubbish, and clear a good foundation for a new building. He really did preach and teach, alternately with his scepticism, very much of definite morals; yet, inevitably, men widely diverse one from another believed themselves his disciples, alike dogmatic Stoics and Academicians despairing of truth. All who were between these extremes were esteemed Socratic, and certainly had common principles and common cultivation. They could learn from one another, and esteem one another, as do the sects of a common religion. But the system of Epicurus, which arose in the break-up of Greek freedom and Greek patriotism, was in entire contrast to all Socratic ideas.

If we are to believe the Epicureans, their master was indeed the divine teacher. The Roman poet Lucretius, a man of unquestioned genius, was not aware that Epicurus owed anything to those who preceded him. Familiar as are his panegyrics to every scholar, it may not be amiss here to present two eminent passages. In the opening of his poem, he says: "When human life was foully prostrate over the lands in open view, crushed under grievous Religion, who displayed her head from heaven, bending over mortals with horrible aspect; a man of the Greeks first dared to lift mortal eyes against her, and was first to withstand her; one whom neither the report of Gods, nor lightnings, nor heaven with its threatening murmurs, repressed, but so much the more excited the ardent valour of his soul; so that he was the first who longed to shatter the close barriers of Nature's portals. Therefore the vivid force of his soul overcame, and went forward far beyond the flaming walls of the World, and surveyed the entire of Immensity; whence he reports to us what *can* arise, and what can *not;* and how possibilities are limited to everything. Wherefore, in turn, Religion is now trampled under foot, and *us* Victory lifts to heaven." Though Epicurus is not here named, he is certainly intended. The poet opens his fifth book with

a still grander eulogy: "Who is able from weighty heart to compose a song worthy of the majesty of our topic and of its discoveries? or who is so effective in diction, that he can pour forth praises due to the merits of Him who bequeathed to us such treasures, won and earned by his own bosom? No one will be able, as I think, who is sprung of mortal body. For if we must so speak, as the notorious majesty of the subject demands, he was a God, O illustrious Memmius—a God who first entered that course of life which now is called Wisdom," &c.

It would seem that Lucretius learned his philosophy wholly from *within* the Epicurean school, and knew no more of the history of thought, than his teachers were pleased to tell him. But this idolatry of their master was shared by the whole sect. Pomponius Atticus, in many respects a learned man—indeed a multiplier of erudite books—according to Cicero (*De Fin.* v. 1, 3) says, that he cannot forget Epicurus, if he wished; for his intimate friends have Epicurus's effigy, not only in pictures, but on cups and rings. Pliny attests that this sect carried about with them likenesses of Epicurus, and set them up in their bedchambers. The mischief done by this idolatry to the progress of their philosophy is visible in Lucretius himself, who has no desire to improve on his master, but simply to inculcate his lessons, as if from a sacred book, which may not be taken from nor added to. To this probably the true key is found in the fact, that Lucretius is careless to learn any of the secrets of Nature, except in so far as they aid him to explode the popular belief in Gods. He will give contradictory explanations of the same fact; and though quite aware that one or other is certainly false, and therefore possibly both are false, yet, believing that one or other still suffices to supersede the theory of Divine action, he is satisfied.

The opposite view taken of Epicurus by Cicero—and probably by all Socratics—is very curious. According to Cicero (*Fin.* 16) Epicurus took up the physics of Democritus only to spoil them: while his moral system was borrowed from Aristippus of Cyrene. "What is there, he asks" (*De N. D.*), "in the physics of Epicurus which does not come from Democritus? True; he changed a few matters. When he saw, that if atoms were carried downward by their own weight [in parallel lines], their motion would be certain and necessary—to avoid the idea of Necessity, he said that the atoms *deviate* a little! It would have been less disgraceful to confess himself ignorant." Elsewhere (*Fin.* 1, 6) Cicero adds another reason why "deviation at uncertain time

and place" must be admitted in the atoms, viz., that otherwise they would move on without collision, and nothing could be created; and in both statements he is confirmed by Lucretius (2, 216, 290). Thus Epicurus surrendered entirely Democritus's main doctrine, that the atoms moved by Law. He made them out to be lawless, yet undertook to lay down concerning them, what are the limits of possibility.

Indeed Cicero, though highly latitudinarian in his belief, towards Epicurus alone shows unconcealed aversion and high contempt. He makes Cotta (the Academician sceptic) say to Velleins (the Epicurean) "You would rather give up your whole status in life than the authority which has sanctioned the doctrine of atoms: for you made up your mind to be an Epicurean, before you had learned the doctrine. Hence you had either to take in all these absurdities, or to lay down the name of the school which you had already embraced." . . . "These blunders, which Epicurus made while half asleep, are reproduced by you as by his dictation, while he, as we see in his writings, boasted that he had had no teacher; a thing which I should believe without his avowal, as easily as I believe the owner of an ill-built house, who boasts that he employed no architect." On every side of Epicurus, Cicero found something to repel him. The moral system seemed to him base or silly, the logic absurd; the very style offended him by its negligence or want of form, though he will not allow that his taste affects his judgments of truth (*Fin.* 1, 5). Nevertheless, we might hesitate to receive Cicero's representations of Epicurus, were they not so thoroughly borne out by Lucretius, where we can compare the two: a fact which makes Cicero's erudition and great perspicuity highly valuable to us. His intimate friendship with Pomponius Atticus, a veteran Epicurean, gave him great advantage. The two friends sat side by side, listening to systematic courses of lectures from two celebrated Epicurean teachers; and in the result, Atticus, while lamenting that Cicero was not convinced, confessed that he understood them perfectly.

The very first step of Epicurean logic, was, to assume that the bodily senses are perfect, and are alone trustworthy, in the decision of truth. Lucretius carries this out to such a pitch of absurdity, as to insist, that the distant object (as a heavenly body) *is no larger than it looks*. A modern student, who has not read him, may be slow to believe the statement, and may think that it is our misconception; but it is quite beyond doubt: his phrases are unmistakable. He says (5,565): "The disk and heat of the

sun can not be much greater or smaller than it seems to our senses: for . . . (So again, 5,575). And whether the moon illumines us with spurious light, or flings her own light from her proper body, in either case she is in no respect of larger form than the disk which we discern with our own eyes seems to be: for . . . . Nevertheless, as we here see fires to twinkle irregularly, it may be admitted that a distant object possibly is *a very little* either greater or less than it appears. Nor need we wonder that so little a sun (*tantulus Sol*) is able to send us so great a light. . . . . Do you not see how widely a small fountain sometimes waters the meadows, &c. . . ." It is clear by this passage, that neither Lucretius nor Epicurus understood the first elements of geometrical optics—did not know that the visible size of a distant object is nothing but the *angle* which it subtends to the eye, and has no *linear* magnitude at all. Moreover, while he knew that the sun is vastly more distant than the moon, and ought to have inferred that it is prodigiously greater, he actually pronounces that the sun is a small body. . . . To Democritus (says Cicero) the sun appears to be vast; for he was a learned man and perfect in geometry: but to Epicurus the sun seemed to be perhaps two feet in diameter; for he insisted that it is just as large as it looks, or at most slightly greater or less.

On reading, side by side with many and monstrous absurdities in Lucretius, many sagacious explanations—as of relative motion, of the ascent of flame, of the transmission of force, &c.—it is natural to suspect, that the good in his Physics comes from Democritus, and that the stupidity was added by Epicurus. It might have seemed incredible that a man could call himself a philosopher, and gravely propound as theories, that every evening the sun is extinguished, and a new sun created every morning; and similarly account for the changes of the moon: to say nothing of his greater absurdities concerning visions and dreams. But his doctrine of images was really that of Democritus. Still, we can scarcely give Epicurus credit for selecting that form of physics which came nearest to modern science, when we find him to care nothing for his physical philosophy, except as a tool to undermine the foundations of religion.

Cicero brings out this very strongly in the speech of Velleius the Epicurean, and Lucretius confirms him. The same tone of pompous assumption is ascribed to Velleius, which we read for ourselves in the poet. "Then Velleius, with the usual confidence of his school, fearing nothing so much as to seem to doubt about anything; as if he had just come down from a cabinet of the gods,

says, 'Listen and learn, not of silly inventions, not of a Platonic artizan-god, not of Providence, that prophetic hag of the Stoics; nor of a World endowed with soul and senses—a round, glowing and rolling God. . . . Because you do not see how Nature could effect anything without some mind, you take refuge in a god. . . . Thus you have placed on our necks *an Eternal Lord, whom we are to fear day and night.* For who would not fear *a forecasting, inventive, observant, curious and busy god, who thinks that everything is of concern to him?*'" The Epicurean here shows a positive hatred, not of the vulgar mythology only, but of the very idea of the most spiritual God whom the highest philosophy can conceive. The same tone is struck in Lucretius also; as, when he complains (5, 87), that "speculators ignorant of his physics betake themselves to old-fashioned religious notions, and bring in upon themselves *severe lords* (*dominos acres*), whom the wretched fellows suppose to be *omnipotent.*" Enough concerning the Physics of Epicurus: what then of his Morals.

He praises virtue of every kind, especially moderation and contentment with a little. The wise man will keep his desires limited, will chase away those which are neither natural nor necessary. He disregards death; he fearlessly holds the truth concerning the immortal gods [that they are blessed in perfect inactivity, absorbed in self-enjoyment]; he does not hesitate to withdraw from life, when death will please him better. Thus armed, he lives in perpetual contentment and tranquillity, which is the highest pleasure. He avoids all perturbations, therefore also all vehement passions, as conducing to pain. If pain assails him, as from disease, he tries to balance it by some pleasure, as by the smell of flowers; or if flowers are not at hand, then by the remembrance and imagination of them. He cherishes, as pleasant, the memory of all past pleasure. He refuses public honours, as embroiling him in the strife of politics. He pities all bad men, as fools; but does not disturb his own equanimity by hating either them or their conduct. His own enjoyments are simple and cheap. His paradise is a garden, or even a field, if it have but trees and a stream of water—fine weather indeed is needed; then "at no great expense he has much corporeal delight." Not but that he esteems mental pleasure highly, provided that it be not bought by study too severe. To vie with others in intellect is folly; for it strains the mind. Geometry demanded too much effort to please Epicurus, whose speculations were luxuriously easy; indeed to test them laboriously was the last thing to which he or his school was inclined. Nevertheless, in a popular view

his morality had little to distinguish it from that of Solon, the great Athenian lawgiver; except on its political side; and here, strange to say, it agreed remarkably with early Christianity. The Epicurean, as the Christian, saw how hopeless a task it was to establish political freedom and good government; and moreover, he considered that it was very laborious and thankless, involving many discomforts. Solon's precept to take decided part on one side of politics, did not at all commend itself to him: nevertheless, Solon's verses on virtuous contentment and cheap pleasure, in which is a couplet too gross for translation into English prose, entirely harmonize with the Epicurean spirit. Lucullus Asiaticus might call himself an Epicurean, but he was not of the orthodox type; he was a libel on his master; for his pleasures, however refined, were too expensive: yet the popular notion of Epicureanism has been propagated from wealthy and self-indulgent men.

Torquatus the Epicurean, in Cicero, admires and defends the stern virtues of his celebrated ancestors, of whom one, consul in the great Latin war, put his own son to death for fighting out of the ranks. A painful virtue, says Cicero. True, replies Torquatus; but it is not virtuous because painful; it is virtuous, although painful. The virtue consisted in its conducing to military discipline, hereby to victory, hereby to safety of the Roman state, "in which he perceived that *his own* safety was contained." Thus until he has made out that his great ancestor was selfish, Torquatus will not allow that he was virtuous. Aristotle indeed sets before us the same thought, but only as a paradox: "There are two kinds of self-lovers," says he; "bad men ought not to love themselves, and good men ought; for the good man assigns to himself what is the noblest and best, and gratifies his highest part, and thereby may justly be esteemed a self-lover, since, while benefiting others, he benefits himself most." But this is the sentiment of a man who maintained virtue to be good in itself. Epicurus regarded virtue as desirable only for the pleasure which it brought with it; on which account he declared that unselfish virtue was impossible.

Another peculiarity of Epicurus lay in his interpreting mere absence of pain to be pleasure, while pain was a sort of negative quantity, to be subtracted in estimating the balance. He regarded himself as being master of fortune as truly as any Stoic: for, ordinarily, so long as foolish pleasures which entail pain are avoided, pleasure in a healthy frame far predominates over pain; and if ever the extreme case occurred that life was more painful

than pleasant, the orthodox follower of Epicurus had in his own hands the prompt remedy; he had only "to migrate from life." What more could the wisest of Stoics do?

The greatest controversy turned on the meaning of the word Pleasure. Epicurus bestowed the word on "everything that gladdens us;" all other philosophers insisted on using separate words, such as delight, gladness, joy, concerning affections purely mental. No one doubts that virtue *in general* tends to impart and diffuse mental pleasure of some kind; but even if this were *universal*, it is certain that a good man in exercising the virtue is not seeking for the resulting pleasure, or at all thinking of it, but accounts the virtue good in itself. A very despicable "sentimentalism" results, if any one try, for instance, to relieve poverty for the sake of the pleasure which he will have in the action. It is hardly credible that anyone in modern times will justify this; but most of us will say that Epicurus defended his case unskilfully, and that he ought to have dwelt on the fact that a virtue (if real) produced pleasure *to some one else.* Thus Torquatus, in beheading his son, may have got absolutely no advantage, no tranquillity, no pleasure for himself; but if his deed is to be justified, it must have brought much advantage, ultimately much pleasure, to Roman citizens.

If it be convenient to fix the name Pleasure on everything that gratifies us, whether intellectual, affectional, or corporeal, there may be no ground for objecting to it, any more than to say Gratification or Satisfaction, so long as the vagueness of the word is kept in mind. But when anyone goes on to imagine that he can combine all such pleasures into a single total, and mentally discuss its maximum, calling the maximum Happiness, it is evident that he regards all such gratifications as *of the same kind.* Moreover, the moment this is conceded, and morals built upon it, no standard of morals, any more than of tastes, can be so rigid as to justify punishment. Contrast the taste of Aristotle with that of Epicurus. "It is right," says Aristotle, "to do many things for the sake of virtue or one's friends or one's country, even if it be requisite to die for them: for the good man will fling away property and honours, and in short all the good things for which men contend, while purchasing for himself nobleness. *For* he would rather be pleased intensely for a short time than moderately for a long time, and live nobly for one year than many years in chance-fashion, and do one action noble and great rather than many small actions. And perhaps this happens to those who die in a great cause, for they choose great nobleness for themselves." Evidently

the character of men principally depends on their tastes, in this larger sense of the word; but there is nothing in the Epicurean doctrine to elevate taste and kindle noble passion—a task which is cardinal in Morals.

In the Platonic, Aristotleic, or Stoical school a true *passion for virtue* was often kindled. Plato, in his own characteristic way, says, "that if True Wisdom could be revealed to men's bodily eyes, all men would fall in love with her." This is the critical matter in all that we have now learned to call *spiritual* morality. Why does the man, who under Christian teaching is "convinced of sin," moan so profoundly and humble himself so deeply? why does he lash himself with extravagant invective, and account himself worthy (as many a one has said and will say) of everlasting punishment? It is because he has an unutterable contempt of his own evil conduct and low desires, and has glimpses of a better life which he ought to have pursued. And when raised out of despair into hope, the vehemence of his longing after a nobler state becomes a real power to help him forward, and to cut away all relations with his baser beginnings. Nothing of this is possible from an Epicurean foundation. One who supposes deeds to differ only in the more or less of pleasure, and all pleasures to be either the same in kind or at least co-ordinate in value, cannot sternly rebuke himself, cannot suffer deep inward shame, cannot pant and agonize for a nobler state: indeed, the more such a struggle is needed, the less is it possible. In trying to raise depraved men into better courses, the great difficulty notorious to us all is truly pointed out by Aristotle. Socrates, says he, was wholly wrong in thinking that bad men differ from good men in knowledge only, and that to remove ignorance is to create virtue. It is in desires and aims that good and bad men differ; the depraved man has wrong desires, and to bring them right needs training, not mere teaching; but with depraved adults we find no possibility of training: a fact which leads Aristotle to fall back on early education as alone of avail, for (says he) the depraved man has not *the first principles* (*οὐκ ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς*), *i.e.* right desires. But, according to Epicurus, all men have the very same desires, namely, the desire of pleasure, which is the same in everything.

Substantially the same moral doctrines have been advanced in recent times by the justly celebrated Jeremy Bentham, a man whose eminence as a jurist and a keen-sighted scorner of political injustices has aided to give currency to his theory of morals. He propounded "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" as

the goal to drive at, and the very statement is a disowning of selfishness—a vast improvement on Epicurus. Besides, however strongly we may insist that Virtue, not Happiness, is man's chief good, which every wise man chooses for himself, and every wise mother would choose for the child she most loves, yet it is undeniable that to choose virtue *for others* is generally quite impracticable, indeed is an offensive pedantry. While we may reverently believe that the Supreme Mind designs the virtue of man as man's highest good, not the less must we confess that individual man has extremely limited power to promote the virtue of his brother-man. To abstain from whatever will hinder his virtue or tend to deprave him, is good negatively; positively there is little to do, but to promote his comfort, his powers, in short his happiness; and then we practically adopt Bentham's formula, which is not ill calculated for *political* use. Even so, how much better to say, that all citizens *ought* collectively and singly to promote the general *welfare?*" Who will deny this? But when the "greatest happiness" is proposed to us as a moral foundation, grave embarrassments arise. The greatest happiness? But what is happiness? No two men have the same idea of it, nor has the same man at different times. No doubt, we are told that happiness means *the total sum of pleasures* minus *pains:* an explanation which is of little avail for practical use. Is it indeed imagined that in selecting one course of action rather than another, we can enter into such computation? Take any ordinary occurrence of daily life. A gentleman's footman behaves saucily, and there is a question whether to dismiss him. By what high calculus is it to be approximately determined, whether the maximum of pleasures and minimum of pains will accrue to the human race or (say) to the English nation by overlooking or by punishing the fault?

It is impossible to pass by the name of Mr. John Stuart Mill in this connexion, though I regard his writings on this subject as chiefly an attempt to infuse a nobler morality into those whom he accounts as on his side. It is chiefly with his phraseology that I quarrel, as leading to evil; but, in substance, he seems to come very close to the school which he supposes opposite. Indeed, he is justly severe on Bentham for asserting that all pleasures are the same in kind; but the moment it is allowed that pleasures differ in kind, the idea of any *total* of pleasures which can be intelligently contemplated and measured mentally, must be abandoned. Mr. Mill justly adds, that pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. The question also enters, whether

the pleasures thus heterogeneous are at all co-ordinate; whether they do not lie in wholly different planes, so that a higher pleasure is paramount over any imaginable total of the lower; and whether a single pain may not annihilate an infinity of pleasure? Nay, the question instantly answers itself. The pain of having a vicious son cannot be balanced against minor pleasures. In ancient times it was asked, whether the pleasure which a cow has in rubbing herself against a stone was the same in kind with the pleasure of discovering the solution of a mathematical problem. This may suggest to ask, whether the pleasure of friction with a bath towel, ever so often repeated, can be compared with the pleasure of repaying to a revered and honored benefactor kindnesses and benefits, with great sacrifices to ourselves? Surely we do not overstrain universal sentiment, in saying that the nobler pleasure is here so pre-eminent that it eclipses and annihilates the lower; and if so, on the showing of Utilitarianism itself, right action is determined by the consideration of the higher pleasure only. And the case is not exceptional. It must be normal, whenever heterogeneous pleasures come into competition. Surely then we have a true grievance against those who insist on using this word *pleasure*, which is the popular name for the lowest kind, as descriptive of the highest kind. Mr. Mill's complaint of the stupidity of the public, who so often mistake what the word means, seems to me a confession how ill his phraseology is chosen. A like objection attaches to Mr. Mill's pertinacious use of the word happiness, as, "It results from the preceding considerations that there is nothing desired [in virtue] except happiness," after he has admitted that the pleasures which make up happiness (so called) are too diverse to be presented to the mind at all by the word. In fact, this sentence can only be understood to assert that "nothing is desired in virtue except *something or other which people like*." Surely such vague statements, whether he meant it or not—nay, however much he desire the contrary—must tend to degrade moral sentiment.

For the word utilitarianism he claims some personal credit. "The author of this essay," says he, in foot note, p. 9, "has reason to believe himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarianism into use." It is common in systems of ethics to insist that a thing is called useful when it is a means to a further end; and that the end is higher than the means. Hence, to call a thing useful puts it below things which are desirable and desired for their own sake. Mr. Mill admits that virtue is certainly desired for its own sake, but only just as

money is, by the effect of habit; that it is an artificial desire needing a justification; and the justification is, that virtue tends (whether the aspirant to virtue know it or not) to produce happiness in other people, more or few, if not in the person himself. Happiness is thus exalted into a primary and natural end, Virtue depressed into a secondary and artificial end; and this while happiness may mean nothing but the gratification of desires neither exalted nor exalting.

The following passsage of Mr. Mill (p. 42, Utilitarianism) is highly satisfactory. He says: "The ultimate sanction therefore of all morality (external motives apart) being a *subjective feeling* in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is UTILITY, in the question, What is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, The same as of all other moral standards—the *conscientious feelings of mankind*." This goes far to remove all differences between us, except those of phraseology. I cannot see what ground he leaves himself to find fault with intuitional morals; for the doctrine of Intuition does not throw away the appeal to experience or the arguments from tendencies. Intuition is concerned principally with establishing that *gradation* in the value of things desired, or in the dignity of motives, which Mr. Mill admits and contends for, which also he enforces by means of men's *inward* feelings. He uses the emphatic language, "It is BETTER to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; BETTER to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" (p. 14). Thus to be satisfied (which is identical with Epicurean happiness) is not *so good* as to be a higher being, a nobler person. Mr. Mill's idea of happiness is not that of mere content: he evidently rises high above Epicurus. But when he is such, why will he torment us by that vague word happiness? and how can he imagine that Science can be founded upon it? If he merely mean that "*that* cannot be virtue which tends to general misery," he can say this clearly and strongly, without setting up any particular system of morals.

Although James Martineau is not likely to have been overlooked by any disputants on this subject, it would certainly appear that few of them can have understood his very luminous statements. A man may do the same action from one set of motives or from another. He has an inward judgment as to the relative nobleness of the motives. This inward judgment we call an intuition. If the individual is very singular, he may be singularly wrong: but if we discern that the judgment is shared by all the men whom on other grounds we most respect, we call it

a human intuition, and think it deserves to be made an axiom. Sir James Mackintosh tells us that Bentham said, "There ought to be no such word as Ought;" and undoubtedly Bentham struggled to abolish it. Mr. Mill talks of men's conscientious feelings!" but Bentham said, "Here is a man who tells me he disapproves, because he *has got a thing* which he calls a conscience." Accordingly, Macaulay with good reason said that Bentham could give no reason why a person *ought* to care for the general welfare, *ought* not to be selfish. But Mr. Mill has a reply, which Bentham could not use. His intuition (which he prefers to call his "subjective feeling") tells him, as mine tells me, that Disinterestedness is BETTER than Selfishness. I cannot but wonder why it is, that while he thinks no justification, nor any further analysis of the fact, is needed for loving a minor pleasure for its own sake, he makes such difficulty about loving a virtue for its own sake; and this, admitting the fact, that it *is* loved. It would seem that any meaner instinct is a born citizen of the utilitarian soil, and needs no passport; but if a nobler instinct venture thither undisguised, the police at once molest it; and it has to plead at the bar of the meaner to get a ticket of leave. Mr. Martineau's words on a kindred topic will here apply: "While this logic is permitted, in every battle of the Gods and Titans, the children of earth will vanquish the sons of heaven."!

Pleasure is asserted to be good in itself, yet to esteem virtue good in itself is treated as a paradox by Utilitarians: and then they shriek with amazement, as injured and slandered persons, when told that under their doctrine the majority of mankind gravitate into baser sentiment.

Paley who almost agrees with Bentham when he attempts theory, has excellently said, that to have the habits well set is of primary importance to morals. Of not less importance is it, to have the noblest desires most cultivated, which is in fact an intensifying of intuition. The Utilitarian school (I do not include Mr. Mill) want to reduce intuition to its minimum: the Spiritual school want to exalt it to its maximum. The two schools perhaps do not at bottom disagree as to the several elements of Morals; but they clearly differ much as to their relative importance; and out of this comes the difference in phraseology. If we wish to excite an enthusiasm, a passion for a nobler state, we must cultivate quick inward perceptions of what is *ignoble*. This certainly will never be done by exclusive talking about experience, by swamping the most diverse sets of feelings under the word pleasure, or by any preachings about happiness. The modern

doctrines are better than those of Epicurus; yet they have a large smack of his opium.

Epicurus was highly temperate, and highly extolled universal temperance; yet it is notorious that his doctrine gravitated into the lusts of the flesh, in the largest sense of the word. In regard to what are called the pleasures of the table, Epicureans were not necessarily or perhaps often excessive; but however cautious of his health a man might be, yet to live for such enjoyments was morally fatal. Numbers of thoughtful persons are now seized with alarm at the symptoms displayed in all the great towns of Christendom; which a prophet would probably denounce as addicted to the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life. Mr. Mill, we may well believe, groans under this, as much as any of us. If we can suggest the sources of the evil, and whence a remedy is to be looked for, he will not disdain it.

Epicureanism rises naturally, as soon as a State becomes corrupt, as, in the break-up of nationality. For the State is the moral heart of the nation, the most potent diffuser of good or evil. It cannot have organic life, until some common morality actuates men. It gives shape and body to that morality, and variously enforces its moral judgments on delinquents. It can reach family life and greatly modify men's habits, and thereby their minds: and according as the public institutions are good or bad, so does the nation become. A vicious nation is a certain index of vicious institutions.

In early times the State has generally taught *religion* with temporary benefit to political order; but if the religious doctrine be made authoritative, the State, in the course of centuries, upholds artificially the immature notions of barbarism. Again, in early times, questions of right are fought out between neighbour tribes, or between the orders of a community. Conquerors assume rights over *land*, which, if not very oppressive at the moment, become more and more oppressive as the nation lives on and multiplies. Out of this oppression grows class-enmity, pilferings, dishonesty; with which family-pride keeps pace, and luxury too, if the higher class be enriched. Again, conquerors regard *women* as having no rights, and licentiousness spreads wide; and if standing armies arise, it is perpetuated in another way. Further, men, having legislation all to themselves, enact laws, especially *marriage* laws, unjust to the female sex, which, taking different form under different circumstances, under all yield a bitter crop. Expensive *courts* set the example of luxury and change of fashion, spreading and almost demanding habits

of pecuniary extravagance; hence a general rush after wealth, and much unscrupulousness: for the saying goes abroad, that one who has not such or such an income is trodden under foot. Last, and not least, *capitalists* are permitted to deprave a nation for their private gain, while perhaps the State, instead of forbidding them, condescends to share their ill-gotten income. Who can deny that all these causes of demoralization conspire in England as much as in any nation on earth? Let all the moralists, all the philanthropists, all the ministers of religion, all the thoughtful heads of families unite their influence; yet they are helpless to stem the flood of immorality. It can only be done through the STATE; and the first necessity is to recall the fundamental idea of State action, that it must promote the WELFARE of the community, which primarily depends on its morality. We have collectively no higher interest. Though individuals can do so little for other men's virtue, the State can do an immensity; and much more can it immensely deprave the country. On both sides, therefore, it is *upon* and *through* the State that philanthropists have to act.

Mr. Mill well understands that we need to exalt the object of promoting the public good and depress (each of us) his own private cupidity. In other words, we need simpler, severer tastes; perhaps the frugality of Epicurus, who generally dined on herbs, and certainly laid great stress on being satisfied with a little. Some people, oddly calling themselves Economists, think it a great gain to infuse into a population artificial desires, and name it civilization. Where a powerful aristocracy has persecuted socially every politician who dares to discuss the *rights* of land, or where the ruling sex tries to crush all talk of the *rights* of women, Mr. Mill comes to the front on the side of the oppressed. Does he not hereby bid us hope that he will step out farther? We need his protest more distinct for simplicity, and against corrupting trades. In regard also to sexual purity, it is to be feared that every approach to Epicurean doctrine is highly sinister. To shield the male temperament from vice, we need not only that the female sex shall have high defensive power, but that a reverence for them, with a stern sense of justice, should lie deep in men's hearts. It is said that, "a woman who hesitates is lost;" and why say less of a man? If a man once begins to compute (what is incomputable) the *pro*-and-*con* of a special vicious action which he allows himself calmly to contemplate, it is ten to one that low instinct and base passion will carry him away. Every young man eminently needs an *intuitional hatred*

of allowing carnal desire to be dominant, or to be gratified *for its own sake*: yet novelists, poets, and artists pander to voluptuousness without being disgraced and shunned. A powerful passion can only be encountered by a higher passion; and undoubtedly the spiritual passions are the strongest. The moralist's task—whatever name he assume, to whatever school he refer himself—is to strengthen and purify *the intuitions*—the inward choice, the inmost hates: for these are the vital forces of action. Otherwise, only the despairing wail will be heard in spite of formal teaching—"Video meliora proboque: Deteriora sequor." (I see and approve the better: I follow the worse.)

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *ODYSSEY*.

[From Frazer's Magazine, November, 1873.]

In the first half of this century a keen controversy was alive in the classical schools concerning the composition of the *Iliad*. It was assumed that the author did not possess the art and materials of writing; and out of certain marked peculiarities of the work it was deduced that it had been enlarged by a succession of poets. Theory after theory was advanced; of which the last perhaps is that of Grote, that it was an Achilleid before it became an Iliad. But the portions called new are in uniform style with the old, and have poetry as splendid. If anything be denoted, it is successive editions with enlargement by the original poet. Only in the later books, and possibly in the gossiping speech of Nestor in the eleventh book (where ninety-eight lines may with great advantage to the poem be wholly omitted),* small diversities of phraseology are observed, which suggest that the last book especially may have come down less perfect, and may have been completed by the editor with many considerable freedoms. But as a whole it is essential to the poem. We may thus say, that the controversy has ended in a substantial acknowledgment of the unity of the *Iliad*. The assumption that the author did not possess the means of writing down his poem was unproved, improbable, and a mere gratuitous invention of difficulty.

In the course of this searching discussion, the *Odyssey* was in comparison neglected. Those who favoured the unity of the *Iliad* appear generally to have received as of course a belief that the same poet composed both epics, and Mr. Mure elaborately maintains that so it was. Hence it is not at all superfluous to go into the question. Ancient opinion here cannot justly be allowed weight on that side. The ancients accepted as the work of one poet nearly all that is printed in our editions with the great epics,

* From xi. 664 to xi. 761. Αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς repeated may then mark the limits of interpolation. Another monstrous passage will not be missed, if omitted, viz., xx. 204 - 255. It is spoken while Achilles is in lion - like frenzy, xx. 164-173. Perhaps Horace's remark of "good Homer nodding" was based on these two passage. In the latter, the anomalous verb *ἀνηρείψαντο* may offend the reader of the *Iliad*. It occurs four times in the *Odyssey*.

besides some lost poems. If we give no authority to Herodotus, when he refers to the Cyprian Epic as Homer's, to Thucydides when he quotes the Delian Hymn, or to Aristotle in quoting from the Margites, we cannot reasonably give weight to current opinion concerning the *Odyssey*. If anyone ask, "Is it *certain* then that the ancients were wrong in ascribing the Hymns to the poet of the *Iliad*?" it here suffices to reply, that no competent modern scholar can believe it. Yet it may be a satisfaction to an English reader, if we refer in illustration to a phenomenon of the Hymn to Mars (Ares). Mars in the *Iliad* is the type of barbarous, ignorant, brutal war; no moral element is found in him: Jupiter insults him in his misfortunes, for he is always beaten. Now contrast the Homeric Hymn to Mars. He is called "the Ally of Justice, the Leader of most just men," and is identified with the *planet* Mars in very elegant lines which denote a progress in astronomy far beyond Homer. The poet implores him "to instil from on high a *mild radiance* and brave hardihood into our life, that we may be able to *restrain* the sharp force of anger from irritating us into a path of dismal battle." "Do thou, O Blessed One! give us confidence to abide in the harmless ordinances of Peace, escaping the turmoil of enemies and violent deaths." Such an address to the God of Battles appears altogether an anachronism in Pagan Greece. A Thales rather than a Homer might be the writer. No doubt it was the poetical merit of these Hymns, and their general style and metre, which made them pass as Homeric, *before criticism was born*. The belief that all the chief poems were from one author was sucked in with the mother's milk, and became a sort of religious creed, accepted as unenquiringly as the ascription of all the Hebrew Psalms to David. The Hymns with all their merit show a tendency to degenerate into rhetorical ingenuity, by amassing long strings of descriptive epithets, such as the power of the Greek language facilitates. Thus they form a transition to the Orphic poems, which remind one of Catholic glorifications of the Virgin. Many of the Hymns have local allusions, which show that they are written after the Greek colonization of the coast of Asia. It is the more remarkable that Thucydides did not see that the Hymn to Delian Apollo, indeed the very passage which he quotes, could not possibly be from the author of the *Iliad*. It is from that hymn that the belief arose that the *Iliad* was composed by "a blind man living at Chios." Nevertheless, as a well-known couplet says,

> Seven mighty towns contend for Homer dead,
> In which the living Homer begged his bread;

which does but express the fact, that there were many poets concealed under the single name Homer. For us, therefore, the question whether the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were written by the same poet, is wholly unprejudiced by any opinions of antiquity.

The first question, then, which presents itself to the student is, "Does the poet himself, in continuing the tale of the *Iliad* profess to continue *his own* work?" We may almost reply, *On the contrary*, his opening invocation to the Muse implies that he is *not* the same poet; for in the closing line he says, "Of these topics, O goddess, daughter of Jove, tell *to us also*, from some source or other." The phrase *to us also* has only one natural interpretation; viz., "*as* to the poet of the *Iliad* who invoked thee, *so also* to us." The somewhat prosaic phrase, "from some quarter or other," (*ἀμόθεν γε*) is unknown to the *Iliad*, and is called by the grammarians Attic. The young student, well acquainted with the *Iliad* alone, who enters the *Odyssey*, is soon struck and embarrassed by new words, even when things are not new. We should plunge into an immense sea of verbal criticism, if we tried at all duly to develop the contrast; yet it is expedient at once to remark on some words which surprize a learner. He finds in the *Odyssey* *εἴρω*, I say; *φάο*, say thou; *φάε*, it shone; *φάεα*, eyes, as in Latin poets *lumina;* *κάλλιμος*, fair, fine, for *καλός*; *ἄδεσε*, *ἄσε*, he slept; *βρώμη*, food; *ζωή*, victuals; *αὐτόδιον*, for *αὐτίκα*, instantly; *ἐπηετανός*, plentiful; *ἀποφώλιος* (for *ἀνωφελής*?), useless, abortive; *ἀδευκής*, unpleasant; *τῆνσιος* (for *ἐτώσιος*?), vain, empty; *ἔπεσχε*, he attacked; *λυκάβας*, a year; *οἴμη*, a tune; *εἴρερος*, slavery; *ἐπητύς*, courtesy; *ἄρτος*, a loaf; *οὖλος* for *ὅλος*, whole; *οὐλή* for *ωτειλή*, scar, wound; *οὖλε*, *salve!* hail! [though *οὖλος* is also *ghastly* and *curly* (hair)]; *ἀκήριος* for *ἀκήρατος*, unharmed, while in the *Iliad* *ακήριος* is heartless, cowardly; *εκλυον* (*ζ*. 185) *they felt*, suggests modern Greek idiom. Besides, there is a vast addition to the development of the language. It cannot be by accident that in the *Odyssey*, as in later Greek, *κώπη* means an oar, while in the *Iliad* it is only a handle, and is never said of an oar. Into syntactical peculiarities we cannot enter. It suffices at this point of the argument to say, that *primâ facie* we seem in the very language to encounter marks of a different poet.

But the new poet borrows immensely from the material of the old, with whose works he evidently had a very familiar acquaintance. This borrowing has been most strangely advanced by Mure as proof of the unity; whereas justly viewed, it is a signal disproof. No great poet would garble and pervert his own fine

passages. As some people who are intimately versed in texts and words of Scripture use them needlessly, or even quite out of place, for their own small convenience, so does the later poem deal. For instance, in *Il.* v. 751 is a celebrated and splendid passage concerning the Hours, warders of heaven and of Olympus, to whom it is "entrusted alike to lift or to drop the curtain of darkness (πυκινὸν νέφος)." In the *Odyssey* the line is garbled by changing the accusative to πυκινὸν λόχον, *the close ambuscade*, itself borrowed from the *Iliad*, but in *Od.* xi. 524 made descriptive of Ulysses's duty in the Wooden Horse! So difficult is it of explanation, that Cowper arbitrarily translates λόχον *the door!* Of course such a perversion of the original poet produces an unnatural phrase. Again, the winged sandals attributed to Mercury in the last book of the *Iliad* are very familiar; and the poet of the *Odyssey* applies them to Mercury in book v.; yet in book i. 96 he attributes them to the goddess Athena; which is surely a great literary offence. The earlier poet often represents his stalwart heroes as grasping something "with stout hand," χειρὶ παχείῃ: the *Odyssey* (xxi. 6) stereotypes the phrase, applying it to Penelope, where she is to be depicted in great feminine beauty. Carelessness and haste may be here the cause: for "slender hand" from *Iliad* v. 425 would have suited the metre as well. Just so, the description of evening, "The sun sank down, and all the *streets* were shaded," he perpetually uses, whether his travellers are in the open field, or on the sea. When he is describing the Phæacian rowers, whose sole accomplishment is that of the sailor, he gives them all witty names, alluding to nautical skill. The last is Euryalus, and he has the bad taste to add to it the phrase pilfered from the *Iliad*, βροτολοιγῷ ἶσος Ἄρηι, "a match for mortal-destroying Mars," where it is quite inappropriate. In a like spirit he calls the rowers of Telemachus (ii. 402) his "*well-greaved* companions," as if they had been heavy armed warriors. The poet of the *Iliad* is too volatile to be logical, and with his great heroes he retains epithets out of place; but I do not think cases of this sort can be found in him. Again: in the *Iliad*, wounds and slaughter are often inflicted νηλεῖ χαλκῷ, "by the *pitiless* brass;" but in the *Odyssey* (viii. 507, xiv. 418) the phrase is misapplied for the cleaving of wood. This suggests to remark, that weapons of war in the *Iliad* are of brass or bronze, and iron is used only for knives, spits, and ploughshares, because of its rarity. Hence the phrase of the *Odyssey*, "*iron* itself attracts a man" (xvi. 294), is unintelligible to a mere student of the *Iliad*, for it means, "The very sight of *a weapon of war*

allures a man" (to fight). Τοῖσι δὲ μύθων ἦρχε is common in the *Iliad* as preface to a speech made *to many persons;* as, "*To them* did [Nestor] begin addresses;" but the poet of the *Odyssey* borrows the formula out of place, when two persons are in dialogue, one speaking *to one* (v. 202, xvii. 184). Achilles (*Iliad* xviii. 34) had described his father Peleus as "cursed by grievous old age." In the *Odyssey* (xxiii. 283) the phrase is modified into "cursed by opulent old age," as applied to Ulysses, who is to live long in prosperity. *Odyssey* vi. 2 seems to say that Ulysses was "cursed by sleep and toil." That ἀρημένος meant strictly "cursed" in the *Iliad*, is guaranteed to us by the kindred verbal ἀρητος "execrable," ἀρατος of Sophocles.* If we admit an interval of time, we easily understand, that as the old French *gehenné* (tormented) was softened into the modern *géné* (ill at ease), so ἀρημένος may have passed from its first sense *cursed* into (perhaps) *subdued*, though the latter sense has no justification in grammar. But a flagrant instance of inexcusable perversion needs closer attention. In his last words to Andromache (*Iliad* vi. 490-3) Hector bids her to go home, tend her domestic duties, and set her handmaids to their task; but "War (says he) shall be a care to Men, to all men who are born in Ilion, and to me in chief." In the *Odyssey* this is three times parodied, and each time detestably. Twice by Telemachus to his mother. In i. 356-9 having exactly repeated the charge to her, he adds, "But Talk shall be a care to Men, and to me in chief: for to this belongs sway in the house."

Again, in xxi. 350, all recurs, except that War (πόλεμος) is now changed to the Bow (τόξον), namely, the bow of Ulysses which has been shut in a closet for twenty years! Thus the poet travesties himself too. But it is hard to say which is more ridiculous, to represent that Talk gives sway, or that the Bow gives sway, in the house. Besides this, in *Odyssey* xi. 351, the passage is put into the mouth of King Alcinous, who has undertaken to send Ulysses home. "Let the stranger (says he) wait, until I make up for him the entire gift: but Escort (πομπὴ) shall be a care to Men, and to me in chief; τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ' ἐνὶ δημῷ." Again, he mocks himself, by changing *house to people*, with uncertain syntax. The contrast of men to women has here vanished: the

---

* Antiq. 972. The Scholiast explains ἀρημένος by βεβλαμμένος, a sense, I think, made for the passage. To prop the error, the moderns in several lines change Ἄρην into ἀρὴν and Ἄρεως into ἀρῆς with the sense of *harm*. Scott and Liddon cannot account for this sense. No wonder.

pronoun τοῦ apparently means *this thing*, viz. Escort (*fem.*), and we have to translate the last clause, either, For to this belongs sway in (among) the people; or, For over this the power rests in the people. But neither gives a moderately good argument. No great poet ever thus burlesqued his own writing.

But we will pass from words to things: and first we observe the new view given of Castor and Pollux. In the *Iliad*, they are named only as brothers of Helen, whom she wonders not to see in the army of Agamemnon: but, adds the poet, *both had died in their native Lacedæmon* (iii. 243). Not a word is dropt to suggest anything miraculous in their death, nor that after death their state differed from that of other men: but the poetical phrase is used, "them already life-gendering Earth held fast." This very formula is garbled in the *Odyssey* (xi. 300) so as to reverse the meaning, by inserting the word ζωούς, *alive*, "both of whom life-gendering Earth holds fast *alive*." The poet adds, "Who even beneath Earth having honour from Jupiter, at one time live on alternate days, at another time are dead; and receive honour on the footing of gods." Very obscure as this is, we see clearly that an entirely new superstition had had time to grow up since the poet of the *Iliad* wrote. Indeed, that hero-worship had advanced in the interval is clear, from the *Odyssey* representing Minos as judge of the dead, as also from his inexplicable allusion to Rhadamanthys (vii. 323). Besides, ἁλοσύδνη (marine), an epithet of Thetis in the *Iliad*, has turned into a special deity in the *Odyssey*, where we also find Leucothea worshipped by sailors. Again, in the *Iliad* we find Vulcan (Hephæstus) married to a Grace, and the meaning of this mythus is sufficiently clear. The vulgar blacksmith with his grimy trade is transformed by genius into a Dædalus, the type of artistic beauty; hence the smithy itself is said to be "married to immortal grace." But when the meaning of this mythus had been forgotten, the Grace was turned into Venus (Aphrodite), as in the *Odyssey*; and next rose the unseemly story which is told with such glee in that poem, concerning the adultery of Mars and Venus. The song of the bard concerning it is in a voluptuous spirit, unknown to the *Iliad*, and the comments of the gods are debasing. The notion of Vulcan, as limping and deformed, was very ancient, and is plausibly traced to the Pelasgian colonies and to the rites of the Cabeiri: but even without this, we easily understand how a figure for the god who works in metal should be suggested, muscular in the chest and arms, but defective in the lower limbs, which were little needed in that trade. When such a god was married

to the goddess of Beauty, the vulgar imagined that a handsome soldier as his wife's paramour fitly superseded him. But the tale is fundamentally inconsistent with the *Iliad*, where the relation of Mars to Venus is entirely pure (that of brother to sister), and Vulcan is married to a Grace. Once more: in the *Iliad* Apollo plays a large part, and is frequently named. He is described as ruling in Tenedos, Killa, and Chrysa; as having a temple in Ilion, a very wealthy temple in Pytho (Delphi), and as worshipped in Lycia (xvi. 514). Also in the *Iliad* only he is called Λυκηγενὴς, which is generally explained, "born at Patara in Lycia." But there is no mention whatever of Delos, much less of his birth there, and of his eminent temple. We may with much certainty infer that the *Iliad* was written *before* and the *Odyssey after* the Ionian colonization of the coast of Asia, whose religious assemblies were organized on the little island of Delos. For in the *Odyssey* both Ortygia and Delos are found: the former is in connection with Artemis (v. 123); with the latter the altar of Phœbus and sacred bay-tree (vi. 162) are named, which are a perpetual theme to all after-poets. So the Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo says (16) that Artemis was born in Ortygia, Apollo in Delos. With the political events mythology moved on. But it must be observed, that neither in the *Iliad*, nor in the *Odyssey*, nor yet in the Hymns called Homeric, is Apollo the Sun-god nor Artemis the Moon. Tethys of the *Iliad* becomes Amphitrite in the *Odyssey*.

Ceremonies of religion are often so fixed by tradition that we have no right to count on their perceptibly changing in a century or two; yet we herein find diversities not to be overlooked between the two poems. The ceremony of sacrifice preparatory to a feast is elaborately detailed in the *Iliad* several times, but unexpected additions to it are found in the *Odyssey*. Such are: 1. The care to cut off the tongues of the victims, and throw them into the fire (iii. 332, 341); which the Scholiast says was an Attic custom. 2. We have also certain new phrases. Αἶγας *ἀνιεμενοι* is strangely explained "*skinning* goats." A professional carver (*δαιτρὸς*), i. 141, apportions the shares (iii. 66) to the guests, and *δαιτροσύνη* (skill in fair distribution) is recognized as an accomplishment to be acquired. *Δαιρτὸς*, *δαιτρεύω*, *δαιτροσύνη* are words unknown to the *Iliad*, though kindred words describe the dividing of spoil and the giving an allowance of wine. The stress laid on "the *upper* flesh" is also new, and the compliment to a person (viii. 474) of sending to him previous cuts out of the back. In later Greek, as in Xenophon, *ἱερειον* is simply an animal destined

to the butcher; all religious idea being merged. The same phenomenon meets us in the *Odyssey*. Ἱερεύειν, xiv. 74, when Eumæus "sacrifices" two pigs without the slightest exterior of religion, seems to be identical with *butcher*. In xxiv. 214, where Ulysses simply wants a dinner, he uses the singular phrase, Δεῖπνον συὸν ἱερεύσατε, "sacrifice for me a dinner of pigs."

The miracles wrought by the goddess Athena in the *Odyssey* are also unparalleled in the other poem. When a god in the *Iliad* animates a hero with pre-eminent courage and strength, or terrifies and weakens him, it is by a mental action and a sort of inspiration, which does not suggest magic nor what we call miracle. The more marvellous cases, in which a hero is rescued from desperate battle and re-appears in another part of the field, or a lady under divine guidance passes unseen through a crowd, are readily understood as human events under a poetic veil. Faces hidden under a vizor cannot be ascertained. Nothing is easier than that a hero, who was thought to have been slain by Achilles, may really have been at quite a different part of the field. To say that Aphrodite or Athena poured signal splendour over an Æneas or a Diomedes is little more than the pious recognition of a beautiful or terrible aspect. If Apollo three times repelled Patroclus from the towers of Troy, or smote him in the back and deprived him of strength, &c., &c., we understand simply that he was repelled, and was worn out with toil of fighting. If a god restores a whip or a spear to a hero's hand, it denotes poetically that the hero regained it by skill. But the miracles of the *Odyssey* are acts of magic, like those of the *Arabian Nights*, and are even wrought by the stroke of a magic wand.* Athena herein differs little from the enchantress Circe. She makes Ulysses alternately a noble and handsome hero in fine costume, or an ugly and foul beggar in vile rags. For a little moment she exhibits his better aspect to Telemachus, but presently again by a sudden touch renews his wrinkles and other ugliness. One may refer to the last book of the *Iliad* for the *wand* of Mercury; but it is not there used for miracle. It "either benumbs men's eyes or awakens them;" whatever this may mean in one whose function it is to escort the dead to the house of Pluto. Thus the *Odyssey* gives a meaner view of divine agency.

The "kindly drugs" of the *Iliad* are medical ointments. The

* It must be confessed that in *Il.* xiii. Neptune, disguised as Calchas, strikes the Ajaces with his augur's staff: but the effect is internal, filling them with brave vigour.

poet cannot have been ignorant, that many things when eaten or drunk are poisonous; and he once attributes the fury of a snake to its having eaten evil drugs—a thing, no doubt, suggested by an adder's poison: but no hint appears that he was familiar with the idea that drugs could be serviceable for *enchantment*. It would seem, that in his poem Circe would be a character as much out of place as an Egyptian magician. In the *Odyssey*, when Ulysses is to be fortified against her, it is, as in the *Arabian Nights*, by a counter-charm, by the herb *moly* which the god Mercury gives him. This is a new form of superstition.

But what are we to say of Mercury's complaint to Calypso? The descent of the active god, like a sea-gull, was described in lines worthy of the *Iliad* (*Od.* v. 50-55). Who would expect him to plead weariness, and to miss intermediate places of refreshment? Yet he says to her: "Jupiter has sent me hither, *against my will:* for, who would willingly run across so much salt water, immeasurable; where is *no city of mortals nigh*, who offer sacrifices? &c. . . ." In the *Iliad*, Iris, not Mercury, carries Jupiter's errands; and she never complains of fatigue. The counter-complaint of Calypso is equally surprizing. She accuses the gods of a very cruel jealousy, if any goddess wishes to sleep with a mortal man and make him her dear husband. Of this jealousy she cites signal instances. It cannot be said that this is more monstrous than Jupiter's own tales of his own doings in the *Iliad;* yet it has the aspect of a further growth of credulity. Tithonus's marriage to Aurora in the *Iliad* is evidently a mere poetical version of the report that a Trojan prince married some distant Oriental queen. We may add another small matter. When the goddess Athena (*Od.* xvi. 160) approached invisibly to Telemachus, *the dogs* knew her!

As to the knowledge of geography, no advance is made in the later poem. Negatively the two have certain points in common. There is no mention of Tyrians, nor of Tyrsenians, nor of Dorian leadership in Greece; nor any closer acquaintance with Egypt, Libya, Sicily, or Italy. Seduced by a passage in *Il.* ix. concerning the wealth of Egyptian Thebes, the author of the *Odyssey* thought fit to carry Menelaus thither: but he probably believed Thebes to be a port on the Mediterranean. His own hydrography is wild and unreal, but, such as it is, it has been wholly misinterpreted. Most plainly he places Aiaia, the island of Circe, at the Dawn and Sun-rising. In going from it to Thrinacia, the first difficulty is to pass the two moving rocks through which (he says) the ship Argo escaped by favour of Juno to Jason. The unintelligible part

of the story is, why, after going from Circe to Tartarus, and returning to Circe, she sends him through this dangerous strait at all. It leads to nothing but Thrinacia, the very place which he ought to avoid. He goes as if purposely to enable his companions to commit the sin which is punished by the destruction of their ship; the sin against which he was warned; then he himself on two beams has to ride back in the waves past the fatal rocks again. Scylla and Charybdis were here on opposite sides. Evidently, then, this is one of the two Bospori, which were, no doubt, confounded into one by the poet. In order to descend into Hades, Ulysses had to go to the Cimmerians (xiii. 14). The *triangular island* (? θρινακίη νῆσος, xiii. 127) on which the cows of the Sun dwelt, in this same Eastern sea, must apparently have been suggested by reports of the Crimea. The two Sirens (for there are only two in the *Odyssey*) are in the same region; also, even earlier, when Ulysses is escaping from the Cyclops, Neptune looks out after him from the mountains of the Solymi, lofty heights in Asia Minor. Evidently, then, the Sea of Marmora with the Black Sea is the "Ocean" in which the voyages of Ulysses for ten years are made: it was not at that time known to have any nothern shore. The Cimmerians were imagined to be in the darkness of the extreme north; but by identifying the "triangular island" with Sicily, and placing Scylla and Charybdis in the Sicilian straits, interpreters have quite gone astray from the notions of the *Odyssey*. Circe, daughter of the Sun, was in the same region as Medea, in the poet's conception: she is sister of Æetes, King of Colchis, and *Perse* is their mother.

He seems to have little knowledge of Peloponnesus, even as to the coasts. He represents Nestor as saying, that he and Diomedes ran with a *favourable breeze* from Lesbos to Eubœa, whence the breeze, *never dropping*, carried Nestor home to Pylos. He cannot have known that many winds, different in direction, were needed for this navigation. Maps did not yet exist, and there was nothing to guide nor to bridle fancy. It may deserve remark, that in the *Iliad* Peloponnesus is twice called the land of *Apis:* in book i. it can have no other sense, and it is justified beyond question by Æschylus and Sophocles. But the author of the *Odyssey*, quoting the very phrase of the *Iliad*, so uses it that we cannot put on it this sense; and drives us to interpret it "a distant land," as derived from ἀπό, quite against analogy. Be the grammatical question as it may, this changed sense of the word denotes a new poet. Stranger still, he supposed that Agamemnon, in order to

get home from Troy to Mycenæ, needed to make (iv. 514) the promontory of Malea, the south-east corner of Peloponnesus; and because the wind would not let him, he was driven on to a coast where Ægisthus intercepted him. This promontory is always in the poet's imagination. Inability to round it carried Menelaus into his wanderings. The same cause drove Ulysses to Crete, when he was on his way to Troy; and equally on his return from Troy caused his misadventures. Crete (Κρήτη εὐρεῖα, xiii. 453) in the *Iliad* is all under the rule of Idomeneus, and is said to have a hundred cities. The *Odyssey* defines the number of cities as ninety, and speaks of the island in the plural, as if it were carved into many principalities, adding the plural epithet εὐρεῖαι slavishly; but his further mention of it deserves attention. Their tongues, says he (xix. 175), are various; some are Achaians, some are original Cretans, others are Cydonians, or *Dorians*, or *divine Pelasgians*. To the Dorians* he gives the epithet τριχάϊκες, which is variously interpreted: but the universal belief of commentators was, that these Dorians had migrated from Greece into Crete, which migration would seem to have been after the *Iliad* was composed, but evidently before the *Odyssey*. The Pelasgians are here and elsewhere in the *Odyssey*, equally as in the *Iliad*, sharply distinguished from Achaians, and are called *divine*, as a people seen through the haze of antiquity. It may deserve remark that once in the *Odyssey* the noun Athena in the singular is used for the city Athens.

But we must proceed to still more critical considerations. The poet of the *Iliad* is pre-eminent in all antiquity for various, definite and consistent delineation of character. In modern literature general opinion assigns Shakespeare as his only equal. We have to ask, Does the same power appear in the author of the *Odyssey*? I think we must simply reply, Certainly not. Ulysses and his son are the two most prominent. If he had intended to represent Telemachus as silly and cruel, we might agree that he has succeeded; but he calls him eminently pious and prudent. Consider his replies on two occasions. Athena, personating Mentes, King of the Taphians, asks him (i. 207) whether he is a son of Ulysses. The pious youth seizes the opportunity of scoffing at his mother's chastity: "My mother indeed says I am his son; but I for my part do not know, for no one yet has had cognisance of his own origin (γόνον)." What king's son in his senses ever

* Dorians are not mentioned in the *Iliad*. In the *Odyssey* the *Messenians* also are named, but not in the *Iliad*.

yet volunteered to suggest the possibility of his own bastardy? Again, the suitor Antinous has sarcastically said to him (i. 384): "Telemachus! you are become a lofty orator. Beware lest Jupiter make you King of Ithaca: for that is your paternal inheritance." He replies, "Perhaps you will be much astonished at the avowal; but, Jupiter allowing it, that is what I should like to get. Or, do you mean to say, that this is the worst lot that can befal a man? Nay, but it is no bad thing to be a king. Instantly his house becomes rich, and he himself is more honoured." As to his cruelty, it will be afterwards commented on. In the suitors, some distinctions of character are marked, but there is no peculiar skill in the poet to draw attention. Nausicaa, daughter of the King of the Phæacians, is very pleasantly set forth; but her tattling with a strange man against maiden unchastity (without the slightest call for it), at her own initiation, is alike unseemly and against nature. Nothing to approach it is found in the *Iliad*. This poet must have lived in an Ionian community, and never have heard a young woman talk to a stranger. He means to set forth her prudence and goodness. Ulysses himself, when escaping from Polyphemus, is depicted as stupidly imprudent, and incurs just reproof from his comrades. But we must come to closer quarters with his character as drawn in the *Odyssey*.

This hero is previously well known to us in the *Iliad*, and is there celebrated for various wisdom, as well as for bodily accomplishments; but the excellences, both of mind and body, ascribed to him in the *Odyssey* are decidedly different, so as to make quite a new character. The earlier poet would not have thus changed him. In the *Iliad* he is a sturdy warrior with heavy armour: among his epithets are "spear-famed" and "city stormer." He is also a good wrestler, and wins the prize in running, though no longer young, against Antilochus, the swiftest of the youths. In the *Odyssey*, it is pretended that he was pre-eminent in archery, only Philoctetes vying with him; but in the *Iliad* he does not enter the competition for the archer's prize, and there is no hint from end to end of the poem that he had any skill of this sort. In the night expedition, where light arms are best, he carries a bow; but in darkness one archer is almost on a par with another. Indeed, according to the *Odyssey* he excels in everything *except* running; but he was then ten years older. We need not grudge him some exaltation, just as the Æneas of Virgil is grander than the Æneas of the *Iliad*. But, in fact, the hero of the *Odyssey* is quite a Proteus, or a rival of the "admirable Crichton." He is

a first-rate joiner, a competent shipwright, a good sailor and pilot, a perfect acrobat. By hands and feet he sustains himself under the belly of a ram, and so rides safely out of Polyphemus's cave. To escape the whirlpool of Charybdis, he clings "like a bat" to the branches of a wild-fig tree by his hands, having nothing to rest his feet on (xii. 434), and holds on till evening when at length (ὀψὲ) the whirlpool vomits out his *cátamarán;* on which he drops most accurately, and is saved, every one of his companions being drowned. Of course, he is a capital swimmer. He is an admirable flinger of the quoit, a formidable and dexterous boxer; most powerful to draw a very stiff bow, and skilful to aim it. He claims to mow a field against any man, or drive a straight furrow in stiff soil (xiii. 365); and to be particularly clever as a menial servant, whether to cook a thousand dainties, or to "build a fire" well; to cleave dry wood, to carve flesh-meat for distribution, or pour out wine (xv. 314). These may be interpreted as false boasts; yet, on the whole, the character is not the Ulysses of the *Iliad*, but rather the clever Greek of Juvenal.

But it is in the nature of his *wisdom* that the contrast of the two characters chiefly appears. In the *Iliad* he has strong common sense, as opposed to the rashness of Diomedes and Achilles. He has sagacity and promptitude, skill as an ambassador, and great power of oratory, with judgment in adapting himself to the populace and to the separate kings. He knows when to be abrupt even to Agamemnon; but he is respectful, imploring or firm, to Achilles. He can retreat precipitately before an overwhelming force, as well as stand firm when the enemy is barely superior. Thus, from all the kings, young and old, he commands high respect, though, like Ajax, he brought to the war only twelve ships. While πολύμητις ("various in counsel" or "full of resource") is his current epithet, no hint appears of trickery and falsehood, nor of wanton violences and piracy.* He is sent into Troy as an ambassador, not as a disguised spy. But in the *Odyssey* falsehood is his natural weapon: cleverness, not wisdom, is his attribute. Indeed, the whole atmosphere of the poem is intrigue and treachery. Autolycus, the maternal grandsire of Ulysses, is praised (xix. 395) as "excelling all men *in thievery* and *in the oath;* an excellence which the god Mercurius gave him." What can this mean, but skill in perjury? The

* The later notion of Ulysses (in the *Odyssey*, in Sophocles, in Euripides) seems founded on the ill-tempered invective (*Il.* iv. 339) which Agamemnon utters in alarm and vexation, but instantly retracts, changing the imputation of *evil wiles* to ἤπια δήνια, *kindly devices.*

goddess Athena, who, of all the Pantheon, plays by far the largest part in the *Odyssey*, is herself wholly demoralized, and sets the example of perfidious violence, urging young Telemachus to assassinate the suitors, before any plot against his life by any of them is imagined. She makes a joke of Ulysses's falsehood, when he needlessly attempts to deceive her, not recognizing who she is. The word *κέρδεα* (gains) is in the *Odyssey* identified with tricks or fraud.* "He must be a gainful fellow (*κερδαλέος*) and a cheat," says the goddess (xiii. 291), "who would outreach thee in wiles, even were it a god that met thee. O thou unscrupulous and crafty one, insatiate of guile—so then! even in thy native land thou wouldest not renounce deceits and cheating tales, which are familiar to thee from the floor (*i. e.* from infancy). But come! *let us have done with such talk, since both of us understand gains* (*i. e.* fraud): for of all mortals thou by far excellest in counsel and talk; and I among all gods am celebrated for prudence and gains (fraud)." When the goddess is proud of her clever rogue, we may be sure that the poet was living in a more demoralized age than the poet of the *Iliad*. It is remarkable how he satirizes his hero, in the praises bestowed on him by Alcinous (xi. 360): "O Ulysses! when we look upon thee, we nowise assimilate thee to a deceiver and cheat, such as, among men of various stocks, black earth feeds numerous; who dress up lies, where lies might least be expected: but in thee is beauty of tales, and a noble mind," &c. It is true, that he has no motive to deceive Alcinous. But, while in disguise of a beggar and using deceit every moment, he borrows and alters the words of Achilles thus: "He is hateful to me as the gates of Hades, who, yielding to poverty, uses deception." Indeed, falsehood of a malignant kind is imputed to the most gallant of the suitors, Eurymachus; and we may add, to the mighty Hercules. In the *Iliad*, this audacious, lion-hearted hero has no slur of perfidy resting on him. His war on Troy was in vengeance for the perfidy of Laomedon, and his loyalty to his own king Eurystheus equals that of Corbulo to Nero. But in the *Odyssey* (xxi. 27) he receives Iphitus (son of the celebrated Eurytus) in his house and at his table, and "cruel! without reverence of gods," slays him, "being his guest," and robs him of his twelve mares.

* In vulgar use this cannot have been new; as *κέρδιστος* in *Il.* vi. 153 for *craftiest* shows; and (though the later books of the *Iliad* seem to have been tampered with) *κέρδεα* in *Il.* xxiii. 322, 515, 709. Also *και κερδοσύνῃ* in *Il.* xxii. 247; but there is some corruption. Perhaps it should be *κατα κερδοσύνην*.

In an atmosphere of falsehood, truth is the exception, and receives marked comment. Thus, when the goddess advises Telemachus to go straight to Nestor and enquire concerning Ulysses (iii. 14), she adds, "Entreat of the man himself to tell the truth, and *he will not tell thee a lie*, for he is very prudent;" that is, he sees where nothing is to be gained by lying. The very same words are put into the mouth of Nestor himself (iii. 327) concerning Menelaus, as if without special assurance the young Telemachus might naturally expect falsehood from his father's comrades in war. Nothing of this kind appears in the earlier poem.

When Telemachus comes into the presence of Helen, the lady says to her husband, King Menelaus, "Never did I see any one so like, as this young man is, to Telemachus, whom Ulysses left new-born (*νέον γεγαῶτα*) in his house," &c., twenty years before. This shrewd Helen is represented as tricky in the extreme, and skilful in drugs—quite different from the simple-hearted, if not silly, Helen of the *Iliad*. Menelaus tells of her, without resentment, and seemingly with pride, that when the Wooden Horse was brought into Troy, Helen three times walked round it, and called on all the Achaian chieftains, who were inside it, by name, *imitating the voice of each man's wife;* and one of them, Anticlus, would have answered her, but Ulysses clapt his hand firmly on the mouth of Anticlus (which is called his *μάστακα*—his beak? his lips?) and *saved all the Achaians* (iv. 271).

After Helen has thrown into the wine flagon drugs of such power that (as the poet tells us) whoever swallowed a draught would not shed a tear if his brother or son were murdered before his face, she may safely tell them any monstrous lie. Accordingly she narrates what is hard to reconcile with Ulysses's prudence. He came as a spy into Troy in the wraps of a beggar, disfigured by unsightly blows or wounds. Helen detected him; and when he tried to evade her questions, she undressed him, bathed and oiled him, clothed him in new garments, and then "swore a hardy oath" not to betray him until he should be safe back at the Achaian galleys. Hereupon *he revealed to her all the plans of the Achaians;* and, having slain many of the Trojans, escaped to the Argives with much *information* (*φρόνιν!*) The Trojan women were full of wailing; but Helen says she was herself delighted. How to reconcile this with her attempt to entice the chieftains in the Wooden Horse to their destruction, does not appear.

Drugs in the wine come near to poison. When young Telemachus takes ship for Peleponnesus, the suitors whisper one to another (ii. 329): "Will he bring back guards from Pylos or Sparta

to massacre us? or will he get from Ephyra (of Thesprotia) *deadly drugs to mix in the bowl*, and kill us all?" Such an idea is foreign to the *Iliad;* so is that of *poisoned arrows*. That such a weapon is inhuman, the poet of the *Odyssey* must have felt, for he says that Illus (a Thesprotian chief) *in reverence for the gods* refused the poison to Ulysses, when he travelled in search of it. Nevertheless (as the goddess Athena in disguise of Mentes tells Telemachus) the father of Mentes, in love to Ulysses, gratified his wish.

Wine in the *Iliad* is simply a refreshing drink, with no idea admitted of excess; in the *Odyssey* it plays a considerable part, and the word οἰνοποτὴρ (tippler) is found. Naturally, excess is imputed to the suitors. But also at Troy, according to this poet (iii. 139), the children of Achaia, when convened for public mote by the two sons of Atreus, came "over-weighted with wine;" whence an irreparable schism. The young princess of Phæacia, extolling her father's grandeur, says that "he sits on his throne enjoying his wine-cup (οἰνοποτάζων) *like an immortal.*" In the *Iliad*, whether from economy or from moral precaution, Agamemnon does not allow the kings at his own table to drink at their pleasure (iv. 257), but assigns a fixed portion to each: Idomeneus alone had an exceptional freedom.

Not only the individuals in the *Odyssey* are less truthful, but the war itself is represented as essentially one of trickery* (iii. 119), as is its final success by the stratagem of the Wooden Horse, to which no prospective allusion is found in the *Iliad*. When wisdom is identified with craft, wisdom seems dangerous and frightful. The wise man is thought to have skill in magic and drugs; in short, to "deal with the devil." Hence Minos, the wise legislator and just judge of the dead, is called ολοόφρων (*deadly-hearted*) in the *Odyssey;* no doubt, in admiration. So is Atlas, "who knows all the depths of the seas." Whatever the derivation of ολοφώϊος, it is not doubted to mean "destructive," and it is a fit epithet for the devices of Circe. Yet we have also πάντα τὰ ὀλοφώϊα, to mean "all the *secret wisdom*" of Proteus. Evidently "deadly-hearted" is used for deep counselling.

Side by side with this demoralization in the *Odyssey*, piracy takes a more shameless form. The raids of the *Iliad* are always veiled as the legitimate war of nation against nation, though single chieftains count on enrichment by them, as in all after-times. But in the *Odyssey* each plunders unscrupulously for his own convenience. Menelaus wanders for nearly eight years, to Cyprus,

* The παντοίοισι δόλοισι is probably a mere echo of *Il.* iii. 202 exaggerated.

Phœnicia, Egypt to Sidonians and Erembi, Æthiopians and Libyans, "gathering much substance," as he frankly tells. Indeed, he and Helen received peculiarly valuable *gifts* from strangers in Ægyptian Thebes! So Ulysses on his first start from Troy plunders the city of Ismarus, and slaughters the men, which the Scholiast excuses, because the Cicones had sent an auxiliary force to Priam. But the poet needed no such pretence. At the close of the *Odyssey*, Ulysses propounds to Penelope his scheme for replenishing their wealth. "Of sheep, whose numbers the suitors have thinned, I shall get plenty by marauding; and others the Achaians will give me, until I fill all the folds," xxiii. 157. Akin to this is the phrase of Telemachus, i. 398, "I claim to be full master of all the house-servants, whom divine Ulysses earned for me by his maraudings." Accordingly, the principal* change in commerce discernible in the *Odyssey* is, the increase of kidnapping for the slave market, which seems there an ordinary practice of traders; and the story of Eumæus suggests that slaves desiring to escape made merchandise of their masters' children. We see a reason why the peculiar word εἴρερος (*bondage*) should be found in this poem. That piracy was not dishonourable in the eyes of the poet, all writers since Thucydides have argued from the hearty reception given by Nestor to Telemachus and Mentor, while wholly uncertain whether they were honest men. Only after he has banqueted them, he asks frankly (meaning no offence, and giving none): "O strangers! who are ye? whence sail ye the watery routes? Is it for business? or do ye roam at random, as plunderers over the sea, who rove abroad risking their lives, and bringing mischief to men of other lands?" Nothing in the *Iliad* is of this colour. The Dorian movements in Greece, and the Asiatic unbridled colonization by Greeks, must have been disorganizing and demoralizing. The mixture of charity and violence ascribed to this state of society is curious. An unfortunate stranger in a foreign land has no resource but to beg; and if he can make it appear that he is of noble birth, he may possibly return home with large presents. Shipwreck leads to cruel plunderings, but also to warm compassion: many a rich man thinks, "I too may some day be wrecked." Thus Ulysses is laden

*As an epithet of a merchant, τρώκτης *(a nibbler)* is found in the *Odyssey*. From the Greek Anthology the word is quoted as meaning *usurer*. When no coin as yet existed, nor fixed prices, a *fixed* percentage for commission on sales was unimaginable. Perhaps a Phœnician captain who sold *other men's* goods, and deducted from the equivalents something for himself, was called *a nibbler*; and was sure to be accounted *a cheat* by the Greek of that age.

with wealth by the Phæacians; yet this, through the special favour of Athena. But he invents the tale that he is in Thesprotia, amassing stores by *beggary;* and though he uses the offensively accurate phrase ἀγυρτάζεσθαι, his story passes as a thing of course. Nevertheless, we cannot press any of this as a fact of the day; it suffices to urge that this was in the poet's imagination; but the credulity of hearers with him is too extreme. Laertes unhesitatingly believes a stranger (Ulysses himself in disguise) who tells him that in Crete he freely gave to Ulysses son of Laertes seven talents of gold, a bowl of solid silver worked with flowers, twelve cloaks, twelve carpets, twelve beautiful robes, twelve fine shirts; and allowed him to choose any four of his handsomest women slaves, well born, and trained to good accomplishment. Laertes swallows the falsehood, on the word of a perfect stranger, with no reason assigned for such liberality. At once we say, this picture has no approximation to real life. But we never say the same of characters in the *Iliad*.

While the poet imitates the lofty style of the *Iliad*, he often caricatures it, and makes it absurd. He entitles the swineherd Eumæus, "the *divine** swine-feeder," "captain of men," not once, but systematically. No doubt, Eumæus was a *foreman** among swineherds; but he was a slave from childhood, with only the coarse accomplishments of a male slave.* In the *Iliad*, the poet sometimes apostrophises a hero, as: "To him then, O charioteer Patroclus! *thou* didst thus reply." This grandiloquence is in the *Odyssey* reserved for the swineherd: "Thus didst *thou* answer, O swineherd Eumæus." Ulysses himself bestows the epithet *divine* on his two slaves, the swineherd and the cowherd (xxi. 234, 240), though the former declares, that a man loses half his virtue on the day that he becomes a slave. In the *Iliad* the chief heroes have high titles, and a few eminent men are named by paraphrase, as, The Laomedontean *might*. The *Odyssey* drives the principle farther. We may accept "The *sacred energy* of Alcinous," considering the benign and mysterious sway of the King of Phæacia, or rather Scheria, a Utopian island; but as applied to the most guilty of the suitors, it is rather offensive. So the often recurring phrase, ἱερὴ ἶς Τηλεμάχοϊο, "the sacred force of Telemachus," is bombast. The title *sacred* is more royalistic than the *Iliad*; next,

* In the *Iliad* a warlike or ancient people, and every hero, is δῖος, *divine:* but the epithet cannot descend to menials and mere industrious persons. As to *foremen*, there may have been some fuller social development when the *Odyssey* was written; for we there have the ἐπιποίμην and ἐπιβουκολος, and σὸς ἐπιστάτης (xvii. 455) seems to mean "thy *major-domo*."

however, applicable to Ulysses is the noun ἶς (sinew, force) in *Il.* xxiii. 720, where his "hardy sinew" proves a match for Ajax, yet as a mere paraphrase for a stripling, it belongs only to a young giant, an Otus or Ephialtes. The extravagant use of words is a moral fact, discriminating a writer.

So is their degenerate use. We have observed upon "stout hand" misplaced, and on *deadly* for clever, sage. There is also a depraved use of αἰνως, "direfully, awfully," reminding us of modern slang. In the *Odyssey* a man likes a thing "awfully" (αἰνῶς), *i.e. much;* or he is "direfully" delighted, αἰνῶς τέρπεται. The grand epithets of the *Iliad*, ἀθέσφατος, ἄσπετος, are systematically abused in the *Odyssey*. The former word meant, it seems, originally, "inexpressible *even* to gods," and is fitly used in the *Iliad* of "storm ineffable." In the *Odyssey* it is well applied to the sea; but is abused to express the *length* of a winter night and *plenty* of wine, corn, or cows. Who would call these "ineffable?" Ασπετος, whatever its true origin, means "immense, immeasurable," and in the *Iliad* is said of the depth of heaven and of ocean, besides its moral applications. In *Il.* xix. 61 it is an epithet of a *vast* battle-field; but in the *Od.* xxii. 269 that line is borrowed and misapplied to the floor of the hall on which the suitors were slain! This poet also uses it, not for *innumerable* but simply for *numerous*, as with us "infinite" in bad style.*

Of the use of words in construction, only one specimen of the contrast shall be here adduced. With the words *so* and *such*, English syntax admits either, So great a sea, or Such a great sea; but the latter formula is inadmissible in good Latin or ordinary Greek; certainly in the *Iliad*. The young student who is familiar with the *Iliad*, is puzzled to meet in the *Odyssey* πέλαγος μέγα τοῖον, which seems as odd as *mare magnum tale* in Latin; yet it is current in the Greek of the *Odyssey*, and is found in Hesiod. Moreover, the word τοῖον in the *Odyssey* occurs where it is superfluous to the syntax, as in (what some call) feminine English, "There I met *such* a beauty!" for, a *great* beauty. The same word becomes adverbial, and is almost unintelligible. We are told that θάμα τοῖον means "*very* often," and that σιγῇ τοῖον means "in silence *thus*," iv. 776, vii. 30; alike alien to the idiom of the *Iliad*. Moreover τοῖος in the *Odyssey* is used for Attic οἷός τε, capable;

* Nay, we once find ἄσπετα πολλὰ (innumerable many?) which seems vulgar and hardly grammatical. But we may not press the fact in this argument, for the very phrase is found in the gossiping speech of Nestor, which *on other grounds* we wish cut out of the *Iliad*. So too is the strange phrase ἠλιθα πολλὴ, which recurs four times in the *Odyssey*.

as, τοῖος ἀμύνειν, capable of defending. Our limits forbid further dwelling on Greek constructions; but we crave patience of our readers, while we refer to a few more single words in detail.

Διηνεκέως means *continuously*, and so the author of the *Odyssey* generally uses it; but in iv. 836 he misuses it for *distinctly, definitely*. Οπωπή notoriously means sight, aspect or eyesight: in the *Odyssey* the formula used rightly twice, is wrongly applied in xvii. 44 through carelessness: for there the sense wanted is "*report*" concerning Ulysses. This led the Scholiast on iii. 79 to suggest a second sense for the word, from ὄπα, *voice*! founding error on error. In xi. 583, where στεῦτο (engaged, promised) is improperly used for *stood*, the Scholiast throws the blame on some editor (διασκευαστὴς) of the poem. Ἀπριάτην, unbought, is in *Il.* i. 99 a feminine accusative; but the poet of the *Odyssey* has mistaken it in that passage for an adverb, and has used it in a masculine connection. θεων ἰότητι ought to mean, "*by will* of the gods;" but, as Professor Malden has remarked, it is perverted into the sense, "*on account of* the gods;" first in the *Odyssey*, then in after poets. Ἀμαιμάκετος, whatever it means, is shown by the use of all the poets to have nothing to do with *length*. In the *Iliad* it is an epithet of the dreadful Chimæra. But in the *Odyssey* it is applied to a mast, and apparently means *very long*. Ἀξηχὴς in the *Iliad* probably means *noisy, shrieking*; but the poet of the *Odyssey* seems to have interpreted it *vehement*, and says ἀξηχὲς φαγέμεν, to eat *greedily*. Is any reader incredulous that so powerful apoet can have made errors in Greek? Then here is an unanswerable fact. He did not know the derivation of βροτὸς, nor that it means *mortal;* else he could not have used the tautology θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι (vii. 210), *mortal mortals*, for *mortal men*.

The writer of this article naturally has taken much pains in the verbal enquiry, and wishes that his trouble could save the trouble of others. I now add *in the close*, what seems unsuitable to *Frazer's Magazine*.

We must finally consider the tragedy by which the poem is wound up. The suitors came not only from Ulysses's own realm, but "fifty-two choice youths" from the greater island of Dulichium (xvi. 247), a foreign kingdom, so that their slaughter was an act of the greatest rashness. And a still greater moral anomaly is the treatment of the wretched maid-servants, whom Ulysses reproaches the suitors for taking as bedfellows *against their will* (παρευνάζεσθε βιαίως), xxii. 37. But suppose it was *with* their will: what other Greek ever thought that women deserved to be hanged for feminine weakness? or for pert lan-

guage ? for that is imputed also. Ulysses indeed orders them to be hewn to pieces, and Telemachus improves it into hanging them. The whole idea is so barbarous, and told so barbarously, as to take away one's breath. Indeed the ferocity, as well as the craft, imputed to Ulysses, seems to belong to the era of the cruel tyrants, who extirpated the aristocracy to the utmost of their power; not to that of the age which we call Homeric, when a king rested on the military support of his subordinate chieftains, themselves entitled "kings." In the hands of such chieftains (Telemachus himself is made to inform us) rested the election to the royalty of Ithaca, if Ulysses were dead.

The poet himself thus describes the death of Antinous: "He was about to lift a beautiful golden tankard to his lips, nor did any thought of being slaughtered cause him anxiety. Who could imagine that in a company of guests, one solitary man, however hardy, should bring on him evil death and black fate?" When the first victim had fallen, the suitors suppose that the shot has been accidental; but Ulysses reveals himself, and fiercely denounces them all, for courting his wife while he was alive, thus defying the gods and eating up his substance. Hereupon the bravest of them, Eurymachus, whom the people had expected Penelope to accept, makes a very temperate reply, nearly as follows: "If you are really Ulysses, you have slain the man who to you was most guilty; who indeed plotted against your son's life. Be satisfied with this victim, and *spare your own people.* We have sinned against your property and you may justly be angry with us, until we have repaid it all to you; this we will do, amply and voluntarily, until your heart is gladdened." Ulysses replies, that if he could get the whole of their substance and much beside, nothing should induce him to spare the life of any of them: so let them prepare to fight it out with him. Eurymachus has a sword at his side, but is slain before he can use it. The poet thereupon felt it necessary to allow the suitors to get at some armour, lest the massacre of the defenceless excite pity; though he has hereby made the story surpass poetical credibility. But the moral phenomena alone are here pressed, as coming from a different mind and soul from the *Iliad.*

How the argument between the suitors and Ulysses stood, our poet well knew; for he puts into the mouth of Antinous's father Eupeithes (xxiv. 425) the complaint, that Ulysses carried away ships and men to Troy and lost them one and all; then after twenty years' absence, comes back to slaughter his own people. Laertes was superannuated before Ulysses could become king.

No king is free to leave his people to simple anarchy, and not even appoint a regent; much less to expect them for ever to believe him alive when he has not been heard of for ten years. Eumæus firmly believed Ulysses to be dead: why not Antinous? In modern England, if a widow had heard nothing of her husband for seven years, no judge in the land and no moralist would censure her re-marriage. It is incredible that the poet could seriously disapprove it: nay, he twice tells us that Telemachus had exhorted his mother to choose a husband, and expresses no condemnation; as though the reason assigned, that he hopes thereby to save his remaining substance, were quite sufficient. And here we have the real grievance, the suitors were offenders against Ulysses's property, by living at his expense against the customs of Greece: and Eurymachus confesses this. But property can be replaced, and the poet makes Eurymachus undertake that they will *more than* replace it, "until the heart of Ulysses is gladdened;" yet marvellous to say, in spite of this humiliation, he thinks to glorify his hero by making him cruelly implacable towards every one of the suitors, without discrimination either of Amphinomus, to whom the poet ascribes right mindedness (φρεσὶν αγαθῇσι), or of the timid and gentle priest Leiodes, who (says he) abhorred the rudeness of the suitors, and was ever indignant with them. When he falls at the feet of Ulysses, and declares that the very women will testify to his uniform good conduct, and implores his mercy, Ulysses brutally replies, that, "no doubt, as a priest, he often prayed that Ulysses might never come home;" so, with the word, he cuts off the suppliant's head. Since neither Amphinomus nor Leiodes are imagined to have been in the alleged plot for killing Telemachus, that evidently is not the poet's justification of the massacre. Indeed he makes the goddess Athena suggest it to Telemachus, *before* the plot, and gives as a sufficient reason for it the expensiveness of their entertainment. At the same time, oddly enough, he makes the faithful Eumæus most wasteful of all; for when Ulysses comes to him in garb of an old beggar, Eumæus kills *two* pigs (*Od.* xiv. 74) to furnish him with a single dinner, and a *third*, "the best of the swine" (xiv. 414), for the supper. According to common sense and prudence, as well as sound morals, if many had sinned in very various degrees, it was wise to wink at the possible greater guilt of some, and to accept the theory of Eurymachus that Antinous's life was a full atonement. To ordinary minds, Ulysses would seeem to have been sufficiently glorified by the humble submission of the suitors and

their ample repayment of damages. Since the poet on the contrary is bent on killing them all, the choice youth and flower of the chieftains, this seems to be part of the thought of an age in which whole aristocracies were exterminated by successful tyrants; who acted as did Lucius Sulla to the opposite party according to Cicero: "quos voluit, expulit; quos potuit, occidit."

It is in vain that one tries to parallel this with the deeds of Achilles. In his wildest fury nothing so monstrous is imputed to him. His ferocities are against the public enemy; his signal malignity against the slayer of his friend. But, what is most cardinal, his evil deeds and evil temper are repudiated by the poet; while the poet of the *Odyssey*, himself and his goddess Athena, approve of Ulysses and sympathize with him. It is not duly observed how signally in the *Iliad* the raw pride and implacability of Achilles are held up to the reader's condemnation. Nestor in the second book strongly condemns him, though thinking Agamemnon also wrong. His outrageous refusal to accept Agamemnon's humble submission is exposed in the narrative itself, and with blunt warmth is rebuked by Ajax to his face, as afterwards tenderly yet faithfully by Patroclus: and after Patroclus's death, Achilles in agony of soul confesses his folly, which indeed in *Il.* xvi. 97—100 is represented as actually childish. His sacrifice of the twelve Trojan youths, the poet gravely rebukes; his senseless barbarity to Hector is scourged by Apollo's invective, with whom the gods in general, and Jupiter in particular, sympathize.

But in the *Odyssey* Ulysses makes war on helpless and worthless women, as well as on men. After the suitors have been despatched, and the doomed maid-servants have been forced to wipe up the blood, Telemachus reflects that for these so honourable a death as that by the sword (which he calls *καθαρὸς θάνατος*, a clean death) is too good: so he hangs them all, "like birds on a string." Then to crown the exploits comes the bright device of Ulysses, which is to hinder the people from driving him and his son into banishment as murderers, xxiii. 120. He bids his wife and son to bathe, and dress in their best garments, and give fine clothes to all the servants, and bring "the divine bard" to play on the lyre, and get up "a sportive dance as if for a wedding." They obeyed him: "the feet of dancers made a thundering noise," and the passers-by believed that all was jollity, and knew nothing of the slaughter! Yet somehow this device did not succeed: "murder will out." Old Eupeithes tries to revenge the death of his son, and has to be slain by the old

Laertes. The goddess Athena, who has prompted Ulysses all along, then forbids more slaughter, reconciles the combatants by a solemn treaty, and so the poem ends.

Yet in closing, the *Odyssey* lays the foundation of *a new epic*, as in the tales of the *Arabian Nights*. A prophecy of Teiresias commanded Ulysses, after regaining his royal power, to wander over the continent with an oar on his shoulder, until he should reach a people who know nothing of the sea, and eat no salt in their food, and mistake his oar for a winnowing shovel. Then he is to fix the oar in the ground, and offer sacrifices to Neptune; after this, he is to return home, and will live into opulent old age, until θάνατος ἐξ ἁλὸς, or θάνατος ἑξαλος (for oracles are ambiguous), whether death from the sea, or death *out of* the sea, or death from salt, should carry him off. It is curious, that in the *Iliad*, we have not only the hint of an Æneid, but in the mouth of Ulysses words which imply that some tale about Telemachus was *already* current. In *Iliad* ii. 260, threatening Thersites, he says: "May I no longer be called father of Telemachus, if . . . .;" and in proudly justifying his own bravery to Agamemnon, iv. 354: "Shortly shalt thou see the fond father of Telemachus mingled in the foremost ranks." No other hero in the *Iliad* thus seeks for honour from the name of his young son. It reminds us of the Syrian or Arabian tendency of fathers to name themselves from their sons (a *hyionymic?*) when the son is grown to a man's estate; as a man who was Yusuf becomes "Abu Jorji," father of George.

Our business has been to contrast the *Odyssey* to the *Iliad*, and in so doing we have had to disparage it morally. This has little to do with its occasional power as poetry. If it had been our business simply to extol the *Odyssey*, it would have been pleasant to point at its many beauties, without which indeed it never could have passed as the work of the same Homer with the *Iliad*. It is finest when it owes least to the other poem. The rhythm in the careless parts is very rough, and its plagiarism on the *Iliad* often quite offensive; but it rises into a vigour of its own, when the poetry otherwise improves. It is no slight praise to say, that many of Virgil's much admired passages are inspired by or are even translations of the *Odyssey*, to which he owed more than to the *Iliad*. In the description of scenery the poet has a richness of his own and somewhat of our modern enthusiasm. Many of his similes are in a style equal to those of the *Iliad*. Great as is the moral weakness of his plot, he has passages of sweet tenderness; and the devoted love of Ulysses for his native land, of Penelope for her Ulysses, have led readers to over-look that side of the poem on which it has been necessary to dwell.

SUPPLEMENT ON THE ODYSSEY,

Not judged suitable to FRAZER'S MAGAZINE.

Not in the *Iliad*.

αβαχησαν, were cheated
αγνωσασκε
αγροτας, rustics
αδευκης
αεσα, I slept
αιθρῳ
αινῶς *for* μάλα
ἀιτιζω
ἀκραὴς, sharp (wind)
ἄκριας, heights
ακιδνοτερυς
ἀλιαὴς
αλεξανεμος, *ep.* of cloak
αλέγω ὅπλα
αλεγύνω δαῖτα
αλὴ - πλανη
αλήθην
αμυθεν, *alicunde*
αμαιμακετος, *for* μακρὸς *long*
αμύμων, *ep.* of a house
αναθηματα, ornaments
ανακτοριος
ανδρακας
ανηνυστεν
αντιθυρον
απευθης, unheard of
αποκοσμέω
απεκαίνυτο
αποπροθι
αποτροπος, secluded
αποφωλιος
απορῤαιω, bereave
αργὴν, white. O. 161
ἄργματα
ἅρπαλεος, *rapax*
αὖδηείς, *ep.* of man
αὐλιζομαι
αντυδιον
αφικεσθε, fetch ye
αφυσσομαι, *fill* the jars
αχεύω, neut. v. *grieve*

βιωσας με
βητορμονες
βολὴ, a glance, a blow
βρώμη, food
βεβυσμένον, crammed
βυσσοδυμευω

Γαιήιον, *terrenum*
γαληνη
γύναιος

δαιτρὸς, δαιτρεύω, δαιτροσύνη
δαιεγαι, is rent (morally)
δᾶνὰ, dry (wood)
διερὸς βροτὸς
δορὸς, leather bag
δρωοιμι
δρηςτοσύνη
δριὸς
δύσζηλος
δωτὴρ

εθελοντὴρ volunteer
εἴρω, I say
εἶρερος, slavery
εισατο, pretended
εεισατο, seemed
εισιθμη, entrance
ἔλπω, I cause to hope
ἕλεσκε, he caught
ελπωρὴ, hope
ελεητυς, pity
ἐλᾷν γαλήνην
ελελίχθη, was shattered
εν νοτίῳ, afloat
ενεύναιον, sleeping robe
εξερέησε *for* εξηρευνησε
εξημοιβοι
επαρτὴς, rigged
επηρετμοι, *ep.* of ships or sailors
ἐπηετανὸς, *perennis*
επίληθος, causing forgetfulness
επιληκέο, to beat time
επαληθεὶς
επέβαλλε, reached parallel to
επιβούκολος
επιποιμὴν
επαλαστρεω
επιστιον, dock
επιστροφος
επιτονος

επταχα
επιφρον, επιφρονᾶ, επιφροσυνη
επιωγὴ
ενεργια, *pl.* benefits
εσας *for* καθισας
εφυδρος, watery (wind)
εφεσσαι

ηλεὸς, silly; making silly
ηγηλαζω, *freg. of* ἄγω

θαυμαινω
θεουδής, god-fearing
θοωκος, *for* council
θυμηγερέυν, taking breath

'ιωγὴ, shelter
'ιονθὰς, shag
θοὰι (νῆσοι)

κακότης, disaster
κάλλιμος, fair
καλάμη, old age
καταριγηλος
καταβροξειεν, swallow
κείω, I split
κέων, *fut. for* κεισομενος
κεσκετο *for* εκειτο
κομιδὴ, supply of food
κραταιὶς
κρυφηδον *for* κρυφα

λἄίγγες, pebbles
λιθαξ, stony
λιτα, *acc. masc.* λίς
λιχομαι

ελὔον
λυκαβας, year

μαστὶν *for* μαστιγα
μαστακα, (human) lips
μακεδνος *for* μακρὸς
μεγαζομαι
μαιομαι, I search
μερμηριξε, plaited
μερμιθα, cord
μελεδώνη
μεσοδμη
μετασπὼν, having overtaken
μήδεα (Siccliot *media?*) αδῖα
μῆλον ἀιγῶν
μήλοπα καρπον
μουναξ
μυθεῖαι
μωμεύω

νάκη, goatskin
ναυτίλλομαι
νεοπριστος
νέποδες
νεμεσιζομαι, revere
νηκερδης *for* ακερδης
νῆσοι εὖδειελοι
νόῳ, cleverly
ἔν νοτίῳ, afloat

ογδοατο
οδεια, *viatica*
οικωφελίη
οιμη, tune
οινοποτὴρ

οινοποταζει
οἴομαι, I *mistrust*
οιοχίτων
ολοοι ἄνεμοι
ολοοφρων *for* αιπύμητις
ολοφωιος
ολιγηπελίη
ονημενος
οπτὴρ
οπωπα
ουλομενη γαπτήρ

ξερὸν *for* σκληρὸν
ξυνεικυσι

παγοι, sharp points
παυσαν, *neut. verb*
παχετον, thicker
παρακλιδον, evasively
παραυδᾶν, exhort, comfort
περιβαλλω, exceed
περιμετρος, large
περιμηκετος, long
περιστείξας, having paced around
περιπληθὴς
πεπειρημαι
πηγῳ, not solid, perhaps *mobile*
πηγυλις
πλισσοντο, trotted
πλαγκτυσύνη
πολυκληρος, rich
πολυκλυστος
πολύφρων, sage
πομπεὺς *for* πομτὸς
ποντοπορευειν

ῥιχοῦν, be cold
ῥηξηνορία
ῥήτρη, a compact
ῥόθιος
ροχθεῖν, roar
ερυσατο, arrested
ῥυιτο, hauled (stones)

σκεπας, a covering, cloak
σκοτομήνιος (νὺξ)
σπειρον, a wrap
σπιλαδες
στίβη, hoar-frost
στειλειον, axe handle
στευτο, he stood. (*Il.*, he engaged) N.B.

ταλαπείριος
τετευχὸς *for* τυκτὸν
ἐς τῆμου, tell now
τῆνσιος, futile
τοῖον *for* τοσον *or* ὅντω
τρυφος, a fragment
τρωκτης, a brother

ὑψοῦ, in deep water
ὑπεριων, *subst.*
ὑποδμὼς, servant
ὑποδρωωσι
ὑποδρηστῆρας

φάο *for* φαθι
φάε *for* εφαινετο
φρονις, knowledge

χνοας *for* αχνη
χάλεπτω, I harass
χρείων, giving an oracle
χρησόμενος, about to consult an oracle

ὠμὸν γῆρας

Account is duly taken of the fact that many parts of the *Odyssey* introduce new scenes and ruder talk, which naturally lead to a diction different from that of the *Iliad*, even if the same poet had composed both. Whether the same remark applies to small grammatical diversities, such as Αθήνη instead of Αθηναι for the city of Athens, επανσαν, neuter, Σάμο for Σαμος, πολλὴν ἠέρα for ἦερα πουλὺν ὅτινα, O. 396 is less clear. But after large allowance for this topic, the remaining diversity of diction denotes an age later perhaps by two centuries. Remark further, that in the *Iliad* ὠμονγερων means "a *fresh* old man," active in old age; while in the *Odyssey* we find just the reverse, viz., ὠμὸν γῆρας, *premature* old age. In the *Iliad* θόος, as epithet of a warrior or a ship, so uniformly suggests *sharp in movement*, so that the θοαὶ νῆσοι of the *Odyssey* quite startle us. Whether πηγὸς and δνοπαλίζω have each the same sense in the two poems, may well be doubted.

STRIVINGS OF GREECE FOR UNION.

[From Frazer's Magazine, April, 1874.]

The movements of modern nationalities for larger unions give interest to the history of attempted union in ancient Greece and compulsory union of ancient Italy. Of course only a bare outline can be aimed at in these pages.

Let an apology for speculation on events be first admitted. More than half the interest of history would be lost, if it were forbidden to speculate about what might have been, but was not. When a State or Prince does some evil or stupid deed, we cry, Alas! or, What a pity! and we consider how matters would have gone if a few men had been wiser. In such reasonings we are liable to much error. We can never really know what *would* have been. Our hypotheses and our wishes are often simple impossibilities. Physical geography and other outward circumstances enormously affect national action, and go far to impress the necessity of a certain career. The limits of moral ability are often much narrower than we think; nevertheless, not to reason at all concerning them is to sacrifice all study of the causes of events. In any complexity, if we are to debate how far one event was influenced by another, we must necessarily in imagination take things separately, even things which may have been inseparable. Thus the most rigid metaphysicians introduce hypotheses which they know to be human impossibilities, such as, that we should have perception without desires, or perfect sight but no muscular power. Again, in studying the life of a man, we not only learn what he did, but speculate on what he was capable of doing. To have had some force in reserve, capacity beyond one's opportunities, and therefore beyond one's achievement, is a cumulus of honour. Here again we may much mistake; as Tacitus says of Galba, that if he never had been put to the trial, all would have judged him eminently competent for the post of emperor. Yet unless we encounter the risk of such mistake, and speculate as to what *might* have been, we must read history without praise or blame, perhaps without admiration or con-

tempt; we must largely use sympathy, and with sympathy insight. We cannot reasonably censure or deplore what *is* unless we believe that something else *might* be.

Greece strove for political union, and failed; narrowly failed, it may seem; so much depended on single minds. In discussing this subject, information concerning ancient Greece will be superfluous to many of our readers; yet for the sake of others, they will kindly forgive some introductory explanation.

Greece Proper is a highly mountainous country, with sharp natural divisions. It has a very long sea-coast, and very numerous islands; and the Greek colonies were nearly all upon the coasts of neighbouring countries. In the historical era, Greeks were sharply divided by dialect into Ionian and Dorian: but although the difference of dialect was strong enough to be of great political importance, it was not so great as to forbid the Greeks understanding one another's speech. What the Lancashire dialect is to us, such may coarse Doric have been to an Athenian. The people were really one nation. They were proud of the same Homer, and loved to recite his verses. They had the same notions of religion, worshipped gods of the same name and attributes, and revered the same oracles. They had the same susceptibility to music and poetry, the same love of solemn and graceful dancing, and they celebrated like festivals. Moreover from the earliest times they had been accustomed to assemble in popular concourse and by representative ambassadors on certain high days; which assembling eminently kept up the conscious relationship of States and tribes. If we believe the Hymn (called Homeric) to Delian Apollo, even the women and children of Ionia assembled statedly at the little island of Delos; which was crowded with ships of the visitors coming to honour Apollo, the peculiar god of Greece. Besides the greater festivals and the great games, there were many smaller and closer unions of tribes under various names. All were of importance to cement Grecian fellowship; but the widest of all was that of the four great games, called Olympian, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian; of which the Olympian, celebrated once in every four years, was pre-eminent. According to national sentiment, a sacred truce was to be held everywhere during the celebrations. Safe-conduct as for pilgrims, was of course necessary for visitors. The people of Elis, on whose soil Olympia lay, had a right to a sort of a sacred neutrality, which it was chiefly their own fault if they did not always enjoy. Thus in spite of rugged mountains, deficiency of wheel roads, and numerous sovereign States, there were many mutual

meetings and plentiful recognitions of general Grecian unity. And though the Dorians were chiefly continental, and the Ionians almost wholly maritime, both alike kept up their reunions and practised mutual recognition. Dorian Sparta and Ionian Athens were regarded as the two eyes of Greece; and apparently Dorian and Ionian differed in temperament no more than the English peasant from the English townsman.

Yet, while the nation was thus conscious of unity, and its very narrow area seemed to make union both natural and necessary, it was vehemently, almost fanatically, attached to local sovereignty, out of which its great political activity flowed; and with difficulty did any State resign the *right* of border war, for regaining or retaining its rightful limits. While Grecian energy mainly depended on the intensity of local politics, which in the more democratic States gave free course to talent; yet the great need of Greece, if she was to stand against the far greater mass of surrounding monarchies, was (as she herself knew and felt) a willing and permanent federation. How was she to coalesce under a single central organ—a power able to constrain her from intestine war by deciding her local quarrels; able also to rally her energies, when needed, for defence against a foreign enemy? This was her cardinal problem. She had all the elements for its solution: she made much progress towards it; with a little more, it perhaps might have been solved—had *this* man lived longer, or had *that* man been killed earlier. She would not then have been conquered by Rome, but would have stopped Roman pre-eminence before it was too late. Greece, Carthage, Egypt, Rome, would probably then have co-existed as independent powers, and the whole history of Europe would have been changed. Did an immovable fate ordain that Greece should ever strive towards union and ever fail? or may we without absurdity think, that, but for this or that irregular phenomenon which we call Accident, things would have gone differently.

The elements of the population might have suggested beforehand to an observer, that many leagues at once would be formed in many districts; that these would enter into alliance, and a general crystallisation follow. In fact, this was the process after the great fall of Athens; but when history first opens brightly on us, we see nearly all Greece clustering round two centres only, Athens and Sparta.

Early preparation was made by wise policy (attributed to Theseus) for the eminence of Athens. The barriers of the petty Attic boroughs were swept away, not by violence, but by a

natural cohesion, as our Heptarchy was absorbed into an England. All Attica coalesced into one State, so that every citizen, of whatever borough, became a full citizen of Athens, the chief city. Thenceforward Attica became not only the home and refuge of exiles, but the fountain-head, whence flowed a wonderful stream of Ionian colonies to the Greek islands and to Asia. Some of these attained prosperity and cultivation earlier than Athens herself; but were blighted, first by the Lydian, next by the Persian monarchy, being no doubt themselves offensively energetic toward barbarians. The colonies sent out new colonies, especially to the coast of Thrace (*Roumelia*), to the Dardanelles, and to the Black Sea; and these all looked up to Athens as their parent. Thus a real and even a close confederation of Ionian Greece could not have been difficult, if justice could have maintained itself.

Union of Greece was likewise greatly forwarded by the attack of the mighty Persian Empire. The danger of the crisis was intense. With a little less of confidence, and a littlemore of military caution, the success of Xerxes would have been assured. He had an enormous superiority by sea, as well as by land, also in money and in all resources: greatest of all, he had unity of action, and armaments devotedly obedient. If he had occupied all at once critical places on the coast and certain islands, with fractions of his vast force, he would have distracted his most formidable opponents. He could have been everywhere superior, and could have used his superiority everywhere; and if he had condescended to buy Grecian statesmen, there were many willing to sell themselves, so great was the despondency. Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly were conquered; Bœotia had embraced the Persian side. Princes of Thessaly and a king of Sparta were in the Persian camp; and when it came to fighting, Sparta was slow to aid and deficient in energy of counsel. Only when (as it were) driven to bay, did the Spartans fight. Without being too fanciful, one may assert, that what Massachusetts and South Carolina were in the American War of Independence, such were Athens and Sparta in the Persian war. Athens like Massachusetts was the heart and soul of resistance, foremost in daring, marvellous in sacrifice, untiring in devoted exertion. Sparta like South Carolina, was embarrassed by slaves at home, who needed to be severely repressed; and though both proud and gallant, she was always apt to be many days behind the time. Her very bravery was too mechanical. It was based on the drill-sergeant, and useful only on level ground and close fight. It was helpless against walls—even against mound and ditch—and liable to discomfiture by archers and slingers.

In the great decisive battle of Platæa, though the Spartans at last did their duty, they at first tried to retreat, and had to fight against their will. No power, in short, could be more unenterprising; for which a real excuse lay in necessary poverty; also in the enmity of their slaves and of their disfranchised free population. Long before the war was finished, the gross misconduct of the Spartan king forced the home authorities to recall him, with the army: but the Athenians persevered in the war, to expel the Persian garrisons. The maritime Greeks, charmed by the behaviour of Aristides and Kimon, freely entreated them to accept for the Athenians the post of leading State. This was a most auspicious, indeed a glorious moment, full of high promise.

Two ideas at that time were deeply fixed in the political creed of Greece. First, that every State had a right to local independence; which implied full internal sovereignty, and external right of action limited by treaties only. Next, that each State must belong to a league, and act with a leading State: to stand aloof was thought misanthropic, and suggestive of piracy. The powers of the leading State may be understood from our Parliamentary parties. The leader is freely chosen, much trusted, often even obeyed: nevertheless he is expected, not to command, but to urge, advise, explain, and, if possible, persuade. To throw off the leader of a party is always a hard effort: with States it was far harder. Nothing but tyranny, or gross incompetence and neglect, could lead to such a step. Hence there was needed in Athens no miracle of virtue, no morality too high for that age, no wisdom which we only late in time have reached; but merely to carry into politics that good sense which they used in common affairs; merely to show to their followers the equity which they knew that all followers expected from their leaders. Nor was there any lack of courtesy, kindness and justice in the Athenians personally. The men who held command had to make themselves agreeable to their poor fellow-countrymen, and (to borrow an artisan's metaphor) knew that a thimbleful of oil goes farther than a pint of vinegar in making things work smoothly. But Spartan commanders, like too many Englishmen in India, thought that an off-hand use of the stick on the backs of freemen was the way to expedite affairs. Though Athens was a thorough democracy (in regard to all full citizens), the lower people much preferred the old aristocracy for places of authority. Nothing but its indolence or incapacity, or incurable disaffection and lawless violence, excluded it from high office and enabled men of lower birth to supplant it.

One heroic leader Athens had at that time, Kimon son of Miltiades, who was peculiarly fitted to conciliate the Spartans, as well as the Ionian allies. He cherished the Spartan alliance, praised their virtues to the Athenian populace, and was damaged in reputation by it. He had more of the Greek in him than of the Athenian. His mother was a Thracian princess : he himself took an Arcadian wife, and named his three sons Lacedæmonius, Eleius, and Thessalus, evidently to indicate his sympathy with all parts of Greece. Aristides first eagerly supported him seeing his noble, truthful and kindly temperament. Μεγαλοφροσύνη (magnanimity) described his character, according to Plutarch. He was a most active champion of the Asiatic Greeks; but because his patriotism was not limited to Attica, he was accused of "Laconism." The ingratitude and insult of the Spartans, when the Athenians listened to their call for military aid, gave his Athenian enemies advantage over him. Pericles (it is believed) even stooped to urge the names he had given to his sons as a crime. Certainly the party of Pericles effected his banishment for ten years—which they called *ostracism*.

But what were the services of the Lacedæmonian State to Greece collectively? To the genuine Spartan his native city was emphatically all in all. Her institutions were his idol, and their essence was stagnation and repression. All virtues, all accomplishments, all enjoyments were to be sacrificed for a mere soldier's prowess: wealth, knowledge, science, taste, refinement were forbidden : industry was despised, except as a slave's virtue. Perpetual drill, in the intervals of raids or hunting, was a Spartan's ordinary life. Even the girls had their military drill of races and wrestlings in half-naked dress, since their sole function was, to breed stout soldiers. Naturally with all this the Spartans were eminently methodical. They did everything by rule,—not only as to eating and sleeping, combing their long hair, oiling their limbs, and going through the drill,—but as to every affair of State. They could not endure a despot, whose arbitrary will should be law, nor yet would they cast off royalty, when kings were troublesome ; but to curb the royal power, they adopted the remarkable system of *two* hereditary kings. We cannot call this Monarchy, but it was a constitutional *Diarchy* under an overshadowing cabinet of five men elected by the citizens. The kings, like the royal dukes of England, were little else than hereditary generals ; who indeed on suspicion of high treason might be imprisoned by the civil executive. But in all the rest of Greece, kings were displaced by aristocracies; and

these, almost everywhere, by usurpers whom the Greeks named *tyrants*. The word at first meant only *lord;* but the power being always undefined, and generally seized by violence, gravitated into a total overthrow of law, and made the very name Tyrant detestable. To such usurpation the Spartans had a fixed repugnance, and by their active interference (as Thucydides tells us) the greater number of the tyrants in Greece Proper, especially the later ones, were overthrown. Even Athens owed her liberation from the son of Peisistratus to a Spartan army. Naturally from such a process much political influence accrued to the Spartan State. Wherever they put *down* a tyrant, they put *up* men of temperament and sentiment congenial to them, who all thenceforth would generally look to them as patrons. The aim of Sparta was, to sustain aristocracy and repress democracy everywhere; the opposite instinct soon led the Athenians to precisely the opposite conduct.

Aristides has the high honour (though Thucydides gives no hint of it) of establishing the original regulations on which the Athenian alliance was based. Some of the allies were to furnish money, others ships and men; the quota was equitably fixed, and willingly accepted; moreover a treasury was established in the sacred island of Delos, into which the contributions were paid, under the management of a board of treasurers. How this board was elected, and from whom, is not clear; but no complaint was made of it. Sad to tell, Pericles, almost immediately upon the death of Kimon, subverted the very appearance of freedom and equality. No one can doubt that the contributions were a war-tax, and that war was never counted on as eternal. The Athenians had already ceased to consult their allies; claimed to continue war indefinitely, and reduced to vassalage those who refused the war-tax or neglected to furnish ships. It is unknown who first openly began the career of arbitrary rule. Everything was at the mercy of one or two officials in Athens, unless the common interests of the allies were decided by common councils. The Attic cultivators could not hurry up to Athens to discuss and vote on pressing affairs. The presiding general was able to colour foreign facts to the citizens who were in Athens itself, and by aid of their vote he shielded his own measures under the name of the Athenian people. Public rumour or a private messenger alone conveyed news; no written despatches were sent home by Athenian generals; no bulletins were published by magistrates. Even an English Parliament collectively feels itself too ignorant in foreign affairs to control the Executive, except in some great

impending calamity; much more in Athens was a trusted official omnipotent. Pericles, in removing the treasury from Delos to Athens, deprived himself (as Plutarch remarks) of the plausible excuse that the removal was necessary for the safety of the treasure; for he plainly laid down the principle that "Athens was not bound to give account of the money to the allies; but it was enough if she protected them from the Persians." Nothing indeed was left for him but to brazen it out, when he was spending the trust-money in embellishing the city of the trustees. Probably he was not the first to use the word Tribute in place of Contribution, Empire for Leadership, Subjects for Allies; but he first blazoned the change before men's eyes, and defended it as rightful. When a Pericles was found to preach such doctrine and act upon it, a Cleon was sure to follow with sanguinary revenge, and an Alcibiades to avow that because the Empire had become a Tyranny, it must be kept by the strong hand. Nay, but Athens had no organized army equal to such a task. Good-will had won supremacy; only good-will could keep it.

Plato assails Pericles as the corrupter of his countrymen, and Plutarch's facts so terribly chime in, that denial seems impossible. But that Pericles was the true ruiner of the Athenian leadership, his own contemporary and panegyrist Thucydides demonstrates against his own intention and will. The people of Athens (he tells us) dreaded the Peloponnesian war; the Spartans did not wish for it, but undertook it with a bad conscience barely from the *point of honour* to their allies. Any slight concession from Pericles would have averted it; but he deliberately plunged into the war, knowing the Athenian alliance to be already rotten, yet expecting to prevail by naval skill, and by resources wrung from unwilling and distant subjects. With mere patience and prudence, the leadership of all Greece must have fallen to Athens; for the Spartans were too rigid and uncongenial to compete with her. Indeed, though she had neither patience nor prudence, yet in forty-eight years subsequent to the retreat of Xerxes, with all her foibles and errors, she was perpetually winning upon her rival. In place of this steady progress, Pericles chose convulsive and uncertain war. Knowing that he could not contend with the enemy in the open field, he summoned the citizens from all Attica into the city and long walls of Athens, where, in the heat of summer, they huddled together in little rooms and stifling tents. A terrible plague followed, which is treated as an inscrutable accident. Nothing but Spartan want of enterprize saved Athens from immediate and total ruin. It must not be forgotten that the

eloquence and cunning of Pericles so held rule over military as well as of civil affairs, as to keep down military talents higher than his own. The party of Pericles had first banished Kimon, next had in his exile brought on themselves the bloody battle of Tanagra, which perhaps left on Pericles a depressing sense of the superiority of Spartan fighting. This may be the excuse for his positively forbidding any sally against the invading army; whereby undoubtedly he damped the Athenian courage. He had satisfied *himself* that Athenian discipline could not compete with that of Sparta. Grant it, as to the heavy-armed. But by a mere force of slingers Myronides under advantage of ground had sadly mauled a Corinthian battalion; and Pericles had not been long in his grave, when Demosthenes defeated a powerful Spartan army by archers and other light troops and brought to Athens nearly three hundred live captives. Iphicrates afterwards showed that targeteers (men with small shields) could vanquish the cumbrous heavy-armed. When Pericles resolved to force the war, he ought to have animated his people to fight against the desolation of their land. When Sparta was master of the field, nothing but her own unwillingness to take up the war in earnest saved her great rival for a time. Pericles is praised for his legacy of prudent counsel; but he himself made prudence impossible, when he set Athens to gamble at high hazards for a brilliant stake. Successes were then as sure to intoxicate as failure to be ruinous. The Athenians came out of the war a changed people, having become accustomed to live on State pay; so corrupted, that thenceforward an upright solid democracy was impossible. To Greece at large the moral evils of the war were still worse; for it opened a civil contest of frightful bitterness in every State except Athens and Sparta. Murder and exile of neighbours, and every form of cruelty, were too common to record in detail. If Pericles had not had many great and noble and specious qualities, the Athenians would not have submitted to enter this fatal war against their own will and judgment. If Pericles had died earlier, and Kimon had lived longer, the whole history would have been changed.

To the contemporary historian the picture of brutal cruelty, perfidy, malice, the breach of all ties, whether of blood, of country, or of oaths, presented a picture of unrelieved gloom. Atrocity had become too common to surprize or to cause shuddering. Indeed, if moral sentiment were only stereotyped on man from without, and did not grow up irrepressibly from within, our race never could recover from such times. But when twenty

years had passed, it might be discerned, that though Athens never could be to Greece what she had been, Greece collectively was in a far more hopeful and forward state. Political movement now actuated whole populations which had been torpid and stagnant. Sparta so quickly abused her power, that a reaction of sentiment ensued, democracy reared its head, and many new combinations were imagined. Thebes became democratic, and tried to establish an independent league of Bœotia. There was also a Phocian league, a Thessalian league, and even a Byzantine league. Presently came an alliance of Thebes and Athens, and an attempt very new to Greece, to fuse Corinth and Argos into a single political community. Each city-State felt its extreme weakness in isolation: Union was the key-note of all the separate movements. Most remarkable perhaps of all was the league of Olynthus in Thrace, to which our histories do not appear to direct adequate attention. Its permanence would have made the growth of Macedonia into an overwhelming empire impossible, and would have saved the liberties of Greece. This league rapidly took up not only the numerous Ionian colonies on that coast, but also some native Thracian communities which were free from kings. In it was comprised the celebrated Athenian colony Amphipolis, the loss of which in the Peloponnesian war was a permanent fretting sore to Athens. The Olynthian power had begun even to encroach on Macedonia, so that King Amyntas had to yield to it town after town. It looked as if in Macedonia also republican federation would prevail. But the news reached the south of Greece that a great power was growing up in the north. Sparta had for nearly thirty years become accustomed to distant naval expeditions and enterprizing war, especially under Lysander and Agesilaus, and to her a powerful league sounded like a powerful enemy. "A mighty affair," it was said, "is growing up in Greece." No time, it seemed, was to be lost. On no other occasion in history did Sparta act so quickly and so boldly. Having advantage in her fleet, and in the support of the King of Macedonia, she displayed against the Olynthian league rashness combined with pertinacity, and by military successes crushed the rising union. The consequence was, that, twenty-five years later, instead of a republican league, Philip II. of Macedon "grew up" against Greece.

But Sparta disgusted most of the Greek cities, alike in Europe and in Asia, by the rude manners and violent conduct of her officers. The political oppression under Athens was forgotten, and the popular manners of the Athenians again began to win

Greek hearts. The King of Persia, indignant at the Spartan inroads on his territories, desired to raise up Athens as a balance of power in Greece, and supplied the Athenian Conon with money for shipbuilding and other purposes. Once more a maritime league began to form itself round Athens as a centre, and we read with astonishment the ease with which Conon and Iphicrates and Timotheus, son of Conon, add city after city to the Athenian alliance. But in this second and wholly spontaneous movement of the smaller States, moral qualities were again lacking in the leading city. The Athenian people, or those whom they elected to office, did not understand that their Ionian kinsmen had no intention of becoming vassals, however desirous of free and equal union. We have no details of the quarrel; we only know that a sad and scandalous war against the Asiatic allies arose, in which Athens was beaten: and this, just at the crisis when all her strength was needed to resist the Macedonian power.

Before this a Thessalian league had been organized so highly, and had raised armies of horse and foot, and ships of war, on such a scale, that its elected leader, Jason, regarded himself as the chief person in Greece. His power reached into Epirus (*Yanina*): he made the Thebans his allies, and after the battle of Leuctra condescended to mediate for the benefit of the Spartans. But he was assassinated by seven young men, of whom five escaped and (says Xenophon) received such honour in Greek cities, that the murder must be ascribed to the fears which Jason inspired. This is a remarkable tale; and indicates the energy of union which was then at work in regions which, fifty years earlier, were unheard of as powers in the political contests.

The Theban league fell into deadly contest with Sparta, who had treacherously seized and garrisoned the Theban citadel. Violent resentment was not satisfied with the expulsion of the garrison. A war followed which the celebrated Epaminondas carried into the heart of Sparta's resources. He drew off all Peloponnesus from their alliance, and founded the city Megalopolis as a centre for Arcadia. Such were the results of his defeat of the Spartans in the critical battle of Leuctra. The loss of Sparta in that battle (four hundred citizens) would have seemed to any other principal State of Greece a bearable calamity; but falling on an aristocracy which could barely trust the middle classes better than the slaves, it was quite irretrievable. Sparta had already shown her moral inability to wield and retain the central force of the Greeks; she now was exhibited as physically weak also. Henceforward she existed only as a quaint, useless, and

noxious monument of effete institutions; powerless for good, noxious by impeding new combinations. But neither was the Theban league, which succeeded to her power morally competent to lead the Greeks. Epaminondas was a man of rare virtue, like Aristides; but he fell in battle, and no Theban arose worthy of the opportunity. Thebes had risen too suddenly: her ascendency was very soon offensive, and again it seemed that no State had the requisite moral qualities for leadership. *Ἀρχὴ τὸν ἄνδρα δείξει* "Rule will display the man," was the sentiment of Bias. When Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had all failed from refusing to treat their allies with equality, some will say, "The age was not morally advanced enough for it; the thing was morally impossible: failure was predestined." Yet, to believe this, seems quite unreasonable when in the next century the semi-barbarous and piratical Ætolians set up a league and extended it by violence, yet admitted into full equality the men whom they overpowered, and treated all public interests by a public assembly, freely electing their yearly leaders without distinction of district from district. Out of this rose their power and prosperity. This was what the just Aristides desired the Athenians to do, but the subtle and unprincipled Themistocles thwarted and undermined him, set the example which Pericles followed; otherwise Athenians were surely capable of being as virtuous as Ætolians. But it is not wonderful that, after seeing so many failures, calm-judging and broad-thinking men, like Isocrates (whom Niebuhr calls "a consummate fool"), became persuaded that a king like Philip of Macedon would, after all, be the best leader for Greece.

Philip grew up *against* Greece, yet he was capable of becoming the much desired cementer of Grecian union. It was very hard to resist him when he had added Thrace to Macedonia, with very little resistance from Greece; the Olynthian league having been dissolved, and Athens being both feeble and preoccupied. With an impracticable Sparta behind, there was no longer time for the gradual cohesion of many leagues into one vigorous executive. It was far better to accept Philip constitutionally, than to be conquered by him. By selling the Phocian people into slavery, he gave warning how cruel on a great scale he could be, where policy suggested. Yet in temperament he was mild and courteous; and to Athens it is thought he was especially well disposed. His position was peculiar. His dynasty was purely Greek. He was acknowledged to be a "Heracleid" by descent, and as a pure Greek he had the right of competing for prizes at the Olympian games; but his people were esteemed barbaric, and

their language scarcely Greek. Philip was undoubtedly proud of his Greek blood. To be conquered by such a prince, could not but be to Greek cities a bitter mortification; yet even that would have been, to Greece at large, an evil immeasurably less than to fall under Persians or Romans. On the other hand, if they could freely accept him as leader, with a reserve of all their local laws and liberties, it would save them from intestine war, and strengthen them against the foreigner. Philip was eager to be recognized as chief captain of Greece, leader of her armies against Persia. To fight one campaign in this character would draw after it fixed relations with all Greece, and make him a constitutional *suzerain*. His leadership could undoubtedly be admitted without the sacrifice of reasonable freedom. Such considerations prevailed in spite of Demosthenes. The battle of Chæronæa had silenced him: and all Greece, except Sparta, opened its ears to Philip. A congress was summoned to Corinth, in order to accept him as leader, and make needful arrangements. He was accepted: but before he could take advantage of his new eminence, Philip fell by the attack of an assassin, who was aggrieved in a private quarrel. In such assassination I see no "inevitable destiny," but account it a calamitous accident, funereal to Greece. It let loose the energy of his wild and wonderful son, and led to the conquest of Persia in the mode least desirable to Greece.

It was natural to suspect that Persian management suborned the assassination, though adequate reasons of personal resentment are assigned for the deed. But it deserves remark that Arrian (ii. 14) professes to lay before us a letter from Alexander to Darius, in which he not only charges the Persians with the murder of Philip, but says that "the Persians themselves had boasted of it in public edicts." Be this as it may, we cannot doubt that a Greek invasion of Persia was a fact predestined. The younger Cyrus so well knew the superiority of Greek armour and discipline, that he planned to dethrone his brother by Greek auxiliaries. The safe return of the Ten Thousand, and the uniform success of Agesilaus against Persian satraps, made Jason of Thessaly (according to Xenophon) regard the conquest of Persia as a slight task compared to a conquest of Greeks. Unless the Persian dynasty had been internally reformed, it could be certainly foreseen that Greek arms would conquer some of its provinces; but no one could have expected—hardly could anyone have imagined—such a sudden rush of conquest as Alexander achieved; nor have we reason to believe that any other Greek of

that century, or of any century, would have acted so rashly and succeeded so brilliantly. Had Alexander never lived, the Persian dynasty would still have sunk; but the war would in all probability have taken a different turn. Partial success would have added some provinces to Greece, who coveted especially the sea coast. Such manifestation of Persian weakness would have loosened the ties of empire, and have prepared the field for a new dynasty, as of Parthians, or Elamites, or Armenians. Success against Persia achieved by Philip was full of hope for Greece; the success actually achieved by Alexander was fatal.

Philip, mature of age, cautious of temperament, accustomed to make progress sure and slow, and look well behind him as well as before; Philip, who never once followed up success hotly and rashly, could not have pursued in Asia the career of his son. When Darius entreated peace of Alexander, offering him friendship and alliance, after the battle of Issus, Alexander could certainly have stipulated to hold all that he had conquered, but he disdainfully refused peace; and when Parmenio said to him, "If I were Alexander I would accept the offers," replied, "And so would I, if I were Parmenio." But Parmenio might have urged on him with truth, "Your father Philip, if alive, would take what is won, and avoid the infinite uncertainties of longer war." The first substantial concession would have satisfied him, because (and this is the main point) he had the heart of a Greek; he did not want to be estranged from the Greek world. Success in Asia was coveted by him, to glorify and establish his supremacy in Greece. Pæonia and Illyria, Europe as far as the Balkan, or, it may be, as high as the Danube, would be far more to him than Babylon and Persepolis. A compact and truly Greek kingdom was the full dream of his ambition. Whatever his Asiatic success, Greece would still have have been his strength and his glory, and he would have returned to her essentially a Greek prince. Her precedents of freedom, her stubborn spirit, her formidable mountains, would have extorted from him perhaps *more* respect for local rights and hereditary laws, for magistracies and free militia, than is often enjoyed under constitutional royalty now. Greece possibly might have won a stability, a force, which she has never had yet, with an influence over all the Mediterranean powers, which would have saved Europe from the dark ages.

Everything was blighted by the peculiar temperament of Alexander. His headlong rashness, joined with high military talent, with officers long trained under his father, and soldiers self-sacrificing for his safety, led to unprecedented rapidity of

success; and success made him insatiable of new adventure. When he heard from one of his generals the words, "Is it not time now *to remember Macedonia*, instead of wandering farther and farther into Asia?" the remonstrance sounded to him as an utterance of disaffection almost treasonable. For his native Macedon and his faithful Macedonians he cared not a straw, except as tools to glorify him in Asia. Not satisfied with conquering Balkh and Samarcand, beyond the Hindoo Kush, he crossed into the wilds of Scythia, and chased the Scythian cavalry in bravado. After conquering the Punjaub, he thought it base and heartbreaking ingratitude in his soldiers that they refused to go farther, and conquer India to the mouth of the Ganges. Foiled in this fatuous dream, he returned into Persia, only to display that he had ceased to be a Greek in feeling. He assumed the manners, the dress, the pomp of a Persian despot; married a Persian wife; expected prostration on the ground before him; proclaimed himself a son of Jupiter; and never forgave his equal in age and playmate, the son of Parmenio, for privately counselling him against such extravagant folly. Too much success had ruined the good sense of a man of wonderful genius, cleverness, and energy. Success could not save him from wearing out his own life at the age of thirty; but it amassed in his hands resources against which, wielded by Antipater, united Greece in vain contended. Treasures equal to those of Xerxes; armies far more formidable than the Persian; generals such as Greece had none; an intimate acquaintance with all the weak points of Greece, moral and material; Greek citadels already held by his garrisons; enabled him and his immediate successors to overawe or crush the States which had elected him their leader. Greece had aspired to conquer the coast of Asia, on which Greek colonies were planted, and suddenly found herself vassal of a monarch reigning in Susa and Babylon. Not without cause has the Persian tradition, which survives in the Shah-nahmeh, represented Alexander the Great as, not a Greek, but a Persian prince, who supplanted his brother Darius.

Through all the historical years from Solon to Alexander, Greeks had continued to fight against Greeks, to kill, and to weep for the slain; yet Greece throve through it all. Demosthenes testifies that she had constantly increased in men and resources, and that the armaments of his day were greater than ever. But after Alexander there was a rapid and constant wasting of the Greek population, with equally rapid decline in manliness. Bishop Thirlwall believes that the striking diminution of

numbers arose from an unnatural reluctance to marry; but if so, why did this reluctance never show itself in republican times? Surely the causes were at bottom political. Perhaps enough weight has not been given to the vast emigration of young men—just the most spirited of the nation—to become soldiers in Asia, or members of the very numerous Greek colonies planted by Alexander as bulwarks of his empire. Be the causes of Greek decline, in detail, what they may, in their origin they must be traced to the Macedonian successes. The princes who thenceforward reigned, whether in Asia or in Greece, were in spirit Asiatics, unrestrained by constitutional rules or freedom of the subject peoples. Had Philip lived fifteen years longer, Alexander in maturer age might, and probably would, have been a different prince, and Greece meanwhile might have learned to combine constitutionally against royal encroachments. But the end was truly mournful. Dried up and wasted under Macedonian despotism, Ætolian buccaneering and Spartan obstinacy, while an ill-cemented Achaian league kept alive but a feeble flame of freedom, she fell an easy victim to Roman power, which did but consummate her moral ruin. As Roman genius perished with Tacitus, so (it seems) did Greek genius with Demosthenes. A night of two thousand years followed, while the cleverest nation of Europe lay prostrate under the barbarian—all because the leading statesmen had misused critical opportunities for equal and just union.

THE MORAL CHARACTER OF ROMAN CONQUEST.

[Reprinted from FRAZER'S MAGAZINE, May, 1874.]

NOTHING can be more self-complacent than Roman writers concerning the relations and comparison of their own State to foreigners. Livy and Sallust, Cicero and Tacitus, are in substantial agreement here; and, beyond what might have been expected, the moderns adopt their moral tone. Gibbon saw through the extravagance of Livy: Niebuhr deplores the wickedness of Rome, from the time that her superiority in arms to Carthage was complete: Arnold is always free-judging: Dean Merivale vehemently denounces the oppressions of the conquering republic in order to glorify Cæsar's usurpation. Yet on the whole we are taught from our youth up that the military successes of Rome were a great blessing to the world, and mere warlike prowess is constantly held up to admiration. It seems to be fully worth while to review the moral aspect of this history in brief, at the expense of traversing again some of the ground which may have been familiar to us at school or college. It certainly is not superfluous. Mazzini, a man whom it is scarcely possible to name without respect, assumed as axiomatic that Europe owes priceless benefits to Rome, which she has long been repaying with ingratitude. The language of the accomplished Pliny may be here adduced as a literary curiosity: no modern panegyrist can come up to him (*Nat. Hist.* 6). In describing the geography of Italy, he says: "I grieve to touch so lightly on a land which is at once a nurseling and parent of all lands; *elected by the fiat of the gods to make heaven itself more illustrious*, to consolidate scattered dominion, to soften religions, to bring together by intercourse of speech the discordant and wild languages of so many peoples, to give to man interchange of thought and *humanity;* in short, *to become the single Fatherland of all the races in the whole globe.*" Though Rome is not named, Rome is intended, in the "consolidation of dominion."

In mentioning discordant languages Pliny certainly does not confine himself to Italy; but he cannot have been ignorant how great a difficulty this topic placed in the way of Italian union;

and to this first it is expedient to address ourselves. The case of Italy was widely diverse from that of ancient Greece. The tribes of Greece, whom the Greeks called *barbarians* were either few and scattered, or had no political strength; whether Pelasgians or Chaonians and Molossians or other Epirots. The Greeks, who were mutually intelligible, were conscious of substantial unity, and strove for political union. No such unity can be alleged of ancient Italy, nor was any abstract desire of union possible. The Latin race, which at length established its supremacy in the peninsula, was at first contained within the narrowest limits, and often seemed likely to be overwhelmed.

To understand the magnitude of the task implied in Italian union, a definite idea must be attained as to the diversity of languages. The northern region which we call Lombardy, was early occupied by Gauls, of the same blood and language as those on this side of the Alps. Without entering into the controversy whether the modern Welsh or the modern Irish more nearly represents their tongue, no one doubts that it was wholly unintelligible to Latins. Also, they were by far the rudest people in Italy, having, in the time of the second Punic war, none of the cultivation which Roman generals afterwards found in southern Gaul. The Romans solved the problem by the expulsion of this people, not by their incorporation with the Empire: hence no further notice of them is here needed. Their soil was occupied by Latin colonies.

At the opposite end of Italy we may pass by the Iapygian tribes, equally as any scattered Pelasgian settlements; for, whatever the languages, they went into disuse before the era of political consolidation. But the Greek colonies, which gave the name of Magna Græcia to the south, are far more important. The enormous contrast of Greek to Latin is an open fact to our school boys. That the Greeks came in as colonists by sea was perfectly notorious, and has never been disputed. That the Etruscans also arrived by sea, and were emigrants from Lydia, was an all but universal article of faith with the ancients. Cicero, it is observed, speaks of Etruscans as *homines barbari*, a phrase he would not use of Sabines, Umbrians or Oscans, who were accounted old Italians.

But when our modern historians speak of "the old Italian stock," we are liable to delusion, as though these people and the Latins could, somehow, understand one another; as though their speech were a mere difference of dialect. The Sabine indeed was probably a dialect of Umbrian, or, as some say, of Oscan. We

have only single words, not sentences, in the language. Dionysius calls the Sabines emigrants from Umbria; but this does not prove them Umbrians: apparently they were absorbed in other races, before the last century of the Roman Republic. But when the terrible "Social War," the war against the *Italian* allies, burst upon Rome, four languages appear as of political importance, Latin, Etruscan, Umbrian, and Oscan. It is certain that they were contrasted, not as dialects, but as languages, as entirely as French and English, Greek and Persian. It avails not to talk, as ethnologists, about "primitive connection." Just so Irish and Welsh, just so Russian and Polish, have primitive connection; yet they are widely separate now, and the peoples are mutually unintelligible.

Let anyone who knows the elements of Latin peruse two Umbrian paragraphs. First, one of old Umbrian. "Sacre sewacne opetu. Jowe Patre promom ampentu destro sese ase. Fratrusper Attieries, ahdisper eicwasatis, totaper Ijowina, trefiper Ijowina, diçlom sewacnim deitu; inomec owem sewacnim opetu." Second, of somewhat later Umbrian: "Verfale, pufe arsfertur trebeit, ocrer pehanner, erse stahmito, eso tuderato est. Angluto hondomu, porsei nesimei Asa Deveia est, anglome sommo, porsei nesimei Vapersus Aviecleir est; eine, angluso sommo Vapefe Avicelu totcome tuder, angluto hondomu Asame Deveia totcome tuder: eine, totceir tuderus seipodruhpei—seritu."* Here the word *est* catches attention as Latin; nothing else. But *est* is scarcely altered in German, Greek and modern Persian.

Next, the reader may be pleased to see a specimen of Oscan from the Bantine Tablet; but the lines are almost all broken at the end. "Pis pocapit post (?) post exac comono hafiert, meddis dat castridlouf en eituas factud pous touto deivatuns tanginom deicans stom dat eizasc idictanon deicum pod valæmom touticom tadait eizum, nep fepacid pod pis dat eizac."† Oscan has the letter *z*, unknown to Latin, and *x* in some new sense, probably for our *sh*. Umbrian had both *z*, and a peculiar *r*, as also a modified *c*, probably for our *tch*.

As to the Etruscan language, our knowledge is indeed very small, but it is distinct and significant. By help of proper names, and a few bilingual inscriptions, it is ascertained that the Etruscans had a genitive case ending in *-s*. I think further that

---

* In a small pamphlet I have essayed a translation of the Iguvine Tablets, from which these specimens are taken. (Trubner & Co.)—F. W. N.

† Mommsen has very ably elucidated the Oscan remains.

they had a dative in *-si*, an accusative in *-m*, and (what is very peculiar) an ablative feminine in *-al*. The following translations seem to me reliable:—

ON A CUP.

Mi Larthia.
Me Lartius (finxit).

OVER TOMBS.

Larth Velimnas Aules.
Lars Volumnii Auli (filius).

Thefri Velimnas Tarchis clan.
Tiberius Volumnii Tarchi filius.

Arnth Velimnas Aules.
Aruns Volumnii Auli (filius).

Aule Velimnas Thefrisa* Nufrunal clan.
Aulus Volumnii Tiberii (ex) Nofrona filius.

Vele Velimnas Aules.
Velus Volumnii Auli (filius).

Aule Tarchnas Larthal clan.
Aulus Tarquinii (ex) Lartia filius.

Laris (?) Pumpus Arnthal clan.
Lars Pompeii (ex) Arruntia filius.

Pup. Velimna Aules Cafatial.
Publius Volumnius Auli (filius) (ex) Cafatia.

IN THE PERUSINE INSCRIPTION.

Aulesi Velthinas Arxnal clensi.
Aulo Volsinii (ex) Aruxna filio.

Clel Afuna Velthinam.
Genuit (?) Aponius Volsinium.

Larthals Afunes clen.
Lartialis Aponii filius.

INSCRIPTION ON AN ORATOR'S CLOAK.

Aulesi Metelis Ve, Vesial clensi.
Aulo Metelli Veli (ex) Vesia filio.

SHORT INSCRIPTIONS.

A. Abassa Arnthal Fraunal.
Aulus Abassa (ex) Arruntia Feronia.

Ve. Cusu Cr. L(ucumo)apa Petrual clan.
Velus Cossus Cnæi primigenius ex Patreia filius.

Titia C. L. Fausal.
Titius Caius primigenius (ex) Fausa.

---

* *Or*, Thefris a (?)—
Tiberii ex—

The Etruscans must have frequently omitted short vowels in writing, as do the Hebrews and Arabs; for it was impossible to pronounce without additional vowels such combinations of consonants as flerthrce, lml, srancxl, cicnl. We may then easily be deceived as to the sound, by the aspect of the writing. The language had the Greek aspirates *th*, *ch*; and *z* and *x* besides. We have no clue as yet to the demonstrative or relative pronouns, and the materials are so scanty as to give little hope of increased knowledge. Nevertheless, it is impossible to dwell on the Perusine Inscription, without seeing how entirely unlike is the language to Latin, Oscan and Umbrian.

To unite in one dominion and reconcile to a common rule nations so diverse, was not a hopeful undertaking. It may be added, that their religions also were different. Nevertheless, this did not with the ancients cause national repugnance. They generally undertook the task, more charitable than philosophic, of identifying every foreign deity with one of their own. But when mythologies have essential contrasts, we see that the people had grown up under different mental influences. Even the Oscans and the Umbrians had separate Pantheons. The Etruscan religion was in many ways very peculiar: some things the Romans had adopted; yet the Latins differed from them all. At a very early time the Greeks were in some sense mediators and reconcilers in religion to Etruscans, Latins and Oscans. Etruscan pottery shows that the artists of that nation had become familiar with the Greek heroes and heroines. Rome largely blended in her ceremonies the religions of all her neighbours: yet she never lost the Latin tendency to worship abstract ideas, such as Concord, Fortune, Health, Womanly Honour. Herein the Latins may seem to have anticipated modern Comtism.

The Etruscans, as known to us, were confined to Etruria proper, where Etruscan tombs abound, and nowhere else. The Umbrians had been expelled by them from this whole district, and were confined to a very limited area in the northern Apennine, between Tuscany and Rimini. The Oscans were of all by far the most widely spread, over the great mass of the Apennines, with its valleys and slopes, over the Adriatic coast from Rimini southward, perhaps over all Apulia (but this is doubted), certainly over Campania and Lucania. The Latin language was originally confined to the single district marked in our maps as Latium, and a considerable part of even this was occupied by tribes of another origin and speech. The city which was destined to conquer and centralise Italy, lay in a corner, pressed upon by Etruscans,

Sabines and Latins. Antiquity universally believed that Rome was a very mongrel city; that each of these three peoples had entered into her composition organically from the beginning; also, that Arcadians from Greece, and Trojans from Asia, had still earlier planted themselves on this very area. But Mommsen, the authority in these matters who has supplanted Niebuhr, is pleased to call it *irrational* to imagine the Romans a mixed people. One who holds to the old belief that early Rome had Sabine, Latin and Tuscan tribes, finds it easy to understand both her ambition to incorporate in her dominion her neighbours of all three languages, and her success in that ambition during the regal period. But the revolution which expelled the Tarquins broke up the dominion of Rome. Her conquest by the Etruscan Porsena following made her struggles tedious and long very doubtful.

Niebuhr originated a new view of the renewed alliances of Rome which he said (perhaps correctly) had been falsified by Roman compilers of history; men unwilling to believe, and incapable of imagining, that Rome had ever dealt with her allies upon equal terms: but this does not much concern us here. To give some backbone of approximate chronology, it may be laid down that kings were expelled from Rome, and tyrants from Attica, almost simultaneously; say, B.C. 510. The Latin and Hernican league was made nearly about B.C. 490, the date of the battle of Marathon. By this league the consul Spurius Cassius began the restoration of Rome from her gravest foreign dangers. Simultaneously, concessions to the plebeians staved off domestic revolution. The foreign enemies most pressing are called Æqui and Volsci, men certainly foreign in race to Latium, perhaps Sabine and Umbrian. The contest was very tedious and very uncertain, until the year B.C. 428, one year after the death of Pericles, when the dictator Aulus Postumius Tubertus gained a decisive victory. Thenceforward Rome, though struggling, is manifestly always winning.

To any moral criticism of Roman conduct, it is common to reply; "Every one of the neighbours would have been as bad, if they had had the power." This is easily said, and has no proof. In the earliest era our materials fail; but a little later, we have illustrations to the contrary, proving that the neighbours were more moderate, more peaceful, more truthful, more just. We know that *all* men are liable to be corrupted by despotic power, Oscans as well as Romans. To adduce this as a reason for sympathizing with despotic successes, is illogical and demoralizing.

By the bravery and fidelity of the Latin and Hernican allies, and at the large expense of their blood, Rome had been delivered from

imminent dangers, had grown strong, and, we may well believe, more arrogant. The allies felt it keenly, and complained (according to Livy) that they were treated as vassals. The Latins sent an embassy to the Senate, claiming equality in the State, but desiring to be one people, and to be called Romans. Their numbers and strength being equal, they said, half the Senate and one consul ought to be Latins. Livy regards the demand as insolent in the extreme, and seems to approve of the speech which he ascribes to the consul Manlius, who declared that if the Senate were mad enough to yield, he himself would kill with his own hand the first Latin who tried to take his seat. The Senate, however, was of Manlius's mind, and chose rather to peril the existence of the State, than to enlarge and strengthen it by the free incorporation of a kindred people, whose fidelity was long tried.

After three years of war, the Romans conquered. Nevertheless, fifteen years later, during the first Samnite war, they had to yield before the armed demands of the Latins, whose general Lucius Fulvius Curvus, Dictator of Tusculum, the head of insurrection, was accepted by the Roman Senate as Consul. Thus the fusion of Rome with Latium became complete, B.C. 321. Rome granted to necessity what, at the expense of bloody war, she refused to equity and to sound policy. This seems to have been her uniform course.

It may be asked: Why did two centuries need to pass, after the league of Servius Tullius, before a union could be effected, which the Roman plebs and the Latin towns must alike have desired? This is to me explicable only by the heterogeneousness of the Roman patricians, who, long after Latin was their language, still retained Sabine and Etruscan sentiment, and made their religious ceremonies (which were foreign to the plebeians) a pretext of exclusiveness.

The Sabines or Sabellians are always praised in later times for their simple manners and austere morality; but this description belongs to those who continued to live as rustics, without the demoralizing influences of power, wealth and ambition. In this respect we may compare them to the Ottoman Turks, who are admired by all strangers in their own villages for the noble and sterling qualities almost universal to them: yet the same men are for the most part quickly corrupted by office and power, and become capable of great atrocities. It is interesting to alight upon a description of the modern *Umbrians* in Mrs. Hamilton Grey's *Tour to the Sepulchres of Etruria*. She says:

One of our party told me, that the farmer with whom he was quartered had with him a band of 30 shepherds, who slept round the court-yard after the manner of the ancient Tuscans, and whose employment all day was milking and tending the flocks and making cheeses and *ricotta* (a sort of curd) from the milk of goats and ewes; and that their food never was anything else, morning, noon and night, all the year round, but this same ricotta, excepting twice a week when they fasted [*qu.* feasted?] upon meal porridge or upon polenta and lentils. He said that *they were Umbrians* and kept themselves most clannishly distinct from all other peasants, having a pride in their ancient country, which has never changed its name from the earliest records; and also in their descent, a thing much prized by all classes in Italy. He described them as tall, powerful, and handsome; such figures as we see depicted in the ancient tombs; and men of that proud and high stamp of character, *who are above robbery, cruelty and meanness.*

Such primitive populations, with rustic simple habits, abounded in Italy, whether called Umbrian, Sabine or Samnite; men unaccustomed to wide political or military combinations, but noble-hearted and upright. It was the cruel mission of Rome to crush, exterminate or corrupt them. By constant occupation in war she learned policy, intrigue and fraud, as well as discipline and large schemes of campaigning. Hence her uniform ultimate success.

In the second era, after the complete union of the Latins with Rome, war with the Oscan nations began on a greater scale. The first Samnite war has been alluded to, but the second was far more severe, and we gain insight into Roman method and *morale* of conquest. Roman encroachments were the sole cause of war. The Samnites, after it had broken out, humbly asked for peace, on terms of equality and friendship, and offered pecuniary payment; but the Romans insisted on absolute submission to their despotic military rule.

The Samnites were a simple martial people, but had no such military institutions as the Romans. The policy of Rome was aggressive, and her mode of warfare was by systematic devastation. The Samnites were less ambitious, and too much satisfied with defence. When successful, they did not follow up success haughtily and bloodily in Roman fashion. We know the events from the Romans only, and by their account the Samnites were greatly the superior in moderation and equity. A most signal history, illustrating the morality of the two nations, was that known by the name of Forks of Caudium. The Roman army had entered this defile, where they were so shut in by the Samnite general Pontius, that they could not escape. As Livy tells us, he might have massacred them easily; instead of this, he made a treaty to disarm and dismiss them in safety, on condition that

the Romans would withdraw their settlers from the Samnite soil, and henceforth live in amity on equal terms. The two consuls who were both intercepted, became sponsors for fidelity to the engagement; so did all the chief officers; and the army returned home safe. The Senate at once voted that the engagement was null and void, and to save the public faith, sent heralds to surrender to the Samnites the officers who had sworn fidelity. Pontius indignantly refused to accept them, and claimed that if the Senate did not like the treaty, it should not take advantage of it, but should replace the whole army into the defile: he therefore sent back the officers unharmed. The Romans renewed the war more fiercely than ever, and when twenty-seven years later, they* captured this same Pontius, they led him in "triumph," which always, under the republic, was followed by beheading.

It may be proper to dwell on this; for when in a small book, called *Regal Rome*, I alluded to this systematic Roman cruelty, a learned German flatly denied my correctness. The classical passage on the subject is *Cicero in Verrum*, Act ii., Lib. v., 30, 77. He is expressing indignation that Verres had *not* executed a captured chief pirate. The imputation was, that Verres had taken a bribe to spare him, and had beheaded some one else in his place. Cicero urges, that the pirate might have escaped, to the danger of the public; and in reply to Verres's plea, that he needed to produce the pirate in his own defence, argues: "So then! you are to defend yourself at the public risk! The punishments *which are due to conquered enemies* you will inflict at the time convenient to yourself! a public enemy of the Romans is to be kept safe under private guard! But even those who triumph, and *on that account* keep generals of an enemy *longer alive*, in order that, from their being led in triumph, the Roman people may enjoy a most glorious spectacle and fruit of victory; yet, when they begin to turn the chariot from the forum into the Capitol, they order them to be *led into prison*; and the day which ends the command of the conqueror, *ends also the life of the conquered.*" It is not a question of special treachery, of violated treaty, or of desertion from Rome: to have been "at the head of an enemy" in open war (just or unjust) is the whole offence: nor is there in all the republican history a single instance where a general, a

* The fact that he was so dealt with is stated in the Epitome of Livy's 11th book. *Caium Pontium, imperatorem Samnitium, ductum in triumpho, securi percussit.* Arnold believes it unhesitatingly. I do not know why anyone is incredulous. Nothing is gained for the moral reputation of Rome by doubting whether Pontius was captured.

king or a queen, who is led in triumph, ever reappears in life. Vercingetorix, the Gaulish prince who defended his native city against Cæsar's invasion, was kept in chains for years by Cæsar, until he could conveniently triumph: yet Cæsar was "the gentlest and mildest of men," according to Cicero; certainly the Romans for the three centuries preceding are not likely to have been milder and more humane.

But to return to the earlier history. The Samnites being Oscans, could not desire political union with Rome: they solely desired amity and good neighbourhood; but this was precisely the thing that it was impossible to get from Romans. It is very remarkable, that in a war with the Numantines of Spain, about 175 years later, an affair closely similar in every point to that of the Caudine Forks occurred, the Numantines showing the same mercy and magnanimity, the Romans the same want of good faith.

Since Rome had simultaneously given grave offence to the Etruscans by the appropriation of their soil, the Etruscans and Umbrians joined their cause with the Samnites; yet feebly at first. In the last Samnite war, the Etruscans and even the Gauls put forth great efforts, and the Samnite forces marched into Etruria, so that in one army were four nations, Etruscans, Samnites, Umbrians and Gauls. But the combination came too late, and Roman victory was only the more decisive in its result. A year before this great battle, the consuls Fabius and Decius had defeated a Samnite army on its own soil. Livy tells us how they used their success, and adds no word of pity or disapproval (x. 15). "The two consular armies, rambling in different directions, *for five months together* devastated everything. There were forty-five places in Samnium, in which Decius, eighty-six in which Fabius had fixed his camp. They did not leave mere traces of the mounds and ditches, but far more signal memorials of emptiness and devastation in the region around." The system was continued by other consuls year after year. We may hesitate to believe the prodigious number of Samnites said by Livy to have been slain in the terrible series of battles, for apparently every man sold his life dearly. But we cannot doubt the wide starvation of women and children, and the enormous depopulation of entire districts by these fiendish destructions of crops, fruit trees, towns and villages. Livy's tale may assure us that the Caledonian chieftain in Tacitus spoke simple truth concerning Roman generals, when he said: "They make a wilderness, and call it peace." The method of Attila and the Huns was that by which Roman

arms prospered. So Regulus in the first Punic war burned down all the beautiful villas of the wealthy Carthaginians to which he could reach, giving Hannibal the hint, by what processes alone the Romans themselves must be tamed. More savage and horrible still, if not more cruel in the result, was the practice of the Romans when they captured a city, according to their great admirer Polybius. He takes occasion to expound it, when his hero Scipio Africanus, the most specious of the Romans, had taken the great Spanish city New Carthage (Cartagena). "When Publius [that is, Scipio] thought his force inside the walls was strong enough; forthwith, *following the Roman custom*, he sent the greater part of his soldiers against the people of the city, commanding them to kill whomever they met, and spare no one, and not betake themselves to plunder, until a sign should be given. As I think, it is to inspire terror that the Romans follow this practice. Wherefore often, when they capture cities, one may see not only human beings massacred, but also the dogs cut into bits, and limbs of all other animals chopped off. But on that occasion this sort of thing was perfectly abundant, because of the hugeness of the population pent up in the city." (*Polyb.* x. 15.) The historian utters no word of horror or disapproval, much as his own country had suffered from Roman violence. Q. Fabius Maximus in Spain cut off the hands of natives who had deserted from Roman garrisons, a method which, if directed against real and extreme ferocity of crime, might have its defence. But when the Numantines proved themselves warriors too formidable for the ordinary Roman generals, one might have hoped that the accomplished Scipio Æmilianus would have found some better mode of defeating or conciliating them. The tale in Appian shows how heartless the very best men of the Romans were. In Lutia, a flourishing town, the younger men desired to succour Numantia about thirty miles distant, which Scipio was besieging. Scipio received notice of it, and suddenly appearing before Lutia with an overwhelming force, he demanded the surrender of those who had urged giving aid to the Numantines. By violent threats he got four hundred young men into his power, and cut off all their right hands. When the Numantines offered to capitulate, Scipio demanded surrender without terms, and would promise them nothing. Naturally they declined to submit to such mercy, and persevered amid all the horrors of famine into utter destruction. These were the men who had released a whole Roman army. At the beginning of the war in which they so often defeated the Romans, they had only 8,000 armed men, and Scipio besieged

them with 60,000. Appian remarks that this Scipio had destroyed Carthage by express command of the Senate; but concerning Numantia no decree had been passed by Senate or people, and the city was neither large nor populous: hence the historian does not know whether such severity of Scipio was inspired by anger at its resistance, or by an idea that he would get more glory by it.

Another Roman general much praised for virtue and moderation, is Metellus Numidicus. He reduced Jugurtha to straits, chiefly by the system of hiring men to assassinate him: indeed, in war he had singularly little success to boast of. Appian tells of him, that when he had induced Jugurtha to surrender some Thracian and Ligurian deserters (men from whom no special allegiance to Rome could have been expected), "Metellus cut off the hands of some; others he buried in the earth up to their middle, then shot at them from all round with arrows and darts, and finally, while they still breathed, set them on fire." This Metellus is called by Sallust "a great and wise man," though he was of the opposite party to the historian. Metellus was succeeded in the same war by Marius, a coarse and violent plebeian. If he alone had acted ferociously, we might not wonder; but the comments of the accomplished historian on his conduct are the matter of chief importance. Marius was informed that across a great desert lay a populous city called Capsa, which he resolved to surprize. Having laden his cattle chiefly with water bags, he made a sudden rapid march, and came upon the city before it had the least idea that it was accessible to an enemy. It surrendered itself at once, without resistance. Hereupon he killed all the adult males, plundered and burnt the city, led away the women and children and sold them as slaves, and divided all the booty among the soldiers. Upon this the historian calmly remarks: "Such violation of the laws of war was not committed from avarice, nor from any guilt in the consul; but because the place was convenient for Jugurtha, and difficult of access to us. In fact, the African race is fickle and untrustworthy, and on former occasions had been found untractable alike to favours and to severity." Thus men whom physical geography separated from Rome too widely to become part of the empire, were for that reason to be killed! It must be added, that the Jugurthine war, with its countless horrors, had no other avowed object, than to punish Jugurtha for the crime of murdering his two cousins—all of them being princes of a nation foreign to Rome, and nominally independent.

Reading such a comment from Sallust, we may be morally

certain that the Romans two or three centuries earlier made no attempt to win the allegiance of Oscans or Etruscans by any process but that of brutal savagery. Even when they cross the Hadriatic, they show themselves morally inferior to the Ætolians, then the most barbarous power in Greece; who, having been faithful and efficient allies of Rome, foolishly imagined, as did the Rhodians, that their services justified them in a demeanour of manly equality. But the Romans, like a tyrannical prince, never forgave one who had done them service and was proud of it. Quick and vehement war reduced the Ætolians to severe straits; upon which they laid down their arms, and (in Greek phrase) "gave themselves in trust to" the Romans. The consul instantly threw all the chief men into chains, who, in astonishment, cried out (but in vain), "We gave ourselves into trust, not into chains." But to break the spirit was always the first object of the Romans, and at last they did it effectually everywhere.

The third Samnite war ended B.C. 290. It had been a war of vast exertion and great suffering to the Romans themselves. Three years had been marked by great pestilence. The dead had been left unburied, the fields were wasted and untilled, the population flocked into the towns. Great disaffection and, after some years, insurrection followed (indeed, it is said, a secession of the Roman plebs), which the dictator Hortensius appeased, by finally surrendering every barrier of aristocracy, and making "the common people," voting in their tribes, nominally sovereign. One might expect, that after such exhaustion, such misery, the Romans would at length take rest: indeed, we may find it hard to understand how they possibly could fight on. But a very few years sufficed; a phenomenon which cannot be understood without reference to the military institutions. Military colonization and military conscription of the free cultivators of the soil lay at the bottom; and at the top the system of two consuls, who for one year were at the head of the national armies, and always wanted a war, to distinguish and enrich themselves.

There was no other career by which a Roman could rise to distinction, but through the army. Every young man in wealthy families was expected to serve ten years, between the ages of seventeen and twenty-eight. Even after Greece was opened to them and they could appreciate high culture, military eminence continued to domineer. Virgil, who called knowledge blessed; Virgil, whose heart was purity and his life gentleness; extols the Romans, as caring not to become sculptors or orators or astronomers, but only rulers; seeking only to impose law on

others, to spare the subdued and to wear out the proud by war. And to a Roman everyone seemed proud who was not submissive. Hence not only among themselves did no original genius arise, but even in the long centuries of peace mind withered in all the subject nations. As among the Ottoman Turks there are noble treatises on morals and excellent rules of government, which yet avail nothing to the Empire, so neither could Roman jurisprudence be of avail, where the sword was law, and the civilian was trampled down.

No sooner had the Romans prevailed over an enemy, than (in their own phrase) they *gave peace* to the conquered, that is to say, they dictated the terms of peace: until they could do this, they persevered in war. Whatever the original cause of war, they enforced uniformly a large confiscation of land, often one-third of the enemy's territory. They selected the place most critical for military purposes, and planted it with a population speaking Latin. In some cases this was made a political extension of Roman soil. It then received the name of a Roman *Tribe*, *i.e.*, parish, district, or county, and the land was divided to settlers equally. But the Roman aristocracy invented another method, which kept the chief mass of confiscated land as public property, of which the aristocracy made a convenience for themselves; giving to the settlers less land and a half franchise, entitled *Latin* rights. This settlement was then a *Latin colony*, though every settler might previously have been a full Roman citizen. Thirty of such colonies were planted in various parts of Italy. Their towns were often, and perhaps generally, fortified with polygonal blocks of stone, which no battering ram could shake. Although the Carthaginians used most elaborate arts of siege in Sicily and Spain, Hannibal never even attempted anything of the kind in Italy, and never captured the smallest Roman town except by intrigue or surprize. Roads also resting, at least in some cases, on polygonal blocks, which it was very difficult to tear up, were built (to build or fortify a road is the Latin phrase): thus the colonies, which Cicero calls "the front ramparts of the Empire," were defended and connected with the imperial centre. As nothing caused greater enmity in the old inhabitants than the seizing of their agricultural land, and planting fortified towns upon it, many a new colony lost its crops or its cattle; but the retaliation was swift and dreadful. Thus in the course of years the Roman tribes and the Latin colonies flourished amid desolation, and grew strong in men. Latium (as it were) spread over Italy, and old Latium became ever emptier. The thirty Latin

colonies were staunch to Rome, all through the war of Hannibal. Their leading men all had easy access to the full Roman franchise, and were then eligible to the high offices. Every agriculturist was liable to conscription for the army. But, as early as the Punic wars, the conscription fell, not on Romans and Latins only, but on all conquered Italians whom the Romans admitted as "*citizens without suffrage*," that is, to total vassalage. Prefects were sent from Rome to govern them with power almost absolute. In the Roman army these Italians were called the Allies. They were officered by Romans, and, as elsewhere happens, discipline made them fight well, especially against an enemy from beyond Italy. Every Roman commander had power over the life of provincials, as well as over the lives of his subordinates in the army. He was attended by men with axes, twelve or six; and at pleasure could produce terror in a whole population by beheading any of their chief men at his own discretion, with no court of appeal. Cicero correctly describes the annexation of a country by the phrase: "The province was cast beneath our axes."

From such military institutions one could only expect hardness of heart, contempt for human life and human suffering. The eagerness of every new pair of consuls, annually elected, for a new war, was as a spark to a vast accumulation of fuel. After new insurrections in Samnium, they took the part of a Greek city against Lucania, and by violating their treaty with Magna Græcia *not* to sail beyond a certain promontory, became embroiled with Tarentum, and hereby with Pyrrhus King of Epirus. In this new struggle the whole of southern Italy was conquered. It might have seemed at length time to heal the wounds of war, to provide for the cultivation of the soil, to conciliate the conquered, and thus to consolidate dominion. But Rome coveted extended rule, chiefly because it gave fresh materials for armies, fresh resources for new conquest, by which her aristocracy was enriched: hence her demand for soldiers crippled agriculture. Freemen were replaced by slaves; slaves could not be trusted to work. Cattle and grazing land supplanted men and crops, as fast as slaves were introduced, and the desolations of war were not healed in peace.

Hardly was the war against Pyrrhus ended, than it pleased the consuls to espouse the side of certain atrocious buccaneers in Sicily, with the express object of getting into a quarrel with the Carthaginians. The Senate was utterly ashamed of so bad a cause, and would not vote: yet (says Polybius) they wished for

war with Carthage. If they had honestly put before the people the scandalous and odious facts, their influence must have prevailed: but they left the consuls to seduce the populace by the shameless argument that a war would enrich the soldiers. The first Punic war was then fought for twenty-five years, without a week's intermission, with vaster resources and huger loss than ever before, by sea as well as by land. Peace is hardly made, when they occupy Sardinia in a crisis of Carthaginian disaster; enter into a war with Illyria (for which they cannot be blamed), and next with the Gauls of Lombardy, who resented the colonies planted on their soil. Hannibal's invasion of Italy, in revenge for the seizure of Sardinia, soon followed. Hannibal found nearly the whole peninsula, except the Latin colonies, hostile to Rome, and was soon at his ease with Etruscans, Umbrians, Oscans, and Greeks. As he remained master of the open field for seventeen years together, not once suffering defeat (so Polybius expressly tells us), he had abundant opportunity to retaliate with fire and plunder on Roman and Latin fields and homesteads. What mind can conceive the long anguish endured in this process? The Roman people never recovered from it. And when Hannibal was at length expelled, the turn for the other nations came; for Rome knew nothing of amnesty—neither the name nor the idea. Towns and populations, in proportion to the sympathy which they had shown to Hannibal, were punished by forfeiture of territory and of political rights, besides the beheading of their most spirited men.

If this process of lingering bloody devastating war had been closed by uniting all Italy in equal and free citizenship, the result would have been dearly bought, yet it might have been unspeakably precious. But the result was scarcely reached (a century and a half later), when citizenship almost lost its worth; for freedom was no more. The Roman system of peace proved as ruinous as its wars. In fact, peace in Italy only meant perpetual war beyond Italy. Young Italians perished on every shore of the Mediterranean by thousands incessantly. The rural places became thinner and thinner (the phenomenon which shocked Tiberius Gracchus), and the little freeholds, left desolate, were invaded by the aristocratic tenants of public lands. Nothing more aggrieved the Italian soldiers than that they were exposed to flogging in the army, from which the Romans were exempt; hence for several generations disaffection spread wide and deep. The sufferings of Italy were diversified, a century after Hannibal, by the irruption of the Cimbri and Teutones from the north.

After their expulsion, the Italians might have been conciliated, if the Senate had been wise; but it did not look forward, and events rushed on precipitately, until all Oscan Italy blazed out into war (B.C. 90). Then at once to the Etruscans and Umbrians the full franchise was given, to prevent their joining the Oscans. The Senate, having command of the sea, could bring in Gaulish and Spanish auxiliaries; nay, even Mauritanian and Numidian are named; so after dreadful reverses Rome crushed the insurrection in the north. The terrible Mithridatic war was simultaneous. It was inaugurated by a universal massacre of Romans, men and women, in the Greek towns of Asia; a frightful mark how intense was the suffering of the Greeks under Roman rule; for they had never done anything like it before. Garrulous and faithless as they were, they for once kept a dreadful secret. In Rome itself the civil war of Marius and Sulla flamed out, before the other wars could be finished; and each party of the Romans then showed towards the other the same heartless, remorseless cruelty into which they had long been trained against other nations. The civil war of Rome confused all parties in Italy. Etruria, the ally of Rome against the Oscans, suddenly found herself the enemy of Lucius Sulla, who trampled her out of political existence. The Samnites were finally crushed by him with barbarous slaughter after victory. All his political schemes and enactments were overthrown quickly after his death; Roman franchise was before long made universal; for everything was yielded after the war, which would have sufficed to prevent the war, and would have saved to Rome the lives of 300,000 soldiers. Upon the heels of these direful commotions, followed the ruinous war of the gladiators under Spartacus, and twenty years later the civil war of Cæsar, itself continuing not much less than twenty years, till Augustus Cæsar remained sole ruler.

Arnold comments with just severity on that stubbornness of the Roman Senate which has been much admired by historians;—Rome, forsooth, was never to make peace, until she could dictate the terms absolutely! A nation which acts on this principle is a nuisance and a curse to the world; for if other nations did the same, war could only end by total exhaustion. The horrors of war, instead of being kept down at their minimum, were hereby driven to their maximum. Of course the Romans never looked back to the *cause* of war; never considered whether it had originated from their own breach of treaties or of fundamental morality: yet alas! seldom do the modern nations of Europe take account of this. But hereby the Roman successes were made immeasurably

more noxious; for the better the enemy's cause, the stronger was his resistance, and the more cruel was his punishment. Moreover, the Romans are admired for their refusal to exchange prisoners; which was an extreme cruelty and injustice to their own troops as well as to the enemy. Soldiers who had been made captive through the incompetence of their commander, were regarded as traitors to Rome and cowards. When Crassus, at his own will, without any public war voted by the people, chose to march into Parthia, and lost both his own life and his army, the captive soldiers, despairing of return, at length married Parthian wives and reconciled themselves to a change of country. Thirty-two years later, Augustus Cæsar, moved by pride, not by pity, extorted from the Parthian king a restoration of these captives; but some of them slew themselves, others absconded. The jovial poet Horace treats it as a scandalous wickedness that rustics from Marsium and Apulia should ever submit to become Parthians. The Roman effort was, to establish as a fixed principle, what Thucydides denounces as intensifying all atrocity, "Making everything else unimportant, in comparison to victory."

It is often assumed that Roman conquest was arrested by the establishment of military monarchy, and that only the Republic was encroaching. Augustus Cæsar is supposed to have had a peaceful reign. But he added to the empire Egypt, Switzerland and all that is south of the Danube; he completed the conquest of Spain and Gaul; he temporarily conquered Germany up to the Elbe; he planned to conquer Britain and Arabia, perhaps Persia (Hor. *Od.* iii. 5, 4); he sent an army into Armenia; finally in declining years his great disaster in Germany under Varus taught him that swamps and forests were not to be coveted. His successor Tiberius was peaceful on principle; otherwise, physical geography chiefly imposed a comparative lull of conquest on the imperial policy.

Now comes the cardinal question to the historian and the moralist, What did Italy, and what did the world beyond Italy, gain by the Roman supremacy, so dearly purchased? Political union, especially of districts which have a geographical unity, is in itself so valuable, that when it is sought peaceably and candidly on perfectly equal terms, diversity of language is not a permanent barrier. We see how well the Swiss go on together, in spite of French and German. Chech and Germans in Bohemia—Germans and Poles in Posen—Welsh and English in Wales—Magyars, Slovacks and Croats in Hungary—though the races have not had full equality, yet have maintained a tolerable content: nay, in

France, the dialect of Languedoc is unintelligible to a mere Parisian, and German Alsace had by degrees become warmly attached to France. But Rome never sought for union on equal terms, and never yielded equality except by compulsion; that is to say, while Rome had any freedom herself. Raw violence and blind selfishness were her method and her motive; thus gaining the smallest result at the greatest expense. But, what is a more fatal condemnation still, the longer any district was subject to Roman rule, the worse was its condition. Its earliest conquests suffered the completest ruin. It amazed Pliny to contrast Latium as it had been, with Latium as he knew it. He recites the names (*Nat. Hist.* iii. 9.) of twenty-one "illustrious towns" of the old Latin league, and thirty-two more that were joined in the sacrifices on the Alban Mount, and then remarks: "Thus fifty-three peoples have perished from the soil of ancient Latium without leaving a trace." Elsewhere in three words he tells a secret: *Latifundia perdidere Italiam*, "broad estates ruined Italy." But it was the ravage of war, and covetous policy, which led to the broad estates. The country round Rome was in Cicero's time a desert, into which no prudent nobleman ventured without an armed guard. Lombardy alone (Cicero tells us) largely decided elections; for there the colonies were *newer*, and the country better peopled. Under the prudent rule of Tiberius Cæsar, Italy was still notoriously empty of "men;" slaves did not count, but neither were their numbers at all commensurate. Sicily, the earliest province beyond Italy, was the most desolated. The strength of the Roman armies then came from every country rather than Italy. Gaul was at first an enormous addition to the strength of Rome; but, as Sismondi abundantly attests, Gaul became more and more miserable, weaker and more helpless, as time went on. In every province the cities were swollen with a huge population, while the rustic freemen dwindled in numbers, and were crushed in spirit. A small band of invading Germans could spread terror far and wide. The defence of every country was entrusted to standing armies, generally of foreigners, encamped on the soil; surely not a regimen conducing to any permanent welfare of nations. That the institutions were fundamentally rotten, we have striking proof in the fact, that after the reign of four energetic emperors, Trajan, Hadrian, and the two Antonines (both models of good administration), the Empire was more ignorant, lower in art, taste and genius, than a century earlier, and less able to resist barbarian attack.

It is astonishing that learned men find a ground for extolling

Roman conquest in the cry, "How else could Europe have resisted the barbarians?" If Greece and Carthage had not been conquered by Rome, on the basin of the Mediterranean, numerous powers would have kept one another in check, then as now. *Freedom* and *Law* would have been saved: and with them manly spirit. With the resources of civilized wealth, and unbroken national spirit, barbarians can always be repressed. Rome broke men's spirits, and would not endure that a provincial should ever have protection from a violent and tyrannical official. *Therefore* was Europe cursed by the barbarian invasion, with infinite anguish, and with an almost total wreck of the knowledge and culture which long centuries had worked out.

CONTRASTS OF ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORY.

IN FOUR PARTS.

[From Frazer's Magazine, September, 1874.]

PART I.

The whole interest of history depends on the eternal likeness of human nature to itself, and on the similarities or analogies which we in consequence perpetually discover between that which has been and that which is. Were it otherwise, all the narratives of the past would be an enigma to our understandings; for we should be without that sympathy which kindles imagination and gives insight; nor would the experience of the ancient world afford instruction or warning to him who is trying to anticipate futurity. With good reason, therefore, the greatest stress is ordinarily laid on this side of the question—the similarities to be detected between the past and the present. In the world of Greece or Rome, of Egypt or Judæa, Carthage or Babylon, the same never-ending struggles of opposite principles were at work, with which we are so well acquainted in modern times. The contests between high birth and wealth, between rich and poor, between conservatives and progressists, to say nothing of the purely moral conflicts of patriotism and selfishness, justice and oppression, mercy and cruelty, all show themselves in every highly developed community, in proportion to the fulness of information which we enjoy concerning it. The names and the form often differ, when the substance was the same as now. Nevertheless, it is equally needful to be aware of the points at which similarity ceases and contrast begins; otherwise, our application of history to practical uses will be mere delusive pedantry. This, no doubt, is the difficulty, through which no golden rule can avail to help us. We are thrown back upon good sense to judge of each question as it occurs, and all that the writer of history or the philosopher can do for the aid of readers, is, to state broadly what contrasts

can be traced between ancient and modern times, leaving it to be inquired how far these may happen to affect any case in hand.

The very expressions, Ancient and Modern History, need a preliminary caution. Some nations may seem to be in nearly the same state in ancient and in modern times: as the roving Arabs and Tartars; perhaps even the inhabitants of China and its neighbouring Archipelago. All such people are tacitly excluded from this discussion; roving tribes, because they have no history worth the name; the Chinese nations, because their culture notoriously has become stationary, and, as we have no history of their earlier times, we cannot detect such contrasts as may really exist between their present and former state. By modern history we must chiefly mean Christian history, yet not so as to exclude the Mohammedan nations. They too have their strong points of contrast to the ancient military monarchies, and will be treated in their turn; but their history is certainly monotonous. One form of Government only—military despotism—has arisen among them; and owing to this meagreness, there is less to say about them. The Mohammedan empires, as in the chronology they more properly belong to the middle age, so in their actual development appear to be midway between their prototypes in the ancient and their representatives in the modern Christian world. Generally speaking, it is only between things in important senses alike that it is worth while to insist on unlikeness. To contrast things different in kind, is seldom needed; but where similarity is close to point out dissimilarity is instructive.

1. The first topic which we may make prominent is contained in the word slavery. In modern Christendom slavery is an anomaly. It had pined away and vanished in Europe in proportion to civilization. When first it was established in the American colonies, no one foresaw the magnitude it would assume. When the great Republican Union arose, its founders would not admit the word slave or any equivalent into the Federal constitution. Believing that slavery must soon die out of itself, they declined any direct controversy about it, and veiled its actual existence under a general term that would include apprentices, criminals under sentence, or even minors; alas! not foreseeing that the invention of the cotton-gin would give a new money-value to slaves, and generate a fanatical theory which glorified slavery as a precious institution. Hence without a terrible civil war the proud ambition of slave owners could not be crushed. But the mighty price was paid. Slavery in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies all now seems to be doomed. Simultaneously the

Russian dynasty has reversed its policy. Having for several centuries by a gradual succession of imperial edicts depressed the peasants, first into serfs and next into slaves, it has raised them into free labourers who have legal rights in the soil and a *status* which the English peasant may envy. The most enlightened of the Mussulmans now glorify their Prophet as a promoter of freedom, a panegyrist of emancipation. In the judgment now of all highly cultivated men, slavery is an unnatural, unjust, dangerous institution, doomed by the voice of conscience, and suffrage of reason, to total extinction; though we grieve to know the perpetual effort which freebooters make, and will make, to renew it; not least, the degenerate offspring of Europeans, whenever they get beyond the reach of European law. But in the ancient world neither law nor philosophy nor religion forbade slavery; slightly to regulate its worst enormities, was all that religion or law attempted. Slavery was with them not the exception, but the rule. No philosopher theorized against it, no philanthropist (if such we may call any Greek or Roman) was ashamed of it, no statesman dreamed of taking measures to destroy it. The savage who wandered over the steppes of southern Russia needed a slave to milk his mares, and blinded him lest he should escape. The Lacedæmonian warrior, proud of freedom, regarded public slaves as essential to his existence, important alike in the camp, on the field of battle, and in his own city. Even the simple and comparatively virtuous German, in his forest hut, coveted and often attained the attendance of slaves, whose status perhaps was rather that of a serf. To the leading commercial states, Tyre, Corinth, Ægina, slaves were a staple article of merchandise. Chattels they were; yet not in those days mere cattle, useful for their brute force and for little beside. They were often persons of greater accomplishment than their masters, and this accomplishment enhanced their price. Some persons kept schools for slaves, in which they learned music and other elegant arts, or arithmetic and bookkeeping, cooking and domestic service, or agriculture and its kindred branches; or some other trade; of course, not for the slaves' benefit, but to raise their market value.

Through the ferocities of war, the ancient slave trade raged most cruelly against civilized man. All captives from an enemy, however seized, became the booty of the captor and liable to personal slavery. Pirates even in peace prowled along the coasts, and often carried off as prey any promising children, handsome women, or stout men, on whom they could lay their hands. In many cases, the same ship played the part of merchant and

kidnapper, as occasion might serve. After the successful siege of an opulent town, it was not uncommon for the entire population, young and old, of both sexes and of all ranks, to be sold into bondage: whereby sometimes the slave market was so glutted that they might be had for a trifle. It thus not seldom happened, that the well educated and delicately nurtured were degraded beneath humanity; and, dreadful as was the personal suffering to individuals, the result was in one sense more favourable to slaves collectively, than the very different state of modern colonial bondage. Slaves, as such, were less despised, and there was not so great a chasm as to moral feeling between them and the free community. The freeborn and instructed were probably better treated in slavery than others; and certainly were often set free by benevolent persons or by grateful masters. There was no prejudice against colour. In no two countries was the actual or legal state of slaves quite the same, and in some places and times the transition from slavery to unprivileged freedom was not very great. This may have been among the reasons which blinded thoughtful persons to the essential immorality of the system, however modified; yet it is wonderful that Aristotle should define a slave to be "a living tool" (a phrase which one might expect rather from an indignant abolitionist), and not draw any inference against the system as inhuman. Nay, he says, that nature by giving to the Greeks minds so superior, marked out slavery to the Greeks as the natural status for barbarians. Barbarian Romans could not assent to this doctrine; yet no voice in all antiquity uttered an indignant protest against slavery as such. In one country only of the ancient world—a part, or some reported, the whole of India—was slave-labour said to be unknown. A species of slavery, serving some of the purposes of *apprenticeship*, may have existed then, as recently, without being particularly noticed; so too may the practice of selling beautiful maidens to supply the harems of chieftains.

That Egypt, as well as India, should have dispensed with an ordinary slave class, was perhaps a natural result of the system of caste. Where a Pariah caste exists there is no want of men for any sort of rude or unpleasant labour, such as the Greeks believed none but slaves would undertake. The strength of domestic animals, aided by good roads, and, still more, modern machinery, relieves mankind from a thousand hard tasks, which the ancients exacted from the sinews of bondsmen. It is interesting here to observe by what process those oppressions are removed which weigh direfully on the lowest class of a civilized

community. Even when Solomon built his celebrated little temple (about as large as an English parish church), for which cedars were cut in Mount Lebanon by aid of the skilful Tyrians, it was believed that he used 70,000 bondsmen that bare burdens, and 80,000 hewers of timber. No mention is made of mules or ponies to carry down the loads; even asses might better have borne the toil, if it had been matter of simple carrying on a clear path. Egyptian pictures represent vast weights as drawn by the hands of men, who tug simultaneously when the conductor sings or waves his wand. Shall we suppose that brutes, though stronger, could not be trained to the co-operation requisite? Be this as it may, the strain fell on human sinews. Hewers of wood and drawers of water are phrases often conjoined to express the suffering of bondsmen from causes which in the present day involve no kind of distressing toil. With us, if enormous masses of granite are to be moved along a prepared road, not even bullocks or horses are often thought in place, but the engineer supersedes them by a steam-engine and one or more chains.

It is recorded that, when the Spaniards first learned the wealth of the American mines, their avarice pressed the unhappy natives so severely as to kill them in great numbers by the toil of ascending and descending the mines with heavy burdens. Of course, our most rudimental machinery immensely relieves or supersedes this. Yet, even to this day, a miner's life is so revolting to one who has not been, as it were, born and bred in it, that we cannot wonder at the ancient doubt whether any but a slave would work in a mine. For this purpose, criminals and prisoners of war were used by the Egyptians, which would seem to be the only form of slavery in that kingdom; and their labour is described as of the most galling cruelty. Whether the Indians had slaves in their mines, perhaps the Greeks were not well informed enough to ascertain. To labour in the dark, and under ground, may appear to most of us an unbearable infliction, but modern experience proves that, by aid of machinery, it may be so lightened as to be chosen voluntarily for gain. To a thoughtful Athenian or Roman it may have seemed doubtful whether civilization was not purchased too dearly; for, its maintenance was thought to require the permanent degradation of, perhaps, the majority of a nation into the unmanly and demoralizing state of bondage. But this was an exaggeration, true only of a brilliant but luxurious and unsound state of society. In the simpler and earlier order of things, the labours of the field and workshop were performed by freemen; but, with the development of the military

spirit, and owing to the small extent of a homogeneous native population, the freemen were drafted off for soldiers, and their place was supplied by captives of war. This undue predominance of military institutions, especially in the Roman world, engendered and fostered *field* slavery. Under the Emperors, through the comparative cessation of wars and piracy, the slave-trade became far less active, and imperial legislation, in many ways, regulated the state of slavery, so that very great cruelties became rarer, and some exceptional forms of cruelty impossible; nevertheless, so much the more was a general grinding degradation riveted upon masses of the country people. Such an idea as the common Rights of Men was nowhere sounded forth. What then was never heard is now an axiom, that all men, of every class, of every nation, of every complexion and climate, have some indefeasible rights, which neither conquest nor legislation, nor sale by parents can take away, Herein lies an enormous difference between the past and future. Whatever the origin of human races, we now recognize all men as morally homogeneous, and, in a just state, subject to a single code of law. On the contrary, antiquity admitted the principle of favoured races, even among freemen. This may deserve a few detailed remarks.

2. The first step upward from slavery is into serfdom. Indeed the former always tends to merge itself into the latter, when the slave trade is inactive. If slaves can only be had from the natural home supply, the value of the workman immediately rises. It becomes at once the interest of the master, and the duty of the law-giver, to secure the due increase of the working population, and the maintenance of their full strength. In a tranquil society, developed only from within, this would secure the transition to serfdom, which is complete when families of labourers are inseparable from an estate. But besides the slaves and serfs, many ancient nations, great and small, recognized ranks very diverse, subject even to different systems of law. A ruling race was sure to be a privileged order, whose liberties with the property or persons of others were ill repressed by law; and of the rest, some were able to rise, others not; some without political rights, but endowed with full social rights; others treated as foreigners. The principle may be seen alike in despotic Persia, in oligarchical Lacedæmon and Rome; in part also in democratic Athens. In some sense it was superseded by a system of caste, where that existed, which by no means implied necessarily a primitive difference of race. But where an empire was founded by conquest of numerous cities and tribes, diverse in race and language, the

distinction of race and race arose naturally, and was unblameable while the revolution was still recent. But meddling and jealous legislation endeavours to enact as a law for ever that which ought only to be a temporary caution of the executive government—a caution which the timidity of newly-seized power is never apt to neglect.

Since our renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1833, the natives of India are by law put on a perfect equality with the British born, and were declared admissible to every office of power except *two:* that of Governor-General, and Commander-in-Chief. Yet every one knows how little danger there is that the executive will be too eager to fill up its appointments with born Indians. If, for security against this imaginary danger, it were forbidden by express laws, this would forbid the barriers which separate the conquered from the conquering race to decay with time; and if to this were added a law against intermarriage, it would exhibit anew the mischievous principles of exclusion, which have so often sustained the galling iniquities of conquest. It is a fallacy to insist that because some races of men have greater talents for government than others—even if the fact be conceded—therefore they are entitled to award to themselves peculiar legal privileges and rights. A dominant race is never liable to think too highly of its subjects and too meanly of itself; the opposite error is uniformly that from which mankind has suffered. If the race which is in power has greater capacities, it will outstrip the rest in a fair field, without advantage from the law. Each individual has advantage already in the very name of his nation. But jealousies and pride in general prevailed. Most ancient empires split up societies into sharply distinguished orders of men; and as there was no sudden chasm, they were the less startled at the depth to which humanity was sunk in the unfortunate slave.

We have less reason for boasting than for mourning and contrition; for our practice is by no means commensurate with our theory; but European theory is now far more humane than that of the ancients. No high executive officer, no judge, no member of a high council, no authority in jurisprudence, will justify giving to the members of a ruling race any indefinite claims for service, facilities for oppression, or for evading rightful obligations. Whatever our difficulties in administering justice where a population is heterogeneous, we loudly and unshrinkingly avow our duty of abiding by and enforcing equal law. This, we may feel confident, will henceforth be the received principle of the modern

world, wherever European influence has once been dominant. Those powers who fail of enforcing their own principle will not the less successfully indoctrinate the subject population with it, perhaps to their own overthrow; for to the enthroning of the idea of Equal Rights to all races, events are sure to gravitate, when the rulers themselves enunciate it; nor can men in power recede from a principle which all the intellect of their own nation proclaims and glorifies. This is a great contrast between us and antiquity.

3. One may not pass by a topic closely akin to the last, although prudence forbids any great confidence of tone concerning a movement which is but in embryo. A cry arises, not only against depression of any Races, but also against the depression of one Sex. Every imperial power uses lavishly the lives of its young men as soldiers. Imperial England lavishes them also in emigration and in nautical dangers. Hence women have the toil of self-support, and, perhaps, the double toil of family support, thrown upon them; and in nearly every market it is discovered by them that their male rivals have unfair advantage. Hitherto women have suffered in silence, and with little interchange of thought. The novel fact is now, that in the freest countries the sex is the most loudly avowing discontent with its political depression. The movement already belongs to so many countries of Christendom, as to indicate that it is no transient phenomenon, but has deep causes. Partial success in so many places (as in the municipal franchise of England) is a promise that the movement must expand into greater force. Hitherto women of the higher ranks have often held executive power, directly as queens, or indirectly as mistresses of kings; or, again, as vice-regents, or representatives of barons or squires, their husbands; but women from the families of private citizens, who are the mass of every nation, have hitherto been utterly without political power, and rarely hold any subordinate public position, except the worst paid. In the American Union they have rebelled against this state of things for a full quarter of a century. The force of mind and grasp of knowledge which many women display in various spheres of thought, and not least in politics, are a fact which cannot count for nothing; so that one who shuns to be rash may yet forebode that the countries which allow a political vote to uneducated men will not long refuse it to the mass of educated women. In this prospect we must surely see a remarkable and hopeful contrast of the Future to the Past, when it is considered how large a part of the miseries of history have arisen from the

sensualities and cruelties of the male sex. Of course, we know that women, equally with men, can be corrupted by the possession of power, and can be exquisitely cruel; but this is rare, and somewhat abnormal. In general the sex is more tender-hearted and refined; and their collective exercise of power would forbid many a war, and be generally favourable to the side of humanity. But wishing here to speak rather of what is positively attained and recognizable by all minds, than of that which is only probable, I stay my pen from further remark on this topic.

4. There is a signal contrast of *external circumstances* between the older and newer state of things herein; that nearly every ancient civilized state looked out upon a barbarism immeasurable in mass and power; barbarism, on which it could never hope to make a permanent impression, and by which it might well fear to be swallowed up. Tartary was the mightiest realm of Barbaria. Gibbon has eloquently and instructively detailed the causes which made the Tartars pre-eminently familiar with the art of campaigning and guiding the marches of immense hosts. At no time known to us can the Tartar nations have been so low in the scale of civilization as numerous tribes whom we call savages. They always had an abundance of sheep and goats, and an extraordinary number of horses. They always had the art of mining for iron, and forging swords. Even the invention of steel was ascribed to northern people, otherwise backward in civilization. Wagons were brought to a high state of perfection, and over vast steppes of Tartary were able to traverse the open country without roads. This implies sufficiently good carpentry, and no lack of needful tools. The whole nation being moveable, it was hard to limit the magnitude of a Tartar army. The northern region could not be coveted by the southerners, and was practically unconquerable by them. It fell under their sway only when some Tartar dynasty conquered a southern people, and still retained the homage of its native realm. This has happened again and again with Tartar conquerors of China. At the earliest era of which we have notice of Persia from Greeks or Romans, it is manifest how powerful were the Tartar sovereigns who interfered in Persian domestic politics, when they did not affect direct conquest. This eternal conflict of the Tartars and the Persians is symbolized in the mythical Turân and Irân. In our mediæval period a Mogul dynasty seated itself in India, two successive dynasties of Turks, the Seljuks and the Ottomans, overwhelmed Asia Minor, and the existing dynasty of Persia is esteemed Tartar. Such is the peculiarity of *Asiatic* geography that it may seem

difficult to boast of civilization being ever there safe from barbarism. Nevertheless the Tartar power is virtually broken by the wonderful development of Russian empire. Mistress of the Amoor, and exercising control over Khiva, Russia shuts the Tartars in on both sides, and teaches them the supremacy of civilized force in ways so intelligible, that no future sovereign of Tartary (if all were united under one chief) could fancy himself the chief potentate on earth. Southern nations are no longer palsied by the idea that their northern invaders are innumerable. Geography discloses their weakness as well as their strength; even China has less to fear from Tartary than in ancient times.

But when we approach Western Asia and Europe, the contrast is far more marked and important. The Gauls, who temporarily overwhelmed Italy, and a century later, Greece, are described as an extremely rude people; so are the Scythians, whose cavalry was generally formidable to Persia and to Rome. Even Germany, Hungary, and the regions south of the Danube, often threatened overthrow to the civilization of their southern neighbours. Imperial Rome for several centuries stood at bay against the Germans, but could do little more; and when her best-informed men had begun to learn the intractable character and vast extent of the more or less closely related tribes, despair for civilization was apt to seize them. Even under the splendid military reign of Trajan, conqueror of Dacia, the historian Tacitus, relating a war in which Germans slew one another, earnestly hopes that the gods will increase this fratricidal spirit, since "the Fates of the Empire pressing us hard," there is no better prayer to offer. Apparently he regarded it as inevitable that the savage would break the barriers of the Roman provinces and sweep away all culture before him; which, indeed, is the very thing which happened, through the essential error of Roman policy and the disorganizations incident to mere military rule.

If a civilized power can entirely subdue a barbarian neighbour, it may, at considerable expense, perhaps civilize him; but when the nature of the country forbids this, it is unwise in the more civilized to admit a common frontier. Augustus aspired to conquer Germany, and actually pushed the frontier of the empire to the Elbe, but the insurrection under Arminius drove him back to the Rhine; then at last he learned that, through her swamps and forests and the wild nature of her people, Germany was not worth having, and that moderation is an imperial virtue. But Germany and the Empire were still conterminous, though the frontier was pushed back. The thing to be desired was to sustain

between them—as a sort of buffer that should break German assault—a half-civilized high-spirited people, intelligent enough to estimate Roman power, proud of alliance and honours, but aware of its own essential inferiority to the mighty Empire. Such a people, well armed and well supported by Roman resources, and taught all the arts of Roman war, would have been worth half-a-dozen armies; but to maintain in them a free spirit was essential to success, and this free spirit was dreaded by the Romans as contagious. Agricola planned to conquer Ireland (says Tacitus, who seemed to approve the policy) lest the knowledge that the Irish were free should make the Britons less contented in vassalage. It was because the Romans systematically broke the spirit of every nation whom they conquered, and allowed of none but imperial armies, that the neighbour barbarians found no resistance in the provinces, when (from whatever cause) imperial troops were not at hand. Thus little good resulted to the world's history from the Roman conquest of the ruder populations of Gaul, or from the complete conquest of Britain and of Dacia. Even wild animals (says the Caledonian orator in Tacitus), if you keep them caged up, forget their courage. The Britons and the Dacians were not merely tamed; they were cowed and unmanned. To have subdued all Germany in this way would have been useless. Charlemagne at length undertook the problem, which had been too hard for Trajan and Marcus Antoninus; but he was already as much German as Gaulish, and his chief strugg lewas against Saxony. The next great gain to civilization was in Poland—in Hungary—and in Southern Russia. When Herodotus wrote, the whole region to the north of the Black Sea acknowledged the sovereignty of roving equestrian tribes; only agriculturists of foreign origin were settled among them in Podolia and in the Crimea, who paid them tribute. These, it may be conjectured, were the nucleus of the Ostrogoths, who afterwards appeared in great strength in that region, and from it migrated into the Roman empire. Other tribes filled the vacuum, but became agriculturists like the Goths; so that the Russians easily retained them under settled institutions. To Peter the Great, in the last century, we owe the establishment of the whole of European Russia as industrious people under well organized Governments. Even Siberia, along the high-roads which have been reclaimed from the interminable forests, has a settled population attached to its own soil and proud of its name. In the course of the last thousand years, in Mongolia itself, the same process has gone on, of restricting the limits of the roving

tribes. In numbers they must now be ever inferior to the settled populations, and every development of the art of war throws them farther and farther behind. Much more is Europe secure from all alarms of the barbarians *from without*. Our dangers are solely when, by bad national institutions and selfish neglect of our-home population, we allow barbarism to grow up from within.

5. Another contrast to be observed between the ancients and the moderns lies in the *number* of great states which have simultaneously attained a robust civilization, no one of which is able to establish a universal dominion. This was for two or three centuries a cause of turbulent yet thriving progress in Greece: but all the Powers were there on too small a scale to be able to resist the great monarchies. No doubt in China, in India, in Persia, civilized states on a grand scale existed simultaneously; but each was a separate world. Possibly in China and in India at an early time there was a complex internal struggle similar to those of which we know in Greece and in Europe; but as far as is recorded, the history of each great country went on independently of the other countries; just as the Roman and the Persian Empires, though conterminous, were little affected in their internal concerns, each by the other. Ancient freedom was generally on a small scale. According to Aristotle, no Polity could consist of so many as a hundred thousand citizens. A state with only so many, may be conquered by foreign force, in spite of wise policy and the utmost bravery; but to a homogeneous people of twenty or thirty millions this can only happen through the gravest domestic errors. In ancient times the attempt at widespread conquest was unhappily more and more prosperous as time went on. A succession of great empires is displayed before us, Assyrian, Median, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, each larger than the preceding. The last swallowed up into itself the whole cultivation of the West and much of its barbarism: each empire in its turn was practically isolated, independent and wholly self-willed, aware of no earthly equal. A victim of Roman tyranny scarcely had a hope of escaping into the remote Persia, any more than into the barbarous populations which girt the empire north and south. Under despotism thus uncontrolled, all that was manly, and noble, all genius and all the highest art, with love of country, died away: the resources of civilization were crumbling and sensibly declining, even during the century which produced the very best Roman Emperors, Vespasian, Titus, Trajan, Hadrian and the two Antonines, before any Gothic inroad; hence when the barbarian triumphed, what

remained of the precious fabric fell as in a mass. But the rivalry of great powers in Europe effectively sustains all vital principles. Despotic and wilful as Russia may seem, she is really so anxious to secure the good opinion of Europe, that she does not disdain to subsidize foreign newspapers as her advocates. The dynasties collectively form a sort of European Commonwealth, which displays great jealousy if one make encroachments on another. Thus in their external action they encounter much criticism, remonstrance, or severer checks, and never think that they are irresponsible. Even as to their internal concerns, in which none will endure that another should interfere with diplomatic suggestion or advice, they cannot be exempt from the criticism of European literature. For in this greater Commonwealth there is in some sense a common literature. Modern languages more and more assume a form in which it becomes a determinate problem, and not an arduous one, to translate from one into the other. Through travellers, fixed embassies, and newspaper correspondents, an atmosphere of common knowledge is maintained, largely pervaded by a common sentiment, which, in proportion to the extent of education, inevitably affects the minds of public men. Moreover, in all the foremost states, and especially those in which despotism and bureaucracy predominate a severe cultivation is thought necessary to high office. A despotism like that of Turkey, recent Naples or recent Spain, which accounts education to be needless for its functionaries, is understood to be decaying, and is despised by the other powers. So large a moral and mental action of state on state was unknown to antiquity. In it we have a valuable guarantee for the maintenance and preservation of anything good which has been earned by civilized effort. In this connection we ought not to pass over the joint cultivation of science by all the leading nations of Christendom. The material sciences have emphatically become "sinews of war" as well as means of wealth: so that no imperial power can despise them. Each great country has its peculiar objects or facilities of study, and what is discovered in one is studied and must be learned by others. Science is notoriously cosmopolitan, and steadily aids the diffusion of common thought and common knowledge upon which common sentiment may reasonably establish itself.

6. We have not at all abandoned, scarcely have we relaxed, the rigid formalities by which imperial power seeks to elevate its high personages and maintain the steadiness of its ordinances. Nevertheless, with the stability of freedom under law, and the

growth of a scientific spirit, criticism of national institutions becomes more and more fundamental, in a country so free as England. Hence it is scarcely credible that we can long continue to be, what we are, a marked exception to the rest of Christendom in regard to the tenure of land. So far as we know of antiquity, conquest and conquest alone, unmodified by considerations of moral right, enacted the landed institutions. Out of unequal rights in the soil, more than out of any other single cause springs social depression to the excluded, and often a wide pauperism. In all Europe like causes produced like results, and nearly everywhere the actual cultivators of the soil were oppressed in various degrees ; but time has in most countries largely altered their position for the better. In less than a hundred years an immense change has passed over the Continent. In Italy, Switzerland, and Spain, things were never so bad as elsewhere, nor perhaps in Holland and parts of Germany. Norway retains a state of equality unbroken by conquest. France and Prussia, Hungary and Austria, Poland, Sweden, and Russia, have all endowed the peasantry with definite rights in the soil. Over the entire breath of the Continent the principle has now established itself, which permits of arguing politically, as all will argue morally, that land, water and air, are gifts of God to collective man, necessary to life, and therefore not natural possessions of individuals, except as actual cultivators. Small states of antiquity, sometimes in favour of their own citizens (generally at the expense of another nation), avowed a doctrine of each family having a right to land : even this was exceptional. No doctrine concerning land was propounded by moral philosophy ; no practical recognition of right in the cultivator, as such, was ever dreamed of by great imperial powers ; no dogma concerning it was put forth by a hierarchy, even after a Christian apostle had written, that the cry of those who sow and reap the fields, whose hire the powerful keep back by fraud, had entered the ears of the Lord of Hosts. When moral philosophy deals with the question of property in land, as it already deals with that of property in human bodies, the effect on all civilized nations will be immense ; and it is now pretty clear that such a development must come, and that shortly. The English Aristocracy will shriek and storm, as did the American slaveholders. A Marquis lately spoke of certain landed property as sacred, *because* it had been sanctioned by Parliament. Just so, it was pleaded that slaves were a sacred property because they had been bought, and because slave owners had passed laws to sanction it. Such arguments are good enough

for those who hold on by the law of might, but are contemptible to all who appeal to the law of right. They avail to show that it is prudent and equitable in the state to give an ample consideration whenever it dispossesses an individual; but never can establish that it is right to keep a whole nation of cultivators living from hand to mouth, without any fixed tenure of the soil, without roof or hearth of their own, or increased profit from increased diligence in culture. If England were in this matter at the head of Europe, existing inequalities might last for centuries longer.

But since she lingers ignominiously behind all the best known powers,—and while Ireland is her old scandal, the Scottish and English peasants have no better security whatever in their tenure, and are accidentally superior, chiefly through manufacturing and commercial wealth—since, moreover, the English colonies entirely renounce that doctrine of land which English landlords have set up,—finally, since in India the supreme power avows and enforces a widely different doctrine; the existing system is destined to a fundamental change. Precisely because those who claim reform feel towards the landlord class as tenderly as abolitionists feel towards slave-owners—making all allowance for their false position blamelessly inherited,—desiring to make the change as gentle to them as public justice will permit; therefore the more decisive and unhesitating is the appeal to moral principle in the political argument. In this resolute appeal to morals is involved a great contrast to the state of things possible in any ancient power, where slavery, serfdom, or caste existed. A claim of landholders which rests on the enactments of a Parliament from which all but landholders were systematically excluded for centuries, is signally destitute of moral weight. They who use it do not know that they are courting contempt. Unless they will undertake to establish that the claim is morally just, they effect nothing but to show that, having stepped into legislative power, they have used it for their private benefit; while, by excluding all but their own order, they betrayed their own consciousness of malversation. This, in part, relates to past generations, but, of course, the alleged rights are hereditary only. The evil deeds of predecessors have wrongfully enriched the present holders. In every case, it is by moral argument that they will have to be established, if established they can be, against the *consensus* of all Europe, the American Union, the other British colonies, and the Anglo-Indian empire.

7. Last, perhaps not least, of the general moral contrasts which

will make a signal difference between the ancients and the moderns, is the elementary education of the masses of every community. This education, no doubt, is as yet chiefly in the future. In the late American civil war the "mean whites" of the south were so ignorant that only by seeing and feeling the force of Northern armies could they learn that there was any greater power in the world than their own State. Germany and the American Union having declared for, and vigorously carried out, the education of the lowest people, it is morally certain that first England, next Austria and France, will follow. Partial interests, religious animosities, old prejudices, timid forebodings, will impede, but can only delay, the movement; though a century may be needed before it is strictly European. When it is established that there are to be no slaves, no serfs, no dangerous class of citizens, the problem cannot be worked out with vast masses of ignorant freemen. Hence general national education is one of the certainties of the future. It is the last contrast of modern and ancient times which it is expedient to treat in one article.

PART II.

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.

The power of rulers and the peculiarities of law are founded upon national opinion, and opinion assumes its most energetic form through *Religion*. In the history of Europe and Western Asia, we may recognize three periods, which for convenience may be entitled the Gentile, the Mohammedan, and the Christian. Politically regarded, Mohammedanism in order of time precedes Christianity; since it attained its full development very soon after its first promulgation, and bore its ripest fruits in the seventh and eighth centuries after the Christian era; while the great and permanent results of Christianity, as a religion influencing political events, unfolded themselves very slowly. Indeed from the time that Mohammedanism received its most decisive check from Charles Martel, we may count the steady onward action of Christian politics. This warrior, grandfather of the renowned Charlemagne, at the head of the Frankish nation, then the mainstay of external Christianity, repelled the invasion of the Mohammedan Moors of Spain in that extraordinary series of obstinate conflicts which are collectively denominated *the battle of Tours*. This was in the

year A.D. 732; and it marks the point of time after which the Arabian religion could advance no farther in Europe, while it is really the mere beginning of the wonderful agency by which Europe has been knit into a Christendom. Of course, in that which here follows, we are in no respect concerned with Theology, but solely with History. We do not treat now of what the Christian religion *ought* to have been, but what it *has been;* and as such, hierarchical power and wars for religion's sake are as much a part of it as brotherly love, tenderness, and humility.

The word *Gentile* is of course borrowed by us from Jewish use; but it expresses well enough what is here alluded to; the separate national religions of antiquity. The rudest tribes of men develop for themselves, out of a wild imagination and fitful observation of facts, many religious notions, which become inherent in a whole nation. The more advanced races, who had invented some means of depicting or describing thought, could give greater fixedness to a complex mythology, but did not much better attain truth. The age of criticism could not be born until after the age of invention. As nations became distinguished and consolidated, each for the most part had its special religion. All may have had a nucleus of important truth, but nearly all were so encrusted with fanciful fable, and gratuitous additions of error, that the truth was buried in falsehood. Most of them were polytheistic.

Of all the early religions known to us, that of the Persians was noblest, that of the Egyptians basest; yet the Egyptian system seems to have promoted practical morality better than the religions of Greece, of Lydia, or of Babylon. Learned symbolism had predominated in Egypt, and under gross exterior forms nobler and deeper truth was sometimes taught, of which the vulgar had no understanding. It would seem that the Persians, in their conquest of Egypt, treated its religion with peculiar rudeness, apparently from despising and resisting the presentation of the Most High in the form of beasts, and the reverence for sacred animals. The Persians also on two occasions appear as religious persecutors; once on the occasion afterwards celebrated as the Magophonia, or slaughter of the Magi; again, on the elevation of a Persian dynasty, the Sassanidæ, on the ruins of the Parthian empire. But probably each was a political contest: the former, that by which Darius, son of Hystaspes, ejected the Magian usurper of the Persian throne, who pretended to be a brother of Cambyses; the latter, as contingent on the change of dynasty, is comparable to the ejection of Presbyterian clergy on the restoration of our Charles II.

One might think that the comparative purity of the Persian religion tended to the persecution of baser religions; yet it does not appear that the Persians ordinarily interfered with the religions of the subject nations. Impure ceremonies, under the name and patronage of religion, and all sorts of polytheistic sacrifices or mummery, went on unchecked at Babylon, Lydia, and Syria, during the rule of the greatest Persian monarchs.

Perhaps then no exception needs to be made in the case of Persia, but we may lay down absolutely, that in antiquity *toleration of national religions* was the general rule. In that simple-hearted and genial writer, Herodotus, we see distinctly how the sincerely religious men among the ancients felt and judged. A Greek who believed that his principal gods had occasionally metamorphosed themselves into a bull, a horse, or a bear, felt little disposed to scorn Egyptian notions, however inconvenient and expensive he might deem some of their practices. Deeply marked as were the varieties of national religions, they but little impeded national sympathies and easy mutual toleration. He who admitted in his Pantheon twelve principal deities and fifty minor or local ones, found it easy to believe, that in other countries there might be other tutelary powers, who had been left out in his enumeration. As all these religions were ceremonial and eminently external, obtruding their processions, or dances, or sacrifices in the public streets, markets, or fields, each in turn needed toleration, which by a tacit compact was in general mutually granted to each religion on its own soil.

According to Aristotle, Politics is a science superior to Religion, because the politician has to decide what gods shall be worshipped, and with what ceremonies. Evidently the only *religion* of which he is thinking is an external *cultus;* he does not refer to private opinion or indoors instruction. The Roman senate did not imagine that its sanction was needed for the worship of Serapis in Egypt; but it was only by a decree of the senate that a temple for the worship of Serapis could be built in Rome. The Greeks thought it natural and reasonable that Dionysius or Bacchus should be honoured among Asiatics by night revels and unbridled excitement; but no Greek state was pleased by the introduction of Bacchic rites. In some it was violently resisted, as afterwards in Rome; and individuals who initiated Greeks into the Asiatic mysteries of the mighty Mother and Dionysus were much despised in Athens: yet Athenians were as susceptible of fanatical frenzy, if politics and religion combined, as any mob of London or Edinburgh. Each religion was thought good, and in some sense

true, on its own soil, to which special gods were assigned, who best knew how they liked to be worshipped. Proselytism was practically disavowed. Different forms of worship were thought best for different peoples. Mutual repugnance there was little or none, but a great deal of mutual credulity.

Evidently this kind of toleration by no means gave scope for free enquiry or promoted progressive amendment. It was a toleration of national religions, of hereditary creeds, not of personal convictions; nor could a thoughtful man notoriously shun the national worship, or fundamentally disown its rightfulness, without incurring public odium; indeed, if any political motive concurred against him, he encountered the danger of banishment. Such certainly was the case at Athens; but Colonel Mure thinks that Athens was more fanatical than other States of Greece. Perhaps the better acquainted a populace was with the poetical legends, and the more elegant its religious festivals, the greater the animosity against one who cavilled at them. But, in fact, as the religion of those times was essentially public and united with all public affairs, the philosophic improver of his country's creed seemed to be a revolutionist. A Jew who desired to proselytize others and condemned all the worship of Gentiles, might be accounted an overturner of established order; if he was tolerated, it was oftener from contempt of his feebleness than from honouring his love of truth.

As time went on, all the more thoughtful and educated citizens saw through the errors of mythology, but it was thought to be the part of a good citizen to conform to the established ceremonies. Many wild stories concerning the gods admitted of a mystical interpretation; so that, on the whole, the most patriotic and virtuous men outwardly followed the national religion without any self-reproof for hypocrisy. Thus in the Gentile world at large there was no idea of such a thing as choosing and loving a religion "for truth's sake," nor was a religious conscience sufficiently alive to make men in general understand what could be *meant* by "conscientious opposition" to an established religion; any more than Catholic Christians of the 10th century could understand it. But with this temperament, ready to persecute any eccentric individual, a crusade against another nation from mere religious sentiment was probably impossible. The wars among the Greeks called Sacred were really wars for the dominion of a temple, for territory, or for power; and the quarrels of Egyptian dioceses about sacred animals can hardly have had any other purpose than protection of the established ceremony on its own area.

Thus the whole genius of Gentile religion was to disintegrate mankind. Conquest and empire to a certain extent united them, but the prevalent theories of Religion kept them apart. Men were assumed to be of many origins, each stock springing primitively out of its own soil, with peculiar local gods, and a corresponding difference of worship, even when those gods were believed to be all subject to one greater God, Ruler of Heaven and Earth. The Persian creed, which is ostensibly monotheistic, represents Ormuzd (Aoramazda, *quasi* "aura megista,"? the Greatest Spirit) as Supreme; yet the inscriptions of Darius and Xerxes habitually recognize "the domestic divinities," and in the next reign the mention of a divinity Mithra remarkably steps in, as a sort of adjunct to Ormuzd. The Persian, though it can hardly be called a local, was certainly a national creed; and so was that of the Hebrews eminently, by its elaborate ceremonies and its local worship. In some cases it was believed that worship offered by a stranger would be *unlawful* and wholly unacceptable to the god. To all "mysteries" a solemn initiation was needful, and perhaps an oath of secrecy. The Roman patricians, from State-motives, fostered the belief—which the plebeians did not venture flatly to oppose—that it would be impious for a man of plebeian origin to celebrate patrician ceremonies. On this plea they long resisted inter-marriage with the plebeians, and longer still kept for themselves the greater offices of state, especially the most honourable and lucrative of the priesthoods.

As time went on, family religion and local rites evidently became more complex. In Greece, as we positively know, hero-worship arose *after* the age of Homer, and established itself locally. Some such development must in long time have taken place in Egypt, where, in spite of a remarkably centralized system, with a homogeneous population and a thoroughly organized priesthood, each diocese had its peculiar sacrifices and different sets of sacred animals.

The care bestowed by the ancients on keeping up the distinctness of local worships had probably a political object. Like our laws of settlement, it helped to sustain the relation of each man to his own parish or hundred. On the same principle that cultivators are bound to the soil, each citizen was bound to his clan, therefore also to the special religion of his clan. Hence issued the notion, or indeed the axiom, that a man is born to his religion, and has no right to abandon the creed and worship of his fathers, not even if he were shocked by cruelties or immoralities involved in it; for these received special interpretation in most cases.

Yet it must be added, that cruelties were generally exploded, as the conscience of nations ripened; and many immoralities vanished, or went into the shade, under foreign censure or ridicule.

Still, look at it, if you will, from its best side, undeniably Gentile religion no longer deserved to live, on its existing basis. By implanting the belief that the differences of nations were inherent, that their primitive gods and origin were different, it gave excuse to ambition, selfishness, and avarice; and made war against a strange people to seem as natural and venial as against wild animals. In the opinion of Xenophon, a diligent hearer of Socrates, no injuries from barbarians were needed to justify Greeks in invading and plundering them. Even Aristotle, in maintaining that barbarians were made by nature to be slaves to the Greeks, seems to give philosophic authority to the righteousness of enslaving them, without any provocation by injury on their part. War against oath and treaty was in universal estimate a sin; but a Greek who had *not* sworn to respect the life and property of an innocent stranger, retained his natural right of attacking him when convenient. To us it seems clear, that the rights of men depend, not on the history of their origin in distant ages, but on their actual present nature—their *sensitiveness* to pain, their capacity of enjoyment, their ability to fulfil common duty and become blended with us in a civil community.

We may THEREFORE easily be too severe upon Islam for its wars of proselytism. When the Arabian prophet saw polytheistic worship wedded to immoralities of various type, it was a nobler impulse in him to wage war against Polytheism, believing that with it he should exterminate impurity and cruelty, than in Alexander the Macedonian to make war upon Persia, in order that he himself might become Lord of Asia. Mohammed was wholly illiterate, yet by aid of Jews at his side he must have been acquainted with Hebrew history in outline. He can hardly have been ignorant that the Jewish creed commanded the Hebrews to slay the seven nations of Canaan because of their impurities, sparing neither sex nor age, and that the book of Deuteronomy—the most spiritual part of the Pentateuch—treats war against foreigners who are *not* of the devoted seven nations as natural and legitimate. Enlightened Mussulmans claim that their prophet made no wars but in defence of those whom it was his duty to protect. Be this as it may, the actual history of Mohammedanism, from first to last, exhibits civil powers, whose

main *reason for existing* was (in their consciousness) that they might propagate a religious creed—the doctrine of God's Unity. Especially in the fervour of new converts is this manifest. A negro nation in Africa, which in its paganism was just and kindly to strangers, unambitious and humble, while blinded by many foolish superstitions, no sooner embraces the Mussulman faith than it becomes haughty and menacing to its pagan neighbours, and generally displays an energy, bravery, and talent before unsuspected, with a vast increase of ambition and ferocity. Since the creed of Islâm is too short to be mistaken or corrupted, we can hardly doubt that the energies now called out by it in an uneducated African tribe may fairly represent to us its original effect on the uneducated comrades of the prophet himself. Cultivation, after several generations, may naturally have softened and improved the theory of those who expounded the creed; but perhaps we shall err in accepting their doctrine as the primitive and genuine interpretation. Necessarily there is a milder and a sterner school in every widespread religion. Wider knowledge, deeper thought, more peaceful times, enlarge charity and lessen the harshness of zeal. Yet, on the whole, all Mussulman dynasties have a marvellous family likeness, with marked contrasts to everything that preceded them. Only one form of government seems to be admissible, that of military sovereignty; yet the sovereign is in theory the minister of religion, and derives his power from it.

Although every Mussulman State must be called ecclesiastical, it is by no means hierarchical, nor even sacerdotal. Great respect has always been yielded to men of repute for holiness or learning, especially for religious learning—knowledge of the Korân and its traditional interpretations—knowledge of the reported conversations or deeds of the Prophet and his immediate followers. Nevertheless learned men or reputed saints have never formed an *order* in the State. The highest ecclesiastic in Turkey, the Sheikh el Islâm, can temporarily arrest and delay the completion of an imperial act, by refusing his assent, if he deem it to be forbidden by religion; but he is liable to be removed from office by the Sultan, as we saw during the Crimean war, when the Sultan found it politic to yield to the demands of his Western allies in favour of Christian subjects. Only by aid of the fervid zeal of the multitude could the 'Ulema, or learned men, venture to resist the sovereign. As in imperial Rome the emperor himself was at the same time Chief Pontiff, so has an Arab khalif or a Turkish sultan always been eminently the Head of their Faith, the Prince

of Believers. Among the Romans, whose politics were ostentatiously religious, the religion was a mere *form*, which added ceremony and augustness to every procedure, but was absolutely void of vital power. But in every Mussulman State the religion infuses an active force into the government, which must emphatically profess to be religious, publicly and privately. Every Mussulman, not excluding the prince, listens to the call of the crier from the mosque, and prostrates himself in prayer, wherever he may be; and this form of religion undoubtedly keeps up a universal zeal for the creed. "Dien! dien!" (the creed, the creed) is the cry which animates a fanatical mob to any deeds of violence, and has often led wild horsemen to victory. Some nations seem constitutionally less susceptible of religious excitement than others. The Persians proper are not so earnest as the Turks, and are both less honest and less fanatical; yet, on the whole, there is very little apparent difference between any two Mohammedan governments, whether Arab, Moor, Turk, Mogul, or even Bornou and Begharmi. The common tendency of all to trust in cavalry rather than infantry is certainly curious. The same religion gives rise both to an intense absoluteness of sovereignty and to an almost democratic equality of persons. Possibly this may be the result of its essentially military complexion. In a camp of warriors, united by religion and the hope of conquest, the social feeling is that of comrades and equals: but this is tempered by the necessity of obedience to the military chief, in whom is vested an absolute authority over the fortunes and lives of his fellows. In spite of the arbitrary power of all Mohammedan potentates, whether their authority be supreme or delegated, there reigns through the nation at large a fraternising and in some sense a levelling spirit. The religion is intensely opposed to aristocratic sentiment. The meanest believer in God and Mohammed judges himself to be fit company for princes, and applies his doctrine impartially. No sooner does a slave embrace the Mussulman faith than his master recognizes him as a brother. Nothing is commoner than to enfranchise such a slave, nor does anyone wonder, if he be adopted by the master as son-in-law and heir. Nor do the poor feel themselves humiliated by poverty. Everyone who thinks that he has failed of justice from the local judge, regards it as the obvious duty of the supreme prince to hear his appeal. Persians are less bold of spirit than Turks; yet a Persian in Teherân has been known to stop and accost the king, appeal to him for justice, and threaten him with God's judgment at the last day if it be refused. Such a thing astonishes

Europeans, but passes without resentment from Mussulmans. As the profession of the creed of Islâm is that which alone gives glory to nations, and is supposed to draw after it worldly supremacy, the prince has no authority independent of his religion; and learned men cannot say to a poor Mussulman, as here we say to a poor Christian, "You must do homage to the prince in his character of worldly potentate, and not only as to a religious leader and fellow-believer."

It belongs to military organisation that each superior officer in turn is despotic over his inferiors. The necessity for prompt obedience in actual war seldom admits of appeal to a higher authority, so as to arrest immediate execution; and we know among ourselves, how a despotism which is only really necessary in the face of an enemy is maintained during years of profound peace and in the heart of our own people. This will perhaps explain the fact, that a perpetual delegation of despotism is the Mussulman form of civil government. Hence the same sad result as in the Roman empire. An emperor or sultan, an Aurelius or a Solyman, might issue edicts of admirable justice; but the subjects of the empire had no means of securing that the viceroys and lieutenants and serjeants should observe them. In our Indian administration we are, or ought to be, painfully aware of this inherent difficulty of a despotic rule.

As regards foreign nations, the Moslem wars were tempered by the principle of proselytism, unknown to the Gentile States. If Chaldæan horsemen or Roman infantry laid prostrate a people's liberties, the conquered had nothing left but to crouch and suffer: but if Saracens or Moors were their invaders, they had but to adopt the new religion, and at once become the equals of their conquerors, and valued members of the ruling body. This has been a great source of strength to Islâm in its onward movements. Nor is it to be supposed that these conversions were merely hypocritical or made with great difficulty. Three great and victorious Tartar nations voluntarily put off their paganism to adopt the religion of the Mohammedans whom they had vanquished; much as did the Goths adopt Christianity, and the Normans succour the Papacy. It is easy to conceive how an enthusiastic contagion often impelled numbers of a conquered people to do the same.

Thus the old barrier between nations, which local institutions and local religions had set up, was effectually levelled. Tribes of most diverse blood and tendencies coalesced, and often assumed so uniform a genius as surprises the distant beholder. In the

first splendid centuries of the Mohammedan outburst it would seem that in Syria and Asia Minor various masses of population which were ostensibly Christian must have surrendered themselves to the Arabian religion; so perhaps did they in Roumelia, after the conquest of Constantinople. But the Christianity of these nations was of a most doubtful kind. After the Roman empire became Christian, and the old religions were forbidden, an external Christianity was superinduced under a form which to Mussulmans seemed polytheistic. One may infer, that those Christians who remained firm, fled to the mountainous regions; for it is in these places, more secure from an enemy who excelled in cavalry, that the Nestorian, the Chaldæan, and the Syrian Christians retained existence and transmitted their faith. In Persia the great majority of the people became converts of Islâm; it is not clear whether they ought to be called polytheists: that they were fireworshippers is an ignorant slander. The Jews and many of the Christians, on whom Mohammed looked more mildly, as "the people of the book" and not idolaters, have stubbornly refused conversion. The Jews, being nowhere an independent State, are less important and hardly a political fact; but Islâm and Christianity are now the two great powers that divide the world, each despairing to convert the other. Each now makes converts of barbarians only; but the Moslem converts are over the breadth of Africa, and may become a great consolidated power, if their barbarism abate; the Christian converts are scattered, chiefly over oceanic isles, and nowhere assume political importance.

To the Mohammedans the Korân, as the Pentateuch to the Hebrews, is not only the standard of moral instruction, but the fountain of political law. So submissive are the Turks to its letter, that they will neither engrave nor paint any living form. In the Hebrew decalogue also, a precept is worded, "Thou shalt not *make* to thyself any graven image, nor the likeness of any [living] thing in heaven or earth." The Persians do not at all object to painting the human face, but the Ottomans esteem it to be a rivalry of creative power, as well as tending to idolatry. But there is no difference as to acknowledging the Korân as the rule of political institutions. Laws concerning land, concerning movable property, concerning women, marriage, dowries, divorce; concerning war and slavery, are all drawn from the Korân.

It is interesting to know that the Indian Moslems greatly discourage polygamy, and endeavour to exterminate it among themselves by stringent covenants in marriage settlements. Yet with the fact before them, that their prophet himself was a

polygamist, it is impossible for their religion to forbid polygamy to their chief men. Many learned doctors have inculcated it as a *duty*, on all men rich enough to support several families, to take more wives than one, up to the standard number *four;* which, for political or other reasons, Mohammed was by special dispensation allowed to exceed. No single cause seems so fertile of mischief to Mussulman dynasties. The sultans, pashas, chieftains in every country of Asia or Africa are uniformly polygamists, and no one cares to enquire whether their ladies are wives or concubines. *None of the children are neglected or despised;* none of the sons are disqualified from succeeding to the father's position. The Turkish Sultan is said *never* to take a legitimate wife; such is the rule of the Court; nay, it has been remarked that every sultan is open to the reproach, "Thou son of a slave;" his mother's status being slavery. When we remember that the Hebrew law permitted polygamy, yet the Jewish nation in long time broke away from the unnatural practice, we might have expected the same thing from Moslems. Does the cause of its persistence lie in the example of the prophet? But Abraham also and Jacob were polygamists. Or shall we say, that the proclivity of despotic princes to this practice is the cardinal matter, and the example of the prophet their mere excuse; and that if the Hebrews had continued to live under despotism, polygamy would have perpetuated itself with them also? It may be so; but whatever is the cause of Mussulman polygamy, the fact appears to be peculiarly deadly in this religion. Every princely family tends to decay by self-exhaustion; besides, the rivalry and animosity of half-brothers tears great houses asunder, to the ruin of aristocracy. Each of the wives is busy to get for her own children as large a share of the paternal fortune as intrigue and coaxing can secure; many a wife contrives to keep a secret hoard unknown to her husband, partly in self-protection, partly to bestow on her children. It seems but incident to human nature, that in proportion to the greatness of the stake for which rival wives contend, should be the bitterness of the contest. We know how often the first act of a king's accession is to slay his half-brothers. What can be more fatal to royalty and to aristocracy than such an institution? We see, as it were, a type of the cruelty induced in the tale of Abraham's two wives. No sooner is Isaac born than Sarah is enraged against Ishmael, and drives him away with his mother to perish in the desert. Besides, the polygamy draws after it not only a jealous separation of the sexes which is hurtful to both, but also (it cannot be doubted) a great contempt of women. The

learned Mr. Lane informs us, that a favourite topic of discourse among Mussulman doctors is, the weakness and wickedness of the female sex.

Yet Mussulman nations are not wholly alike. Some, as the Turks, have much virtue among themselves, and great probity in the observance of all public treaties, however liable to be ferocious (as indeed, the English have shown themselves) when they suspect that insurrection is meditated by a subject people. Among the Turks, as among many Indian Mussulmans, there is nothing to forbid poor men of undistinguished families from rising into the highest posts of state. There is no division of patricians and plebeians. The consciousness of dignity manifested by a poor Turk is often ludicrous to a European; and though we see that the empire is wasting, and probably must waste, through the ignorance of sultans reared in a seraglio, and the ruinous process by which the pashas are appointed, still it would seem that the government of Persia, which inherits the despotic principles of the old Gentile monarchies, is more destructive to the virtues and happiness of the Persians than are the more purely Mussulman principles to the Ottomans. Persia differs from the other Mohammedan kingdoms, not only in belonging to the sect of Shi-ites (which reject the traditions), but in never having surrendered her political system so entirely to the Arabian principles. From neither people is any regeneration of Islâm to be hoped. The Arabs have tried religious reform, and have produced only the fanatical sect of Wahabis. It remains an interesting problem, whether from the cultivated Mussulmans of India we can hope any diffusion of humane, civilizing, and exalting principles into this widespread religion, which shows no tendency to vanish away. Of Mussulmans, still more truly than of Roman Catholics, it may be said, that they have no national patriotism so strong as their religious bond. Through their meetings as pilgrims in Mecca, they have a common contact of great influence; and no one can foresee what power the companies of more enlightened pilgrims may some day put forth, from Mecca as the centre, to modify the whole world of Islâm.

Under Mohammedanism, we have seen, the Church and the State are one, and religion is the paramount influence; yet there is no hierarchy. Under Christianity one might have expected religion to be still more the paramount influence. The Apostle Paul pointedly declares, "Our citizenship (*πολιτεία*) is in heaven:" but no Christian nation has ever surrendered itself so unreservedly to its religion as the Mussulmans have done. Moreover, since a

hierarchy, powerful in union and in the subjection of the laity, already existed in the Christian Church when Constantine, though remaining unbaptized, became its patron, the whole aspect of things was totally different from that which confronted Mohammed and the Khalifs. After the overthrow of the Roman empire in the West by the rude German invaders, the first remarkable phenomenon which meets us is, that over many countries a single religious organization is spread, which, possessing far more literary knowledge than any of the actual rulers, struggles everywhere to control the military and civil power. Although in various parts the bishops and abbots gradually became actual princes, at the head of no inconsiderable force of warriors, yet the Church as a whole was an *un*armed power, confronting armed men by moral influences, by superstition, by craft and intrigue. In a barbarous stage of human nature, craft and wisdom generally coexist, nor can we expect, even in a more advanced stage, to see them disentangled in a corporation. We shall generally be right in wishing success to the men of cunning, rather than to men of violence. The former, in fact, wield the best moral powers which a rude age possesses; and however alloyed with evil their ascendency may be, it has in it the elements of improvement. In Mohammedanism, as has been stated, the power of the ecclesiastic has never sufficed to curb or withstand that of the military leader, while in modern Europe the opposite phenomenon is the most characteristic feature for a thousand years together. It is not exactly as in the ancient monarchies of Egypt, and probably of Assyria, where a priestly caste stood side by side with the military on the same area, and competed in authority. In mediæval Europe we have a multiplicity of martial nations with independent chiefs, while a firmly united ecclesiastical system acts through and by them all. The centralization of church-authority in Rome was already far advanced, when civil government was in chaos, and military chieftains numerous.

Much of the actual progress of events was, no doubt, due to the position of Charlemagne and his predecessors, who, having been only Mayors of the Palace to the French king, usurped the royal power, and at length obtained a sanction for it from Rome and the Pope; two names, of which each singly had weight with vulgar ears. The great Charles himself was crowned in Rome with the iron crown of the Lombards by the hand of the Holy Father; and the secure possession of so large a part of Italy as the temporal dominion of the Papal See, down to recent days, was due to the favour and gift of Charlemagne, who, it seems,

was imposed on by a forged grant from Constantine. Thus in Europe the spiritual power gained a firm, material, and independent basis in the south, while it was preaching, teaching, or intriguing in the north. If national churches, such as the Reformation set up, subject to the control of princes, had gained existence four or five centuries earlier, the Church would everywhere have become the mere tool of the Crown; and whatever difference of opinion there may be, whether it is a change for the better that the Protestant hierarchy has been made subservient to the State, it cannot reasonably be doubted that it would have been worse at an earlier period. A king of England or of France, or an emperor of Germany, who fell into conflict with one of his bishops, soon found, to his inconvenience, that the bishop was countenanced by the Pope, and the Pope's name carried with it the support of all the ecclesiastics everywhere, and that their influence brought against him the feelings or even the weapons of many a baron and duke, sometimes of a neighbouring king. Thus, although the spiritual power was in each separate State much weaker than the military, yet, since the former was fixed in a centre generally out of reach, and occupied exclusively by the spiritual potentate, neither of the two combatants could annihilate the other's agency or appropriate his resources. This is the grand peculiarity of the Middle Ages, distinguishing that period alike from Islâm and from the earlier Gentile system.

One immediate and marked result of the early fixed independence of the Church, was the giving honour to civil as opposed to military employment, and in no small degree, honour to industry. Under ancient Rome, we know, Cicero was the first man who rose to the highest power by the arts of a civilian; in Greece, though Athens was literary, feats of arms and skill as an army-leader were the accomplishments most frequently looked for in influential statesmen; and we must reasonably believe the same to be true of every warlike State of antiquity; but the literary qualifications of churchmen, in an age which looked back to superior cultivation, marked them out as the only persons qualified as compilers of codes, interpreters of law, ambassadors in delicate disputes, chancellors of a kingdom; so that in many cases ecclesiastics of higher or lower grades occupied the most important offices of administration, whatever their original rank in life. The majority of them came from the middle ranks, a few eminent men from the lowest. The Church has been called the "ladder for low-born men" in those times. The considerable

infusion which it received of the high-born tended alike to give dignity of manner to ecclesiastics, and to increase their respect with the nobles. In so far it was a democratic influence tempering the evil tendencies of selfish hereditary power.

Against civil war, when it had no ecclesiastical grounds, we may be sure that the ecclesiastical power exerted itself, but it is very hard to make out that the general influence of the clergy was conducive to peace; indeed, looking at European history broadly, war seems to have been as ordinary as among the old Gentile powers. We know that the clergy were the most active promoters of crusades against Saracens and Turks, and against heretical dukes and kings. We know also that they systematically promoted insurrection of subjects against their native prince, not only for heresy, but for minor ecclesiastical quarrels; and that when the Order of Jesuits arose, and taught the doctrine of assassinating kings for Church reasons, the Popes stood firm and were the last to abandon the Order, after it had incurred universal hatred. In our own day we have recently seen them revive the Order, which boasts of its past, and alike in Mexico, Spain, Italy, France, and Germany we behold the same influences vehemently exerted on the side of war for the Church. Against this we have to set partial and occasional efforts in distant times to promote 'sacred truces,' or to arbitrate against threatened war. When one tries to count up or discover such cases, they are indeed very few and small as a pacific influence, and utterly inadequate to counterbalance the desolating wars which Papal ambition has promoted or caused. The Thirty Years' War of Germany alone seems to outweigh all the alleged influence of Christian ecclesiastics for peace in 1500 years.

In spite of Protestantism, which has seemed to subject the Church to the State, a phenomenon continues to present itself in all Europe, which was wholly unknown to the ancient Gentile world, and also to the Mohammedans,—*a permanent contest of the Church against the State.* Among Protestants it for a long time took the form of Dissent or Nonconformity. In particular our English and Scotch Dissenters bore an aspect towards the State analogous to that of Christians before Constantine; so indeed did the Catholics in Ireland. But ever since 1832, when Nonconformists were necessarily in considerable number admitted into Parliament, the Church by law established has become jealous and disdainful of law, and seeks to be independent of it; so that we see the two antagonistic influences, Church and State, acting almost as freely here as in Catholic countries. If the Churches

cared solely or chiefly for moral interests, their independent activity would be matter for sincere rejoicing. In the American Union, where no religious sect is favoured, the State appears to know nothing whatever of their proceedings. This may suggest that our present condition is one of mere transition. Free churches, it is to be hoped, will not always limit their views as hitherto, nor always be in variance with one another, nor with the impartial thought outside of them.

While it is impossible to admire the intrigues of Rome, or not to deplore the Crusades, yet it must not be overlooked that these have in large part cemented Europe into a single diplomatic commonwealth, of which in ancient times we see a type on a small scale in the contrast of Greece to Barbaria; that is to all the world beside. To be comrades in a long series of wars, from a sincere common sentiment, however fanatical, must in itself greatly break down national barriers. The first crusade to avenge the Holy Sepulchre was primarily stirred up by wild fanaticism; but later crusades were probably fostered by policy. The See of Rome had not forgotten, if Europe had, how deadly and dangerous a war Charles Martel and the Franks had to wage against the Moors from Spain. A new and redoubtable nation, the Seljuk Turks, had appeared on the confines of Europe as a fresh champion of the Mohammedan creed, not less formidable than the Saracens. It is not attributing too much foresight or sagacious policy to the court of Rome, to believe that they wished to stop and put down the Turkish power before it should come near. However this may be, such was the result: the might of the house of Seljuk was crippled on the plains of Palestine, and did not ultimately reach Europe. Somewhat later the armies of Jenghiz Khan advanced into Europe, ravaging it as they advanced. After they had defeated and slain the Duke of Silesia in a terrible battle, the severity of which made them recede, the Pope stepped forward, as the representative of collective Europe. He first endeavoured to stir up all the powers to oppose them, but found that no hearty alliance was possible, after the enemy had actually retired. In fact, ignorance of geography struck all with panic: no one knew whence the enemy had come, or whither he was gone. Nothing further could be done but to send Papal embassies to the remotest part of Tartary, of which to us the chief interest is, to observe how unhesitatingly the Pope announces himself as the mouthpiece and central power of Europe. A large portion of Christendom, which disowned the religious headship of Rome, was afterwards subdued by the Ottomans or Osmânlies, but

Romish Christendom was scarcely touched by them; their conquest of Hungary was partial and transient: Poland, Germany, and Hungary, even during the schism of the Reformation, saved Papal Europe from the Ottomans, as the Franks had saved it from the Moors. On the whole it seems probable that to the Roman Church we are largely indebted for that united sentiment and action of European nations, without which Mohammedan invasion could hardly have been repelled. A new conquest would in any case have been disastrous; but when we see in every Moslem country polygamy, military tyranny, stagnation and decay, and the feeble state of the co-existing Christian races, no price may seem too great to have paid for our escape. Each successive development in its earlier movement brings from its nobler elements advantages that are not to be overlooked; but in the later stages all its weaknesses and imperfections grow up to maturity; so that those who have, as it were, to drink the dregs of the vessel, find them merely bitter or poisonous.

With the Reformation of Religion in Europe a new era opens. A great cleft was made in the ecclesiastical power: in all the Protestant countries except Scotland the church fell at once into dependence on the State, as in old Rome. It remains to ask, Is there nothing new introduced by Protestantism, through which we are put in contrast to ancient times?

Undoubtedly an eminently important principle, destined to influence the world to remote ages, has for the first time been forced forward into public law by the instrumentality of Protestantism;—and that is, *the right of individual conscience.* This, as I have said, was scarcely imagined by antiquity. It was practically disowned by Jew and Egyptian, Greek and Roman. It obtained very partial admission with Mohammedans, and was utterly denied by Romish divinity and by the practice of the Catholic States. Nay, it was long refused and deprecated by leading reformers,—men who above all others needed toleration themselves. Catholic princes of Transylvania were the earliest to grant toleration to deniers of the Trinity: England in the eighteenth century persecuted some of them to death. Evidently in no country have the rights of conscience been established by influence of pure reasoning or of pure Christianity: but the details are sufficiently important to enlarge upon.

Many eminent men, whose position would naturally have made them zealous for the rights of conscience, have nevertheless, shrunk from avowing those rights, without qualifications which reduce them to a nullity. Not merely Romanists, nor merely

Protestants born, but those who have actually seceded from the one side to the other have deprecated toleration, and not only when they have been in the ascendant, but some of them even when subjected to the caprices and cruelties of power, and while accounting the Bible to be the standard of truth. Would it not then seem that toleration cannot be so clear as we think in the Bible? The explanation is perhaps very simple. The doctrine of Toleration is perfectly clear in the New Testament; but the contrary principle is equally clear in the Old Testament; in which persecution of the most unflinching kind is commanded, described, and glorified. The men who looked on *the whole book* as of equal authority and equally addressed to themselves, would necessarily be embarrassed by the contrariety; and it is easy to see in the Scriptural quotations made by the Puritans when in their fiercest mood, that the Old Testament was the real stronghold of this doctrine. Those who wished to disentangle themselves from this part of Scripture feared to lose authority for National Religion or Sabbatical observances; yet as no one dreamed of accepting the Levitical law, each drew a line of his own to mark off *how much* of the Old Testament was obligatory; hence the Bible failed to be an arbiter in the important strife. In point of fact, the battle was fought out terribly with weapons of war, not with argument.

That religious wars were unknown to the ancients, was above remarked. The war of Charlemagne against the pagan Saxons, was followed by crusades against Saracens and Turks. The atrocious crusade against the Albigenses was the first war of the kind within Christendom itself; and dreadful as it was, it was but the beginning of horrors. The heretics assailed were numerous enough to be called a nation, yet not strong enough to retaliate prolonged misery on their assailants. The first outbreak of Protestant warfare was in Bohemia; where the blind general Ziska displayed in five years of victory what the new enthusiasm could do. This was A.D. 1420-1424. It was imitated by the league of Smalkalde against the emperor Charles a century later; but through the extreme forbearance and gentleness of the Protestant leader their resistance was neither bloody nor successful. When the cruelties of the Inquisition (a tale of older date) began to be turned against Protestants in Spain, Italy, and Holland, the struggle became frightfully intensified. In France, Holland, Sweden, England, it was felt that Protestants must either be tamely burnt and butchered, or resist. In France and Holland the struggle was long and devastating: in Sweden and

England it was less severe. Early in the seventeenth century Germany became convulsed by the great commotion called the Thirty Years' War, in which the great and good king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, came to aid the Protestant cause. By this prolonged conflict, the horrors of which have not been paralleled in modern history, two-thirds of the population of Germany is said to have been destroyed. But as this was the fiercest struggle, so was it the last of avowed religious wars on the continent of Europe. It ended by the peace of Westphalia, A.D. 1648. The Protestant Churches gained toleration and establishment, but only at the expense of the unity of the German empire. In Great Britain the clash of religious war began when it was ceasing in Germany; nor was it until after the expulsion of the Catholic James II. from the throne by the united Protestant feeling of all England, that churchmen and dissenters became so far reconciled as led to a Public Act of Toleration; an Act, which, though in many respects incomplete, had the germ of a fruitful and universal principle.

There was a difference between the toleration won by arms on the Continent, and that which little by little has been wrung out of authority in England. The former was gained for existing communities of Christians, not for individuals; the latter shelters future possible communities and any eccentric person. Even in the Republic of Geneva, where there was no prince to tune the pulpits, the Reforming leaders had no thought of allowing a conscience to individuals; so little did the first generation of Protestants understand the logic or the necessities of their own position. But the second stage of the conflict came on in England when the body known by us as the INDEPENDENTS became numerous, who denied that the State had any authority to dictate religious truth to individuals, or control their collective worship. Politically, their great representative was Oliver Cromwell; and though he did not succeed in establishing their fundamental tenet, yet from that day onward it has been secretly working itself into English policy. The first thing permanently gained was, *Toleration without State subsidies*. This was a step towards separation of Church and State. Prussia has given public endowments to every sect which she tolerates; so did Napoleon I.: but English toleration was from the first a recognition that a sensible *part* of the nation was become (ecclesiastically) separate from the State, although this was not avowed in so many words, or quite consistently acted on.

Meanwhile a great preparation of mind had been going on, from

the cultivation of Moral Philosophy. It had become manifest to all thinking men, that morals had a basis of its own, independent of Church or Bible; so that a man like Socrates might be a moral and worthy citizen without being a Christian at all, much more without belonging to a special sect of Christians, or holding the creed of the ruler. In earlier times, whether Gentile, Jewish, Moslem, or Mediæval, no other ground of moral practice was imagined by the rulers of State, than the sanction of the national religion; a man who disowned the creed of his fathers was assumed to be ready for the perpetration of crime. A dim notion to this effect has immensely influenced public men who would not have dared to utter it; indeed, what else can have reconciled such a man as Sir Thomas More to cruel persecution? But the whole basis of their proceedings is undermined, when it is notorious that sound morality (so far as the ruler can test it) may exist separately from any particular religious belief: thus all imagined difficulty is removed against recognizing bad believers as good citizens. In all parts of Europe, *in the convictions of statesmen* the revolution is now undoubtedly complete. No one of them now imagines that it belongs to the State to dictate a creed in religion, any more than in astronomy or chemistry, or in any way to claim obedience in things spiritual. The *State-conscience*, which has been talked of, must be confined purely to things moral. On the accurate distinction between *the moral* and *the religious* undoubtedly a sound judgment of the duties of the State depends. In India the absolute necessity of this discrimination shows itself again and again to our statesmen, when confronted by *immoral religion* at one moment, by *fanciful religion* at another. The State being founded on morality and existing for moral interests, cannot allow immorality, of whatever type, to shelter itself under the cloak of religion. In all the freest nations it is now avowed, that good citizens must be treated *impartially*, be their religion what it may; and apparently this principle is destined to disconnect the State from all religious establishments, until (in the future) real unity of religion may pervade a nation.

In the three eras here contemplated, I have tried to exhibit the spirit, first, of Gentile religion, various and intensely divided, unaggressive in itself, yet only the more justifying political aggression; easily tolerant of national diversities, but most intolerant of individual conscientiousness. Next, the Moslem spirit, aggressive in an eminent degree, yet more greedy of comrades than of subjects; tolerant so far as to allow life and social rights to unbelievers who renounce idolatry, yet degrading

them into an inferior caste; allowing slavery, yet a slavery on the whole of a milder form; fostering polygamy and despotism, yet recognizing a common faith as a closer bond than nation and blood. Lastly, we have seen how, in the long equipoised European battle between one Church and many States, freedom for individual consciences has been gradually won—everywhere in Europe, we may now say, except in Russia,—at the cost of many terrible struggles and multitudes of noble lives. This freedom of conscience, in fact, includes *freedom of teaching and preaching*, freedom therefore of science and of history. Whatever the form of the government, even be it despotic as in India, this freedom puts into it a new spirit, with immense after-results.

The European literature for a hundred years past has looked realities in the face, unchecked by ecclesiastical or any formal rule; and out of this boldness has issued *more tenderness for human nature* than ever before. Few statesmen as yet dare to look deeply into the *causes* of national evil; but great notoriety is given to facts by our abounding literature, by the accumulation of statistics, and by the interchange of knowledge between the different Christian nations. Now that slavery is regarded as extinct, a great anxiety has gone abroad among statesmen concerning the depraved and dangerous class of citizens. That a deep concern about the treatment of criminals affects nearly all the Christian powers, was strikingly proved in the Congress of eminent persons, assembled in London in 1872 by the initiation of the President of the American Union. Philanthropy acts upon governments as never before. Of course there is plenty of doublemindedness. Men want to get a great result without paying the necessary price. They do not like to ask too closely, what is the source of pauperism, of crime, and of wide-spread debasement. Nevertheless, new principles are admitted, and will have to be worked out. The "State-conscience" is turned from ecclesiastical meddling to moral ordering. The duties of the ruler to the ruled are unaffectedly confessed. Humane principles are proclaimed as alone worthy of wise rulers, or tending to beneficial ends. Where there is an abhorrence of torture, an almost morbid aversion to take away human life, a belief that the *reformation* of criminals is of more importance to society than the *punishing* of them, there will not be a permanent connivance at the causes of criminality. A new political era is entered upon, which will make the future better than the past.

PART III.

THREE WELL-KNOWN FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

One who undertakes to contrast ancient and modern history seems bound not to omit such contrasts as may be observed between forms of government denominated alike, as between ancient and modern despotisms, ancient and modern oligarchies, ancient and modern democracies. A difficulty is here encountered from the insufficiency of nomenclature, and from the great diversity, alike in ancient and modern times, between two forms of government which bear the same name. If we define despotism to mean the rule of one person, irresponsible to law, we see at once that the results of such a Government change prodigiously with the person, even over the same nation and in the same country. Over different nations also the result is different; indeed in some the ruler is held in check by the popular spirit, however absolute he may be in legal theory. Imperial sway which is without constitutional check is naturally far more scrupulous and forbearing towards the ruling race, than towards subject races. A military oligarchy like that of the old Roman patricians, differs naturally from the mercantile oligarchy of Venice: to explain the differences, we need not refer to ancient or modern world-wide tendencies. When we alight on two forms of government that can fairly be identified, the likeness of results so prevails that the differences are seldom to be called *contrasts*.

(1)—Despotism.

Despotism, or personal rule, can rarely continue good, except by careful *election* of the sovereign; which election will generally be made, perhaps from the royal family, whether by the chief selecting his successor, or by a compact of the collective family, providing for its own stability; or else by choice of the nobles. The first method—in fact, *adoption*—gave to the Roman empire almost its only good emperors, never actual *sons* of the reigning emperors. Tiberius Cæsar, Trajan, and his three successors were adoptive. The second has been practised by the Russian, and sometimes by the Austrian dynasty. The third was followed by the Tartars, when their empire was most powerful. But alike in ancient and modern times despotisms have been prone to decay, from the absence of ruling qualities in the ruler. Perhaps India was never better governed than under Acbar and his immediate successors; but we know that the general tendency of Indian despotism has been towards imbecile and fatuous princes. The

degeneracy of the successors of the great Darius in ancient Persia is comparable to the degeneracy of the Ottoman dynasty, after it had received several military checks. The decay of the Spanish monarchy and empire has a family likeness to the decay of the French monarchy, yet has its own peculiarity, religious bigotry being still more efficient in its ruin; this bigotry may be treated as the modern contrast. But the fanaticism which was fatal to Spain and gravely damaged France, did not harm the Austrian dynasty so fundamentally, because the subject peoples were more successful in their insurrections, and the despotism never became complete.

Russia, perhaps, ought to be accepted as our modern type of personal rule. She is in truth by far the latest born. Her peoples are outside of Roman Christendom. Little or nothing in her institutions is traditional from the old world, or even from the middle ages. Her vigorous organization is of a date later than the birth of modern national science; and out of her sagaciously importing every mechanical invention or adaptation of physics for imperial use, her rapid aggrandizement has sprung. In Russia we see not only an elaborate imperial organization, but a population ever increasing on a soil of vast extent and capable of indefinite improvement. Probably never before did an imperial power rest on a nation of forty-five millions of homogeneous people as its nucleus. All the subject races increase steadily, and none are lost by emigration. The depression of the peasants is said to have been a bequest of the Tartars. Accustomed to their violent rule, despotism seemed to the people natural when they were expelled. Under different sovereigns the dynasty has shown a different face. The tales of Ivan the Cruel are frightful; but it is little to the purpose to go back earlier than Peter the Great; indeed, we are chiefly concerned with this century. Even under the amiable Alexander I., whose talk and theory was that of a constitutional monarch, the eternal spying and terrible power of the fixed officials were a constant alarm to the aristocracy; but under the severe Nicolas,* who was for turning all into soldiers and making parade perpetual, the nobility and gentry had a truly painful time. No one seemed to breathe freely until the accession of Alexander II., and alas! he presently fell into deadly feud with Poland, and consummated the ruin of that unhappy nation. The religious persecution of the Poles under Nicolas was cruel, far beyond what might seem possible in the nineteenth century, and

* This emperor always signs himself Nicolas (good Greek) in our blue books.

the rigorous punishment still inflicted on dissent from the Established Church, is the chief mark that Russia is far behind the age. The collision of ecclesiastical opinion between the Russian Church and the Church of the Cossacks may yet lead to convulsion; possibly may win religious freedom by the approved routine of martyrdoms. Yet it is rather to be hoped that the dynasty will learn wisdom from the experience of the rest of Europe, and by the influence of educated Russians. In other respects the rule is favourably contrasted with the known despotic empires of antiquity. The recent emancipation of the serfs, who were not cast out of relations to their masters to become landless proletarians, but received definite rights in the soil, seems a guarantee of steady improvement. Each great Government, under which the monarchy is organized, is destined to take a rank similar to the States of the American Union, with powers of local administration, as soon as a powerful and intelligent middle class is formed. At present, it seems, the dynasty is so much strengthened by its enfranchisement of the peasants, who have little political thought, that it can afford to despise the wishes of the nobility and gentry, to whom the administration by irresponsible, perhaps low-born, officials is necessarily offensive. The great Russian nation is as ambitious and as resolute to continue one and undivided as the French; indeed, the continuous plain from Berlin to the Ural Mountains makes it a certainty of the future, that, come what may in political strife, European Russia will hold together as one. The great fact of modern times is *the increase and diffusion of knowledge;* nor can Russia be excluded from this, especially when the dynasty is so forward to promote geographical, chemical, astronomical, and geological science. The first curb on the caprices of personal rule comes from precedent and fixed procedures, which make experienced ministers and lawyers needful. Open law-courts and incorruptible judges are an immense second step. It is reported that in these matters Russia has much to improve and develop; but if one interpret her present Government at the worst, it appears far preferable to any of the Mussulman Governments whose tradition is from the middle ages, and to any of the great ancient empires known to us. The *Russian* power, on a greater scale, has something in common with that of *Prussia*, viz., the vigorous organization from which its eminence has arisen is strictly the work of the dynasty itself. In other cases, free towns and legally organized monarchies have wrought out a prosperity which despotism has turned to its own purposes, has expended lavishly, and ultimately destroyed.

In *these two* cases the dynasties themselves had an organizing and creative instinct which, in spite of wasteful ambition, studies on the whole the material welfare of the millions. The harshness of despotism is not likely to last long over a notoriously loyal people,* nor will liberty, won by Russians for themselves, be withheld from Cossacks and other tribes ripe for the rule of law.

In some respects the despotic rule of *England in India* reminds one of the Roman empire; and it is natural to collate them, in a comparison of the ancient and the modern. Yet the comparison to the monarchy of Rome is unfair; for the British administration in India is not directed by *a personal rule.* The East Indian Company was an oligarchy of merchants, which could not control its own agents. It was itself soon overruled through the "Board of Control," which was subject to the successive Cabinets of England. To the Indians, no doubt, our administration and laws are despotic; but so they are, and have always been, to the peasants of England itself, who yet are not at all the more liable to the evils of a mere personal rule. The Indian administration is never, in its consciousness, irresponsible. It sees behind it the ministers of England, who are accustomed to dread national criticism, and anxious to make the despotism in India as little despotic as may be. Though on the whole the Indian Civil Service has its own way, the Governor-General is sure to be imbued with purely English notions of rule. From this complication we have in India some developments of freedom which Russia would not endure; such as a newspaper press, free to criticize the acts of Government; also free utterance at public meetings. This freedom was justified by Sir Charles Metcalfe as essential to our safety, because it warns us of native disaffection, and hinders secret conspiracy. So too we have a Government Budget, published for universal criticism. Law courts are at least open, whatever their other weaknesses; nor does anyone fear arrest on political grounds, short of offence which in England would make him amenable to the law. Further, the chief Judges are not only appointed by England, but are irremovable by the Governor-General and his Council. Even where a political principle, as the freedom of the press, is concerned, their decisions cannot be reversed by the will of the Government. It is to be lamented that the native princes have no refuge in our law courts against purely political decisions, which may strip them of fortune, rank, and power; yet private citizens among the natives have

*[1891. Alas, the reign of the Third Alexander forces on us new thoughts]

long been accustomed, with full confidence of obtaining justice, to bring civil actions against Government in its own courts. All such things make our Indian empire unparalleled in form, equally as in circumstances.*

Perhaps if we would ascertain what are the phenomena which will henceforth distinguish European despotisms from those of ancient times, we may find them in the counsel vainly urged upon the Pope by the Emperor Napoleon III. for the improvement of his government in Italy. Of course he intended to recommend the continuance of personal rule, and had no thought of popular freedom; yet he especially urged *publicity of law courts, publication of Government expenses and income*, and (I think) *security against arbitrary arrest*. Prussia and Austria, both of which, until of late, we must decidedly class with despotic powers, have long yielded so much to publicity. Moreover, energetic rules have kept their armies subject to *civil* functionaries, so as to guard against the excesses of Prætorians and Janizaries; nor were soldiers ever used, as in the scandalous Roman system, to execute violence without sentence of law. It must be expected that in the future all rule, even the most despotic, will be carried out by the instrumentality of a civil Board; in short, Monarchy will be a *bureaucracy*, and never will assume the high-handed form of military execution. Hereto must be added, that, more and more, as government becomes complex, and as miscellaneous science is called into its service, superior training and accomplishments are needed by a bureau, especially by all the heads of departments; which, in a widespread system, tends at once to bridle the caprices of personal rule and to infuse humane precautions.

(2)—Constitutional Royalty.

So much as to modern *despotism*. As for ancient *constitutional* monarchy, perhaps we can only find it in the great kingdoms where *castes* were established, especially in Egypt. The Assyrian monarchy was probably at one time constitutional and sacerdotal: at least, its intimate union with religion suggests this; but, after it became an empire over men of foreign race, and rested on a large army, it is believed that the king felt no restraint on his general government. Egypt is known to us only in her decadence. She was already a wreck when the Greek Herodotus, father of history, visited her. Most of the accounts of her institutions are traditionary, nor can we wholly trust their echoes of the past.

* [1891. Yet our trial in India is only beginning.]

Unless machinery is seen at work, it is not possible to judge of its results accurately: just so, it is hard to judge of the operation of the Egyptian regimen from the dry statements of archæology. Still shorter glimpses of India come to us through the window which was opened for a moment between West and East by Alexander's expedition into the Punjaub; yet its institutions were living when they were reported, and the reporters are intelligent Greeks, accustomed to political variety; not low caste interpreters, or proud, but fallen priests, bent on enhancing the greatness of the past. Nevertheless there are leading facts on which we can hardly be mistaken. In both countries a steady development of national wealth, superior art, intellect, and population took place, when nearly all Europe was in barbarism. Their arts and their literature, their laws and constitution were homesprung; and although, from knowing Egypt only since her political downfall, we are apt to think of her state as implying total stagnation of mind, it is evident that such was not always the case. In spite of monstrously erratic religion, the system, taken as a whole, obtained for her people through a long succession of centuries so much of security and order as to allow of progressive cultivation of mind, and to generate a well-defined nationality.

The word *caste* is derived from the Portuguese *casta*, and signifies race. Since each caste ordinarily intermarried with its own members, the tendency of the institution is to generate as many races as there are castes, and thus to justify the apellation. The castes in Egypt are said to have derived their names from the occupations of their members, as agriculturists, herdsmen, fishermen, interpreters, warriors, &c. None of the details, if we could trust them, here concern us, but only the relation of the system to constitutional royalty.

Wherever wealth exists in superfluity sufficient to enable a chieftain to maintain an army—that is, in all the world, some dreary districts alone excepted—the first great political problem is to secure that the chief who enforces the laws on others shall himself obey the law. The difficulty does not press much while anarchy is the chief danger, for to get one tyrant instead of a thousand is an admirable bargain; but when anarchy is past, when industry is steady and wealth increases, the powers of the prince and the dangers from him multiply still faster, if no special precautions have been taken. In an illiterate people, custom supplies the place of law, but without organizations to transmit and attest the customs, there is no fixedness. It cannot be doubted that every union of trades or professions defended

their own customary rights, stood up with more or less boldness to support an injured member, and helped the executive Government in punishing their members when disorderly and guilty. They were also an organ for collecting the taxes, and for publishing edicts of State. Out of special trades and occupations, as above said, rose actual castes, of which the most honoured in "the sacerdotal kingdoms" was that of *the learned*, who were all included in the Priesthood, science and religion being united. The most formidable order was the military, whose chief was the king. Every king of Egypt was adopted into the priestly order immediately on his accession. The priests had the high function of watching over and expounding the laws of the land, and included among themselves judges, lawyers, councillors, secretaries, in short, all civil officials of high rank. To say that the priesthood held the supreme power, was, *then* equivalent to saying that military force had become weaker than civil authority, and that the king himself was obedient to the law. It is even stated, that on the death of a king he could not be buried in the royal sepulchres without solemn sanction from the priesthood; so that by withholding the permission they might degrade one whose malversations they had failed to arrest. The fear of such a disgrace may have sensibly influenced the kings; indeed, it would seem that the royal power never became despotic and unconstitutional. A general equilibrium was sustained. The common people were undoubtedly very poor, as well as very industrious; but as the necessaries of life were marvellously abundant, and the ease of feeding a family quite remarkable, while in such a climate men have few wants, all classes for many generations were contented with the national institutions. Such a nation does not criticize its laws and customs (*we* criticize them from our very different point of view): and as long as it can escape hostile invasion and the exhaustion of war, it may flourish, in spite of very much which we regard as unjust, unkind, unwise, or despicable.

Our European monarchs in the middle age were restrained by proud armed barons, by many an insurrection, and occasional dethronements. This constant drawing of the sword to control princes was a less satisfactory method than the pressure of a national "priesthood," *i.e.* a civil bureaucracy which was fundamentally *independent of the king*. Here lies the point of contrast. After wealth began to accumulate all over Europe, and royal marriages aggrandized especially the House of Austria, and standing armies arose, the civil barriers were swept away by

royal perjury and violence. In England, which, being an island, needed no great army of defence, and could not use an army for encroachment, the dynasty failed in its attempt to imitate foreign usurpation. We are proud of our representative Government, as that which saved our freedom; but the Parliament did not succeed by mere civilization: they had to fight bloody battles for success. We cannot then boast, as apparently the Egyptians could, that their civil wisdom saved their institutions from their monarchs. It is apparent that a king ought never to be recognized as head, *both* of the military *and* of the civil Government; an arrangement which makes it impossible to act legally against illegalities or treason of the king, or call him to account without arresting the whole administration. In consequence, we have had to reduce royalty to a state which makes it little else than an expensive and cumbrous ornament, not allowed to do us good, lest it do greater harm. The royal chief, alone in the realm, is not permitted even to tell the nation what is his opinion on any political question.

The representative or Parliamentary system is regarded as the great peculiarity of modern times; and some have wondered that the ancients never alighted upon it, and never were aware of its importance. Guizot remarks, in his lectures on European civilization, that when Honorius and Theodosius the younger, joint sovereigns of Rome, wrote in the year 418 of the Christian era to the Prefect of Gaul, ordering deputies of the province to attend every year in the city of Arles, the people refused the proffered boon, regarding it as an infliction. The Emperor Augustus was the first to allow the votes of every Italian municipality to be given on the spot, whereas formerly those who had the Roman franchise needed to travel to Rome if they desired to use their vote. This innovation might have led to new developments; for, the Senate was understood to be elected by the Roman citizens, who elected the magistrates; and the Senate consisted chiefly of ex-magistrates. But the first act of Tiberius was to extinguish the popular elections, which Augustus had previously made of less and less importance. In Greek history we read of various congresses, which might have been Parliaments; but all laboured under the same difficulty as the German Parliament of 1848. It was unarmed, while armed princes watched its proceedings. Our English boroughs in early days, thought it more of a burden than a privilege to send representatives to Parliament. A pure civil body can ill resist military and executive power; and although the English House of Commons was strengthened by the knights

of the shires, who represented the smaller nobility, it would very rarely in those days venture direct opposition to any but a very weak and highly unpopular monarch. Henry VIII. was terrible even to his nobility, when they no longer brought armed retinues with them; though he had no standing army, and often had barely a hundred soldiers at hand. When Charles I. endeavoured to arrest the five members, Parliament felt its danger very great, and *interpreted the crisis as already civil war;* though they needed to dissemble their perception of it until a Parliamentary army could be raised. So large a part of the richer classes were conscious of a separate interest from the nation, as to dread a really popular triumph over royal usurpation: hence the nation had to fight a very hard and doubtful battle, their leaders of nobler birth seldom being faithful. Dr. Arnold has said that if the profligate Buckingham had been a Marlborough—if, in consequence, the English arms on the Continent had been brilliantly victorious instead of signally disgraced — it would have entailed ruin to the liberties of England. No unarmed Parliament can ever control an armed executive, except where it is notorious that a national uprising and the deposition of the prince will follow the attempt to violate the constitution. Two rebellions, of which the latter ejected the Stuart family for ever, proved necessary in England. The Hungarians count twenty civil wars against their usurping Kings of the House of Austria, who were armed from their other kingdoms. In Spain, in France, and everywhere on the Continent, the same tale is told, the same moral is learned. We may then cease to marvel at the stupidity of ancient nations, who could not expect a few hundred of men in the garb of peace to act independently of a man who sat at their side, with 20,000 trained troops at his disposal. The movements of an energetic Government are swift, and its preparations stealthy. Ancient nations were very slow in learning facts, being without our newspaper press and other publicity, or rapid transmission of letters. Thus, in short, the representative system, so valued by us, is not at all a main point of contrast between us and them. Many other material appliances, of which they were destitute, underlie its utility to us; and after all, we cannot claim for it truly, that it is a power to restrain the violence of the armed hand.

If, laying aside our patriotic self-admiration, we review as with the eyes of a foreigner the struggles between our barons and the kings, the civil wars concerning succession to the throne, the encroachment of the landlords (who were our warrior caste) on

the traditional permanence of the cultivators, and their self-exemption by self-sanctioned laws from their hereditary State service, after the nation had won its battles against the dynasty; finally, when we consider our masses of pauperism, misery, and criminality, we shall perhaps speak in humbler tones of our political wisdom, and its actual achievements. The king, whom the Egyptian civilians kept subject to the law, was not only head of the warrior caste, but through many reigns chief of an empire, extending on several sides beyond his native realm. One point of their regulation was like ours. The king's household was formed of noble persons, and he was daily waited on by gentlemen. But, perhaps, this is everywhere the case, except in usurped military rule.

(3)—Republics.

It remains to contrast the *Republics* of the ancient and the modern world. It is to be regretted that our acquaintance with ancient republics is so imperfect. We reckon them as Phœnician and Carthaginian, Greek, Etruscan, and Latin; for of Siculian, Gaulish, Spanish, Celtiberian we know almost nothing; indeed, when we go beyond Rome and the chief Greek States, our knowledge is quite fragmentary. Yet some general facts are of interest. Intestine war was the habitual state of the Greek republics, which ordinarily coalesced under *leaderships*, but never under stable *federations*. The less known and smaller Italian republics had federations,—as the Latin, which at last fell into Rome, one and indivisible. The Etruscan appear to have been federated, though no central power was energetic enough, nor does any fixed centre appear; but Etruscans never appear at war with Etruscans. The Punic States in Africa had a few civil contests, but in general were free from such war; indeed, the great superiority of Carthage to every other, made her a fixed centre of inevitable attraction. They also had a federation consolidated under legal forms. Finally their kinsmen in Phœnicia itself were in like case mutually independent, except so far as their federation joined them; but the union seems less close, except of three cities, called by the Greeks Tripolis. Perhaps all these ancient republics were originally monarchies, as, we know certainly, many of them were. Each separate State rested on a very narrow area, though the Punic colonies ranged far by sea, and spread wide on land among the Libyans. In general all ancient republics were chary of communicating the right of citizenship, except while they were weak and very immature:

none of them accounted birth on their soil to convey the franchise. Foreigners permanently resident often received a half-citizenship, coupled probably with the liability to serve in the national army. Rome, the greatest of these republics, became great by conquest only; her homogeneous primitive population occupied barely the small district called Latium; and as she expanded, she dealt out the rights of citizenship systematically, but warily. Under her sway the entire population was divided into Romans, Latins, Italians, Foreigners, Freedmen, and Slaves; six classes, of which each had different rights. All Italians at last gained Roman rank, but only when the republic was about to perish. Many of these States (in fact, most of those best known to us) passed from a royal to an *aristocratic* regimen, and only in process of time became more democratic. The prevalent Greek routine was, for a demagogue to stand up against the aristocracy, and fraudulently make himself tyrant. By him the aristocracy were destroyed or exiled; then, on his overthrow, a democratic republic followed. In Greece the internal contests of rich and poor were bitter and unrelenting, as were the violences of the tyrants. In Rome the struggle against the patricians was lingering and painful, but by no means mutually atrocious in its earlier stages, in which the legal supremacy of democracy was won; only after Rome had become the victorious plunderer of the world, the battles between two sections of its aristocracy were ferocious and bloody. The demagogue Cæsar, who ended as a usurper, acted the part of the Greek *tyrannus* quite later in time and differently in circumstance. From his victories the republic had its death-blow. Carthage had two difficult struggles against the attempts of usurpers, but we do not know that either Etruscans or Phœnicians suffered any civil convulsions so terrible as Greece and Rome.

Against these ancient republics we have to set those of Italy, of Holland, of Switzerland, and of recent America. The Italian republics, except Venice, belong to the middle age, and greatly bear the traditional stamp of old Italy, in their better and worse features. That with powerful monarchs—their eternal enemies—watching them on every side, they should engage in mutual wars, and furious domestic factions, belongs to the mournful infatuation of old Greeks. Venice was a most anomalous power, beginning with men who fled from tyranny almost into the sea, who in time grew wealthy and powerful by the carrying trade, until some area of land for home resources was won; at last they formed a naval empire, over which a mere oligarchy reigned. Nothing so singular existed in antiquity, unless possibly in early Sidon or

Tyre. To turn our eye to Holland is more to the purpose here.

Holland, like Venice, was largely won from the sea. Her industrious citizens elaborated early wealth and prosperity, which it was hard to defend from the attacks of neighbouring feudal counts. These claimed allegiance, not because their defence was needed, but because they were able to lay waste and rob. Thus it is uncertain how early we may call the towns republican. Falling under the House of Austria through the marriage of Mary of Burgundy, Holland was involved in the frightful struggle against the bigotry of Charles V. and his son Philip; and, after that lingering war was ended, had to encounter the attempts of France to subdue her. No republic of antiquity ever stood out against such unfair odds, and came out triumphant. The United Provinces do not seem to have found the problem of federation at all difficult. Strong common sense and desire of justice sufficed for their laws and administration, except so far as the fanaticism of creeds, which has poisoned the veins of all Romish Christendom except Hungary, occasionally led them astray. But on the whole they have avoided internal convulsions, even in the crisis at which they returned to monarchy. The maritime empire of Holland for a while made this small confederation rank with the greater European powers.

Switzerland appears to yet greater advantage, because it is easier to compare her with the ancient republics. Her early contest for freedom against the far greater power of Austria cannot but move admiration; her sagacious institutions and firm patriotism show her to be worthy of the freedom which she won. Though the religious schism painfully and dangerously divided her, and two languages prevail as well as two religions, she has known how to meet the difficulties and do justice to all. Each canton has its own reasonable freedom, yet the Federal power has the energy reserved to it which is needful to the protection of all; needful also for its own permanence against local wilfulness. Switzerland has undergone no such terrible religious struggle as the forty years' war of Holland, but having more of Catholicism left within her, she is more severely strained by the intrigues of the Papacy and the pressure of Catholic powers. Her excellent system of popular, *not professional* soldiery—which is only that of old England adapted to these times and perfected—gives her a force which the great military monarchies cannot but respect. In their wars she maintains her own neutrality with a strong hand, as we recently saw. So self-confident of strength is she, that she shelters political exiles from the bitter hatred of her

mighty neighbours: no ancient power would thus run risks for a beaten party or a persecuted individual. Switzerland is sheltered by her mountains, but is also impoverished by them. The Alps, horrid with ice, with crags, and with torrents, were a disgust and terror to Romans; but the Swiss, like the Hollanders, have conquered the elements. The mountains of Greece are grand, yet do not compare with the Alps. When did the Greeks—or the Romans after the conquest of Greece—make such roads as Switzerland displays? What state of Greece or Italy ever made so just a distribution of the soil and timber for the benefit of the mass of the community, as is made in Switzerland? In this republic foreigners are pre-eminently welcome. When the neighbouring kingdoms harassed travellers for passports, Switzerland had no such jealousy. So poor a country, which has to be disproportionally armed and to sustain roads at great expense, cannot be eminent in art and science; nevertheless, she is in many ways eminent for a just and able policy.

But these elder republics are far eclipsed in magnitude by those of America, which are our best contrast to the ancients. Not that we can dwell on those which rose from the dependencies of Spain; for they inherited great weakness from Spanish ignorance and bigotry, and had, besides, a predominance of native American blood, with no previous culture from the past of Europe. Mexico and the South American Republics have had a sixty years' initiatory turmoil, which is comparable to that of early Attica or Etruria. Their institutions are scarcely adult, and we cannot yet judge of their fruits. But the North American Union is far more mature. All its bases were firmly laid centuries ago, when the States were English colonies. Our literature, our history, and our law have been their property also; and they have expanded into a first-rate power, which may multiply its population fourfold or tenfold without any need to alter its forms or its principles. To every republic in the world this is now the chief example: this therefore is the typical polity, which we ought chiefly to contrast with the ancient republics. Its enormous magnitude is the first great contrast. Aristotle did not believe that a free polity could subsist, with so many as a hundred thousand citizens—women and children of course he did not count. This republic has a population of nearly forty millions, and expects to double it before the century is ended. The Phœnician Confederacy was larger than any Greek republic, but its area would only be a fraction of some single State of the American Union. The Roman republic, after the enfranchisement

of the Italian municipalities, did but spread over the *towns* of Italy;—the *country* was prevalently a wilderness, over which a few slaves tended cattle; and a whole Italy is but small, placed on the breadth of the North American continent. A hundred years ago anyone who had asserted that so vast an area might be a free country under republican institutions, would have seemed to Edmund Burke a wild dreamer. A second wonderful contrast to antiquity is found in the thorough *miscellaneousness* of the democracy. Their greediness for citizens may seem to be a marvel. If a foreigner merely profess that he *intends* to become a citizen as soon as the law will allow him, he is instantly an object of interest and favour. Whatever his race or language—at least if he come from Europe—matters not: of late the Chinese have been ill-treated, because they work for less wages, and thus tend to depress native wages; but this is illegal violence, not approved law. When the slaves of African race were enfranchised, American principle was put to a severe trial. Should they accept these as their political equals? But it was felt that without their vote, the North had few loyal citizens in the South; and those loyal citizens declared that neither their fortunes nor their lives would be safe, unless protected by the negro vote. Moreover, it was felt unendurable by the republic to have in its heart a population of four millions disfranchised, which would prepare materials for all the disorders of old Europe. With a noble faith that adherence to principle would justify itself, negro-suffrage was decided on by a vast majority.*

The celebrated words of the original Declaration of Independence—that all men are naturally equal—was directed against the claims of royal descent and aristocratic blood. Of course it did not mean that all individuals have the same natural strength or the same natural talent, but that all *must be treated as equal* by the law. This sentence at once condemned a system of slavery, though slavery continued in spite of it. But the children of the men who upheld slavery will soon rejoice in its extinction. South Carolina, the State where slave-owners were most virulent, is now the State where the black race has earliest risen into high office. Prejudice has not yet died out, and more or less severe struggles remain; but sagacious liberality wins the day. Much inconvenience is endured by the immigration of Irishmen, illiterate and Catholic; but the republic educates their children, and in the next generation they display new and valuable qualities. Popular

* [1891. The aspect of things is now far less pleasing.]

education is that on which the Union relies for hindering the blunders of democracy, for suppressing crimes, and moulding foreign immigrants into the type of American citizens. No sum seems to be grudged for education ; and the totals expended on it are immense. Athens lavished public money on the dresses of tragic actors and dancers ; the American Union spends not only to lay a foundation in reading, writing, and arithmetic, but to teach geography and political statistics, the powers of the States, and the rights and laws of the Union ; that the citizens may know well about what they are voting. Zeal for education pervades also the negro race. When General Sherman made his famous march through Georgia, and reached South Carolina, he had not been many hours in Charleston before the negroes held a public meeting, the leaders being men who had bought their freedom from their masters,—a meeting for what object? To establish schools for instructing the coloured people : and for this purpose a considerable sum was subscribed on the spot. New York, the State to which Irish emigration is chiefly directed, is dissatisfied to find so many citizens remaining uninstructed, in spite of the munificently provided free schools ; it has, in consequence, just passed a law (June) for *compulsory* education. Whether it will be possible to execute it against the influence of the Catholic clergy, is a question of much interest, which time will soon answer ; but the law itself displays the resolute policy which New York now holds. Until public education is given to all the negroes and to the poor whites of the South, the *North* feels that the republic is not safe, nor can its institutions produce their right fruit. No democratic republic of antiquity had a particle of zeal for the education of poor citizens. It cannot be doubted that the all-pervading contrast between the future and the past will lie in *Publicity*, in active *Public Opinion*, and in *Public Education* to make it intelligent.

Another eminent peculiarity of this great republic is seen in its treatment of public land. On this very matter a great scandal rests on the old Roman patricians—as, indeed, on the English barons and their successors,—for their converting public land, held conditionally, into private land held unconditionally, and then claiming to eject tenants. Rome, in the fulness of her power, holding vast and valuable tracts of public land, was satisfied to leave them to slaves and cattle, nearly as do Scottish highland lairds. But the American Union desires nothing so much as *to people the wastes* with independent cultivators, accounting that the strength of a nation lies in the number of its

stout-hearted rustics. The first step was to discard the English system of making large grants of land to favourites, and to sell all at a very moderate fixed price, yet taxing it by an acreage so as to secure that it should be bought for immediate cultivation not as a mere speculation for the future. The second great step was the Homestead Law, passed as soon as the secession of the South made Northern votes supreme in the Congress. By this law any citizen or any immigrant receives 160 acres of cultivable land for the mere office fees, on undertaking to cultivate it in a limited time. In order to encourage railways, an indiscreet quantity of public land on each side of a rail has been voted to them. This (it is beginning to be felt) was overdone; but as the railways cannot serve their own interests better than by putting cultivators on it, and cannot screw up prices while so much public land is free, the general aim of the policy will perhaps be attained. Still wiser, in the opinion of some, it would have been, not wholly to alienate the land from the State, but to sell it for a hundred years, conceding to the tenants all buildings and fixtures as their own. But to us here the notable thing is, that the republic holds as a fixed policy to shun pauperism, proletarians, dependent cultivators, and town-rabble, equally as serfs or slaves. The Roman aristocrats scorned and despised town-rabble—"the dregs of Romulus"—but never had the heart to plant them out into the country, as freeholders, on the public land; nay, a mob of senators, with clubs made from the broken benches, murdered Tiberius Gracchus for proposing it. They had, in fact, the hearts of slave-owners, as slave-owners in general they were.

But the land system suggests to contrast the army system, which closely touches the other. The Romans did sometimes plant colonies, Latin or even Roman; but the Consul's sergeant, year by year, picked off all the strong youths for the army; so that when the era of conquest was begun, the demand for them emptied the country. Under the merciless conscription the rustic Romans and Italians perished on every shore of the Mediterranean, and their place was filled by slaves who could not be seized for the army. Freed men and needy citizens flocked into the chief towns, which swelled continually in population. But the army could not be fed by volunteers; the discipline was too merciless; rigorous conscription continued even after the democracy was strongest. On the contrary, the great modern republic has employed conscription only in her severest strain and then most reluctantly. In general there has been no com-

pulsory service, and so small a Federal army that it may be called a mere nucleus of officers, and a skeleton. Each State has had its separate trained bands of volunteers, whose services cannot be commanded by the President; thus there is no danger of his using national troops for the purpose of usurpation. As to exhausting the military population, the terrible slaughter of the late civil war was more than retrieved by the natural increase. Another such war, so wasteful of life, there is no present reason to apprehend.

Again in the treatment of conquered rebels, the modern State shows a wonderful contrast to ancient, and even to all European powers. The Athenians, when the revolt of Mitylene had been suppressed, were persuaded by the impetuous demagogue Cleon to account the whole State guilty and command the military execution of the entire people, including the democratic friends of Athens. Having slept off their rage, they repented, and with difficulty rescinded the blunder; yet a thousand Mitylenæns of the opposite party were slain in cold blood, and this in comparison seemed merciful. The Latin colony of Fregellæ had been foremost in brave resolve against Hannibal; and, proud of its fame and loyalty to Rome, indulged in free and spirited complaint on some minor matters. Words were retaliated by deeds of war: the consul Opimius, accounting them treasonable, summarily destroyed both the citizens and the town;—and is extolled for it by Cicero as patriotic. Put in contrast the dealings of the American Union with her rebels, who, solely because they were outvoted, had broken oaths of office and oaths of Congress, and had used their official powers under the Republic to make war on the State to which they had sworn allegiance. After victory no one was punished. General Lee, the worst antagonist, received sympathy and almost honour. Jefferson Davis, President of the rebels, responsible for most cruel treatment of the Northern prisoners, after a short detention was contemptuously set at large. Nor is this attributable to the spirit of the nineteenth century. Russia sends her Polish nobility, captured in an honorable national war, to work as criminals in the Ural mines or in Siberia. Austria hanged the Hungarian generals, who, one after another, had surrendered to Russia, enticed by honorable reception. In the Indian rebellion, an English officer allured two sons of the king of Delhi by fair words to surrender themselves, and presently shot both with his own hand, lest they should be recaptured by the people. He received no censure from our authorities. Nay, the humane Lord Canning sent their aged

father, the Great Mogul — under whom, as *suzerain*, the East India Company held legitimate authority to collect Indian taxes —to labour in the garb of a felon, among felons, in the Andaman Islands; and when the last spirited Indian leader, Tantia Topee, was yielded to our demand from a neighbouring State, he was instantly hanged, though the war and the danger were past. No remonstrance or reproof for any of these deeds came from our Parliament. Hence the widely different conduct of the American Union is imputable solely to the sympathy of this democracy with human weakness. Though smarting under bloodshed, taxes, and debt, they were ambitious to show to the world that in abhorring tyranny they will not be tyrants themselves. This is a very new form of ambition, and one of excellent omen.*

Something also is imputable to the magnitude of the republic, to its proud sense of stability, and to its wise coveting of the affections of the Southern whites. A little State of antiquity might so easily be revolutionized, whatever the form of government, that it was prone to an intense jealousy; which made tyrannies and aristocracies more cruel, democracies more furious. But in a vast community the mass cannot be overawed by force, all changes of opinion are the work of time, no formidable preparation of military power can be secret. Great moral results flow out of this magnitude of territory, with a sea-coast on opposite oceans. In no war but a necessary war of justice can California and Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts have common interest and sympathy; hence, so long as all the States have proportionate power over the national policy, the more widely the republic spreads, so much the stronger is our guarantee of its peacefulness. That, like the English in India, it has an "earth-hungering," cannot be denied: indeed the recent purchase of Russian America remarkably attests it. Perhaps they were glad to shut out Russia from any future claims on their continent; or perhaps they thought that it would conduce to an ultimate coalition of the British possessions on the Pacific with their Union. A willing annexation would gratify them; but they desire hearty fellow-citizens, not reluctant subjects. In the long run, amalgamation is the winning principle, when neighbour States talk the same language, and have the same political sentiments; for when an organization is so flexible and

* [1891. Yet in generosity to white enemies, they forgot the rights of various-skinned dependents, and sacrificed their own principle, — *No Privileged Order.*]

so just that local liberty is not lost in becoming members of a larger community, all feel that their grandeur, their safety, and their comfort are promoted by fusion. A central power which represents them to the outer world, protects them the better, the mightier it is; and, at the same time, the more effectively does it guarantee them from civil war, and constrain each separate State to legality. Moreover, each man is in right a citizen of the Union, and not of the State only. Internal custom-houses are forbidden by the constitution: goods, as well as persons, have perfectly free transit. Wherever a citizen travels he feels himself always with his own people, as much as we do whether in Cornwall or in Yorkshire: thus for a *homogeneous* population, however large, the problem of *federative* republicanism is now solved, provided that the people have a free active spirit and habits of political organization. Indeed, it is wonderful with how little disturbance heterogeneous and refractory elements are digested and assimilated in this political chemistry. Germans, Dutch, Norwegians, of foreign tongue, Irish Roman Catholics, with very uncongenial sentiment—immigrants, however inconvenient temporarily—are soon moulded into as much of congeniality as is needed for democratic fellowship. No shock is endured by the nation as a whole, which is able to take in the material strength of the new comers without risking an upturn of institutions. Most probably then, in the future, the Dominion of Canada and the great republic are destined to coalesce for mutual benefit. At present the honour of England and the high republican taxes occasioned by the war-debt forbid the thought; but neither obstacle will last very long.

If now we ask what has conferred on the great republic institutions so successful, the reply is on the surface: it is, because, *reversing English practice*, she has studied to do *everything on principle, nothing by compromise*—nothing by inconsistent regulation, by half measures, or by temporary expedient, which shall ensure after-quarrel or need successive patchings. The only exception was in the matter of slavery; there, in English fashion, dissimulation and compromise were used, with a truly frightful punishment. With a generous confidence in broad principles, laws are enacted which, if at the moment inconvenient, are sure in the long run to conduce to justice and contentment. The regulations of all the franchises are *self-acting*, so that if population in different parts expand unequally, no injustice shall arise to the more populous, and no need of Acts to amend Acts. Looking on jurisprudence as a science, they have sought to give

to its practice the breadth and stability of science; believing that when men are unripe for public duty and honour, to call them to duty and honour is the way to ripen them. They cast on the State itself, as a parent, the task of educating its citizens; and to stingy or timid rich men they say, "Educate the poor well *lest they be dangerous to you.*" England has feebly entered this course: Prussia and America lead the van of the movement. Probably it is the great distinction of the modern world, our chief contrast to antiquity.

PART IV.

ON THE STABILITY OF CIVILIZATION.

To a reader of history nothing is so painful as the destruction of the works of peace by the violence of war, especially when the destroyer is a ruder and more barbarous power. Most of all is this terrible, when the destruction is not confined to one nation, but spreads equably over a great continent, so as to entrain an age of new barbarism in which science is forgotten and art is marred. In Europe we look back upon, not a mere century of such degeneracy, but a period which may count as a millennium, interposed between two civilizations. In Asia also it is truly melancholy to one who travels through Turkey or Persia, to find ruins of stately buildings, huge quarried stones, or fragments of beautifully inlaid marble, amid unsightly petty villages; or immense systems of irrigation all destroyed, and, in consequence, drought and desert, or thin inhabitants, and miserable partial cultivation, where once was thriving and abundant population. Egypt and India likewise were formerly in a far higher state of power and opulence than now: there also great works were once executed, attesting and maintaining national well-being, which now are in decay or ruin; so that all the culture attained by man seems to have been, at least once, temporarily wrecked, and in large parts of the East is not yet fully recovered. Naturally then the thought is forced on one, May possibly this happen again? *If not*, this (in continuation of three previous articles) would be a remarkable *contrast* of our modern to the ancient state; namely if their civilization was unstable, and ours have won stability. Most melancholy is the thought that the world passes through cycles of prosperity and ruin, ever coming back into its old positions. The fruits of civilization—in law and learning, morals, science and religion—are so precious, that without them life

would seem to us insupportable. What we most desire is, continuous progress; if slow yet sure; so that each age may bequeath to the next "a better and a bonnier world." If progress be unbroken by convulsion, safe against barbarism, not to be undermined by tyranny, we shall not much murmur at its slowness, knowing, as we do, that great masses cannot change rapidly, and that custom makes a thousand hardships seem natural and reasonable to the less favoured part of society, which those on whom fortune has smiled regard as a sad marring of life. If no second wreck of arts and organization be within credibility, this may be deemed the greatest of all contrasts between the new and the old; but scarcely can such a contrast depend on a single cause. In order to examine the question fundamentally, it is requisite both to detail the occasions of the past destructions, as known to us in history; and to analyze more closely what we mean by civilization.

Civilization, as popularly understood, demands not only the qualities of *mind* which fit men for the duties of citizens—which are its proper essential meaning—but also various *mechanical arts*, which conduce to save labour and aid interchange of thought, or add to the knowledge which is power. Because fresh and fresh mechanical and chemical inventions are a great boast to the last four centuries, we are apt to think *chiefly* of these things as civilization, and to count all men barbarians who are without them. Yet our men of science tell us that the applications of science to art now advance with increased rapidity in each generation; according to which, every nation may regard its own state three centuries before as barbarous, if one esteem this outward machinery to be the test of civilization. On the opposite side, if we avow that civilization is to be estimated as a mental state, independent of knowledge and art, those Tartars of Jenghiz Khan, whom we familiarly call barbarians, and perhaps think of as typical barbarians, were far more civilized than the population of many a modern European metropolis. No man among them thought that he existed for himself, but for his people and for his prince: from this sprang their union, so terrible to other nations. "Among themselves" as a papal legate testified, "the Tartars are very friendly; all are wonderfully enduring of hunger, want and cold; everyone obeys the order of his superior, though it be to starve or lose his life." Now, inasmuch as the possession of art and knowledge is matter of degree, it cannot be the essence of civilization; but mutual cherishing, obedient co-operation, self-devotion to the State, submission to public authority, are

positive qualities, and suffice to make a true *citizen*. But those same Tartars were to other nations scornful in the extreme, insolent to foreign ambassadors even from great and wealthy realms, Persia and India; ready for outrage and slaughter unlimited of innocent people, as much as are English seamen of innocent seals, or cockney sportsmen of sparrows and bats. It seems then that the barbarism at which we shudder is not the antithesis of civilization, but the antithesis of humanity—of human expansive affection: nor perhaps will it ever be subdued by mere civilization, but only by that universal kindliness which is outside of patriotism—which fosters all harmless creatures, and abhors cruelty and injustice to man or brute.

If barbarism mean barbarity, inhumanity, many of the most civilized nations have been barbarous, though possibly none with so little discrimination as ignorant Scythian and German hordes, who have rather despised than valued cultured accomplishment. The discoveries of the last thirty years give us higher and higher notions of the Assyrian attainments in art and science. No one, until of late, imagined such a thing, as that they had in their Government offices, engraved on stone, elaborate dictionaries (if that be the right word) to explain current ideographs; also trilingual dictionaries to render Persian and Scythian writing into Assyrian, and conversely. Of necessity, for the purposes of administration and taxation of an empire organized under civilians, there must also have been gazetteers in stone, recording the geography of the empire. All these things imply a very complex previous intellectual labour, carried on by consecutive effort. Again, we now know that in beautiful small sculpture for the adornment of furniture, they excelled, before Grecian art had its infancy. Indeed, in Homer, the elaborate ornament on the breastplates or shields, or other pre-eminent excellence in art, is always either stated to be an importation from Asia, or ascribed to the gift of a god. Minute sculpture cannot become accurate and beautiful, unless it have first attained much perfection on a larger scale. We cannot doubt that alike in sculpture and architecture the Assyrians were eminent, while dealing with the hardest materials. Now this remarkably advanced nation of antiquity was fond of executing representations of events in basso-relievo, and after a victory the enemy's prisoners are often represented as *impaled* or *flayed!* It must be inferred that this frightful cruelty passed as a common and glorious deed. And what was the offence which provoked it? To have done what the Assyrians regarded as a duty—to have defended their native

land against an invader. No greater barbarity could be, from a North American savage, or from a Tartar; though the massacres by the Tartars were on a scale quite unequalled. The fruit of such cruelty was of course hatred from the oppressed; hence, when the time of revenge came, the Assyrian cities and Assyrian works of art, were destroyed with a most elaborate and unparalleled completeness. The stone dictionaries above mentioned, which the wonderful diligence and sagacity of the late Edwin Norris and others (worthy coadjutors of Sir Henry Rawlinson) re-established, were found broken up into small fragments so numerous as only to be attributable to hostile effort, anxious to annihilate the material through which the Assyrian organs worked. Nineveh, their chief city, a wonder of the world, so vanished that it never again was habitable, and its site became a disputed problem. Every royal palace was made a heap of ruins, instead of being taken as an ornament and delight of a triumphant rival. What cruelties fell upon the unhappy population when their day of overthrow came, we can but conjecture: but it would seem that from the great Nineveh none of the inhabitants escaped, except into slavery. Neither Babylon nor Ecbatana nor Persepolis, nor any known capital of these parts, ever vanished so suddenly and completely. In the total destruction of the ingenious workshops, the schools of art, the materials of linguistic teaching, together with masters, apprentices, professors and interpreters, who can doubt that a great retrogression took place in civilized accomplishment? The destroyers were not wild Scythians, but Medes and Babylonians. The latter, kinsmen to the Assyrians, speaking their language, and aspiring to become the head over all Mesopotamia, may have aimed to secure that Nineveh should never again be the local centre; but cannot have wished to destroy material which they could themselves have used, if policy was listened to. But it may be, that blind hatred and fierce resentment held sway in both destroyers: both had been subject to Assyrian rule.

The Gothic invaders of the Roman empire, and other German tribes who came after them, slew men and women mercilessly, and occasionally destroyed works of art. Attila the Hun is execrated in history for his deliberate wide-spread ravage of fields and crops: but probably the most permanent ruin came, not from any direct and intentional mischief, but from the cessation of industry and of public oversight. In Italy, the great river Po, from the neglect of its banks, overflowed the country, and stagnated in vast marshes, as the Euphrates and Tigris have

done. New and new irruptions continued for centuries: neglects accumulating in long time undid the labours of civilization more effectually than any violence of the barbarian. Education also being almost universally suspended, the posterity of the civilized nations degenerated. In the pages of Tacitus, the German mind appears fairly comparable to that of the North American Indians, whom his description of the Germans often recalls to a reader's thought. The brain of an Ostrogoth or Visigoth holding sway in Italy or Spain was perhaps of the same calibre as that of a modern Bedouin chieftain. Six centuries pass after the conquest of the Western Empire, during which the mind even of the learned appears utterly deficient, according to Hallam, in talent and genius. Long time was required, before the German mind displayed any of the high qualities which we now recognize in it. Talent to direct armies, to entrap rivals, to attract followers, to discern when to flatter and when to strike—were what a king or baron chiefly valued. Mental development and a new birth of civic arts, came back to Europe first from Italy, where the traditions of higher culture had been best preserved.

The Saracens, who invaded and conquered Persia, may perhaps be thought even less advanced than the Tartars; for Arabia proper was then, as now, a land scarcely made for human habitation, and the Moslem leaders still retained the primitive enthusiasm. Imputing to the Persians fire worship and every moral abomination—abhorring sculpture as idolatry, and assuming impiety to exist in every record of the past—they elaborately destroyed all the literature of Persia, and much of its art; with such success, that the modern Persians, in professing to write history, show profound ignorance that their ancestors had any wars at all with Greece and Rome; ignorance of that, which we know cannot have been forged—the dreadful defeat of the consul Crassus with his army, and the Persian capture of the Roman emperor Valerian. Under the Mussulman invaders there must certainly have been great malicious ruin; but evils have gradually been intensified by long misrule.

But what of the Turkish invaders of the Eastern Roman empire? Seljuk Turks and Ottoman Turks alike were Tartars, with many noble qualities. With those of the house of Seljuk we had little permanent contact, nor do we know the interior of their rule: the Ottomans we know intimately. As individuals they may seem intelligent and sagacious, honest and pious, courteous and humane. As traders they are scrupulous and sensitive, jealous of honour; they never bargain, nor take less

than they have asked. In religion they are grave and earnest; yet this very religion is so interpreted as to make their rule a curse, even while their intentions are best; for their religion enforces a despotic sultan and countenances a seraglio of sultanas. Under this regimen everything goes to ruin. It is proverbial that "the Turks repair nothing." Great pieces of ordnance publicly rust into worthlessness. Palaces, city walls, city gates fall down, and are left in rubbish. Canals, tanks, and works of irrigation have perished. Roads there once must have been, but are seldom found in Turkey. Any track through rocks, bushes and stumps of trees, where a mule can pick his way and find breadth for his packages, is called a road. Rivers either stay within their banks or overflow, as pleases them. In the Tartar's "high road" to Constantinople the bridge over the considerable river which makes the swamps of Nicomedia is covered with loose stems of small trees, which move about under the traveller's foot, and show between them the water below. (Such at least was their state at a recent time.) Standard weights in the market there are none: each dealer has bits of stone for his own use, and a stranger may be cheated to any extent. In taxation an ordinary Turkish governor is rapacious in the extreme, treating rich men as his natural prey. Merchants make no contracts in Turkish coin, but always in terms of foreign money, because of the unspeakable fraudulence in the Government mint. Since the Crimean war they have learned from us the vice of national debt, and the use of bank notes, which (it is to be feared) cannot be sound. The sultans build palaces and yachts for their sultanas: the sultanas are believed to sell the Pashâlics. Somehow, amid it all, roving Arabs plunder, and hinder cultivation: riches are dissembled, hoarding or idleness prevails, national wealth decays, in countries which might be the very garden of the world, and were once in high opulence. The devastation here is real; but gradual and stealthy, like an eating canker.

Some other devastations deserve mention. The persistent inroads of the Independent Tartars into Persia, carrying off men and girls as slaves, and burning the villages, have unpeopled long tracts of country which were once populous. The inroads of Arabs also, though far less cruel, yet forbid cultivation in a large part of Syria. In 1831 the writer was informed at Aleppo by the Pashâ's surveyor, a native gentleman of French blood and education, that he had surveyed the whole Pashâlic, and found not one-tenth of the fertile land to be cultivated. There is no ostensible reason why Aleppo should suffer more from this cause

than other Pashâlics which are in contact with Arabs. Mesopotamia was a land celebrated for fertility, so long as it was duly irrigated from the two great rivers, which now do but make noxious marshes in their lower course. Alike in Persia and in Turkey it is uncertain how much of the modern desolation is imputable to roving Tartars or Arabs, how much to the incapacity of the governing powers, who do not seem much elevated above the Tartars from whom both claim descent, though with great admixture of Circassian and Persian blood.

North Africa, alone of all the Roman empire, was raised by Roman possession from a comparative wilderness into a cultivated and settled country. In the districts which our maps attach to Tunis, the Carthaginians had already planted numerous Libyphœnician colonies; but the Romans found in Numidia only a wild country and roving people, with a few considerable towns. This is the modern Algeria. Military Roman roads were constructed and a vigorous check kept upon highway robbery: cultivation became safe, villages sprang up, and towns became numerous. Tunis, Algeria, and Tripoli (where the Greeks had established colonies earlier) became ere long an opulent and populous region, adding great strength to the Roman empire. Afterwards, whether from the violences of German invasion, or the incursions of African barbarians when anarchy prevailed, or later from inroad and conquest by the Mussulman Saracens, a great devastation was suffered, which never has been repaired. Under the hot sun of that latitude, all the lowlands must be much scorched, unless water be abundant. The rivers in general are short in course, mere torrents, perhaps often scant of water; but from the vast highland connected with Mount Atlas a full supply of rain is insured, which unless wasted in the flood season, or in barren swamps, would suffice to fertilize the country. All this, under Roman rule, was turned to service; and will be so again. In the first twenty-five years of French occupation, at vast expense to the French treasury, marshes were drained and roads made; apparently with no other result than to enhance the price of cattle and enrich the roving Arabs; for still, no sensible progress is made in cultivation; indeed, the French love neither solitude, nor the Arabs for neighbours. In this case, as in Turkey and Persia, only a strong and sagacious government can impose peace, curb marauders, and restore fertility: hitherto success has been attained by the French, only so far as they have ruled *through* Arab chieftains, incorporating them into the Government. This, it can hardly be doubted, is the true way.

They may be fanatical, and, in comparison to us, ignorant; yet they are not a stupid race; and if honourably treated, are sure to improve. What 'Abd el Kâdir was, shows how sagacious and docile all may be, in spite of temporary fanaticism.

In modern Christendom there have been some frightful direct ravages. The devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV. is stigmatized by historians. Quite recently, in the late American civil war, fields were ravaged, stores of food and mills destroyed, rails torn up, in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, by the northern armies, in order to cut off from the Southern armies the supplies behind them. But in a year or fifteen months the war was over, and every effort was made to repair the damage: then such destruction is soon forgotten. The same thing may be said of the Dutch breaking down their own dykes for protection against the enemy. It is the length of a war, yet more than its severity, which is destructive. The war of the Northern nations—Germans, Alans, Huns, and Magyars—against the Western Roman empire, may be said to have lasted for six or seven centuries, during which time nothing was fixed, no institutions could take root: hence the terrible devastation. The worst war of more recent centuries was the Thirty Years' War of Germany, in which, to speak roughly, two-thirds of the human population, and of the cows, sheep, goats, and horses, perished. It was caused by the fanaticism of an Austrian prince, and by the obedience of a part of his subjects: no other religious war known to us has been so permanent in its ruin: though fanatical rule in Spain has been in other ways still more disastrous. But in each case the evil has been local, and has not been able to affect the age.

The question being now presented to us, Is it likely—is it even possible—that events so funereal as those of our Middle Age can ever be renewed? we seem able on several grounds to answer NO. It is not likely: it is not morally possible. The devastations in the past have been occasioned, 1st, through martial nations who are accustomed to submit to a chief, but recognize no duties to the foreigner: 2ndly, through the organization of standing armies in industrious, opulent, and intelligent nations—armies which the prince can use as blind tools of his ambition. These two sources of danger are separate, yet by a simple discussion it may appear that in the future the ruder nations collectively will never domineer over the more cultivated collectively; and that no one power among the more cultivated will ever be able to domineer over the rest.

There are regions of this earth on which it appears undesirable

that men should live, since they cannot live there in settled habitations. Where no crops grow and very few trees, population must be thin on a given area: only by rapidity of movement could Tartars or Arabs gather forces so numerous as to overpower a settled people. Tartary has an abundance of grass, enabling it to feed cattle far beyond the scale of Arabia; and by the use of wheeled waggons it has far greater resources for a campaign. But the more advanced communities by means of the railroad have now prodigiously greater facility for concentrating troops than ever could be attained by a roving people. The agricultural nations must always be the more populous. The whole art of war has assumed a complicated and scientific aspect. In ancient times the roving hordes were as well armed as the agriculturists. They not only made swords of good steel, bucklers, helmets, pikes, arrows, and bows, but in some cases chain-armour to defend their horses—though with doubtful advantage. They did not attain the arts of siege. Neither Tartars, Germans, nor Arabs could make much impression on stone walls; but an enemy who was superior in the open country everywhere could generally reduce cities by starvation. Since the adaptation of gunpowder to war, a rude people is immeasurably inferior, unless, as the Ottomans, it can overpower industrial towns, and constrain their workshops to its service. Every further development in the manufacture and use of deadly weapons gives new superiority to those who have knowledge and industry. The vast power of our workshops, by the enormous supply of material, and by the use of huge cranes and pincers, with the steam-engine and steam-hammer, turns out the whole material of war with a speed and in a variety which give us a strength unapproachable by a roving or a rude people. Difficult or useless as it may be to follow wild tribes into their own deserts, they cannot now be a terror, but at worst an annoyance. It becomes the duty and wisdom of the superior power to court, and not to irritate the savage. Brigham Young, the Mormon prophet, discovered that it was cheaper to give free dinners and many small kindnesses to the neighbouring wild tribes, than to incur their enmity. Nay, the Peruvian Incas on a great scale long ago showed, that if the power in which arts and opulence are more advanced will cherish the passion of doing good, the savage is turned from a wolf into a grateful and affectionate dog. Christian states will not always be deaf and blind to so simple a truth. To carry on wars and raids of revenge is conduct as mad as hereditary blood feuds among Arabs.

At the same time our geographical knowledge is now a great

protection, and constantly becomes greater. We know the limits, the outlets, the barriers of wildernesses which it is inexpedient to enter. Approximately, we know the utmost numbers which could issue from such regions, and in what lines they must move. If by concentration into a new empire they might attain a new power, overwhelm some settled country and visit it with general devastation, the fact would at once be known to the whole civilized world, and would excite, not panic, but unmeasured indignation. All great powers would come to the rescue, before the mischief could be other than local. The misery to the Roman empire was, that the whole military force was dependent on one centre, and (when the armies were most obedient) on the wisdom or folly of one man: and when the throne was contested, the armies which were maintained to repel the invaders and crush insurgents, were called away by rival emperors to fight their intestine wars. At such intervals the outer barbarians rushed in and found wealthy provinces to be wholly undefended and incapable of resistance. By easy success at calamitous moments, their avarice and their contempt were whetted; nor did after-repulse at all terrify them. No circumstances similar to these can be apprehended in the future. *First of all*, the region of the roving people then reached from Kamchatka to the Rhine. From this we now cut off Germany, Poland, Hungary, Russia up to the Ural Mountains, and Siberia, Western and Eastern. High Asia (as modern geographers call it) is and must be a great and terrible wilderness; but it is at a vast distance from Europe; it is separated from India by insurmountable barriers; if, through Russian and Persian neglect, its rude armies could burst out upon Persia, that must be the end of their conquest. China is not much better defended than she was, but the forces of her old enemy are greatly curtailed: moreover, it does not appear that the Tartar conquerors of China ever destroyed her arts and organization, or wasted her resources. *But next*, there is not the slightest fear that civilized Europe will ever again (according to a market-dame's metaphor) put all her eggs into one basket; stake her prosperity on the wisdom and energy of one frail mortal; which occasioned the overthrow of the Western Empire. On the contrary, the utmost jealousy is traditional and hereditary in Europe against the encroachments of any one over-weening State. This is all that has been meant by the outcry for "the Balance of Power."

In ancient times, any great empire, as Persia, Macedonia, Rome, either aggrandized itself without encountering coalitions,

or at least met with no intelligent, united and persevering resistance at the critical time. Probably geographical ignorance and the slowness with which news travelled, besides the lack of good military roads and the backwardness of navigation, had much to do with this. With the exception of the petty republics of Greece, where was a system of Europe in miniature, the States of antiquity were not alarmed into coalition until too late; and then were themselves swallowed up by the conqueror, nearly as the successive powers of India by the British. On the contrary, in modern Europe, each State, as soon as it began to tower above its neighbours, has excited the jealousy of all. While Mohammedan empire was aggressive, Europe was glad of a "Holy German" Empire called Roman, and seven centuries later, proud for a little while of a Spain to lead against African Moors, and pre-potent Ottomans. But victorious Spain was soon too great. By a series of royal marriages the young king Charles inherited four kingdoms, Austria, Burgundy and the Netherlands, Naples and Sicily, with Spain; Spain itself being a union of three kingdoms. He also laid claim to the Milanese, and was elected emperor of Germany. By the genius and faith of Columbus, by the service of the mariner's compass, by the avarice and fanatical zeal of Spanish captains, the King of Spain simultaneously received transmarine empires in America and in the eastern archipelago. Gold and silver, in abundance previously unknown, flowed into his treasury from the New World; and if a policy of ordinary astuteness, of common worldly wise selfishness, had prevailed, it is impossible to estimate how widely Spanish power might have spread. But Charles adopted a policy of religious fanaticism, barely because he resented the disobedience to authority which conscience inspires. He committed the education of his son Philip to the Jesuits (a new order), and bequeathed to him the counsel of exterminating heretics. This fanaticism pulled down the Spanish empire, not the power of its foes; though first France took the alarm, then Germany resolutely broke away, next Holland fought her single-handed dreadful battle of life or death; England also was driven into bitter enmity; till, by French and English incessant efforts, and by aid of Spanish imbecility, the great empire became more pitiable than terrible. Next, France under Louis XIV. became the encroaching power which Europe unitedly resisted. Her glory was shorn by the joint exertions of Holland, England, and Germany, Holland being then the great naval state of Europe. But France too, like Spain, sank still deeper by inward decay than by the reverses of war.

In the eighteenth century England, the only great State which had preserved Protestantism and liberty, had unawares risen to such robustness as surprized both the world and herself. Her victories under the great Lord Chatham, and the extent of her colonial empire, excited her to great arrogance, and caused general disgust. Hence when her colonies boldly resisted her claims, France and Spain gladly seized the opportunity of attacking her; whence her greatest public mortification soon followed, the establishment of North American independence. Out of this arose on the ocean a naval power which firmly resisted submission to her tones of dictation. Under the French Republic, which Austria imprudently undertook to suppress, the new energies of France and her violent successes once more, and with good reason, terrified all Europe; but a long and obstinate war at length disarmed the ambition of Napoleon I. After his overthrow Russia was made too powerful for Europe. The princes of Germany were dominated by the Czar. In the war of 1829 he imposed very disadvantageous terms of peace on Turkey: in 1831 he subdued Poland for himself, in 1849 he crushed Hungary for Austria, and then believed his time to rule Turkey was come. The German and Hungarian exiles in London avowed that there could be no freedom for the Eastern half of Europe without a great war to drive Russia back. They little dreamed that Western Europe would fight that war for the East; but it was done as we now know, by our reluctant ministry,* daring not wholly to resist our Queen's German Consort, and Russia in her turn was humiliated and repressed. So certain is the law that the European commonwealth will coalesce against any power which is too arrogant and confident of might. Hereafter there may possibly be grand federations of nations, to the end of repressing mutual war. The immensity which Russian and North American power will attain may quicken the stable confederation of other powers: but each nation will retain the control of its own domestic concerns. Neither will the savage from without ever again find a universal imbecility through the neglects of a concentrated despotism, nor will all great States moulder away through misrule prevailing in all simultaneously.

Another contrast has its importance—the interests of *commerce*. Commerce at all times, on the small or the great scale, is a principal agent in human union: the rise of eminently commercial states is the first influence whence the higher culture

* See my little book—*Two Wars Two Exiles.*

of mind has been diffused. Such were in very early times special cities on the Euphrates and Tigris; such were the Phœnician cities; such, afterwards, the isles of Greece. In the ancient world the commercial states occupied extremely narrow limits of land: the arts were cultivated in cities only, and the great rural areas were left very rude, from the want of roads and the great expense of land carriage. Commerce went on either down the great rivers or by sea, which greatly limited its action. But with the improvement of European roads, and the invention of *coach springs*, the difficulty of traction was lessened, and speed became endurable. Canals, long since used for the internal commerce of the far East, were opened in aid of roads. Last and greatest of all is the railroad, which makes the carriage of heavy goods at once cheap and swift. Prices are almost equalized by it in town and country—a mark that the entire breadth of a kingdom enters the market of the world. *Every industrious nation is now a commercial state*, and, so far as its sea-coast reaches, is nautical also. Moreover, the mariner's compass and the advances of astronomy immensely aid navigation. Hereby the pecuniary interests of the industrious peoples are entangled as never before. Each has a constant interest to know the interior of other countries for the sake of interchange of products. Mutual intercourse and common interests break down national prejudice and barriers of language, so that collective mankind more and more coheres into a single community. The intercourse of diplomacy does but facilitate the spontaneous movement of the peoples. Already it is understood that rich customers are the best friends of traders, hence a commercial nation has to desire that all her neighbours be rich and prosperous. This is a valuable theorem of science.

The formation of solid nationalities, divided by national *languages* and in general by national *religions*, was necessary to the developments of the past; or at least, such is the course which human nature has actually pursued. Great good has resulted; but also, through mutual ignorance, great evil. In the future we are not to *lose nationality*, but we are to *cultivate humanity*. For all peaceful relations with the foreigner, it is needful to observe the same law of morals towards other nations which we exact for our ourselves. This will be enforced upon each by the pressure of all; until all are conscious of common moral sentiment and of the common human nature which it implies. The attempt of German and French and North American workmen to form an International bond—whatever

objections may attach to the form it has taken—is an important indication of the tendency in the majority to estimate human ties and the interests of their class above those of national rivalry; the more so, since the Germans, while still smarting under the miseries of the war which the French rulers forced upon them, have been so forward in sympathy with the French people as to displease and alarm their own Government. It is probable that in the not distant future, the number of languages needed for intercourse will be greatly diminished, and that the ill-developed tongues will be gradually disused. The educated natives of Madras, and (I believe) of Bengal, in talking among themselves use English in preference to their mother tongue, from the greater ease and clearness which they find in English when higher and accurate thought is to be expressed. What Latin was to Europeans three or four centuries back, such is English to Indians now: natives who do not understand one another can communicate in English. For a like reason the Russian tongue will domineer over the vast surface of that empire, English in North America, probably Portuguese in South America. Where a local language is retained, it will be found expedient, and no hardship, to add to it the knowledge of some one of the wider-spread and highly developed tongues. We may also confidently anticipate, that religious hatreds will not divide mankind, after the more active minded can converse in a tongue mutually understood, and discern that their moral sentiments are one and the same. Yet barbarism still retains a deadly power, as wars between the highly cultivated nations attest.

The Christian nations cannot pretend that their religion or their humanity or their institutions save them from war; nevertheless, two changes may be marked as fixed and important. Wars are shorter by far, and the victor is less able to abuse victory. As above observed, the length of a war is the most afflicting part of it, especially to the country which is the seat of war. The wars of the present day are thought long if they last three or four years: this is a great improvement on the last centuries, and it depends on abiding causes. Also, wars, even when they are wholly on the Continent, so damage the interest of neutral powers, that all the world of diplomacy is angry with combatants, and watches them keenly. In general also the neutrals are jealous of any change of frontiers; so that the motives for aggressive war are considerably diminished. In short, it is no longer from the direct ambition of governments that our worst dangers now spring. Our worst danger is from

the immorality of degenerate civilization; partly at home, and partly in the colonies of old nations.

There is no worse ruffian in the world than those whom the great Christian cities rear in thousands. Avarice impels traders to press the sale of intoxicating drugs; sympathy with capitalists, routine, political convenience, gains to the exchequer, moreover theories of freedom, induce statesmen to support the evil trade. Out of the intoxication of parents come pauperism, orphanhood, and half-idiotcy of children, and the reign of lust, and the perpetuation of a prostitution which the rulers of Christendom are mistaking for a natural and necessary condition of things. As in the times of Marius and Sulla, so now in every rank a plentiful crop is produced of selfish profligates, hardened in vice, disbelieving in virtue, and ready for lawless action as soon as they are beyond the reach of law. Did not the collective governments impose restraints on each separate government, and each in turn on its subjects, the ocean would be covered with lawless buccaneers—not least from England and France—uniting all the mechanical knowledge and skill of their native realm with the atrocity of the worst savage. The slave trade still rages in Africa, through the complicity of European traders; and the countless islands of the Pacific afford abundant nests of piracy. England has annexed Fiji, to hinder its being the centre of a slave mart: how many more islands must she annex—putting a governor and an admiral and all their train on "every rock of the ocean where a cormorant can perch"—before this policy can be effectual? Our colonists in Australia, if left to themselves, would presently follow the course of South Carolina and Georgia, and glorify slavery. They will, ere long, be too great for England alone to control; and unless all the Great Powers unite to declare the slave trade *piracy*, and honestly suppress it, new dreadful evils may grow up from the dregs of our population and from the avarice of colonists.

But because *corroding vice* from within is now our chief danger, one may almost say from every capital, every large town in Europe: *Delenda est Carthago*. There was once a military reason for living very compactly—in order that a defensible wall might contain the largest number of people. But now, this is the way to make a population most vulnerable to an enemy. A Roman army encamped every night with ranks as close as possible. A modern army avoids this, as peculiarly exposing it to danger. For military safety, for health, and *for moral reasons*, our towns ought to be emptied out into the country. If English legislation ever

looked onward, an immensity might have been done (indeed much may still be done) by enactments concerning the building of *future* towns. Every block of houses should spend its refuse on *agricultural* land in close contiguity: this would secure us against living too close, and solve several problems at once. Demoralization is the terrible foe; and it cannot be grappled with unless society be organized, trained to industry, and kept in social relations. No private claims on the rustic areas must be allowed to forbid a due colonizing of them, in order to transplant the towns. A vast civic battle, no doubt, remains to be fought; but unless it be fought bravely and our internal barbarism be conquered, England will not permanently stand high among nations, and possibly she may suffer a very humiliating fall. But the world will move on, without any general retrogression, as we see in the case of Italy and Spain. When old nations degenerate, others take the lead.

MORAL ESTIMATE OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

[From Frazer's Magazine, June, 1875.]

Mr. Aubrey de Vere opens his preface to *Alexander the Great, a Dramatic Poem*, by informing us that in the last century it was thought philosophical to sneer at "the Macedonian madman," and moral to declaim against him as a bandit. The ancients, he says, *made no such mistake*. He proceeds to panegyrize Alexander as uniting the highest military genius with a statesmanship instinctive and unerring. His intellect, he tells us, was at once vast and minute. His aim was to consolidate the whole world into a single empire, redeemed from barbarism and irradiated with Greek science and art; an empire such that its citizens, *from the mouths of the Ganges to the pillars of Hercules*, should be qualified to learn from Plato and to take delight in Sophocles. It is not necessary to quote further from Mr. Aubrey de Vere. The above sufficiently shows what a picture he aims to hold up for our admiration, what impressions he desires his drama to leave on the minds of readers. In this article it is not proposed to discuss its poetical merits, which must be left to another pen and time, but to enter into the historical questions whether Alexander the Great was a beneficent or a malignant star to Greece and to mankind, and what sentiments are just concerning him. But it may concisely be said at once that the present writer is intensely opposed to Mr. de Vere's avowed judgment.

No one ever has grudged, and no one will ever grudge, praise to Alexander for military talent; but the talent was not that of a scientific general who plans a campaign, as a Von Moltke or even a Napoleon; it was only that of a quick-eyed Garibaldi or a Condé. Generalship of the highest modern type was then impossible, for the plain reason that maps did not exist, and the roads which Alexander traversed were in every instance unknown to him. Not only was he without the means of forming previous plans of operation; he was also destitute of storehouses and stores for feeding his troops, and of gold or silver to purchase food and remunerate their services. The Romans, who methodized

war, accounted money to be its sinews (*pecuniam nervos belli*); but all agree that Alexander entered upon war against the opulent Persian monarchy with resources of money and stores of provisions utterly inadequate, so that nothing but instant and continuous success could save him from ruin. But, says Plutarch gaily, though his resources were so small and narrow, he gave away his Macedonian possessions freely to his comrades; houses to one, a field to another, a village to a third, harbour dues to a fourth; and when some one asked, "O king, what do you leave for yourself?" he replied, "*Hopes!*" This is very spirited, no doubt. In the midst of a martial people, and from a prince barely of age, it may be thought very amiable; but with Grecian statesmen and philosophers the delusiveness of hope was a frequent topic. Nothing is plainer than that from the beginning Alexander was a gambler playing "double or quits," and that causes over which he had no control, and knew he had none, might at any moment have involved him in sudden overthrow. The unexpected death of Memnon as much as anything (says Arrian) ruined Darius's fortunes. No doubt it was just to count on the great superiority of Greek armour, Greek discipline, and Macedonian military tactics; also on the feebleness entailed on Persia by royal luxury and half-independent satraps. The successes of Xenophon and of Agesilaus had long familiarized the Greeks to the belief that a moderate Greek army was superior to a Persian host. Experienced Greek generals did not esteem the invasion of Persia to be a wild expedition; the Congress of Greece, from which only the Spartans were conspicuously absent, deliberately sanctioned it. No one could foresee such a commencement as was the battle of the Granicus; everyone in the retrospect judged Alexander's conduct rash in the extreme. That it succeeded we know, but Mr. de Vere has not said a word to produce conviction that such conduct is that of a wise general.

The Persian satraps had assembled a force, powerful in cavalry, but in infantry very inferior to the Greeks, to prevent his crossing of this river, which, by the uncertainty of the bottom and steepness of the banks, was in itself formidable enough. The day was far gone, and Parmenio urged that the enemy would not dare to pass the night in proximity to Grecian infantry so superior. (Persian cavalry always dreaded a night attack, and systematically, according to Xenophon, passed the night some twelve miles distant from an enemy.) Hence the Greeks would be able to cross by night without opposition. The young king replied that, after crossing the Hellespont, it was disgraceful to be afraid of

the little Granicus; and presently plunged into the stream, bidding his thirteen squadrons of cavalry to follow. The violence and depth of the water, the rugged banks, and the enemy awaiting him, rather incited than appalled Alexander. It seemed, says Plutarch, to be a strategy of despair, not of wisdom, and indeed to be the deed of a maniac. But the young king was certain of one thing—that wherever he led, his Macedonians would follow; and this fact was the impetus to all his military conduct. The Macedonians, from their long spears, had advantage in close combat over the Persians who fought with swords; but darts and arrows from above were severely felt while they were in the river. Struggling up with difficulty through the mud, they could not keep any ranks and lines of battle, and the opposite squadrons became mixed, horse pushing against horse. The signal helmet displayed Alexander to the enemy, and three eminent Persians hurried into personal conflict with him. According to Arrian, Alexander slew the first, received from the second a blow of the sword which cut off the crest of his helmet; nevertheless him too he slew with the Macedonian pike. The third would undoubtedly have killed Alexander had he not himself first been pierced through the body by the Macedonian Cleitus.

Not unlike was the conduct of the younger Cyrus in the battle of Cunaxa, as narrated by Xenophon; but Cyrus egregiously miscalculated in expecting his mercenary, the Spartan Clearchus, to obey orders. Cyrus impetuously rushed against the Persian king's body-guard, commanding Clearchus to support him. But Clearchus thought this a rash procedure, disobeyed, and allowed Cyrus to be surrounded and killed; thus sacrificing the whole object of the expedition, and exposing all the Greek troops to difficulties so severe that their ultimate escape appeared miraculous. Alexander's troops and Alexander's generals were of different mettle; on that he counted, and was never deceived. Fearless exposure of his own person was his mode of inciting them; but they quite understood the error and the misfortune of such conduct. Even after the final overthrow of Darius, if Alexander had been slain in battle no one could measure the calamity which such an event might entail. Nevertheless he retained this habit of acting the part of a soldier as well as of general, being many times severely wounded with swords, darts, arrows, and stones, until he narrowly escaped with life in his Indian campaign. Arrian gives the account in great detail. The wall was difficult to ascend. The king thought his soldiers deficient in spirit, seized a ladder, and himself climbed to the top.

Alarm for his exposure made so many hurry tumultuously that their weight broke the ladders. Finding himself alone on the top of the wall, he leaped down on the other side, and, in spite of prodigies of valour, received a very dangerous arrow-wound in the breast. The Macedonians poured in after him just in time to save his life, which for days after was accounted doubtful. His friends severely reproached him for an imprudence which might have been the ruin of them all; and (says Arrian) "he was greatly vexed, because he knew that their reproaches were just; but as other men are overcome by other vices, so was he by this impetus to fight." This being his habit, surely no more words are needed to show the character of his generalship. Speed of movement, urgency in pursuit, were his two marked peculiarities; but to these he added a marvellous quickness to perceive at the moment whatever the moment admitted. On this account he will ever be named among the greatest generals of antiquity, although he was never matched against troops at all to compare to his own, nor against any experienced leader.

Without for a moment undervaluing his high military qualities, we must not put out of sight the pre-eminent army which his able father had bequeathed to him. The western world had never before seen such an organization. A reader of Greek accustomed to Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes finds it hard to translate the new Greek phrases made necessary in King Philip's army. The elaborateness of modern times seems to come upon us suddenly. We find Guards, Horse Guards, Foot Guards, the King's own Body Guard, the Vanguard, the King's Horse, the Cavalry, Equestrian Tetrarchies, the Agēma (which may seem to be the *Gros*, whether of an army or of each brigade), the Horse Darters, the Lancers, the Horse Archers, the Archers, the Forerunners (or Scouts ?), besides all the Infantry common in Greece; and an apparatus for sieges, such as the old Assyrians and Egyptians display to us in sculpture and painting. The history of the transmission of this art is curious. We have no reason for supposing that the Persians ever used its higher mechanism, but the Phœnicians carried the knowledge of it to Carthage. The Carthaginians practised it elaborately in some of their Sicilian wars, and from them Dionysius of Syracuse learned it. Philip II. of Macedon is said to have imported it into Greece from Dionysius; but his temperament was adverse to the use of force where bribery could effect his object. To him is imputed the saying, that he deemed no fortress to be impregnable, if an ass laden with gold could climb up to the gate. He must have incorporated with his

army sappers and miners, and men furnished with engines and ladders, skilled also in *ex tempore* construction; for in his son's campaigns these agencies come forth whenever they are wanted. It is quite unexplained how in his rapid marches through mountainous countries (as Cabul) he could carry with him huge machines that rained arrows on an enemy from a distance farther than a human arm could send them. The speed with which his engineers make bridges to cross rivers, even the great river Indus, takes one quite by surprize. Long skill and training is here presupposed. Under Alexander's successors the engines of siege attained a magnitude and importance previously unparalleled. Philip disciplined every class of troops to its own work, and from Thrace and Thessaly had men and horses beyond any previous Greek potentate. Greece had been accustomed to admire Spartan discipline; but Spartan troops were nearly all of one kind, heavy infantry. They had scarcely any cavalry, and, with all their solid armour, were unable to stand against arrows, or even against slingers and darters. Before walls and ditches they were helpless. Yet Agesilaus had not found the Persians formidable. He never encountered such clouds of arrows as Mardonius showered on the Spartans at Platæa; hence in general the Greeks feared Greek mercenaries fighting on the side of Persia far more than they feared Persians. Every Macedonian captain knew so well the superiority of a Macedonian army, that they counted on victory if only they could meet the foe in the field, whether a Philip, a Parmenio, or an Antipater was to be the general. This must be remembered in estimating Alexander's victories.

Plutarch, desirous of exalting Alexander, makes much of his boyish utterances, among which is one of jealousy against his father for too great success. "Why, boys," said he, "my father will leave ME nothing to conquer." Everything which is told of him by his panegyrists points to the same intense egotism. To be a conqueror greater than his father, and to be a fighter equal to Achilles, and if possible to be celebrated by a poet as noble as Homer, was his ardent and constant aspiration. Alexander himself told Darius plainly what were his motives for persevering in hostility. At least Arrian (who follows the accounts of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, and of Aristobulus, one of Alexander's commanders) professes to have before him the actual despatch.* After the battle of Issus, in which Darius's queen and young son and mother and other ladies had been captured, Darius wrote to ask

* "The despatch of Alexander," says he, STANDS THUS: ὧδε ἔχει."

of Alexander that he would restore them, and accept from him *friendship* and *alliance;* for which he offered full pledges, and begged for the same in turn. Alexander had treated the captive ladies with ostentatious honour; therefore a mild reply might have been hoped. Instead of this, from beginning to end the letter breathes reproach and defiance. In conclusion it says: "Since I have defeated, first thy generals and satraps, and next thee and the forces with thee; since I hold thy country, and have now in my army numbers of those who fought on thy side, come to me as to him who is lord of all Asia; then thou shalt receive back thy mother, thy wife and children, and much beside, whatever thou canst persuade me by asking for it. But in future do not send to me as thine equal, but as the lord of all that is thine; else I shall regard thee as injurious." Such a repulse of friendly overtures, when Alexander had attained far more than any Greek hoped or wished, must surely be censured by every modern. Yet, before any new defeat was encountered Darius made yet another attempt at peace. As Arrian tells it, while Alexander was engaged in the siege of Tyre, ambassadors came, offering to him ten thousand talents (say, two millions sterling) as ransom for the king's family; Darius was willing to yield to him the country *as far as the Euphrates;* he proposed that Alexander should accept his daughter in marriage, and that they should be friends and allies. The only reply of Alexander was "that he wanted no money of Darius, for he counted all Darius's money to be his own; he would not accept a part of the country instead of the whole; and if he wished to marry a daughter of Darius, he would take her by force without her father's leave." The historian who tells this does not seem to be aware how very inhuman was such a reply; no censure escapes him. As far as we can learn, to make Alexander great and glorious, is Alexander's motive according to his own account. Mr. de Vere would persuade us that his aims were philanthropic. The notion is in itself wholly anachronistic.

Ambition, not philanthropy, down to the present time is the motive for conquest. Philanthropy does sometimes lead to annexation; we see an instance in the archipelago of Fiji, which has been accepted reluctantly, not conquered, by the rulers of England. So, we make no doubt, the Incas of Peru benevolently accepted the responsibility of rule over various barbarian and scattered tribes, whom they presently attached to themselves by benefits. Instances of this kind exist in history, enough barely to show what is possible to human nature; but, alas! they are

very rare. Where the philanthropic object is sincere, the sense of duty and responsibility is keen, and there is no coveting of territory and power, no claim that might makes right, no violence is used to establish the claim. To make armed invasion and attack on another country is an avowal that you are not seeking the welfare of the invaded, but some interests or imagined rights of your own or of your ally. Now, it is obvious in Greek literature that up to the time of Aristotle and Alexander no idea of international right existed. In the discourses reported by Xenophon we have no hint that Socrates thought a war of Greeks even against Greeks *to need justification;* and Aristotle lays down that, by the natural superiority of the Greek mind, barbarians are made for subjection to Greeks; and if they do not submit, they may rightly be forced to submission—in fact, as brute animals. When Aristotle so reasoned and so believed, we cannot expect any Greek Prince, or any Greek republic, to have moral scruples against invading any foreigner. If, from a modern point of view, anyone now call Alexander a 'bandit,' as Mr. de Vere complains, it is not on the bare ground that he was an invader; it must mean that he was a peculiarly reckless invader, who, with no motive then generally esteemed adequate, marked his course with blood and devastation. That is a question of detail. But up to that time the world had seen no right of territory or of empire asserted on any other argument than that of simple force. The great Darius, son of Hystaspes, piously records on his monuments the names of the successive nations which *God gave* to his sceptre. *Hebrew princes* spoke in the same tone concerning whatever conquests they could make on their narrower scale. None can now wonder or censure if Alexander, after the battle of Issus, says to Darius, "By my victory, *God has given me* countries which were thine." The Persians had no title but force to the possession of Cilicia and Lydia; force might be repelled by force. From the earliest times the Greeks had swarmed out into colonies planted on the coast of Asia, without asking leave of Asiatic princes; but those princes no sooner became powerful than they endeavoured to recover the possession of their sea-bord,* and the Lydian dynasty at length absorbed into itself these Asiatic Greeks. When the Persians conquered Lydia, they naturally regarded the Greek coast as an integrant part of their domain; but the Greeks, rejoicing in the fall of the Lydian suzerain, hoped for entire independence, and had to be re-subdued. The

* Bord=edge, border; a different word from *board*.

Athenians imprudently assisted them against Darius, and sent a body of troops which took part in the burning of Sardis, the capital of Lydia. No modern empire would wink at such an outrage; nor could King Darius; yet the Athenians always speak as though his war against them had been unprovoked. Each side knew the outrages it had suffered and forgot those which it had inflicted—a common case. Unless treaties and oaths forbade, war was received as the natural and rightful relation even in Greece itself between city and city.

But when ambition is the real undeniable motive of war, there are yet two kinds of ambition—personal and national. However much we may palliate, excuse, or even praise the latter, all good feeling, all morality, and all common sense unite severely to rebuke the former. No moral reasoner can justify the deeds of Warren Hastings or of Clive, yet we do not stigmatize the doers as vile men; Cicero may defend Fonteius, yet the reader sees that the defence amounts to this, that the oppressions complained of, if criminal, were violences perpetrated in the interests of Roman conquest, not for Fonteius's own enrichment or aggrandizement. Each nation is strong by patriotism. Patriotism seldom escapes a tinge of national vanity, and generally is deep dyed in absurd national self-esteem. One who sacrifices himself for the exaltation of his own people has in him the vital element of high virtue, even though he may injuriously overlook the rights of other peoples; hence we can honour our mere soldiers, faithful servants of a dynasty or of a powerful republic, when they wholly decline all judgment of the right or wrong of a war, and bestow their entire energies and their lives to exalt their nation and dynasty. The more signally the selfish element is suppressed, the higher is the honour due to them; but just in proportion as the selfish element is combined with unjust war, our moral estimate is turned the other way. If the separate commanders are encouraged to love war because it enables them to become rich by plundering the conquered, the war is demoralizing to the victors. If the king who decrees the war is aiming at the exaltation not of his own nation and race, but of his own individual person; if he is ready to trample his own people underfoot, and set up the barbarian as equal or superior, as soon as *this*, in turn, conduces to his personal magnificence; and if at the same time he is utterly reckless of human life and suffering on *both* sides, whenever he has a fancy or a whim of glory—it is rather too great a strain on our credulity to hold him up to moral admiration. Now, in the case of Alexander we

have to enquire of which class was his ambition? Was he aiming to exalt himself, or his royal race, or to exalt Macedonia, or to exalt Greece? None of these alternatives contents Mr. de Vere, who says that Alexander was aiming to make Indians and Spaniards learn wisdom of Sophocles and Plato. But we must go into various details in order to get at the truth.

Alexander, in Greek belief, descended from Hercules on his father's side and from Achilles on his mother's. He might naturally be proud of each genealogy. The Macedonians were half-Thracian, and doubtfully Greek; but the Macedonian dynasty claimed to be Heracleid. Philip had satisfied the Olympian umpires of his right, as a genuine Greek, to send chariots and horses to contend for the prize, and was sincerely proud of the honour. Plutarch, a great admirer of Alexander, censures Philip for the pleasure which he took in the rivalry of cultivated Greek conversation, and for engraving on coins his Olympian victories; while the boyish Alexander, on the contrary, said "he must have kings for his rivals before he would enter any contest." Such royal airs did he give himself when he was but sixteen, that a jocose saying became current: "Alexander is our king, and Philip only our general;" and Philip himself was pleased with it. But the politic Philip committed at last one imprudence; it was great and fatal. He had long been tired of his queen Olympias, as well he might be, for all agree that she was proud, intemperate, and violent. Plutarch believes the story that, as the poets tell of Thracian women, she practised Orphic and Bacchanalian enthusiasm, and was a zealot of "possessions," inspiration, or catalepsy, which the moderns do not easily believe to have been managed without drugs or wine. Be the cause what it may, she was very overbearing and unamiable. Alexander was moulded into pride by his mother, and was in general very much disposed to yield to her; but an utterance of his, after he was supreme in Asia, has been stereotyped: "My mother really charges me a very high rent for my ten months' lodging [in her womb]." Philip is said already to have had another wife, Eurydice (Arrian, iii. 6), but apparently Olympias still held the chief place as queen, until he became fascinated by a much younger lady, Cleopatra, who was introduced to the Court in a magnificent wedding-feast. Her uncle, Attalus, when much the worse for wine, uttered an imprudent blessing on the marriage. Olympias flamed out with all the wrath of a Medea. Alexander expected to be disowned as successor to the throne and superseded by a new heir. He escaped with his mother into Epirus, and

thence took refuge with the Illyrians. This was when he was about seventeen. With a slight turn of events his history might have been that of many Oriental princes—a son contending with his father for the throne. Philip, by kind messages, persuaded him to return; but Alexander was still jealous, and his new jealousy was of his brother Arrhidæus. Pexodorus, satrap of Caria, desired to give his daughter in marriage to Arrhidæus. Alexander, suspecting some treason in this, sent a private messenger to the satrap, dissuading the match, and asking why the young lady was not rather offered in marriage to *him*. Plutarch, who tells this, does not see how unamiable this makes Alexander towards his brother as well as his father. With his cousin Amyntas he had a deadly feud, because Amyntas, his elder, was son of Perdiccas, who preceded Philip on the throne, and had ostensibly a higher claim to the succession than Alexander. All danger of collision with Philip himself was removed by the assassin Pausanias, whom Olympias was believed by the public to have instigated.

The new reign opened with all the symptoms of a Court revolution. Noblemen who had gone into exile returned at once, among whom was Ptolemy, son of Lagus. Amyntas was put to death as a dangerous rival. Cleopatra's infant son suffered the same fate. Attalus, to whom Alexander was implacable for a drunken speech, had been sent forward by Philip with an army into Asia, but was there assassinated by Hecatæus, Alexander's emissary. Cleopatra herself was "handled cruelly" by Olympias—words of Plutarch, which are generally interpreted to mean that she was put to death with bodily outrage.* But when the violent deeds of princes are secret we must make allowance for credulous exaggerations of detail.

Though Alexander was proud of his descent from Hercules through his father, so quickly was his head turned by too rapid and dazzling success, that he presently disowned his father Philip, and wished to be accounted a son of Jupiter. This was the beginning of disgust to the Macedonians. His comrade and playmate Philotas, whom Philip had employed to reprove him for his foolish and wrongful meddling against the marriage of his brother Arrhidæus, wrote to him honest truth in Egypt, when

* Plutarch says that Alexander was very angry with his mother for her conduct to Cleopatra. One might interpret his words to mean that Olympias inflicted some bodily outrage that marred her beauty; but I fear that a still more terrible sense is truer

first Alexander trumped up this monstrous fiction, and warned him of the mischief which he would do to himself by it. That Alexander never forgave him for his plain speaking appears undeniable: for, years after, when Philotas was accused of complicity in a plot against Alexander's life, Alexander, rising in the council of chief Macedonians, bitterly accused Philotas of having been a traitor from the beginning, and adduced this letter as a proof of his early disaffection. Whether Philotas was, or was not, *at last* in complicity with the plot, it is not probable that the moderns will ever agree. Quintus Curtius condemns him; but the argument which Curtius puts into his mouth appears a complete and sufficient defence, and on this point makes him reply: "I wrote to the king direct; I did not write to others concerning the king; I feared for him; I did not raise odium against him; my trust in friendship, and the dangerous freedom of giving true advice, have ruined me." Be the case of Philotas as it may, all the historians agree that Alexander insisted on the title *Son of Jupiter*, for which he had obtained the sanction of the oracle of Hammon by a very dangerous journey through the desert. On one remarkable occasion (Arrian, vii. 8), when the army was able to speak with a combined shout, by which no one should be singled out for vengeance, they cry to him that "they had best all return to Greece, and leave him to campaign in Asia by help of *his father*"—meaning Jupiter Hammon, says the historian. Plutarch, who certainly does not censure him, says that "to the Persians he assumed the haughty tone of one who was quite convinced of his divine birth, but to the Greeks he was more moderate and sparing in his assumption of divinity, *except that* to the Athenians he wrote a letter concerning Samos, saying: "I, for my part, should not have given to you a free and glorious city [Samos]; but you have received it from him who then was master of it, and *used to be called* my father"—meaning Philip. But a king who could gratuitously write thus in a public despatch to the Athenians displayed a determination to enforce his preposterous claim.* And here it is difficult to understand the liberty which Mr. Aubrey de Vere takes with history. He re-

* A curious story is told, that the priest of Hammon tried to give an oracular reply in Greek; and not being deep in the Greek language, thought that παιδιον for *a youth* ought to be masculine; so, instead of addressing Alexander by ω παιδιον, O youth! or, O my son! he said, ω παιδιος; and Alexander, in Greek fashion, instantly "accepted the omen," declaring that the priest had addressed him by the title ω παι Διος, O child of Jupiter!

presents Alexander as speaking with contempt and disapproval of the mythical tale of his miraculous origin (p. 7):

> Mark, Hephæstion!
> The legend-mongers at their work! 'Twas thus
> They forg'd in Macedon that tale prepost'rous,
> Scand'lous alike to me and to my mother,
> Touching great Zeus.

Such a tale cannot have been invented before the battle of Issus, and Alexander himself eagerly adopted it (whoever was the inventor) within half a year after the battle. It is evident, therefore, that his head was turned by his sudden and vast success; and the Macedonians saw it.

A second great disgust with them was his disparaging of his father Philip, especially over his wine-cups. The Macedonians were right loyal royalists and justly proud of Philip. He had raised their country from a very feeble to a predominant position. When he came to the throne, Macedonia had but half a sea-coast, from the number of independent Greek cities. He had recovered all Macedonia and added Thrace to it, including Byzantium itself; had brought Thessaly and Phocis into his dominion; had defeated the Theban and Athenian forces by land, and made himself at sea equal or superior to Athens; had become master of Molossia and Pæonia, and was at length acknowledged as the genuine Greek prince, who was the only rightful leader of Greece. His army he had so organized as to make it unequalled, and by the consent of one and another State he had been allowed to garrison many of the most critical fortresses in Greece. What Macedonian captain could be willing to hear Philip the Great disparaged by his own son? All the old officers of Philip were indignant at it. The habit of the Macedonians, as of the Thracians, was that of much wine-drinking, and the king was expected to dine with his chief captains and ministers. It is a sufficient mark how national customs preponderate over talents and wisdom, that the father and son who in all Greek history are signal and pre-eminent were both gravely damaged by the wine-cup. Mr. de Vere is pleased to allude to it as Alexander's "*supposed* intemperance;" and no doubt Arrian tries to excuse him, as does Plutarch, on the ground that his tarrying over the wine was from love of company, not from sensuality. Of course; so it generally is. The historical form of drunkenness with Greeks, Romans, Persians, Gauls, Germans, and we readily believe also of Macedonians, was different from that of an English artisan who stands up at the bar of a gin-palace to enjoy his solitary glass. But the evidence of mischief from these Mace-

donian banquets is not to be sneered away. The beginning of ruin to the house of Philip was from the wedding-feast of the new queen Cleopatra; at which her uncle Attalus, when overfilled with wine,* prayed "that the gods would give to Philip *a legitimate successor* by Cleopatra." "Am I then a bastard, you rascal?" cried young Alexander, and flung his cup† at the head of Attalus. Philip rose in anger, and, sword in hand, tried to step across to his son; but his feet failed him, and he fell on the floor. "Here is a man," said the youth, "who is preparing to cross into Asia, and is upset in passing from one seat to another." Evidently Alexander, as well as Philip, was already the worse for wine; but that scene, in which he might have been slain by a tipsy father, must surely have impressed him deeply, if he remembered his own scoff. One who was planning to reorganize all Asia, one who knew the frightful mischiefs which a despotic king may inflict on himself as well as on others, when wine overmasters him, is not exempt from our moral criticism. The higher his intellect, the deeper is the censure deserved. But that Alexander was fond of wine, Plutarch regards as a fact, while he apologizes for it. Alexander's body, he says, had a delicious fragrance; no doubt from his hot and fiery nature; for heat brings out aromatic smells; and the same heat of body made Alexander addicted to drink and passionate (*καὶ ποτικον καὶ θυμειδῆ*). A history written of a king by another king, or by one of his generals, is not likely to allude to drunken bouts such as the customs of the nation sanctioned, except when special necessity required; yet wine in this Macedonian tale plays a part previously unknown in Greek history. The defence of Alexander rests on his love of conversation; but what was the talk which he most loved? The poison of flattery. Arrian, his defender, throws the fault upon those who extolled him as superior to Hercules and the other mythical heroes, and of course as far and far above his father Philip; but since Alexander never checked them, but manifestly enjoyed their praise, it necessarily became the staple of these feasts. At other times he was too busy to listen to such reptiles; the essential evil of his long sittings was, that there was plenty of time for him to drink in such adulation, to the ever increasing disgust of Philip's old soldiers. Q. Curtius regards it as a certain fact that Alexander himself was fond of disparaging his father's deeds and exalting his own. The report of it even reached Italy, where his uncle Alexander of Epirus, who met his death in Italian battle,

* *ἐν τῷ πότῳ μεθύων*

† "Scyphis pugnare, Thracum est," says Horace.

uttered an epigram which was re-echoed in Asia—that in Italy he had had to fight with *men*, but his nephew Alexander in Asia had alighted on *women*. No one can wonder that a king who in his boyhood was already comparing his own future deeds with those of his father, should inwardly boast to himself, after conquering Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt in less than two years, that he had far exceeded the deeds of Philip; and with each new success, new vanity and new arrogance entered his heart. *In vino veritas.* After wine had sufficiently lessened his self-restraint, he was liable not merely to listen to praise from others, but to trumpet his own praise. The same wine sometimes affected the self-restraint of his comrades; and he surely must have foreseen each possibility.

Mr. de Vere wishes us to make light of his killing his faithful comrade Cleitus; and since Cleitus could not be brought to life again, and Alexander was shocked at his own deed, of course all the Macedonians tried to comfort the king, and to accuse Cleitus as having provoked his own death. Arrian, a profound royalist, is very severe upon Cleitus; yet the fact comes out that Cleitus's high words were elicited by the disparagement of King Philip, which Cleitus could not endure, whether from Alexander or from Alexander's flatterers. It is seldom indeed that one can attempt to guess the utterances of tipsy men; but if you cut short either the long story of Arrian or the still longer story of Q. Curtius, you get something like this as the result: "King Philip, my predecessor," says Alexander, "was nothing of a general compared to ME. In twelve years he did not conquer half of what I conquered in twelve months." "Stop!" replies Cleitus; "remember that he never had the chance of fighting with Persians: he had to deal with stubborn Greeks. Besides he never committed such a blunder as you did at the Granicus, where you nearly ruined us all, and nothing but this right hand saved your life." The last words Arrian regards as abominable and inexcusable from a soldier to a king; and so, no doubt, all the flatterers urged: the greater the truth, the worse the offence. But the absurdity is, to expect a man who is half-tipsy to retain prudence and modesty. Alexander, according to his warm admirer Plutarch, was of a "furious and violent nature" (*ραγδαῖον καὶ φερόμενον σφοδρῶς*); and now, being full of wine, of course he was uncontrollable. When reminded that he owed his life to Cleitus, and virtually all his after-successes, he could not bear such an amount of indebtedness; and although all the armed men around, seeing his state, disobeyed his orders, he succeeded in snatching a weapon from one

of them and with it laid Cleitus dead. Might not one have hoped that such a tragedy would for ever have cured him of long drinking? But it did not. Indeed, Arrian, wishing to defend him, represents him as *already** somewhat corrupted into Asiatic depravity, implying that he was on the downhill track—not that we know anything so bad of Persian kings.

Another grievous offence to Macedonian feeling was, that he exacted of them prostration on the ground before him in Persian fashion. This was as detestable to Greeks as to Englishmen. It was emphatically the unmanning of free men. Æschylus puts into the mouth of Agamemnon the sentiment of every Greek:

> Nor yet in fashion of barbaric wight,
> Prostrate before me mouthe unmanly words.

There could not be a more decisive proof that Alexander intended to destroy every vestige of Greek sentiment and Greek freedom, and reduce them all to the level of Oriental slaves. Disaffection was inevitable; his noblest comrades were the most certain to disapprove; the basest took the opportunity of calumniating them, and ingratiated themselves with the king by slander. We cannot know the exact time of this and that detestable whisper, nor whether it be true that Alexander tampered with Philotas's mistress, and bribed her to report month by month whatever words of indignation Philotas might drop. Such is Plutarch's account, who indeed represents Philotas as put to torture, and Alexander behind a curtain listening to every word; and when, overcome by suffering, Philotas uttered piteous entreaties to Hæphastion the torturer, Alexander drew back the curtain and reproached Philotas with unmanliness. Plutarch in general is just and tender-hearted; yet he can tell this horrible story without seeing how odious it makes Alexander. Arrian cuts the tale of Philotas short, but relates on the authority of King Ptolemy that he was killed by the darts of the Macedonians —equivalent to the modern shooting of a soldier. On this comes a second deadly crime, to which Mr. Aubrey de Vere will hardly reconcile us. "Silly is he," says the Greek proverb, "who slays the father and spares the son." "Silly shall I be," argued Alexander, "if I kill Philotas and leave his father Parmenio alive." Parmenio had conquered Media for the king, and was there at the head of a large army. Letters are therefore sent, with the utmost speed, to three generals in high command,

* "For Alexander had already, in the matter of drinking bouts, made innovation towards more barbaric manners."

ordering them to assassinate Parmenio while he is engaged in reading certain despatches, which are sent to put him off his guard. That they were all base enough to obey proves how completely the Macedonian commanders were already enslaved; but the wrath of the common soldiers was extreme, and might have been dangerous. There can be no doubt that Alexander was now hated as much as he was feared.

The accusation against Philotas had risen out of a real conspiracy of the pages when Alexander was in Bactria, of which, it was alleged, Philotas had had knowledge. Philip had established the system of royal pages—youths of the noblest families, who waited on the king, acted as grooms, helped him to mount his horse, and hunted with him. On one occasion, when a dangerous wild boar rushed at the king, the page Hermolaus killed the animal with his dart. The king was enraged at losing his own chance of killing it, and ordered the page to be flogged. Such a reward for such a service was of course unendurable to a noble Macedonian youth, who at once vowed revenge. Whether he would actually have taken the king's life we cannot now ascertain. Other pages shared the indignation of Hermolaus. The evidence against them, according to Aristobulus, was swollen by Alexander's belief in the supernatural powers of a Syrian woman who was subject to "possessions," and was allowed access to the king day and night, to warn him of danger. She was believed to have saved his life from Hermolaus. One thing only is here clear—that he knew himself to be hated, and through his suspicions degraded himself to precautions at once pernicious and odious. One of the alleged conspirators, Dimnus, slew himself when he found what reports and beliefs were accepted; the rest were stoned to death, guilty or guiltless. For us it suffices to know that Alexander was definitely engaged in the task of trampling out the Greek sentiment of freedom from his own people. This is very unlike the task to which Mr. de Vere thinks he set himself, of redeeming the world from barbarism, and irradiating it with Greek science and art, with the wisdom of Plato and Sophocles.

Callisthenes the philosopher had been the tutor of Hermolaus and a great favourite with him. The flatterers knew that Alexander dreaded his honesty and his courage, and they laid a plot to force him to deliver his opinion on the question of prostration before the king, by questions over the wine. Arrian, who calls him clownish or rude (ἄγροικος), gives his speech at great length; but no rudeness is apparent in it to us. He says

that he honours Alexander as the first of men, but different honours are due to men and to gods; that prostration is fit honour to gods only; that Alexander would not approve of a low multitude voting a common man into the royal throne, nor can the gods be pleased with men voting a man into divine honours; that Darius, honoured by prostrations, was defeated by Alexander, to whom no prostrations had been used. Indeed, the great Cyrus, who first received such honour, had been chastised by the Massagetans, and the great Darius by other Scythians, as Xerxes and the later kings by Greeks. This discourse, says Arrian, violently displeased Alexander, but was acceptable to the Macedonians. Callisthenes afterwards distinctly refused to prostrate himself. He now was accused of having incited the pages to their conspiracy. That the mode of his death was uncertain, Arrian regards as remarkable; for Aristobulus says he was put in fetters and carried about wherever the army went, until he died of disease; King Ptolemy says he was first tortured on the rack and then hanged. Every honourable Greek philosopher had now full warning to keep his distance from Alexander. To Aristotle the king had already sent from Asia a characteristic complaint, when the philosopher published some lectures. Plutarch professes to give the very words of the letter. "Alexander sends greeting to Aristotle. You do wrong in publishing your lectures. For wherein shall we excel other men, if you impart to them the instruction which you gave to us? But I, for my part, would rather excel men in the noblest experiences [science] than in military forces. Farewell." This is not in the tone of one who desires all foreign peoples to imbibe Greek science and philosophy, as Mr. de Vere fancies.

The pride and violence of Alexander, his vices and his crimes, one by one, Arrian seems able to defend or excuse; but when all culminates in his assumption and enforcement of the Persian dress, the historian's eyes seem at last to be opened. "I do not praise," says he, "his excessive punishment of Bessus" (whom he first scourged and exhibited naked in a cage, afterwards cut off his nose and ears, and sent him to be put to death by his own countrymen), "and I confess that Alexander was enticed to imitate Persian luxury and barbaric ceremonialism; nor can I praise that he, being a Heracleid, wore Median vesture instead of his native Macedonian, and assumed the Persian tiara instead of his own victorious garb. But if the mighty deeds of Alexander can teach us anything they teach this, that no accumulation of outward magnificence conduces to any man's welfare, if he

cannot retain sobriety of mind (*σωφροσύνη*)." Let this be a set-off to Mr. de Vere's other quotation from Arrian, which he says "is doubtless right"—that Alexander assumed the Persian dress that he might appear not altogether to despise the barbarians. He himself took three noble Persian ladies as his wives, one of them a daughter of Darius—a frank adopting of the Oriental seraglio, the curse of princes and nations. He induced eighty of his high officers similarly to take Persian wives. The marriages were all conducted with Persian ceremonies, and to all of them the king gave liberal dowries. More than 10,000 Greek soldiers followed the example of marrying native women. The king had the names of them all registered, and sent marriage gifts to every one. Nothing is clearer than that he desired to shift his centre of support. Instead of depending on Greeks, who were sure to abhor and resist his striving after Oriental despotism, he aimed simply to step into the shoes of Darius, and let the Persians feel that their *institutions* remained unchanged; they had only changed one *king* for another. To Macedonians, and to all Greeks who had a particle of free spirit, such conduct appeared treason to Greece, who had freely chosen him as leader, treason also to freedom. As Callisthenes said to his face, the progenitors of the Macedonian dynasty came from Argos to Macedonia; there not by force, but by law, they were accepted as rulers, and received honour as men, not as gods. Surely the idea that Alexander was bent on imparting the blessings of Greek civilization to all Asia is, in the face of the facts, only a wild fiction.

And here the thought presents itself, What is the erudition of Mr. Aubrey de Vere? Has he enough knowledge of Greek to read Arrian or Plutarch for himself? A matter in itself slight moves strong disbelief. Nine times in his drama he pronounces the name Κρατερὸς *Cratĕrus*. It would appear that he cannot ever have seen the name in Greek letters, common as it is, or he could not make such a blunder. There is no ambiguity about it. Thus:

> p. 27. Or keen edg'd, like Craterus. This I grant him—
> p 74. But sacrilege. I scorn your words, Craterus.
> p. 79. Which by Craterus, Ptolemy, Hephæstion—
> p. 90. Forth, sirs, and meet them. Let Craterus bide—

He is uniformly consistent with himself in the error. So too he pronounces Heraclĭdes (p. 212) with short penultima, evidently unaware that it is Ἡρακλείδης in the Greek. The *Nisæan* horses (ἵπποι Νισαῖοι) he converts into Nysæan (p. 164), misled by Νύσα, Nysa, the supposed Bacchanalian centre. In p. 96 he makes the

Macedonians talk familiarly of the philosophy of Epicurus, whom our books represent as "flourishing" half a century later. At that day Epicurus surely cannot have been known. On the whole, Mr. de Vere does not *primâ facie*, command any deference to his opinions; else one might be curious to know, whence he gets his information that Alexander planned the conquest of Italy and Spain. "The empire which Alexander had resolved to create was that of the whole world. *Had he lived, he must have created it* . . . . had ten years more been accorded. But it was not to be. Alexander was not to tread the banks of the Tiber. . . . . He had aspired to give to one small spot on earth's surface, Greece, a power extending over the earth. . . ." Will he, perhaps, appeal to the wild speech in which he strives to persuade his soldiers to march to the mouth of the Ganges, assuring them that the sea of Bengal joins the Caspian Sea, and that he will carry his army from the Ganges round Africa to the pillars of Hercules, "*and so all Africa becomes ours*"? How can a modern who knows anything of geography fail to see that if he was serious, he was a fool, rather than a statesman with unerring judgment?

The schemes of Alexander were wild enough, and it is not requisite to attribute to him what is wilder still. All his generals—and one may add, all his soldiers—knew that his dream of holding India to the mouths of the Ganges was morally and physically impossible. To imagine that the native Indians would submit voluntarily and become loyal to his sceptre, was simply ridiculous. Greek heroism and discipline must make the conquest; but the entire military population of Greece was insufficient to garrison and maintain even the Persian empire, say nothing of India proper. Alexander showed admirable military judgment in choosing sites for Greek colonies, but he could not people them without unpeopling Greece. The vast drain of young men and mature men to fill his armies quickly made the native population decay, and the Macedonian army there under Antipater crushed all that remained of liberty. Mr. de Vere whimsically says that Alexander was aiming "to give to *Greece*(!) a power extending over the whole earth," at the very time when he was actually trampling Greece itself, as well as Greek institutions and sentiments, under foot, training Persian levies to control what he regarded as Greek insolence, and putting forward native Persians, who willingly submitted to prostration and all Oriental servility, into high posts expressly as a curb on the Macedonians. It may even seem that from the day that Alexander set foot on Asia he abandoned all thought of returning to

Greece. This explains his lavish giving away of Macedonian revenues. Like Achilles, that type of pride and royal egotism, he meant to conquer or die; at best Macedonia was to him but a distant recruiting ground. When Parmenio or any other general dropped the suggestion, "Is it not time to think of *home?*" he at once treated it as disaffection. The desire of soldiers to return to their native lands and friends, was with him base and stupid ingratitude. On two occasions Arrian gives a very full account of his resentment, but condensation is here desirable. After Alexander's victories over the Indian king Porus, the army showed extreme reluctance to march farther eastward, and the dissatisfaction was too great and general to be dissembled. He tried to persuade them to march to the mouths of the Ganges, and his speech shows us on what motive he relies. "He makes them *rich by plunder;* he shares toil and danger with them; no nation has yet withstood them, and none will be able. *He will make them satraps* over new and new lands. He gives them even now *good pay.* After they have overrun all Asia *he will load them with riches,* and either will let them go home, or will lead them home, or will make those envied who prefer to stay with him in Asia." Such were the base arguments by which from the beginning he had trained his soldiers to thrive on the misery of the conquered peoples. But the army felt the toils, the wounds, the numbers who had perished, the little chance of carrying home a robust frame: in short, they were home-sick; and, to his extreme disgust, he was forced to listen to an honest speech from his old officer Cœnus, who, after long silence, expounded to him the views and feelings of the army. Mr. Aubrey de Vere seems to think that the soldiers were fools and narrow-minded, and that, even years later, an inscrutable Providence, cutting short Alexander's life, alone hindered the accomplishment of conquests far more difficult than any which he had achieved. If he had economized his own strength and that of his Greek troops, he might doubtless have reigned over all Darius's empire and over Greece in addition, but certainly not while he lavished Greek life recklessly.

Mr. de Vere is indignant that Alexander should be spoken of as the Macedonian "madman," and evidently does not understand what is the justification of that epithet. It is because he was not satisfied with encountering inevitable dangers and losses, but gratuitously espoused and invented needless dangers and new losses. The battle of the Granicus was the first manifestation of this folly. His war against Tyre was a signal and needless

cruelty, which might have been fatal to him. The Tyrians, having no aid from Darius, sent ambassadors to say they would perform all his commands, except that they must receive neither a Persian nor a Macedonian force *within their city*—an island. If he had accepted this compromise, their fleet and their resources would at once have been at his disposal; and as soon as the fortunes of Darius were manifestly irretrievable, the very small reserve of respect for Persian rule* was certain to vanish. But Alexander's pride was inflamed that any exception or reserve, however temporary, should oppose his absolute will. He sent away the ambassadors in anger, and commenced a war which proved extremely difficult. In it he received and inflicted cruel wounds, wasting time and enormous effort. At the end he won a ruined city, having spoiled its site for ever by his works; and after all the slaughter in the siege, and frightful carnage in the final storming, he had the miserable satisfaction of selling into slavery thirty thousand Tyrians and foreigners who were in the city. No other Greek general would have committed such an error, if we may not call it crime. Again and again we find him undertake dangerous and difficult enterprises, wasteful of Greek life, not because they are needful, but barely because of the difficulty.

In Sogdiana there was a natural rock, supposed to be impregnable; among the Paraitakæ a second rock; among the Bazeri (modern Cabul?) a third, which it was said Hercules had failed to take. He must waste blood and time to capture them all. The mention of Hercules instantly inflamed his passion to outdo the mythical hero. When he came to the Iaxartes (the Sir Deria), the river which separated the Massagetan Scythians from the Persian empire, he of course found Scythian cavalry watching him. They shoot arrows into the stream to show him that he must not cross. It is an unendurable insult, he says: he must chastise them. He crosses the river, undergoes hard fighting, takes credit for victory, but presently has to come back again, half poisoned by drinking foul water, with no reward but needless bloodshed. Naturally, when he turns his back, they come over to help his enemy. But nothing so much deserves to be called a wicked destruction of his soldiers as his march through Gedrosia, the modern Beloochistân. After the toils, wounds, and

* The case is not fully explained. Perhaps the Persian kings had so far honoured and gratified the Tyrians as to stipulate that no Persian force should enter their city. A highly reasonable request.

losses encountered to conquer in India territories which could not be kept permanently, he built a fleet of transports and sailed down to the mouths of the Indus. There he heard that no army had ever passed safe through Gedrosia; that Queen Semiramis had attempted it, and brought through only *twenty* men, and the great Cyrus had come through with *seven* only. This immediately determined him to do (says Nearchus, his admiral) what to them had been impossible. (The tales were, no doubt, mythical; but Alexander had an open ear to every lying legend, equally as to soothsayers and cataleptic women.) All the sufferings elsewhere endured by the army were as nothing compared to this. Heat, want of water and fodder, presently reduced them to the utmost distress. They could not feed or water their cattle; they killed them for food. Alexander knew it, and did not dare to forbid it. The waggons had to be abandoned. They dug into the sand for partial supplies of water. A miserable stream and timely rain saved a part of the army. Many are said to have perished by excess of drinking after long thirst and heat, probably also after long fatigue and fasting. Alexander in the worst suffering displayed great* magnanimity, and, like the Hebrew king David, when water was brought to him that did not suffice for many, poured it out on the ground. The guides professed to have quite lost the tracks, and a miserable time had still to be endured. That he got through safe with any considerable part of his men, seemed to be a miracle; and meanwhile several satraps took great liberties, not expecting that he would ever reappear. It cannot be pretended that such a king either economized his resources or acted as one who understood the difficulties of his own task. It is vain to talk of his statesmanship, when his military impetus and habit of sacrificing everything for the victory of the moment uniformly carried him away.

His cruelties to the unfortunate and innocent Asiatics would not deserve censure from a Greek point of view, if they had proceeded from any long-sighted policy. Philip also was cruel to the Phocians where it served his ambition. No one greatly blamed Alexander for his severity to Thebes; though all shuddered. He sold all the Thebans who survived his attack, men, women, and children, into slavery, divided their country among his allies, and razed the walls to the ground. This was intended to strike terror into every Greek city, and teach to all the danger of his enmity. Beyond a doubt it was politic, but not the act of one

* Plutarch tells a story not unlike this on a different occasion.

who desired to exalt Greece. It was in his uniform style of pure egotism. But his cruelties to the unhappy Asiatics who for the first time heard his name are repeated to satiety. He comes suddenly into Bactria, where is only one strong place, Cyrupolis. He captures *five cities in two days*, and massacres as many of the people as he can. He places cavalry round one city to intercept fugitives who might report his presence to the next, lest the people run away into the woods and mountains and be harder to catch. Nevertheless the smoke of the burning city gave warning. Tidings also of the disaster came, and the population took flight; but they were mercilessly slaughtered—unarmed and without discrimination. In storming these hapless and utterly weak places Alexander gave strict orders to kill every man, and make slaves of the women and children. (What the army could possibly do with so many slaves, and how they could be fed, here as elsewhere is unexplained.) When Alexander was wounded, as often happened, the Macedonians were made doubly ferocious. Nothing so bloody is ever imputed by the Greeks to Xerxes. Our historians would never have been silent had he committed such atrocities as they tell of Alexander.

And this may remind us of the burning of the palace in Persepolis. Alexander himself was afterwards ashamed of it, and so, apparently, was King Ptolemy, who represents it as an act of mistaken policy. Forsooth, Xerxes burnt Athens, and Alexander wished to avenge the outrage! Had, then, the countless multitudes* relentlessly slaughtered in pursuit, after his great victories, been insufficient revenge for ancient deeds? And did Alexander forget that Persepolis was now his own city, and that he was burning his own palace? Arrian elsewhere, in courtier fashion, says that Ptolemy, being a king, was likely to tell the truth; but he forgets that it must have been very painful to him to tell facts disreputable to his royal patron and friend, on whose favour and successes his own fortune had been built up. Plutarch gives another account, which Mr. de Vere believes, that the palace was burnt under the initiative of the Attic courtesan Thais in the midst of drunken festivity; that she was the mistress of Ptolemy; that Alexander was not the master of himself when,

* In all mere estimates of force we may justly suspect immense exaggeration. Arrian says that, after the last great battle with Darius, as many as 300,000 corpses of barbarians *were gathered*, and a far greater number of persons were captured. One may suspect that he wrote Δ, and that it has been corrupted to Λ. This would reduce the number to 40,000, and agree with Q. Curtius.

with garland on his head and lamp in hand, he assisted and aided in the conflagration; finally, that the Macedonians eagerly assisted, *because they thought it a certain proof that Alexander did not mean to keep Persia and live among barbarians.* This is the more probable account, but it was morally impossible for King Ptolemy to publish it.

One cannot read the details of battle, and fire, and ravage of peaceable homes, without seeing the vast amount of suffering, of starvation, and of ruined prosperity entailed by this ruthless conquest over a vast area of country. If it had been followed by a total overthrow of old corrupting despotism, and the introduction of nobler institutions, we might say it was a dreadful price paid for a great good; but when Alexander carefully preserved all the worst Persian institutions, who will show us any good at all from it? So successfully did he act the part of a mere Asiatic, born in a seraglio, that Persian tradition, and the celebrated Persian epic, represent him as a younger Persian prince who dethroned his own brother, and so succeeded him in the empire. If we ask, Wherein did he improve Persia? we get from some the reply, "He diffused a knowledge of the Greek language." Yet the Greek language and Greek literature could not save Greece itself from decay, nor from worse and worse corruption, under the despotism which he imposed and bequeathed. He exposed his own life recklessly, month by month, yet never took a single precaution for the benefit of the empire in case of his death. This is in perfect harmony with the essential egotism of his character. He believed himself the most generous of mankind, because he gave away the fruit of other men's labour to his soldiers; and he frequently boasted that he retained nothing for himself, when he was claiming the supreme power over all their property, their lives, and their honour. At the last, when they saw he was dying, they implored him to name his successor; but to the question, "To whom do you leave the empire?" he would give no other answer than, "To the strongest man among you." Hereby he entailed on Asia the new misery of twenty years' civil war among his generals.

The mischief to Greece in each new generation was worse and worse. Freedom was almost everywhere crushed. All the young men had to unlearn patriotism, and accept the creed that to become mercenary soldiers in Asia, or suffer conscription under a tyrant, was a life good enough for a Greek. That genius in Greece perished with Demosthenes is so often remarked, that it is difficult to understand how any scholars blind themselves to

the evidence that Alexander was the assassin both of liberty and of genius. Of course the evil results from the overthrow of law and of all semblance of right could not appear at once. The vast system of standing armies undermined in Greece industrial pursuits, cultivation of the soil, and family life. The same result, depopulation, followed in Italy from the demand of men for the Roman legions; and we cannot be wrong in tracing to the same cause the marked and steady decay of population in Greece. As to Asia, we have no documents to base assertion upon, but nothing visible denotes that under Macedonian or Parthian despots things were better than under Persian. While princes are born in a seraglio, and practise polygamy from an early age, no royal dynasty is long equal to common men in body or mind. To join personal despotism to polygamy is fatal to all enduring good government; yet this is exactly what Alexander did. Of durable prosperity he laid no foundations. Military posts in abundance he planned and fortified; docks for ship-building he established on the rivers of the Panjáb; but how could he hope to obtain allegiance from the people? He depended on mere force. When his back was turned they revolted. He might well say, as Napoleon I. said, "Ah! I cannot be everywhere." When an Indian king—Musicanus—revolted, Alexander in revenge razed to the ground the walls of the cities which he had placed under Musicanus, and reduced the people into slavery (what he did with them as slaves is never explained, and this makes one hope there is exaggeration), and where he had himself placed garrisons he dismantled and destroyed the citadels: an impotent mode of securing future submission. Musicanus, having been caught by the Macedonian Peithon, was sent back by Alexander to be hanged among his own people. It must surely be evident that Alexander could not always be an Achilles, and that the Panjáb was certain to be lost to him the moment that it ceased to fear an overwhelming military force. The description of the army with which he conquered it, takes one quite by surprise, though in his letter to Darius after the battle of Issus he boasts that many who in that battle were in the king's ranks now fight in his. But in India the Greeks in Alexander's army were so outnumbered by Asiatics that, if the king had died of the arrow-shot in his lungs, they feared to be massacred by their own auxiliaries. Were these to garrison all India for the king?

We cannot wonder at the entire absence of prudence in a young man spoiled from childhood, intoxicated with military success, and bent on egotistical glory; but to extol such conduct as

"instinctive and unerring statesmanship" is very delusive doctrine. "If I were Alexander I would accept Darius's offers," said Parmenio. "So would I, if I were Parmenio," replied Alexander, insolently and foolishly; yet it is lauded as a right royal sentiment. Parmenio thought it better to accept treasure freely granted by Darius, and use resources accumulated in the past, than to seize supplies by wasteful and odious rapine; better to accept three solid countries with the whole sea-coast fronting Greece, and take time to consolidate the conquests and press lightly on the conquered, than to push farther at once and risk their communications with home; better to establish peace with Darius, even if it could not last very long, and secure their home predominance, than to make the quarrel with Darius implacable and give hope to all the Grecian enemies of Macedonia. If Antipater had been defeated in Greece, Alexander might have been ruined by it in Asia; the loss of a single battle by Alexander himself against Darius might have been fatal. Parmenio, it seems, is a stupid pedant in Mr. de Vere's estimate. If his advice had been taken—if the Greek dominion had never gone beyond the Euphrates—we cannot be sure that the history of mankind would have been happier, simply because vast contingencies always elude certain knowledge. But, without rashness, we may say,—acquaintance with the masterpieces of Greek literary genius would even then have been diffused in the East among minds capable of appreciating them. Whether Parthians or Babylonians ever got much benefit from such literature, it is truly hard to ascertain; but high literary eminence does not need WAR to extend the sphere of its admiration. If anyone lay stress on *such* a result of Macedonian conquest, he confesses that it was very barren of good in Asia; that it was deadly to Greece is no theory, but manifest fact.

MODERN SCIENCE RELIGIOUS IN THE LONG RUN.

[1875.]

We cannot move about in this world without being made aware how large a part Religion has played in human history. In every old country Churches or Temples abound, many of them of great antiquity and elaborate structure. Every Cathedral implies a number of clergy attached to it with special provision for their maintenance. It is not only in Christendom and since the Christian era that sacred buildings meet the eye: the same thing existed on even a grander scale in ancient Egypt and in India, where the intellect of man first received high development. Moreover in rude tribes of barbarians a recognition of God or gods is ordinary. To impute all this to Priestcraft, is a superficial explanation and really foolish. Priestcraft in plenty there has been; but crafty priests would have been wholly unsuccessful, had not mankind been generally predisposed to religion, simple-hearted, and thereby deceivable. The tendency of mankind everywhere is, "to feel after God, if haply we may find him," by an instinct comparable to that, by which each animal seeks its appropriate food.

But while all nations agree in the importance of Religion, it is very perplexing to discover the enormous diversity of opinion, when we ask, wherein Religion consists. This diversity warns us of two things: (1) not to rest on the authority of any learned man or any separate school or creed: for, it is evident that in this way every monstrous error is transmitted and made perpetual; (2) not to be confident in any special wisdom of our own, but to be confident only so far as our judgment is supported by the universal reason of *mankind*. The closer we look into facts, the more do we find, both as to Religion and as to Morals, that under outward diversity lies a deep inward agreement. For Morals, all the words descriptive of virtues and vices exist with very close equivalence in every cultivated language. Justice, Truth, Bravery, Generosity, Kindliness, Mercy, Purity, Modesty, Temperance, Faithfulness, Patience, Candour, are praised, and

their opposites are blamed: hence, though in detail of special cases different judgments may be given, we see in substance a fundamental and most satisfactory agreement. So too in Religion; though the various contradictory, and endless mass of legends presented to us in different nations as "Religion," is startling and at first very discouraging, yet, we soon discover that the thoughtful and intelligent men of every nation, school or sect, defend its Religion only as conducive to Moral Goodness, and confess it to be untenable, unless this claim can be made out. People may be devoted to very frivolous and unbecoming tales as sacred; and may mistake ceremonies and postures for Religion; yet their conscience quickly responds to the assertion, that the essence of Religion is Just and Kind dealing towards MAN, and Pious thought towards *God*. The routine of what they call Divine Service or Assent to a Creed *may* or *may not* in fact conduce, as they think it conduces, to practical Virtue; but in general it is admitted, that practical Virtue is the end, and the whole religious apparatus only the means. Thus the heart of Mankind under all creeds or ceremonies avows that we must judge of every religion by its Moral fruits.

In no other way is it possible for the millions of mankind to have an independent judgment concerning Religion. In no other sense can Religion be of value to them, than as animating to love Right and to do Right, to love Truth and to seek Truth. While we merely seek to supply bodily needs and obtain bodily gratifications, we are on the level of brute animals. The peculiarity and superiority of Man is in his mental power, by which he discerns Right and Truth, and becomes a moral being. Every one of us is made for the noblest joys of the spirit, but these come to us (like other good things) only by careful cultivation. They are the fruit of righteousness. The older Hebrew Psalmists, Proverb writers and Prophets, substantially agreed herein with Jesus of Nazareth. In the Proverbs (xxi. 21) we read: . . . . which says much the same as Matt. v. 6. . . . . *Life* means emphatically *spiritual life* in the older as in the newer religion. The prophet Micah emphatically says (vi. 8) . . . .

Thus to follow after Righteousness and Mercy, to cultivate Goodness is the end, the purpose, of Religion. No persons can have believed this more absolutely, than the inventors of pious frauds; for they justified falsehood when it would promote goodness: but they forgot that Truth is one of the virtues which we need to cultivate; hence they became blind to the certainty, that because Virtue is harmonious with itself, therefore no falsehood

can permanently conduce to Virtue. I need hardly say, how earnestly the first and greatest teachers of Christianity announced under many names, Holiness, Righteousness, Virtue, Spiritual Life, in its fullest and largest sense, as the end for which man exists. This great truth is far too important to be new. *It is older than Christianity:* no one can say when it was first uttered. Yet the world does not understand that it is paramount, pre-eminent; and that the outward forms, ceremonies, churches, books, creeds, which are called Religious, become noxious and Irreligious, whenever they assume an equal place, a co-ordinate rank, with Righteousness and Holiness.

The noblest of the old Greek philosophers held most emphatically that to attain Righteousness is man's best and happiest state. We cannot pretend that any *School* of Greece or Rome attained so high knowledge and such enthusiasm of humanity as we had known or surely heard of in a later bi-millenium. *Individuals* among them may have equalled the highest since known, but we seldom or ever have historical knowledge of individuals as trustworthy as of schools. Meanwhile, we wrongfully depreciate ancient men on the ground that they could not "spiritualize" the mass of mankind. A most unfair claim to make of them! No individual, no sect, no school, has *yet* achieved the task so complacently exacted of a handful of Greeks. The fact is, that the most ambitious men seize and alternately keep the guidance of State affairs, and until very recent times *have demoralized* every human nation faster than any moralists could spiritualize it.

In such a process a few philosophers, even if they had been concordant, are comparable only to a sect of modern Quakers declaiming against war. Greek philosophers fared only as did Christian apostles. At first and at best they raise a small but noble sect,—as Pythagoreans or as Christians. If its energy increase its members, the new members bring in new ideas, and presently Sects arise, with a struggle for separate Creeds. The name may continue, as Brahmin, Persian, Christian, but in a few centuries the primitive ideas evaporate and are changed by ambition of priests within or princes without. The ambitions of each class have ends to serve other than those of Right and Truth, and have generally the use of tools far more immediately influential than any wielded by the faithful votaries of Right.

When an ambitious Empire wages wars wasteful of blood and treasure, it tends to impoverish many peoples and overthrow even their power of resisting barbarism; necessarily the incipient

Education of nations is arrested and pulled down. This backward war is seen in each America, in Africa, in India, in Mediæval Europe, and most strikingly in the more temperate zone of Asia. Who can wonder that Philosophy fights unsuccessfully against the reckless ambition of armed princes?

What then? Are we to expect that the Future will be like the Past, and (as perhaps did some of the wisest Greeks and Romans believe) that Mankind has no better *future* to expect than an ever recurring destruction of Better things before they can establish themselves? So indeed it may have seemed reasonable, before the rise of Modern *Material* Science, which though on superficial aspect it is irreligious, because it is so rudely antagonistic to all *false* religion, has wonderful power to bridge the Oceans and unite mankind; also to preserve literature and to strengthen educated nations. We count its eve from Galileo and Kepler, its full birth from Isaac Newton. While the Spanish and German monarchies, in alliance with the Papacy aimed to trample out every spark of sound Science, and beyond Europe was no national light visible, our prospect seemed, to the end of the German Thirty years' War, very doubtful. But in the struggle Spain and Austria were exhausted, the Papacy was more and more discredited. Astronomy then assumed its modern form, and the human intellect seemed to be born anew, in the baptism of Numbers and Quantity, by a treatment wholly new, founded on systematic Experiment, not on mere casual Experience and Observation. For, *Experiment*, a new and vast power, was found in instruments previously unimagined, which measure Quantities more accurately than the unassisted senses could attain. We must honor the rude yet sagacious meters of Egypt and Chaldæa; still, all that was done for ancient Astronomy with help from Greece, was quickly surpassed when out of the Microscope rose the Telescope and upon this the Thermometer, the Barometer and the Mariner's Compass. Plato had believed that no Science would be rested on the human senses: but it now appeared, that with the just aid of instruments, no foundation of Science was so sound, and so fertile, as the eye or the touch; and no previous Science had *verifications* so numerous and so convincing as have the numerous Modern Sciences; none so opens Nature to the Student who applies them rightly. Without verifications we now admit nothing to be Scientific.

Many of the new Scientists, especially in France, which among Catholic countries had best attained Free Thought, supposed the old Religion to have perished, and with Lucretius and Epicurus,

hailed the New Sciences *as dispensing with Divine aid* in the government of the world. Having discovered a few principles or rules to be Universal, such as Gravitation, Cohesion, Heat, and last Electricity, they leaped to the conclusion that the world would work itself. But the greatest leader, Isaac Newton, never halted in such a notion. All indeed professed as a FIRST PRINCIPLE, that no inanimate thing could *originate motion*. It could only be moved by something which had life. Obviously then, when Newton taught that two vast orbs in heaven *attracted one another*, he and his school must be understood that the movement was the result of a Divine Force impressing it. Newton also proved that the Total Attraction between our Earth and its Moon, or between our Sun and our own Globe, is simply the *result* of the separate attraction of *every particle* of the one on *every particle* of the other: that is, he proved that the result of the latter collectively was equivalent to supposing all the particles of each combined in its Centre of Gravity; after which no one could doubt that the attraction, though apparently on the entire mass, is really on each separate particle. To imagine that every molecule of the Sun and its envelope, every drop of water or gas in a Comet or in the planet Saturn gave an infinite series of pulls on each different particle of our Earth, according to its ever-varying distance, is not difficult to any young mathematician; but to ascribe such *knowledge* of endless distances and such accordant action to the *natural power* of brute matter, is a doctrine inadmissible to common sense, and worthy only of a Fetish savage. Barbarians always saw Divine Power in the Elements and in the Anatomy and Instinct of living creatures. The Newtonian doctrine of Gravitation, so far from superseding this, does but add new and purely scientific descriptions of ever-acting *Divine* Forces around us and in us, wholly repeating and confirming the utterances of the Hebrew Psalmist, "The Fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God.'"

All future Science is certain to be *in its theory* profoundly religious, and being necessarily cosmopolite, will act equally on all religions, enforcing on each the same broad human principles, and tearing away from every creed its untenable sides. In nations, as in persons, Ambition and Avarice do not listen to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely. Every step toward the millennium has been gained and will be gained by a mighty struggle, and will not come to us from heaven without human effort. But we already see that the future of this world is not to be like the past. The millions of every great civilized nation are

no longer to be kept in ignorance, as material of fighting men. Prussia and North America have led the way to national education which must have its technical and scientific side. No great nation can *afford* to starve its science, and every great system must sidle towards democracy and towards the possession of the soil by its actual cultivators. Religion will more and more, if unawares, yet not the less certainly, be affected by deliberate and serious foreign thought, and if unhappily, some weaker human tribes die out, whom Philanthropy would rather elevate, yet the general world, with Woman in her right place, will in every century less and less deserve the Lamentations of a Jeremiah.

ON THE WEAKNESS OF ROMAN EMPIRE.

[Reprinted from Frazer's Magazine, January, 1876.]

"During a happy period of more than fourscore years," says the historian Gibbon, "the public administration [of the Roman Empire] was conducted by the virtues and abilities of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the two Antonines." This remarkable series of eminent administrators is generally suggested to a reader's mind, if "the Good Emperors" be alluded to; but most persons will account Augustus Cæsar eminently good, as also Vespasian. To give prominence to the true causes of Roman weakness, and show that merely good administration could not save the empire from rapid decay, I purpose fully to analyze the two first reigns before passing beyond. They will show the secret springs and germs of all that follow.

Let us omit those deeds of the youthful Augustus—then Octavianus Cæsar—which were most bitterly censured by antiquity. If the facts are truly represented, yet we cannot blame his exasperation at the assassination of Caius Julius, his adopted father, over whose death even Cicero fiercely gloated. In every case his juvenile career is wonderful. Wholly inexperienced, delicate in health, and surrounded by unscrupulous men, who were accustomed to prompt military action in cutting civil knots, he deals with them alternately in war, in peace, and in treaties, with no superiority of military force, yet never makes a single false move. By Marcus Antonius's monstrous follies, he is prodigiously aided; he suffers at most two naval defeats from Sextus Pompeius, yet by his friend Agrippa's talents is even in that war victorious. Fourteen years after his great-uncle's death he is left the acknowledged chief of the Roman world at the early age of thirty-three. He then had the arduous task of readjusting the whole machine of State, so that in future it might work without convulsion under new and constitutional relations towards a single permanent head. The death of Caius Julius warned him that the Romans would not endure an oriental king. The very word *Rex* suggested to them despotism and tyranny. Studying to legitimate his position by the forms of the Republic and by the sanction of the Senate, he solved his problem with skill so successful as to dazzle

alike his contemporaries and later ages. The relief to the empire from internal peace, after nearly thirty years' civil war doubtfully intermitted, was so great as to win for him unmeasured panegyric, and exaggerate the positive merits of his rule: into which, the more closely one looks, the graver appear the weaknesses and the errors.

In the first place, it must be remarked that he was far too anxious for popularity with Roman citizens to keep any due control upon the licence of oppression, which Romans, especially Roman officers, used in the provinces. Under the Republic the licence was notorious. The Senators were oppressive by accepting heavy fees for false judgments, privileges, or extortions, partly as hush-money for exemption from false charges. The Knights oppressed as farmers of the taxes, often getting military force from the governor to aid in exactions. The soldiers oppressed by simple terror of the sword. Augustus made no change which should fundamentally remove and prevent any of these three dire mischiefs. Of the misconduct of individual soldiers the Emperor would rarely hear anything; but how great was their licence we may judge by the frightful case of the British queen Boadicea, a little later. She rebelled against Rome because her daughters were violated by Roman soldiers, and herself was scourged—probably for trying to save them. The almost continuous war—chiefly civil—for thirty years before Augustus became monarch, and the ruthless murders of noble Romans in cold blood, cannot have allowed that generation to rise at all above the level of Lucius Sulla's contemporaries. We may therefore be certain that nothing short of stern and resolute justice at Rome could save the unarmed and helpless provinces from the Roman governors and farmers of the revenue *then*, any more than under the Republic. But Augustus had nothing of stern and resolute justice in him. We may believe that Dion is right and Suetonius is wrong concerning his early career, and that from the beginning he abhorred proscription and murder; though, as Maria Theresa in the partition of Poland, he accepted the advantage of crimes which he could not prevent. But the higher his star rose, the more did he covet Roman popularity, alike with the people and with the Senate. He knew that his great-uncle, Caius Julius, had risen entirely on his magnificent shows, so he resolved to captivate the people by shows still more magnificent; and to the Senate, whose co-operation he urgently needed to impart a constitutional exterior to his rule, he was most anxious to exhibit himself as a mild, tolerant, and benign prince. In nearly all

history we know that the despotic satraps in a great empire can only be prevented from tyranny by the stern severity of a higher despot. In Persia, ancient or modern, in Turkey again, it is not a gentle or well-intentioned sovereign, but one sternly just, and even capable of cruel retaliations, who best consults the welfare of the subject people. Our own Alfred is praised for bridling his officers by summary severity, not by civil law. Dion (liv. 23) gives in detail a very remarkable story, which shows how slow and reluctant Augustus was to punish a provincial governor appointed by himself. He had made a certain Licinius—who was of Gallic birth, and first a slave, then a freedman in Cæsar's house—a governor in Gallia. This man, not satisfied with ordinary exactions, impudently decreed that the year had fourteen months, and levied fourteen tributes instead of twelve. The Gauls complained; Augustus avowed sympathy, and partial disbelief. He came himself to the province,—to examine into the facts, we must suppose. But Licinius showed his treasures in gold and silver, and declared that he had amassed them for Augustus, in order to weaken the province and hinder its rebelling. The Emperor took the treasure, and the rogue escaped without further punishment.

After the dreadful revolt, which reached from Illyria to the Black Sea, and threatened Italy with invasion, Baton, the Dalmatian leader, to whom, for special mercy to an intercepted Roman army, Tiberius had given honourable terms, was asked publicly by Tiberius why they had revolted and persevered so obstinately in war. He boldly replied: "Blame yourselves for it. To guard your herds you send, not dogs nor graziers, but wolves." Such were the governors, not brought to those provinces by lot from the Senate, but selected for them by Augustus. Yet it is possible that he had little choice; all the military men may have been equally hard, and softer men might have fared as did Varus in Germany.

The cardinal mischief lay in rapid conquests and annexations. The praise of moderation awarded to Augustus by Tacitus and Suetonius has been wonderfully re-echoed by the moderns, even Gibbon and Sismondi* being carried away by the delusion. The area, peopled by brave and stubborn nations, which this prince added to the empire, was enormous; and his ambition aimed

* Not that Sismondi praises the moderation. Valuable writer as he is, he wants calm judgment. He strangely despises the Emperors for not conquering Germany, and says that the Republic would have done it. Where would he have had conquest stop?

at yet more, which, diverted by insurrections, or compelled by defeats, he reluctantly abandoned. He planned to conquer Britain (excited to the scheme, says Dion, by the example of his adopted father, the Dictator Cæsar), but was twice arrested by rebellion in the Alps and Pyrenees. He sent expeditions against Arabia Felix and Ethiopia, with miserable result. He temporarily pushed his conquests in Germany up to the Elbe, but by Arminius's insurrection three legions under Varus were destroyed, and the Roman frontier driven back to the Rhine. This great and critical event, which the Germans have been recently celebrating, is hard to parallel in history; but an acute friend of mine compares it to the destruction of the English army in Affghanistân. Tiberius Cæsar, like our Generals Nott and Pollock, was sent, not to reconquer, but to inspire terror; to show that Romans were still superior to Germans, and could not only repel, but invade. Augustus, for the first time, and nearly at the end of his life, learnt the vanity of coveting extended territory. In fact, his numerous wars, says Velleius, "fatigue the writer."

To borrow names from modern geography, he conquered Egypt, Bulgaria, Roumelia, Servia, Bosnia, Illyria, with Dalmatia, Slavonia, Corinthia, Styria, Austria, all Switzerland, Bavaria, up to the Danube, and the north coast of Spain with the Pyrenees, besides completing the conquest of France, with Belgium and Holland. M. Crassus (grandson of the Crassus who is infamous for his lawless, self-willed, and calamitous war against the Parthians), when Governor of Macedonia, conquered for Augustus Roumelia and Bulgaria, and first brought the empire into collision with the Sarmatians or roving people, namely, with the tribe called Bastarnæ, who had crossed the Danube into Bulgaria. Through inexperience, the Romans were quite unaware that small nations of industrious agriculturists on the frontier of the empire were their most valuable friends, and, if maintained in freedom, would serve as a shield and buffer against the roving nations, who were incapable of being attacked or pursued; therefore, to push the frontier up to meet them was an insane policy. Yet to nourish the strength and spirit of the mountaineers and agriculturists could not occur to any Roman as wisdom, while the provincials were kept unarmed, spiritless, and enslaved—*the only form of rule which Romans understood.* Crassus tried to maintain his conquests by the characteristic Roman cruelty of cutting off men's right hands; a policy pursued by Æmilianus and others in Spain. No doubt it inspired terror effectually,

yet it also intensified hatred. The wild and brave mountain population, subdued by the generals of Augustus in some twenty years by violent and bloody struggles, could only be held down by violence. Hence great standing armies were needed, and resolute, severe commanders, called Governors of the provinces. Naturally these were more like wolves than dogs. Nor is it easy to believe that the taxes on the empire at large for these terrible wars and permanent armaments can have failed to be oppressive, however clearly and fairly adjusted in the clever emperor's schedule.

With the Parthian king it was all along easy to preserve peace but for Crassus's escapade. Intervening deserts separated the monarchies, if only Armenia were maintained in independence. Before the battle of Philippi, Brutus and Cassius conceived the bright idea of getting aid for their cause from the Parthian monarch, and sent Quintus Labienus to him as an ambassador. After their defeat and death, Labienus did but bring in the Parthians to conquer provinces from Rome, who for a little moment overran Syria and Asia Minor. Marcus Antonius was already a victim to Cleopatra, to wine, and to every folly of dissipation; but one brave and energetic under-captain, Publius Ventidius, with inadequate forces and at his own initiation, inflicted on the Parthians many defeats, slew their noblest and much-lamented leader, Pacorus, the crown prince, and recovered the provinces—apparently for Antonius, really for Augustus. Thus was the Roman Empire fortunately secured on the side of the east.

But Augustus's great standing armies presently proved a scourge to his successor, and their necessary maintenance was the germ of ruin to the empire. If Augustus was severe in anything it was in military discipline. Idle soldiers, he knew, were a terror to those whom they had to protect and to their own commanders, rather than to the enemy. The formidable masses of men who were placed along the Rhine and Danube were kept at severe work even in time of peace, and their numbers forbade high pay, even if it had conduced to discipline. After twenty years' service they were nominally dismissed, but liable to be still detained "under the flag;" at last they might receive a bit of land, after they had lost all taste for peaceful husbandry, if happily free from wounds; many having served thirty years, some even forty. Most of them having had a terrible taste of war in Germany or Pannonia,* were already much disposed to

* Pannonia is Hungary West of the Danube.

discontent; and at Augustus's death his will made them flame out into mutiny. The prince was aware that his power depended on his body-guard, which was quartered privately on the Palatine Hill (says Dion) in small bodies here and there, or many cohorts in Italian towns. He kept them in good humour by pay more than double, with no duty but of escorting him in Italy, often to pleasant watering-places. They were never assembled into a mass, so as to see their own strength, nor were subject to any harsh or painful discipline. The Senate well knew that the chief to whom these troops were devoted could in a moment crush any obstinate and hostile individual, even if he bore the title of consul; thus this celebrated body-guard, called the Prætorians, was the firmest bulwark of the throne. Grateful to their fidelity, Augustus bequeathed to every Prætorian Soldier 1,000 *nummi* (a sum computed to be rather more than £8 of our money), and to every legionary soldier 300 *nummi*. There was no precedent as yet that could have made them claim a legacy; but this single act of Augustus made it ever after necessary, at each new accession, thus to bribe the armies. In fact, it was a public avowal that no prince could ascend the throne without purchasing the consent of the soldiers. If nothing at all had been bequeathed, no reason appears why any should have been aggrieved; but when the legions reflected that the Prætorians, who served only sixteen years, and had two denarii a day, were now to receive 1,000 coins for their light services, while the legionaries, who often served twice sixteen years, and had only ten *asses* (i.e. $\frac{10}{16}$ of a denarius) as daily pay, were only to get 300 coins each as their legacy, the smouldering discontent burst into a flame; and first the nearer army of Pannonia, next the more distant Germanic armies along the Rhine, broke into mutiny. Such was the terrible beginning of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar.

This very able and excellent administrator was then fifty-six years old, and every year of his life he had seemed more admirable and more worthy of esteem—worthy perhaps even of love from the wise. Up to that very mature age no tooth of slander, that we know, had nibbled at him except from the flatterers who wished to ingratiate themselves cheaply with the grandsons of Augustus, by pointing at the experience and high reputation of Tiberius as likely to be dangerous to their imperial hopes. To avoid eclipsing these boys, he had resolutely withdrawn from public life for some years, and retired to Rhodes, in spite of the vehement disapproval of Augustus. Only after the death of Caius and Lucius Cæsar did he come forth again. Then Augustus

adopted, first his surviving grandson Postumus Agrippa, next his stepson Tiberius Nero, adding concerning the latter emphatically,* "Him I adopt *for the public welfare.*" In fact, it soon appeared that Postumus, "a savage and wild fellow," was quite unfit for office; hence, at Augustus's suggestion, he was imprisoned in an island by a decree of the Senate. Tiberius, already invested by the Senate with tribunicial authority, received supreme power, lawfully and constitutionally—not by arms—not seeking it, and with reputation not blameless merely, but pre-eminently high. Nevertheless, because the end of his reign was dreadfully overclouded—scarcely through his own fault, so far as appears, and because his mind was at last overthrown by a belief in a dreadful tissue of guilt among his own family (some of it perhaps fictitious), after-ages have seen his character distorted and stained through this turbid medium. Of all his assailants Tacitus bears the palm of bitter and perpetual snarling and discolouring, and by his splendid style and eminent talents has earned a credit which he does not at all deserve for impartiality.

The miseries of the imperial family were caused entirely by the errors of Augustus, if indeed errors be not far too gentle a word. Unless he is slandered by his biographer, his dealings with the female sex were about as bad as they could be. His first wife, while he was very young, was the daughter of P. Servilius Isauricus; but he got rid of her to marry Clodia, step-daughter of Marcus Antonius, when it was convenient to form with him a close political junction. But before this marriage could be consummated, it became more important to conciliate Sextus Pompeius; therefore he suddenly dropped Clodia, and married a near kinswoman of Sextus, Scribonia, who had already had two consular husbands. His numerous infidelities to her aroused her resentment, which he retaliated by divorcing her (on the pretence of her bad temper), on the very day on which she gave birth to Julia, his only child. In fact, he was already in love (if such a man could be in love) with Livia Drusilla, wife of Tiberius Claudius Nero. The husband, either complaisant or terror-stricken, agreed to divorce his wife (then pregnant), and officiate as her "father" in bestowing her in marriage on the rising prince; and soon after died. Livia certainly proved an excellent wife to Augustus, just the very thing he needed; too good indeed,

* Tacitus meanly repeats the gossip of men humiliated by Tiberius's strict rule, that Augustus adopted Tiberius, only to make the Romans the more regret Augustus's death: and this passes as history!

if we are to believe his panegyrist Suetonius, that she catered to his sensual taste in ways better not specified here. Dropping as possible slander all private and unverified assertions, we find in the abominable divorces and marriages for mere political reasons (all of which are public facts) abundant condemnation of Augustus's conduct as pernicious in the extreme to those nearest to him. In fact, he first gave Julia in marriage to his sister's son young Marcellus, and on Marcellus' death in the next year, married her again to Marcus Agrippa, a man three years older than Augustus, having ordered Agrippa to divorce his wife Marcella, sister to the young Marcellus, and first cousin to Julia. Who can wonder that this unhappy princess shortly became notorious for her numerous amours? She had three sons and two daughters in this marriage, but it must be highly doubtful whether Agrippa was the real father to more than the eldest, Caius. Of the two daughters, one called Julia became as notorious for her profligacy as her mother Julia; the other, Agrippina, according to Tacitus, had one signal virtue, chastity —of course, highly celebrated from the contrast to her sister and mother; but the historian confesses her contumaciousness, pride, and tempestuous spirit. These vices in her were far more fatal to all her kin and to Tiberius than the lax morals of her mother and sister, who (as may seem) were politically harmless. Agrippa was no sooner dead than Augustus *compelled* Tiberius (such is Suetonius's phrase) to divorce his beloved wife Vipsania, daughter of Agrippa by his first marriage, and grand-daughter of T. Pomponius Atticus, the friend of Cicero;—divorce her—at that very time pregnant,—in order to marry the already infamous Julia. *Possibly* Augustus was then the only man in Rome who knew nothing of his daughter's misconduct. Dion says he already suspected it; Tiberius knew it, but had to submit. Tacitus tells us that "Julia despised Tiberius *as her inferior in rank!*" Is it credible that she was ignorant that the ancestors of Tiberius led the patricians of Rome when patricianism was at its highest, before the Cæsars were heard of? Did she not know that, on his mother's side also, his ancestors the Livii Salinatores were high in power and esteem in the era when the first Marcellus, ancestor of her first husband, earned his celebrity? At any rate, she could not have been ignorant that her second husband Agrippa (*ignobilis loco*) was far below Tiberius in pretensions to high birth. It may rather seem then, that the spite of the great historian has betrayed him into foolish invention. However, no one has impeached Tiberius's morals

under this deplorable infliction; perhaps love and pity for Vipsania shielded him; indeed, Tacitus charges him with hating Asinius Gallus because she was transferred to him as a new husband, an indication that Tiberius could not forget his Vipsania. But now the historians (so-called), who scrape up the vilest scandalous gossip of Rome, would persuade us that the man who passed blameless through such trials and such an atmosphere of wild licentiousness, and was accounted severe in all his habits, yet, when verging to his seventieth year, gave himself to sensual practices too foul and monstrous to be intelligible to us. When an aged prince, weary of cares and sick of flattery which he despises, goes into complete retirement, it is easy to invent anything of him, since there is no one to contradict secret slander in books unpublished. Be this as it may, Augustus thus ruined his daughter, who in turn could do nothing for her children but fill them with imperial pride. Two of the sons dying, and the third being manifestly incompetent, nothing remained but to take Tiberius as successor. As Velleius observes, choice or election was not needed. His services and high qualities were quite unparalleled. They must be very briefly mentioned here.

His first military expedition, at the age of twenty, was little but a triumphal march, though at the head of a great army, to place a king on the throne of Armenia. No war took place: the Armenians promptly obeyed. But Tiberius gained credit, by recovering from the Parthian king the standards and captives lost by Crassus. Horace celebrates his victories (and those of his brother Drusus) five years later in Switzerland and Bavaria. When revolt arose in Pannonia, and Marcus Agrippa died suddenly, apparently from his exertions in quelling it, Tiberius, now in his thirty-second year, was sent against the insurgents, who were emboldened by the news of Agrippa's death. Only very severe measures could succeed; but he did succeed and in no long time. Four years later, after his brother's death, he was sent across the Rhine against the Sicambri, and was made consul next year as a special reward. Then came Tiberius's sudden withdrawal into private life.

Next, for the conquest of Germany beyond the Rhine, which Velleius justly calls *asperrimum et periculosissimum bellum*, he undertook in person all the most arduous tasks, subdued the tribes as far as the Elbe, and explored with his fleet the whole northern shore between the Elbe and the Rhine. When sent to achieve the conquest of Bohemia, where the skilful German king Maroboduus had trained a formidable army in Roman discipline,

a sudden explosion revealed how much too rapid and violent had been Augustus's annexations. All the brave people who lay along the Danube below Vienna, or occupied the mountainous country from Illyria to the Black Sea, made simultaneous insurrection, even Thracians (Roumelia) assisting it. Suetonius calls this the severest of all foreign wars except the Punic. By an immense pouring in of legions, it was fought out in a third year. Scarcely had Tiberius quenched this fire, when Germany rebelled, crushed Quintilius Varus with the whole Roman army of occupation, and postponed for ever the conquest of Bohemia. Tiberius had thus a new task in Germany. Suetonius is here very full as to his extraordinary precautions and personal simplicity of conduct, equal to that of old plebeian generals or of the Greek Agesilaus. In this dangerous service he avoided trusting anything to chance and all needless blood shed. After two years he brought back his army and fleet without sensible loss. But in performing these great achievements he learned *on the one hand* the absolute necessity of not driving brave nations to despair by the violences of Roman soldiers and governors; *on the other*, that to retain Germany in subjection would cost more in blood and treasure than it was worth: hence he adopted a strict policy of not extending the empire, and as soon as he became emperor proclaimed this as Augustus's sacred admonition to his successors. The difference was this, that Tiberius adopted the policy from the very beginning of his reign, Augustus only at the very end.

The anxious care of Tiberius to spare the blood of his own soldiers is attested by Velleius too definitely to disbelieve. Horace had called him *sine clade victor*, in his Alpine conquests. When his brother Drusus died in Germany from his horse falling on him, Tiberius walked *on foot* with the corpse all the way to Rome, says Suetonius. Velleius (ii. 114), an eye-witness and comrade of his wars, narrates his tenderness to the Roman officers. "Through the whole time of the German and Pannonian wars (says he), none of us, indeed whether of higher or lower rank, was weakly, but his safety and health were supported by Cæsar's care, just as if, instead of being immensely distracted by the weight of multifarious duties, he had been at leisure for this one task. Whoever of us needed it, had an ambulance ready to convey him. Cæsar's own litter was yielded for public use, and I as well as others enjoyed the advantage of it. Moreover, surgeons and special stores of food, and the equipage of the bath imported for him alone, were made to succour the weak health of every one of us." Somewhat earlier, when Tiberius retired to

Rhodes (a conduct which Tacitus shamefully discolours), Suetonius draws a picture of him highly pleasing. Though he already held the "tribunicial authority," he lived as a private man in a moderate house, without even an official attendant in his walks, and exchanged kindnesses almost on equality with the undistinguished natives *(Græculis)*. His kindness to the sick is there also mentioned. While he was at Rhodes, Augustus, in his name, divorced Julia from him, a step which Tiberius had not dared to take himself. He instantly wrote back, entreating "in frequent letters," forgiveness for her; and *begged that she might be allowed to keep everything that he had ever given her.* Yet we are expected to believe that, years later, with no new relations or new offence, he caused her to be starved to death! All deeds of tenderness to the wounded and sick must have sprung in Tiberius from a deep sense of what it was right and prudent to do; for he was reserved and never studied popularity. Probably, as most of the Claudii, he was proud; certainly he was disdainful of common applause. Such a man could not easily change his whole character after the age of fifty-six.

Living until about fifty without any prospect of succeeding to the princedom, he had seen all public matters with the eyes of a private man and citizen. He understood the hollowness of flattery too well says Tacitus: true; and he understood equally well the causes of provincial revolts. Hence, to keep down *the imperial expenses* and *the provincial extortions* were the prime efforts of his administration. The former could only be done by avoiding foreign war and superfluous domestic pomp. Expenditure on shows, to gratify the Roman populace, he disapproved; to gladiatorial shows he was averse; in fact, he was too busy with imperial cares to attend any public pageant willingly. Tacitus regards this as morose and unamiable, yet stigmatizes his young son Drusus as "rejoicing in the shedding of vulgar blood," because he loved the gladiatorial combats. On every public calamity Tiberius was most generous to open the treasury for the relief of a city, or to remit provincial taxes. He was indignant at the attempts of the nobility to establish themselves as pensioned sinecurists, pleading that their ancestors bore historical names. Tacitus tells at full the case of Hortensius Hortalus, and is marvellously blind to the fact that, by his own showing, the emperor was quite in the right, and his temper the opposite of dissimulation. What then was the dissimulation of which so much is made against this prince? Plainly two-fold: first, like every wise Cabinet minister, he knew when to be silent about

matters of State, and if insurrections broke out, was in no hurry to publish all that he knew or did not know—a thing which the gossips of Rome took very ill; next, whenever accusation was brought against anyone, whether in the Senate or before a tribunal, he was resolute to show no sign that he wished the accused to be acquitted or to be condemned. His universal doctrine was: *Let the law take its course, without spite and without favour, against high or low.* If forced to speak while a trial was pending, he always so balanced his utterances as to make it impossible to say that he was urging the judges to severity or to mercy. This, forsooth, was guilty dissimulation! No doubt in the very base moral state of Rome, an inconvenience resulted. When the accused was *notoriously* guilty, accusers made sure that the emperor, though ambiguous, desired his condemnation. Hence they tried to ingratiate themselves with him by superadding accusations of treason to those of extortion, a proceeding over which Tiberius had no control. When guilty persons were thus condemned, they were pitied (says Tacitus) as being unjustly punished for treason, and *not* for extortion:—as if that were the emperor's guilt. This historian himself, if duly criticized, consistently admits that the constant effort of Tiberius was *not to interfere* with the course of justice, but simply to insist that guilty men should not be sheltered by rank and connection. The result was an extraordinary number of condemnations; but the Senate or the judges—never Tiberius himself—pronounced sentence. Still, because in this reign so many of the nobility suffered in judicial trials, the prince himself earned deadly hatred from the aristocracy, who remembered in pleasant contrast the laxity of Augustus. Far better than any severity in punishing oppression was Tiberius's conscientious effort to appoint no governor of a province likely to oppress. "A shepherd ought to shear his flock, not skin it," was his maxim. When he had found a good governor, he kept him in power year after year, and was heartily glad to need no change. Tacitus derides him for his anxiety in choice and his distrust of his own judgment, and tells us that on some occasions, after nominating a man as governor, he had misgivings or new information, and would not let him leave Rome. The historian imputes it to spite against the aristocracy, that he left one man in power for (say) five years, instead of letting five men enjoy the honour for a year each. That it was more important that the provinces be well governed, than that a number of noblyborn Romans should in turn have the governing, does not seem to cross the writer's mind.

It is pretended that certain senators really planned false accusations secretly with Tiberius: but no proof is ever alleged, and the accusations are often confessed to have been just. Moreover, Tiberius saw through most flatterers and sneaks at a glance, and despised them: only Sejanus was too deep for him. As to flattery, it may be worth while to lay before the reader part of a speech which Tacitus attributes to this prince, on refusing the honour of a *temple*, which Farther Spain desired to erect to him and to his mother Livia Augusta:

Conscript fathers! that I am mortal and fulfil human duties, and possess quite enough in occupying the post of chief, I both call you to attest, and wish posterity to remember; who will bestow enough and more than enough on my memory in believing me to be worthy of my ancestors, provident for your interests, unshaken in danger, *and not afraid to incur private odium for the public good.* These are my temples in your hearts. These are my statues, most beautiful and durable; for those which are formed of marble are despised as sepulchres, if the judgment of posterity turns into hatred. Accordingly, I implore the gods to give me to the end of my life a tranquil mind, intelligent of human and divine rights. I also entreat our allies and our citizens that, whenever death overtakes me, they will escort my deeds and the repute of my name with praise and kindly remembrances.

Tacitus is not ashamed to add the censures which thereupon passed in private on Tiberius, as mean-spirited, for refusing the honour of divinity.

Immediately on the death of Augustus, as Tacitus tells, Tiberius was unwilling to seem to steal into supreme power by his mother's influence over the declining age of the deceased prince. He was equally resolute not to seize power by military force. That despotism was a thorny couch, he perfectly well knew; and if he must occupy it, he claimed that the Senate should voluntarily and distinctly confer it on him. Evidently he could not retire into private life, without the certainty of inflicting upon the empire new civil war. In this crisis, Sallustius Crispus sent a centurion to put Postumus Agrippa to death. Tiberius was aghast at the centurion's tidings, and at first avowed that he must bring the matter before the Senate. We cannot know how Sallustius dissuaded him; for assuredly their private talk was only *guessed* at by contemporaries; but the argument was obvious. "Do not blame me. I have saved the empire from a civil war, by sacrificing one worthless life." A single day revealed the imminence of danger. A slave had devised the plan of carrying off the captive prince to the Germanic armies, and proclaiming him emperor; but his ship, a merchant vessel, was slower than the galley which carried the centurion, and Postumus was slain before his champion could reach the island. This same slave, a

little later, passed himself off as the deceased prince, and for a moment caused great joy and consternation. When Sallustius could point to this attempt of the slave, as proving the reality of peril, it was morally impossible for Tiberius to take any step. He was profoundly silent *in the Senate;* but a report went abroad, that he privately alleged Augustus's orders to put Postumus to death. Such are the grounds for calling Tiberius "murderer of Agrippa." Meanwhile, to use Tacitus's indignant phrase, all the high Romans "were rushing into slavery" (what would he have had them do?) The consuls, the military chiefs, the Senate, the soldiers, and (he adds) the people, took the oath of allegiance, but Tiberius still assumed no despotic airs in the Senate, but behaved with senatorial modesty. This, which is praised in Trajan and the Antonines, is called "dissimulation" in Tiberius. So is his careful distinction between his privy purse and the public treasury, at which Tacitus contemptuously scoffs in the words, "*as if it mattered.*" But Marcus Aurelius was equally punctilious. The news of disaffection in the Germanic and Pannonic armies also impelled Tiberius to rest his power visibly and beyond dispute on the Senate; and the events proved his wisdom. Dangerous mutinies indeed ensued, which were with difficulty appeased; after which the Germanic soldiers were eager to atone for their offence by the slaughter of Germans, for which Germanicus (nephew and adopted son to Tiberius) was only too eager. He made two very cruel and very dreadful campaigns against the Germans, quite useless, almost gratuitous, causing (no doubt) immense misery to women and children as well as to armed men, but suffered himself from swamp and from the incursions of the German Ocean as much as from barbarian attack. There probably he caught the consumptive disease of which he died. Tiberius, at the earliest moment that he safely could, recalled his nephew from an inhuman and disastrous war. At this also Tacitus snarls, saying that the emperor grudged to his nephew military glory, and feared his ingratiating himself with the legions. Truly he might well fear this concerning Agrippina, wife of Germanicus. But this historian himself avows that the war had no worthy object (*dignum præmium.*)

Much as Tiberius shunned war, some guerilla or other was sure to be permanent. Already the provinces had numbers of destitute men, ejected or ruined by taxation, who formed themselves into bands, were reinforced by fugitive slaves, and lived as brigands, to the misery of the little cultivators. Now and then a more ambitious insurrection took place, as that of Florus and Sacrovir

in Gallia. The cause (says Tacitus) was "the enormous indebtedness" of the States. How this arose, we know from Cicero's writings. Suppose a war not very distant: large supplies are demanded, and large moneys. They give up corn, oxen, horses, carts, and what money they have. When more money is required, they have to borrow it of a Roman knight, who brings it for the purpose. The Senate allowed 12 per cent. as normal interest, but the knights struggled for 40 per cent.; and Brutus quarrelled with Cicero, because the latter said that 12 was enough for his agent, and that the provincials had a right to repay the principal of the debt as soon as they had the money in hand. Not many Roman money-lenders are likely to have been more scrupulous than Brutus, and not many Roman pro-consuls so steadily just as Cicero. A dangerous insurrection flamed out from this cause, Sacrovir and Florus urging, "There is no end to the claim of *war-money;* the interest demanded is enormous; our governors are proud and cruel; the Roman armies are disaffected; *our* land abounds in men, but the *Italian fields are empty*, and the town populations unwarlike."

Augustus well knew how weak, close at home, the empire was, and alike in the Illyrian and in the German insurrection, was in grave alarm *lest the enemy should march down into Italy*, where little resistance could have been offered them. From the reign of Augustus onward the military policy of Rome was that which Jefferson Davis adopted in the American civil war; he threw the entire strength on to the frontiers, so that the country was like a hollow shell—once break through the outer covering, and you can march across unresisted. Augustus did attempt to remedy the depopulation of the Italian fields by planting settlements of *coloni* from the great cities, chiefly we suppose, from Rome. The measure for which Tiberius has been much censured perhaps may be accounted for by his unwillingness to let Italy appear defenceless. We, who know how ill the Prætorians behaved two centuries later, blame Tiberius for bringing them into a single camp. But they were not the only army, nor at all the strongest. The troops on the Rhine and Danube were likely to be somewhat less haughty if they knew that Rome had a powerful army, kept in firm discipline; moreover, the Gauls would be less ready to calculate on an easy march into Rome. Also the Prætorian cohorts, quartered on private houses, must have been a great discomfort, or something much worse; nor could they there be kept in such training as to be ready to meet a formidable enemy. Sejanus is said to have urged Tiberius to bring them

together into one camp, by delusive reasonings, really to serve his own ambition; but Tiberius, it may well be believed, knew what he was about. He had then a son alive, at least one grandson, and three adoptive grandsons, sons of Germanicus. To attribute to Sejanus *at that time* a scheme of aspiring to the chief power is ridiculous. He was a mere knight, and at the utmost could only hope for a secondary post. But this ambition grew as he found the senators more and more to crouch before him; and after Drusus, son of Tiberius, was dead (as his father believed from various debauchery), when two of the grandsons were disgraced and a third (Caligula) was evidently unfit for power, then at last the ambition of Sejanus culminated. Public folly assumed that from the first he had planned the whole; so his divorced wife was believed when she declared that Sejanus had corrupted Livilla, wife of Drusus and sister of Germanicus, to poison her husband, who was also her cousin, in order to marry *him*, a Roman knight! Space does not allow for discussion here whether the frightful tissue of crime attributed to Sejanus, and to Tiberius on the discovery of his guilt, is true or false. The broad fact is terribly clear that the last years of this able, industrious, and excellently intentioned prince were quite tragical to Rome, but not to the empire. Dion Cassius is probably correct in saying that Tiberius by will made his own grandson, Tiberius Gamellus, his sole heir; but Caligula, whose vices the aged prince knew too well, having secured the support of the Prætorian guards through their commander Macro boldly claimed the place of prince, and enforced on the Senate to decree that Tiberius, *was not in his right mind* when he made a will which raised a youth of eighteen to supreme power. This young Tiberius was presently killed by direct order of Caligula.

Then succeeded three dreadful reigns—of Caligula, the madman; Claudius, the learned glutton; Nero, the profligate and cruel musician. Claudius was in his best hours wise, like our James I., but he allowed his freedmen to oppress. Under these emperors were thirty-one years of great suffering. But the death of Nero opened a new fountain of woe. The armies of Spain, of Germany, and of Pannonia contended which should give an emperor to Rome. First, the army of Spain and Portugal set Galba on the throne; next the army of the Rhine defeated Otho (Galba's assassin) and made Vitellius emperor; lastly the army of Pannonia defeated the Germanic army in the name and interest of Vespasian.

The civil war was in itself a terrible calamity to every place within reach of the legions on march; and when they crowded

into Rome, the state of things was frightful. Fighting in the city itself, they burnt down the capitol a second time. But calamity spread still wider by the removal of the troops from the defence of the frontiers. The disaffected provincials and the outside barbarians alike saw their opportunity. At this very crisis a year after the death of Nero—the empire might have fallen for ever, as many Christians ardently expected. Tacitus indeed says of this year (A.D. 69) that to Galba it was the last, and *almost* the last to the Roman Commonwealth. At first a Gaulish province had made insurrection which had been planned with Galba against Nero; but the precipitation of the Roman troops, always glad to fight with rich provincials rather than with poor barbarians, crushed the war in the absence of their leader Virginius, who did not mean to fight. Hereby the whole of Gaul was shocked, weakened, and laid open to the Germans, against whom a great war was presently necessary. The Suabians also and Sarmatians attacked the empire and Illyricum was in commotion. Rome was saved by two events which may appear accidental: first the Emperor Vitellius, who happened to be in command of the Germanic legions was a worthless and incompetent sot; next, in the Pannonic army was a young senator of singular genius, the Garibaldi of the first century, only much wiser. His name was Antonius Primus; he is celebrated by Martial as a purely virtuous man, able in his sixtieth year to look back upon every day of his life with pleasure. He became the darling leader of the Pannonic cohorts and thoroughly eclipsed the patrician, Vipstanus Messala, a literary friend of Tacitus—whose falsely-coloured notes of this war, we may infer, are the source of error. In Tacitus all Antonius's *deeds* are splendid and praiseworthy, all the *motives* assigned by the historian are despicable and gratuitous. Our historian would have us accept from him the following summary of this remarkable man:—"Guilty at law and condemned for forgery, an able fighter, a ready speaker, skilful to weave mistrust of others, and powerful in disorders and mutinies, ready to plunder and to lavish; in peace the worst of men, in war not despicable." *Not despicable!* truly not. Being but a "tribune" in a great army, he declared war for Vespasian against Vitellius, and insisted that they must march *at once* into Italy—not wait until the Moesian and Syrian legions could join them, and avowed that, unless held back by force, he would march with his single cohort against the worthless emperor and all his Germanic hosts. They shall soon see Italy unlocked, the Vitellians driven in, and will be glad to follow

his victorious steps. The army exclaimed, "This was the man and leader for them;" Vipstanus Messala and the nominal commander-in-chief were swept into his train. He broke into Italy with inferior forces, fought dreadful battles, always victorious, against the celebrated Germanic legions, besieged and took cities, but with immense anxiety restrained the troops from violence; nevertheless Cremona sustained a dreadful conflagration, from uncertain causes.

Finally, he entered Rome in triumph, and proclaimed Vespasian sole emperor. Spain and Gaul at once came over at the news. If this success had been attained only twelve months later, the insurrections and invasions gathering from all sides might have overthrown the empire. When Mucianus, governor of Syria and partizan of Vespasian, reached Rome, angry at the speedy success which he had tried to delay, he thought it quite necessary to disarm the formidable friend from whom Vespasian was receiving the gift of empire. Antonius proceeded to Vespasian at Alexandria to complain; but finding himself attacked by letters from Mucianus and from numbers of others whose pride his wonderful successes had wounded, and that Vespasian was puzzled and cold, he at once retired into private life, and lived there with dignity and respect, giving no further trouble, and receiving no public honour, though he was the admired favourite of a powerful and victorious army. And this man is called by Tacitus, without a single fact in proof, *pace pessimus*.

Vespasian had next the huge task of restoring order and organizing safety. The Sarmatians called Roxolani had invaded Moesia (Servia or Bulgaria); another Sarmatian tribe, the Jazyges (the eldest branch of the Magyars), had been conciliated by the Pannonic leaders. A formidable war in Gaul, chiefly Germanic tribes—Batavians, Treveri, and others—was quelled with difficulty. But when it appeared that civil war was ended, and a single emperor was on the throne; when, moreover, the Roman armies once more assumed the aggressive, the tide was manifestly turned, and the empire was saved. But the warning was, to princes really wise, invaluable; so near did danger come, and so clear were its causes. Vespasian found the treasury emptied, and the provinces largely exhausted. His first business was to recover a sound state of the finances; this apparently was a sufficient task for ten years' reign. He achieved it by strict parsimony, with new and heavy taxes. He originated public salaries for public teachers—a suggestion of national universities, and perhaps of public education. It does not appear that he

introduced any new element of prosperity; but he repaired the waste, the calamities, and the disorders of thirty-two years, yet apparently established *in permanence* a heavier system of taxation than Augustus instituted. Gibbon, after mentioning "the arbitrary interpretation, antiquated claims, and insolent vexation of the farmers of the revenue," adds: "It is somewhat singular, that in every age the best and wisest of the Roman governors (Emperors) persevered in this pernicious method of collecting the principal branches at least of the excise and customs."

Vespasian's reign cruelly ruined one province, Judæa, not through his personal iniquity, but from the fatal pressure of misgovernment on an enthusiastically religious people, whose sacred books taught them to expect supernatural help against Pagan oppressors. That Romans who write with virulent hatred of Christians of whom they know nothing should abhor the Jews and think no misrule too bad for them, is natural; but that Christians, who revere the Book of Isaiah, should blame the Jews for accepting the only obvious meaning of its splendid prophecies, is wonderful. This remarkable people, had begun their dispersion and their martyrdom much earlier; but now their extreme sufferings engendered blind fanaticism, and they perished horribly. How much better for the empire would it have been to re-establish them under some native rule, and to be satisfied with homage and tribute, than with vast effort to kill and scatter them as slaves! Slaves, alas! abounded more and more. Smaller proprietors could not pay the taxes, or could not defend their crops from banditti, and gladly sold their lands. Great estates, which had ruined Italy, proceeded to ruin the provinces. A vast trade, fed by wars, supplied these estates with slaves as cultivators or graziers; nor were the new *coloni* much above serfs. Disintegration and decay went on, even under the best emperors.

The most remarkable proof of this was in the eighty years of *happiness* celebrated by Gibbons. Trajan, says the amiable and learned Crevier, seems to unite all the best qualities of the best princes, and to be at the very head of good governors—"at least, if he had been a little less of a hero." We could not expect of Trajan modern thought, much less Christian *sentiment;* but from a cultured Roman of sweet temperament we might have hoped for as much *policy* as from Cyrus the Great, before whom no page of History lay open. Cyrus by reversing the crude violence of Babylonians won the love and loyalty of the Jews. Trajan might have done the same, had he tried: instead of which he had to encounter their fanatical enmity in Epirus, in Egypt,

in Mesopotamia. Roman victories over Jews were always bought at lavish expense of Roman soldiers. Trajan's Oriental career was a sad aggravation of all his errors. He deplored that his age exceeded that of the great Alexander; but alas! it did not warn him from Alexander's wine cup, but only excited him to military folly.

Hadrian mended this, being very peaceful. He was indefatigable in visiting the provinces; he sustained military discipline, yet avoided war, except another dreadful one against the Jews. Crevier fears that his liberal gifts to certain barbarians were mistaken by them for bribes to avert attack! Titus Antoninus was a model prince, yet, alas! he had war against Germans, Dacians, Jews, Moors, Greeks, Egyptians, and a great British war. When Marcus Aurelius ascended the throne, it needed no great discernment to see (what Tacitus saw in Trajan's reign)* that the empire was fatally sinking; nor, if his sweet philosophy had been far wiser, could any skill of administration have saved such an empire. First came on him an outburst of war from Parthia, which lasted four years; and a dreadful plague, said to be *imported* from Parthia (for nations never will believe that their own vices breed plagues at home); on it followed a great war against the Marcomanni and Quadi, which can scarcely be said to have come to an end when the emperor died at Vienna fourteen years later. Besides, he had wars of which we have but little acquaintance, in Egypt, in Spain and Portugal, and with the Gallic Sequani. Against the Germans he had a terrible want of soldiers, partly from the Parthian War, partly from the plague, but chiefly no doubt from the decay of free rustic population. He was glad to put slaves, gladiators, and robbers into the legions, and at length to *purchase* auxiliary troops of the Germans to fight against Germans! The Roman losses in war were so great that when peace was made, more than a hundred thousand prisoners were delivered up to them. It is impossible to doubt that the "happy period" of these four excellent emperors was a period of steady decay. Taste, learning, genius declined side by side with free rustics, rural cultivation, and national wealth. City vices played a large part herein.

If the fact be admitted, free criticism of these great men is neither presumptuous nor superfluous. Trajan lost a most splendid opportunity. The provinces no longer resented Roman rule; they now revered the empire; they only resented oppression.

---

* German. 33. The words are very remarkable.

For ninety years the Germans had been left in profound peace, and were without a suspicion that the Romans desired to conquer beyond the Danube or Rhine. "The Hermunduri" (whose region reached to the Elbe in central Germany, and to the Danube in the south), says Tacitus, "are faithful to us; therefore to them alone of Germans is commerce granted, not on the bank only, but in intimacy, and in our most splendid colony of the Rhætian province" (Augusta Vindelicorum: Bavarian Augsburg). "They cross everywhere without a guard; and while to other nations we show only our arms and our camps, to these we have opened our homes and our villas, *and they do not covet them.*" It is evident, then, that this tribe stretching to the interior, would have firmly allied *all* Germany to the empire, if a *public* and fixed policy of alliance on terms of *independence* had been adopted. Trajan spoiled all this by his vehement coveting to annex Dacia. To chastise its king, Decebalus, just enough to let him feel how heavy a Roman hand *could* be, was necessary. If, when he implored peace, honourable alliance and independence had been granted, the Marcomanni and Hermunduri in all probability would have been glad of the same high honour and privilege, and the brave Dacians would have kept the frontier of the Dniester safe. *All these nations were intelligent and docile*, not mere barbarians. But as Crevier observes, "the Romans never left the Germans at peace, except when they had another war on hand; but returned to the charge as soon as their hands were free, and it cannot be doubted that Marcus Aurelius *aimed to reduce Marcomannia to a Roman province.*" This change for the worse was the fruit of Trajan's ambition; war made all internal radical reform impossible.

A little enlargement on this topic is not at all out of place. It must be admitted, that in historical speculation it is idle to expect modern sentiment in ancient rulers: as well might you expect modern science from antiquity. But history would lose half its interest, if we were forbidden to study: "What if Alexander the Great had had a little of his father's sagacity? What, if Pericles had had the heart of Aristides?" So too, it is not idle to discuss: Were the material surroundings of Trajan such, as forbade him to be as sagacious toward Jews, as the elder Cyrus had been? Judæa had been made a wilderness by the Babylonians; Cyrus won loyalty from the Jews by restoring them. Trajan found them growing up afresh in Mesopotamia and in Cyprus, in Cyrene and in Egypt and Northern Palestine; and if he could not trust them with military rule, he might have sought to use

them by wise protection, and have guarded against their despair. As the contrast of Cyrus to Nebuchadnezzar won Hebrew hearts, so might any moderate contrast of Trajan to Vespasian. The Greek historian Dion Cassius draws everything in such dark colours, that we cannot trust his statements of Jewish atrocities. Of the oppression which they suffered there can be no doubt. All allow that Trajan desired *to be loved*, and was in temperament very amiable. If it had occurred to him how much love from the Jews a little justice would win, and any marked kindness, how many myriads of Roman soldiers might have been spared! Probably the awful conflicts in all the lands where Jews still abounded would have been prevented, beside the final war against them which Hadrian had to fight. The military exhaustion of the Empire was sadly felt by each Antoninus. Of course Trajan's gratuitous Eastern aggression was a principal cause; but War was his passion, and amiable as he was, his whole world, at home and abroad, suffered by it. On a trifling pretence, he resolved to annex Armenia to the empire, therefore prepared for war with Parthia. The Parthians apologized for a neglect, and tried to keep the peace; but Trajan was resolved on war. He first conquered Armenia, next Mesopotamia. Meanwhile his lieutenant Cornelius Palma had subdued Stony Arabia, by which the emperor earned frequent revolts and much fighting. He proceeded to subdue Georgia and Mingrelia after his first Parthian war. In a second war he crossed the Tigris and conquered Assyria, also the great cities Ctesiphon and Susa; then sailing down the Tigris, entered the Persian Gulf, and (if we can believe it) coasted round all Arabia until he reached Bab-el-Mandeb, captured Aden, and attacked the coasts of Arabia Felix. Returning safe up the Tigris, he crossed to look at Babylon, and there learnt that his conquests had vanished into thin air. His garrisons had been cut to pieces, and he had to win everything anew. He captured the city of Edessa. Seleucia was won by two of his lieutenants, but he miserably failed against the Assyrian city Atra, narrowly escaped with life, and returned to Syria to die a lingering death. He is said to have become, like Alexander the Great, "a hard drinker," and to be dying of dropsy! Hadrian is wrongly said to have *resigned* Trajan's conquests; they were lost before Trajan ceased to breathe. Parthians, Armenians, Assyrians returned to their old princes, and the Roman empire earned nothing but disgrace.

To sum up. Every empire formed by conquest is rotten in the foundation until the violences and injustices of conquest are

redressed. Such was pre-eminently the case with the Roman empire, which did not associate the vanquished as comrades and equals, but trampled them under foot, and (to use Cicero's words) "laid them beneath the axe edge," *securibus subjecit*. The evils of such a state can scarcely ever be removed by an executive officer or prince, who is fully occupied by the enormous duties of a wide administration. Either a powerful and sagacious Senate, or a religious legislator, may bring things right; or compulsion from powerful foes, or successful rebellion, may extort new and sound principles. But if none of these things happen, the empire decays from within, as Turkey is decaying now, and as Rome decayed of old. Does anyone ask, How then did the Roman empire endure so long, if it was essentially weak? It is more than four centuries since the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople; and Turkey would seem strong now, if the surrounding European peoples were barbarians, organized in small tribes. Turks are the only cement of the Turkish empire; the vanquished peoples have long lost political cohesion or organization; they have no mutual confidence, nor precedents for union; many of them have been unmanned by long servitude. Romans, or the old families adopted as Romans, were the cement of that empire. The trained armies, however, played the part which the armed Turks play in an unarmed population. Discipline and habitual subservience are great powers. But if the vanquished are forced to unlearn bravery, and the fields are emptied of free rustics, even if increase of wealth follow, the strength of the community is sapped. This was the Roman process from the beginning, and in this it persevered to the end.

ON THE RELATION OF THE SUPPLY OF FOOD TO THE LAWS OF LANDED TENURE.

[From the MANCHESTER ATHENÆUM, 1876.]

The following ought to have been in Volume IV. (Economies), but having been published by the Manchester Reform Union, it was out of sight. Being earlier than the Parliamentary Debates of 1881, the writer did not then dare to imagine that Parliament would accept a *Land Court* to fix rents, over the head of those who claimed to be Land Owners. This fact cannot be confined to Ireland, and immensely facilitates our vast Problem.

I APPROACH my present subject with a sense of responsibility which is almost painful. I am entirely convinced that the subject of Landed Tenure must become a vital one for the next generation. In barbarism, tribe has fought with tribe, and in a later stage, nation has fought with nation, for the possession of land; no decider of the strife has been found but force. In the advanced stage of many nations the poor have fought for the land of the rich, and such civil war is deplorably ruthless. That England cannot long acquiesce in her present system of Landed Tenure is to me certain; first, because it is in contrast with that of India, that of the United States, that of the greater English colonies, and I may say of all Europe. Next, because our pauperism is chronic; a fatal blot on our institutions. We are running in the track which wrecked France in a horrible revolution. With a contrary policy, Prussia gave to her landless peasants a sure tenure of the soil. The Diet of Hungary showed the same wisdom. The Austrian dynasty followed a like course. And, after the Crimean war, when the Emperor Alexander emancipated the serfs of Russia, he did not convert them into landless peasants, but imparted to them definite rights in the soil. In an opposite extreme of human life, when, after the late American civil war, the red men (so called) of the Indian territory set free their slaves in imitation of President Lincoln, they voluntarily re-divided their fields and gave to the freedmen an equal portion. In sharp contrast to this generous wisdom, the English Parliament which voted *first* fifteen millions as a loan to

the planters of the West Indies and the Mauritius, and *next* converted the loan into a free gift of twenty millions, never thought of giving to the emancipated slaves any right in the land whatsoever. Hence misery and conflict in Jamaica to this day. The notions on land traditional with English landholders are in sharp collision with those of the vast bulk of the human race, yet they are maintained by our landed aristocracy, and even by many who wish to be political economists, with simplicity of conviction, like a national creed. It is of extreme importance that the contest, which will have to be carried on against our modern English system, should be a war of peaceful argument, a remonstrance of friendly citizens, not a deadly struggle of force; and for this it is essential that the townsfolk be the leaders of the movement, and thoroughly understand how vital to their interests is a right and wise reform,—a reform thorough and bold, yet as little as possible damaging to those who have blamelessly inherited a false position. I have selected for my topic the relation of *food supply* to landed tenure, because the immediate market strikes all minds at once, and brings quick conviction. Yet this does not at all exhaust the subject. The towns have two other urgent arguments. They must insist that the rural neighbourhood shall maintain its own new births, and not make the towns sinks of misery by pouring into them perpetual streams of needy rustics. Nay, every large town must have a right of largely colonizing the rustic parts, and establishing upon every town area a law of maximum population, which shall not be exceeded. Pure air and pure water are a primary right of every community, earlier and more pressing than any landlord's right. Land is not only *as* necessary to life as air and water, but when men are deprived of all control of the land, pure water and air cannot be had. So much I remark that I may warn you how imperfect is my present treatment of this great subject. I do but open one side of it.

Now, in the first place, I claim and insist that the principles on which land shall be held must be debated in a Court of Morals before they can be justly settled by the votes of a Parliament. A Parliament *may*, no doubt, debate them in a moral and just spirit, may indeed make morality and natural justice paramount. But when the argument used is as follows: "Such and such rights have been granted by a former Parliament, therefore they are a sacred possession of individuals which must not be contested,"—I vehemently disown it. Just so, it was argued elsewhere, "The law has sanctioned slavery, therefore slaves are a rightful

possession." But a law is wrongful which gives away the rights of many in order to pamper the wealth of a few. Now as regards moveable property (which ought to be esteemed the only *real* property), the mass of it being practically infinite, and most of it incorporated with human labor, which makes it a private possession, one man seldom can injure another by possessing it even to a huge amount. If indeed an article be *unique*, as an ancient MS., a picture, a statue, or some other relic of antiquity, the State may claim a right to buy it up for general advantage. Again, if from any cause either water or some necessary food is dangerously scarce, the State may take possession of the supplies, indemnifying the individuals. These are exceptional cases in regard to *moveable* property; and even so, they set no limit to the amount of exchangeable valuables which one man may hold. But in regard to land the circumstances are widely different, and the moral argument different. In every nation which has passed out of barbarism, and does not live on the edge of a vast unoccupied region, land is sensibly scarce; and its just distribution to a community is a delicate problem of ethics. I do not mean that abstract morals can prescribe some one definite mode; several different ways may be all equitable enough to satisfy nations which have inherited them. But *some* modes of distribution are palpably *un*just; and these cannot be made just by the vote of a legislature, especially if the legislature has consisted of landholders who were voting for their own private gain to the serious damage of the community.

It is here requisite to look straight into the face of facts. When a nation even very rude, or what we call savage, like the modern North American Indians or the ancient Germans, deliberates in general folkmote on any question of property, whether it consists in moveables or in land, their decision is generally sagacious and just. They are not biassed by theories nor warped by avarice, nor has a rich man any influence by his riches. Justice is the chief common good, and sound common-sense has, perhaps, a better chance with them than with us; as we see in the case of the red Indians re-dividing their fields to give land to their liberated slaves. But when one rude people conquers another, and despoils it of its land—imposing tribute, services, and general vassalage in the mere insolence of superior force—then the laws which the conqueror enacts in his military council or parliament for upholding his domination over the conquered are sure to be essentially wrongful, and are almost always cruelly so. Even if time soften their hardest features,

the essential injustice inheres in them until some great reversal takes place, either peaceful or insurrectionary; and however much we may grieve over the evils or horrors of such a revolution, yet in the retrospect it will be pronounced beneficial and salutary. France is an eminent illustration of this. From the cruel iniquity of her land-laws and of her taxation, the mass of the people were miserable in the extreme. No redress was possible, until the Government became bankrupt through the failure of taxes, and the army was thoroughly pervaded with the popular discontent. Then came a great overturn in politics, and a general burning of the country-seats of the nobility; in short, a fierce and violent seizing of the land by the long-oppressed peasantry. Dreadful as was that transition, we now at nearly a hundred years distance rejoice in it, as a most necessary reconquest by the peasants of men's natural rights. The longer that we English postpone a fundamental reform of our landed tenure by calm, equitable, and gradual change, the closer we shall run to the dangers of a violent explosion which no wisdom can direct or moderate. Our duty is to insist on the discussion of the subject from a moral basis, and utterly to disallow the pretence that the landed rights now legal are therefore sacred, as if natural equity to a whole nation were not more sacred, than any privileges of a separate order of men. All these pretended rights originated in conquest, during the slavery or vassalage of the conquered; or, further, in the votes of great councils or parliaments, from which all but landholders were long studiously excluded. Moreover, the modern squires and noblemen claim and exercise power which no feudal baron possessed—of emptying their estates of men, with enormous damage both to the public defence and the supply of our food.

Before I intended to introduce the topic, I have all at once alighted on the most forcible illustration how direfully a bad landed tenure may damage our food-supply. It is not an imaginary or fantastical occurrence. It is not the ingenious invention of a novelist. It is not a matter of which we read in history, as of a Spanish monarch who orders all the vines in Mexico to be rooted up, or a Norman conqueror who burns villages by the hundred in Hampshire to make for himself a hunting ground; but it stands before us as first practised in Scotland early in this century, and since repeated frequently down to last year—the dispeopling of wide areas, the artificial creation of wildernesses, either to please the taste or to swell the rent-roll of some great proprietor. When complaint is made,

that the vast private estates of dukes are a legacy of ancient military spoliation, we get the calm reply that, though the system began in mere violence, it now conduces to the universal good by promoting secure cultivation. But, unhappily, this is just what it does *not* do. The open fact is, that the law enables a landlord at his own will simply to *forbid* cultivation, to eject the cultivators and all human population except a few gamekeepers or shepherds; this very thing is actually done, and with impunity. Will it be pretended that the sheep or rabbits or deer, which multiply over the area vacated by man, afford us by their carcases food equivalent to the lost crops? When the soil is very thin or sandy, of course we do not wish to drive out the animals. They have their own natural and reasonable sites. But where the soil can bear good crops of human food, it cannot be made out that sheep produce as much food for us, much less deer or rabbits. Some members of a recent Parliamentary Committee, which sat on the Game Laws, were disposed to believe that there are ninety million wild rabbits in the United Kingdom, and to boast of them as an important supply of meat to the market; but the damage to crops by animals, which bite off the tender shoots, is immensely out of proportion to the bulk of their carcases. Wild rabbits are an exceedingly wasteful crop of food. As for the deer, few indeed of the public ever taste his flesh, and, if in a severe season he migrates into sown fields, Scottish farmers are painfully aware how costly is his appetite. At present, I simply lay before you two considerations: *First*, that the primary use of the national land, according to natural equity, is to maintain the national existence; *secondly*, as the law now stands, landholders may and do forbid the raising of food. They study their taste, their sport, or their rent, not the national sustenance.

I am not competent to go into details of farming; but a few notorious facts satisfy *me*, and, I think, may satisfy *you*. So long ago as 1827 the evidence given before a Parliamentary Committee became the basis of an elaborate article in the *Quarterly Review*, which much excited squires and noblemen. The quantity of produce raised by spade-cultivation, and by such tending as peasants give to their own crop, was attested beyond dispute to be immensely greater than anything that farmers can raise, who have to pay wages. Out of this came a movement for allowing to laborers small allotments, to which they might give their vacant hours. When in 1828 I called the attention of an able economist to this fact (a gentleman who soon after was Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford), he replied:

"Well! if the things attested are true, it would seem that Goldsmith, in his 'Deserted Village,' was a wiser economist than any of us." For the doctrine was then rising into strength, that small farms must be exterminated, and large farmers with large capital be established everywhere. But observe how meanly unjust was the treatment of the poor peasants after the new discovery. When it was ascertained that on small plots of land they could raise enormous crops,—then, instead of laying upon them rent proportioned to what a farmer would pay, they were charged three or even four times a farmer's rent. This still goes on; and now it is objected to such allotments, that they can only repay the cultivator when they are very near to a town-market. Possibly enough that is true, while so high a rent is exacted, and while the laborer is liable to be ejected at short notice, with loss of his crop, as happened lately with some, whose allotments I could see from my windows at home. But that they do pay these high rents is a notorious fact; and it proves beyond reasonable dispute, that such cultivation produces immensely more food for the towns than farmers can raise from the same area. Some pretend that small holders will exhaust the land, and never can afford to manure it: but I see, day by day, the masses of manure which they employ on crop after crop in the same year, and this without any security of tenure. Who then can wonder at the exuberant produce which the peasants of Belgium, France, and the Channel Islands raise, in all of which places the cultivator is remunerated in proportion to his own diligence, and his position is secure?

Among political economists the late Mr. John Stuart Mill deserved chief honor for going back into the footsteps of Adam Smith, the true founder of the science, and vindicating small independent culture. He also did the great service of calling our attention to the stupendous change which our legislating landlords have brought about, by converting a feudal rent of custom into a commercial rent of competition. On this subject I must touch again. But at present I must dwell a little on *small culture*. With the exception of allotments which are intended to occupy only odd hours of the cultivator, which also have no security, the thing hardly exists in Great Britain. A farm of 50 acres is called *small:* but no farmer can raise crops from 50 acres by his own hands, even with the help of his sons. He must hire laborers and pay them wages. Farmers who have capital are not fond of working hard as laborers, and from little farmers the laborers cannot expect much generosity. Even so,

in several respects, our little farmers supply the town-markets better than do large capitalist farmers. The wives and daughters of the rich have more refined and ladylike employments than the care of fowls, eggs, and butter. We may be told that these articles are provided for us on a great scale by the large farmers; but it is an evident fact that they are not supplied in the proportion that they used to be before high farming was known, nor on a scale at all commensurate to the wants of the present population, even with our enormous foreign importation. In my memory a fowl used to cost eighteenpence, which now may sell for three shillings or three shillings and sixpence; butter now claims a shilling and tenpence a pound, of a quality which I remember to have cost only ninepence or tenpence. Keen competition for farms raises rent, and farmers who have to pay high rent cannot sell their produce so cheap; yet, the political economists who have abandoned Adam Smith's doctrine of rent, insist that rent does not and cannot raise prices; a doctrine of which they never have been able to persuade me. I insist that the landholder's enormous legal power vests in him a virtual monopoly. The farmer counts on the rent as a first and unavoidable payment, just as if it were a Government tax, and then adjusts his wages and his prices so as to enable him to bear the burden.* When farmers prosper, the majority of them have quickly to pay more rent in consequence, and their superfluity does not overflow to the benefit of the wage-receiver. No doubt there are two exceptions: a fraction of the whole have long leases, and the rent is slower in rising upon these. A second fraction of them are hereditary on the estates of wealthy landlords, and, as tenants-at-will, pay a moderate rent, which is not raised so long as they are obedient and dutiful clients. They are bought into political slavery by the compact well understood between them and the bailiff: and their subservient votes and interest are a strong support of the existing landed system. Except in these two classes, the wealth of the farmers is a sponge for the landlords to squeeze. The tendency of rents is upwards (1875); and, as I think, is decidedly to the damage of the town markets. Quantity is lessened and price is raised.

* I must not be understood to mean that the farmers can get what prices they please. If they strive to depress rent, to raise prices, and depress wages, *they find the first of these three tasks by far the hardest*, by reason of the legal power of landlords, and the great competition for farms. Therefore, in the present state of things, they submit to the rent dictated to them, and exert themselves only to beat down wages and hoist up prices.

Let us look in contrast to some other neighbouring countries. The food sent to us from France is something wonderful. I seem to remember that in 1825, Mr. Huskisson said that we received from France *every year* six millions of hens' eggs; but I believe that now six millions in *one week* is a computation nearer to truth. The importation of fowls, grain, and of various dried fruits has also increased prodigiously. What an idea this gives us of the activity of French agriculture! Our economists of the school of Macculloch pretend that the small culture of France is a deplorable failure. Of course, I am not concerned to defend French testamentary laws; but the French economists, men of immense knowledge, insist that the little properties, take them for all in all, are no failure at all, but a vast success. Nay, do we not all know how Louis Napoleon got millions of francs out of the peasants, and made himself independent of the great money-lenders? Still more recently, we have seen how quickly France has re-established her financial position, after the vast expenses and desolations of her German war, and the huge fine which she had to pay for her aggression. No one can plausibly explain this, but by the sound condition of her agriculture. I read that the French Government has had the good sense to teach the peasants many secrets of cultivation, especially in fruit-culture. When will our landlord parliament be equally wise? The climate of France, as a whole, is doubtless superior to that of England; but how vast has been our improvement already in vegetables and fruit! And of what sort were the French markets in the last century, before the system of small independent proprietors was established? At that time general deficiency was the normal state; a dearth often approaching to famine. Universal wretchedness was a fair general description then; but now, in spite of wars and revolutions and taxation, the actual cultivators of the soil stand far higher in comfort, content, wealth, and security than the mass of the English peasants. They not only feed themselves and lay-by money, but their food overflows for our English markets. With all this, and with the supposed superiority of English high farming, our prices are most unsatisfactorily high.

If any of you say to me, "Do you forget the large supply from the new gold fields—California and Australia?" I reply: I do not forget it, but I am slow to believe that this is the cause of the high prices. I do not pay more now, but rather less, than I paid fifty years ago for a coat or a shirt, or a table or a chair, or a bed or a book, or a hat or a carpet, nor for a cab or an omnibus.

These and numberless other things, in which price has not risen, are as continually in the market as is food; and there has been abundant time, since the new gold fields were open, for the superfluous gold to be equally distributed among all things purchased. Nay; but as trade-unions have forced up prices in some articles, so the greatest of all trade-unions, that of landlord legislators, has forced up some other prices, as to me it seems. Supply and demand are the only agencies which force prices up or down, whether the supply of gold be increased or lessened. A man who finds gold tries to buy something with it. If that for which he seeks is unique, as Italian pictures, he forces the price up, perhaps permanently; but if he demand something which can be supplied without limit, as porter or brandy, or hams and champagne, the rise of price is only local and momentary, and ceases as soon as the production of the article is commensurate to the demand. If all other things in the market are increased as fast as the new gold, the gold cannot raise price. Other considerations, which may be urged on this side, I here omit. Thus I believe that the true, the only real cause why coal and flesh-meat and butter and many other things are dearer, is because they are not produced in proportion to the demand; and, in the case of food, our laws of landed tenure are visibly the cause.

It is contrary to common sense to imagine that a wealthy farmer, who has to deal with 500 or 1,500 acres, will as scrupulously turn every acre and half acre to profit, as will a laborer whose acre is his all. Alike against common sense it is to expect that a peasant, who is paid by time and gains nothing by extra diligence, will elicit from the soil crops as good as one who is to get the benefit himself. Of workmen paid by the day one who is superfluously active seems unfair to all his fellows, so that a conventional languor of work tends to become normal. Farmers complain, sometimes bitterly, of the indolence of the rustics. Says one: "If I have a horse that walks well, their first business is to break him into sluggishness, because they are too lazy to walk up to him." Says another: "If a cart pass in the lane, a whole gang of laborers turn round and stare at it from the first moment it is heard, until it is out of hearing. Anything for an excuse to be indolent." I am not here to accuse, nor yet to defend, the peasants: but we well know that in all human probability special vices will spring up out of special circumstances. Give a class of men tyrannical power, and a majority of them become proud and tyrannical. Impose on another class slavery,

and it becomes cunning and untruthful. We cannot count on conscientious diligence from workmen who do not identify their employer's prosperity with their own, and are paid by the time, not by the job. Therefore I am disposed to believe the farmer's complaints of the idleness of the peasants: but it is not the farmer only who suffers from this: the markets also suffer, and *we* suffer. The mischief springs—I may say legitimately, normally—from the existing system of landed tenure. With us there is no real deficiency of land, but the people are not allowed to get at the land: the rich buy up the small freeholds, where they exist.

If any one think that the smallness of our English area is the cardinal difficulty, let him look to the Channel Islands. I think that Mr. J. Stuart Mill directed attention to these, but his friend, Mr. Thornton, brought out the details instructively in a special treatise. I have it not at hand to quote; but I remember the general result as follows: Guernsey and Jersey are more thickly peopled than any part of Great Britain, and have no natural advantage in soil. The cultivating population is a much greater fraction of the community than with us. After feeding themselves, they send to market more produce by far, acre by acre, than comes from our wealthiest high-class farmers. The reason of this is on the surface. Every peasant there, by ancient custom, has a definite right in the crop, which it is his interest to make as profitable as possible. Though they cannot all possess freehold land, their active thought, ingenuity, and diligence are freely exerted to make the produce abound. It may well be believed that weeding, which to an English farmer is so expensive, costs nothing there. Surely this is more than a hint, how noxious to our town-markets are our existing laws of landed tenure.

Indeed, I must ask you to allow me to dwell a little more on the Channel Islands. From a paper written in the present year,* I extract the following summary:—Guernsey has only 10,000 cultivable acres, a small estate for a duke. She has no ducal landlord, but nearly 2,000 small proprietors, with five acres apiece on the average. The population is twice as dense as in England, yet there are no paupers. They have been spending £16,000 on a covered market, and £10,000 for a new road to the harbour. Their quays have cost £285,000, of which they have paid up £65,000, and clear off the debt at the rate of £1,500 a

* Article on Channel Islands, by W. Gibson Ward, in *National Agricultural Laborers' Chronicle*, Jan. 22, 1876 A learned and very useful writer.

year. They have excellent markets of vegetables, fruit, and poultry; and in the year 1873 (as one specimen), they sent to London fifty tons of grapes grown under glass. Jersey also sent to London in the same year £300,000 worth of early potatoes. Instead of this, the island would soon be full of paupers, if you gave them to a Duke of Sutherland, or a Sir James Matheson. I mean, turned into game preserves, or into a dozen big farms, they would not raise a third part of their present food. In fact, no such population could then exist on the area.—And why are these islands so different from us? Because, like Norway, *they have not been conquered.* Their feudal lord conquered us.

A most notable instance of pauperism, induced by ordinary farms, and removed by very small culture, is attested in the small parish of Cholesbury, near Tring, in Buckinghamshire. The details are too long to read. But the clergyman of the place, the Rev. H. P. Jeston, in 1837 or thereabouts clearly narrated the facts.* The parish contained 112 cultivated acres and 44 of unenclosed common. The population was 139, and the cultivated ground was divided between two farmers. Fifty-six acres apiece seems really small. But the poor rates ate the farmers up. The total rates at last became 30s. to the pound. The tenants threw up their farms and the landlord lost his rent. The gates were taken down, and the fences left in unrepair, to evade rating. The parish minister for years had no income. But the Agricultural Employment Institution purchased fifty acres (thirty-six of arable, and fourteen of woodland), and allotted the thirty-six acres to eight or ten married men, at a rent of 23s. per acre. The tenants immediately prospered, and paid both rent and rates punctually. Previously 119 out of the 139 were paupers; but at the end of four years the number of paupers had run down from 119 to five, these five being aged or disabled. Some of the allottees kept cows, some had a horse or oxen. Such was the efficacy of small culture to extirpate pauperism. It could not do so, if it did not get more out of the soil.

Perhaps you will allow me now to explain more closely the important revolution in rent, at which Mr. J. Stuart Mill pointed. We are generally disposed to think of the feudal system as one of unmixed tyranny. No doubt there was plenty of tyranny. The armed hand was apt to deal at pleasure with the person and goods of the unarmed. There was no sufficient limiting either

* Letter of Rev. H. P. Jeston, to Mr. Farden, a Quaker. It appeared in a book called "Remedies for the Perils of the Nation." London: Seely & Co. Second edition. 1844.

of the king's power or of the baron's. The king's court and the baron's court recovered the rights or customs of the king or of the baron, and probably did justice between equals in rank; but they did not avail to withstand oppressions by the powerful. The only appeal against the baron was to the king, and the result (if attempted) was very doubtful. Nevertheless, in the feudal system, as with the Ottoman Turks, the general principles, when fairly acted on, were equitable and beneficial. The king was chief of the barons, who were called his peers, that is, his equals, I suppose; as in Homer's Iliad, all the chief heroes, though subject to Agamemnon, are entitled "kings nurtured by Jupiter." As a baron, the king held large crown-estates, from which the ordinary expenses of his government were defrayed. They were not his private property, but were attached to his office, as the phrase *crown*-estates denotes. So too the barons held estates, not as private men, but as high political officers. The whole theory was fundamentally military. The baron in person owed military service to the king, and was bound to maintain a trained population, a small army of retainers, to swell the king's army when called for. He was also responsible for the peace of the district, "the king's peace" as it was called. Hence difficulties arose when the baron was aged, or if he died when his son was a minor, or if he left only a daughter as his heiress. The king then knew how to remunerate himself. Such cases were well provided for; but the cardinal matter is, that the baron's revenues were strictly his political salary paid to him in his official character, and in remuneration for presumed public services. Custom regulated and restricted his claims. The idea of driving the human population off any part of his estate in order to promote his private gains, could not then arise. No law was needed against it, for the act was unimaginable. William the Norman, among his tyrannical violences, did make a wilderness in Hampshire for the pleasure of hunting, but his memory was execrated for it. Every baron was honoured by the king, and was safe against the king, in proportion to the number of his retainers, that is, the military retinue, at the head of which he could appear at the great council, or afterwards in parliament. The military tenure had at least this good, that it made a human population valuable in the eyes of the barons. They were not then accounted a warren of paupers. Estates were esteemed by the number of fighting men upon them; moreover, the customary payments which we now call *rent* were, to speak roughly, in about the same proportion; and the larger the crops of food, the

better all were pleased. But when the political power of the barons was nearly crushed under Henry the Seventh, and gold and silver began to ooze in from the newly-discovered world of America, our great lords turned from politics to trade, and began to study, not how to keep their retainers, but how to augment their rents. So far as I can learn, it was in Henry the Eighth's reign that they first claimed to eject farmers, through a mere wish to consolidate many small holdings into great sheep-walks, because the exportation of wool had become profitable. A long series of local agrarian wars hence arose. Colonel Ouvery, on deputation from the Land Tenure Reform Association, of which Mr. J. Stuart Mill was president, spoke an elaborate and important speech in Bristol, on this subject, a few years back; and summed up in the phrase, that as England had been conquered by her King William the Norman, so was she conquered a second time by her landholding lords under Henry the Eighth. Chronic pauperism has ever since been the unfailing result. Whether it can be proved that Parliament ever passed a statute to justify the change of *rent by custom* into *rent by competition*—a change which converted the landlord into a landowner—I do not know; and it is morally of little importance: for the landlords were omnipotent in Parliament. Moreover, we know that in Charles the Second's reign, they voted themselves free from nearly all the remaining feudal duties and feudal burdens; a deed which (in a moral estimate) was to abdicate their right to their estates and rents, which ought thereby to have reverted to the Crown for public uses. The fraud on the nation has been enormous: and, though the injustice to later purchasers would be cruel, if we insisted that the rents now belong to the State, and not to the noblemen, baronets, and squires, still the grievous historical iniquity fully justifies a determination not to allow a continuance of things as they are. Into what the feudal system ought to have developed, *we see in the Channel Islands;* instead of that, the feudal lords have made themselves into commercial landowners.

Unhappily Mr. J. Stuart Mill's death seems to have killed the Land Tenure Reform Association, which was supported by many M.P.s, apparently only from their esteem of his talents. He held a peculiar doctrine, which few people regarded as practical, of claiming for the State, *as a small fraction of its right*, "the future unearned increment of Rent." No one now steps into his place, nor presses his scheme—a scheme which to me appeared perfectly just in theory, but too difficult to carry out justly. For myself, I confess I have always looked for a remedy in a different

direction. Very old abuses so entangle themselves with just claims that even if, after the manner of a little Greek city, we were to set up some sage as a plenipotentiary lawgiver, no single settlement could bring things right. To avoid violent treatment of the case we must have a long series of enactments, all moving in one direction, and all consistent, for which we need not a law of Parliament, but a solemn VOTE, enunciating the policy which is henceforth to guide legislation. This is called *unpractical* by men who love intrigue and shuffling—men who dread legislation that rests on principle, and is guided (as all law ought to be guided) by impartial and noble morality: but to me nothing appears so practical. A vote of the House of Commons (for the concurrence of the Lords is not needed) has no effect in a court of law; it alters no man's immediate rights, though prospectively it has great moral force. If, after solemn debate, such a vote were to deplore the unjust legislation of a past age, and to lay down the direction which legislation ought to take in future, stating the objects to be aimed at steadily, with a general outline of measures to be contemplated and evils to be redressed, the nation would eagerly discuss all the points, and opinion would ripen for successive enactments, which, by being gradual and foreseen, would press as lightly as may be on existing interests. The main principles which I should like to see foremost are these:—1. In order to promote the supply of food, to aid us towards independence of foreign accident for our first necessities, and to do justice to the laborer: the cultivator ought to have an interest in the crop, and, as far as possible, security of his position. 2. It is against the public welfare that any individual should control more than a thousand acres of cultivable land, or more than one acre of town land. 3. Every large town ought, as soon as possible, to buy up the entire town land, and the building land around it, at the price now obtaining, to be settled by a jury. 4. The State ought steadily to aim at recovering its control of country land, partly by purchase, and partly by a legacy tax, taking the tax not in money but in land. 5. In order to exterminate the pauperism and laziness of the rustics, which ensues when the laborer is divorced from the soil, the State ought actively to aid in re-establishing small culture. One obvious method is, to carve large portions of the crown lands into farms of from six to ten acres, with copyhold rights to the tenants, and a guarantee that the rent should never be raised on an individual by reason of his prosperity, but, if ever, only by a vote of Parliament affecting all tenants of the crown lands alike, as in general taxation.

Time allows me only brief comment on these cardinal principles. According to natural equity, no man has a right in land except by dwelling on it or cultivating it; and when he ceases to do either, his right ceases, except that if he have improved it, he has a right to sell his improvements, if he can, before abandoning the cultivation or habitation. When the State set up a Lord of the land (that is, a chief person), he was a political officer, not a proprietor; that was intelligible, and not at all unreasonable. The modern commercial idea of land is essentially unreasonable, and is pernicious unless jealously limited in the extent of possession. Land being the surface on which we live, to make any man the owner of large tracts is to vest in him a power very inequitable over a whole population. Such power can hardly be made responsible. It is in some sense more than royal power, although in theory the baron, as the king's delegate, could have only at most the same power as the king. A king might as well call himself *owner* of England, and warn us off his land, as a baron clear people off his estate. No small possessor would set up game-preserves or deer-forests, destructive to the food of the nation. A thousand acres allows as much of beauty and of privacy as any man ought to desire; and in the present developments of industry large fortunes may be variously invested in great concerns, or lent on solid guarantee; hence, to restrict possession of land (which is naturally scarce) does not restrict private fortunes. If once Parliament set a public ban on estates larger than a defined limit (I say a thousand acres, to fix ideas), we should soon have laws to tax exceptionally all estates above that limit. The tax might increase with time, and be especially heavy upon bequests exceeding the limit. Thus in two generations a great change might take place. Indeed, another law would soon give to healthy towns a right of purchasing land for public purposes and colonizing the countries. Instead of emigrating into distant lands and sending our capital abroad, we ought to people our own empty fields and many a Scotch wilderness. If cultivators multiplied on the soil and had a safe tenure, we should soon have an enormous increase in the supply of food. Our fruit would not equal that of France, nor would our wheat ripen so surely; but wheat is not the only grain, and we should in one sort or other vastly increase and improve our supply of food, if the peasantry had security and early teaching. In recent centuries we have scarcely known properties on the scale of Belgian or French farms; yet there is amply sufficient testimony

to the abundant crops which a single family will raise from six or even four acres. The Cumberland *statesmen* (as they were called) had farms ten or fifteen times as large, and needed laborers to help them. Those who object to small properties point to the decay of this Cumberland institution, in proof that small culture cannot succeed: but it proves nothing of the kind. As I understand, the proprietors have been simply *bought out* by the high prices which men, enriched by manufactories or by minerals, have offered them: not but that the bad habit of drinking has often aided the break-up. Yet, this experience is a warning to us that small freeholds will not stand while the holding of large estates is lawful. Rich men offer a fancy-price for land, and will generally succeed in buying it; and then they moan over getting only 2½ or 2 per cent. in return for their money, as if it proved their great equity; perhaps too they plead this as a reason why their *burdens* should be lessened. When the State is the landlord, the farms cannot be sold and incorporated with the property of—what shall I call an insatiable land-buyer? —well: a *landshark* seems to me a fit name. But the prophet Isaiah cries out woe against him. "Woe unto them that join house to house, and lay field to field, that they may be themselves alone in the midst of the land." Thus in Judæa we see, though the legal and sacred system was one of small hereditary freeholds, it was very difficult to prevent the rich from buying out the poor. In the Roman republic there is a history not wholly unlike our own. The official aristocracy was perpetually at work, with great success, to turn public land into private by playing into one another's hands; and the people found no remedy until they carried a law to forbid any one from holding more than 500 Roman acres of the public land. That statute brought relief to the original citizens: but when Rome conquered all Italy, the same evil grew up on a far greater scale. The Gracchi saw it, tried to bring a remedy, but only became martyrs; and 200 years later Pliny wrote, in three words, an emphatic sentence: *Latifundia perdidêre Italiam*—"Large estates have ruined Italy." In the days of Cicero and Horace, Italy could not feed the city of Rome. The poet Horace complains that barren shade-trees and flowers and ponds of fish superseded orchards and crops of food; general cultivation was largely supplanted by grazing. Huge towns abounded in population: over the country, herds of cattle and a few graziers moved, except where some nobleman had his palace and ornamental grounds. Full towns and empty country characterize ancient Rome, modern Turkey, and England,

—this is a painfully ominous mark of decay. The political intelligence and freedom of our towns, with their vast wealth, give to us great advantage. If we now open our eyes to the danger, remedy does not come too late. Let not a defective and perverted political economy deceive us.

Unhappily, several leading economists seem to have forgotten that vice and bad law are of all things most wasteful, and from their zeal to repress population by artificial methods (an unnatural and oppressive aim), they have soothed the consciences and hardened the hearts of landlords, who empty their fields of men. But politics and morals, not political economy, must discuss and define men's *rights*. Land is not merely a surface destined to bear rent for a few grandees; it is the surface on which a nation must dwell, and from which a nation must have food. I do not complain or grieve, as some do, that we grow less *wheat* now than we used. In other lands wheat ripens more surely than with us, and there is reason in buying it with other products, provided that we raise other food on our own lands. On this we deliberately calculated in 1847. But when enormous fortunes are earned, some by commerce or manufactures, others by the demand for those minerals which wealthy communities need, the millionaires buy up land, *not* to get it cultivated for the nation's food, but to pamper pride and indulge fancies, or for the yet baser purpose of getting a high sporting-rent from another class of self-indulgent rich men. Our statesmen seem to be so accustomed to things as they are, as not to reflect that chronic pauperism is a disease which must at length kill any nation that neglects it. Cheap food is a matter of prime importance. When the necessaries of life are cheapest, all commodities which gratify higher tastes rise in value. When food becomes scarce, whatever refines and ennobles human life becomes depreciated. Therefore cheap food is even of first necessity to national wealth; but what is far more, it tends to keep down pauperism, vice, and rascality. Even corn has not been cheapened as it ought to have been when the Corn Laws were abolished. I am aware, we deplorably waste grain: that is a large, a very large, topic. Still, even with our existing bad habits, the market would soon abound with cheaper grain, fruits, roots, and all agricultural produce, with great relief to both town and country, if everyone who desired to work on the land could get a safe tenure, and the number of actual proprietors were greatly enlarged.

THE POLITICAL SIDE
OF
THE VACCINATION SYSTEM.

A Paper read at the Conference in Birmingham,
October 26th, 1874.

The most precious of human possessions to every one of us is Just Law. This it is which makes national attachment to national institutions a sacred duty,—This it is which makes self-devotion for their maintenance a wise and noble patriotism. Only under just law can a great community soundly flourish, and be rightly proud of their country.

In proportion as just law is valuable, so is unjust law pernicious and detestable. The more law-abiding a community is, so much the more deadly does unjust law become. Some indeed will tell us that law, however unjust, is sacred by the mere fact of its being enacted; but when a clear and strong case of injustice is presented, such as that of *slavery*, few will persevere in so arbitrary and paradoxical an assertion. In every case where the injustice of the law is clear, even though the thing be trifling, it becomes a mere question of personal prudence, whether to risk encountering the penalties by disobedience. Where the injustice is intense, it may be the part of noble heroism to violate the law and accept all risks; as in aiding fugitive slaves to escape, or otherwise imparting to them human rights and human kindness against the command of inhuman legislation.

Through our frequent ignorances injustice is often enacted without wrong intention. It is now a received principle in Christendom, that by way of safeguard against this result,—or rather, to lessen the probability of a legislature thus erring—a first indispensable condition of all legislation is, that it be exempt from arbitrary favouritism. As an obvious illustration; if, in the belief that public danger requires it, men are violently forced into the army, it is a most reprehensible tyranny to exempt rich families and impose the violence on the poor only. Neither rank nor locality should be favoured: unfitness, or pre-occupation in higher public duty, is alone a right ground of exemption.

Put another case. If a contagious disease is abroad, as plague, or an infectious leprosy, for the public safety it may be justifiable to impose special restrictions on those innocent unfortunates, who are centres of infection; but in that case it is unendurably unjust to exempt some of them from the law, who are as infectious as all the rest. If the legislators exempt themselves, when any of them are as certainly infectious as those whom they imprison or otherwise vex for the supposed public necessity, we can hardly be too severe in branding such dastardly conduct. Forsooth, a poor man, who is unable to defend himself, is to be made an object of the law's severity, while a legislator, who is as much a diffuser of pestilence as the poor man, is to be left at large and unmolested! If such a case occur, it is either vile, malicious tyranny, and the talk about pestilence is a false pretence, or the legislators are so overworked as not to know what they are about, being perhaps blind pupils of the blind, submissive to a clique of fantastic and ambitious physicians. On either hypothesis, common sense will say that resistance to the law is a patriotic duty.

Now, it is FIRST on this head that I confidently assail our existing laws of Compulsory Vaccination—falsely so called.

It is confessed by Vaccinators that Jenner was totally mistaken in supposing that no vaccinated person can take the small-pox. Though many of them shamefully declare to the ignorant that vaccination is an easy and sure preventive, the leaders of vaccination flatly contradict them by placarding every village (at Government expense, no doubt,) with earnest recommendation to be re-vaccinated, whenever small-pox is rife; and that, without any limit assigned of the time which the force of vaccination may be supposed to last. They dare not assert that it lasts seven years, nor five years. If you press them, they have to confess that in a bad season they cannot guarantee that a person vaccinated the previous year is really safe;—and then allege the damaging excuse that vaccinators are apt to be unskilful. Their whole plea for Infant Vaccination rests on the dogma (fitly called impious) that a healthy infant is a focus of infection. What is their argument? It is this. "An unvaccinated child *may* catch small-pox; *in that case* he will become *hereafter* a focus of infection; therefore he is *now* to be treated as a focus of infection!" I do not now stop to comment on the fact that scarlet fever and plague are prodigiously worse diseases than small-pox, and certainly as infectious; so that by this reasoning we are every one of us, at this moment, to be treated as foci of scarlet fever

and plague. But confining myself to the small-pox, I direct attention to the fact that all who need re-vaccination, in this medical theory are as *truly* foci of the disease as the healthy infants. It is useless to pretend that the vaccinated, if they do catch the small-pox, have the disease more lightly. If this were ever so true (as was at one time thought true of the inoculated), they do not the less spread the disease; and no vaccinator now ventures to set a limit, and guarantee a time, during which vaccination makes small-pox impossible. Either therefore their whole argument for the compulsory vaccination of infants falls to the ground, or periodical *re*-vaccination of adults ought also to be compulsory:—how often, no surgeon can undertake to define. Thus, if the reasoning of Vaccinators, to whom Parliament has enslaved itself, have a particle of weight, the existing law is at once tyrannically capricious and absurdly inefficient, by the surgeons' own theory. Physicians and surgeons unless wholly insincere, ought to come before Parliament, displaying sore arms from recent vaccination, before they dare to plead for outraging healthy infants. The first duty of legislators then is to be themselves re-vaccinated from arm to arm in consistency with their own law. All high-born ladies, and their daughters rising to womanhood, all the judges and heads of departments, and not low officials only, ought to be forcibly re-vaccinated, just as the soldiers and clerks of the War Office, and other persons easily trodden under foot, have been disgracefully forced. Nay, the Royal Family must be subject to the same law. Her Majesty perhaps has undergone her punishment; for I think her re-vaccination is within five years. Of course Her Majesty lives, moves, and reigns *under* the law, and would never consent to remain a focus of pestilence. But, in two years' time, when she is deemed to be again clear of her salutary cow-pox, it may be that she would prefer to yield up her crown and throne, and flee into some distant foreign exile,—some barbarian land, where the cruelties of medical theory are unknown,—rather than again endure what her patriotic devotion to her subjects' welfare is said to have cost her in her first re-vaccination. Of course the Russian bride, whom the Duke of Edinburgh so recently brought to England, ought to have been met by a band of Court physicians and surgeons, to examine her arms, and possibly to re-vaccinate her before she has set her pestilential foot on our sacred soil,—if there is any particle of weight in the medical reasonings. The Acts for Compulsory Vaccination avowedly rest on these reasonings; yet it cannot be pretended that the

legislators still believed with Jenner, that small-pox after vaccination is impossible. That under such circumstances Parliament should openly violate a first principle of legislation,—should act so tyrannical and dastardly a part as to enforce vaccination *only* on tender infants, not on powerful and rich men, nor even on adults;—should send fathers to prison for defending their infants, yet not dare to enforce re-vaccination on the fathers themselves, —this drives me to the conviction that there never was any free, open debate on the subject. I have not at hand the means of ascertaining the fact; yet (under correction) I infer that the Acts must have been disgracefully smuggled through thin Houses, at a late hour, in pursuance of medical fanaticism.

No possible amendment of the law can remove its monstrosity; for no medical scientist can lay down how long the practical efficacy of vaccination lasts, and no legislator can fancy that he knows of himself. Hence all the laws on the subject are thoroughly rotten. The only remedy is total and unconditional repeal.

But Secondly, I assert that it is beyond the function of law to dictate any medical procedure, or enforce any scientific theory. The usurpation is similar to that of enforcing a religious creed. In the latter case certain bishops and clergy assure the legislators that persons who exercise their natural faculties of thought and speech are *foci of moral pestilence*, and will cause the eternal perdition of thousands, if they are not stopped. To kill free-thinkers is the most effectual way; to banish them is to make them a curse to other lands. The clergy therefore pleaded for the burning of heretics, if possible; if not, "then at least" (said they) "burn their books, and if they preach, fine and imprison them; crop their ears, slit their noses, or scourge them: in short, outlaw them, for persisting in free utterances." If a legislature were now to abandon independent judgment and avow its submission to a hierarchy, it would be branded with disgrace in every country of Christendom, as betraying its trust and outstepping the limits of its just authority. Legislators *cannot* abdicate their own responsibility and transfer their functions and power. Abandoning personal judgment is *one* offence,—invasion of private conscience is a *second*.

So too in compulsory vaccination; in which they commit usurpation, alike against science and against private freedom. Every physician,—especially one on whom the State has bestowed a diploma, which solemnly authorizes him to practise, —not only has a right to treat his patients as his own judgment

dictates, but also must in duty protect one who consults him, from erroneous treatment. If the law says to *me*, "Get yourself vaccinated;" and I consult a physician whom I trust, he has a right to reply, "You are now in good health, and you know it,—let well alone; do not be such a fool as to infuse a disease into your blood, when you have none. Whether you choose to encounter the risk of legal penalties, it is for you to judge; but, as a physician, my advice to you is,—keep well as long as you can. It is easy to make a sore, and hard to heal it. Once put matter from the sores of other people into your veins, (an unnatural and detestable process) and you *do* not know, you *cannot* know,—no physician can possibly know,—what disease will come in with it. As a physician, I pronounce the law to be the fruit of ignorance and folly, pernicious in the extreme, a wide cause of infant death, and far wider still of ruined health and misery." Such is the actual, serious, vehement judgment of physicians, ostensibly as competent to judge as any pet surgeon of the Privy Council. I say, Parliament sins against science, if it dictate a medical procedure instead of leaving every physician and surgeon free. What progress can the art of medicine make, when Law thus usurps upon it? Parliament has had here abundant warning. In the last century the physicians frightfully extended small-pox, by using and pressing inoculation. If they had *then* been as powerful as now,—if there had been a clique of medical men whispering into the ears of the Privy Council; wielding the name, authority, and money of Government; giving the cue to Ministers what to favour, and to Members of Parliament how to vote,—they would *then* have made inoculation compulsory. They have now found out their error, as of course they must at last, after countless victims have perished by it; for, as the great surgeon, Sir Astley Cooper (so I read), enunciated, —"Medicine is an art, founded on conjecture, and improved by murder." Of course he spoke of medicine, such as he had known it. Well the Faculty has now taken a turn, and has induced Parliament to make inoculation (then the approved practice) *penal*. What a condemnation of their learned and much trusted predecessors! If our law-givers had a little leisure for tranquil thought, if they exercised any independent thought, if they did not vote at the bidding of their party, surely any ordinary wisdom would have led them to retort on the medical men who have been intensifying compulsory vaccination,—"What would be the state of your art and of the public health now, if under the pressure of your graduated predecessors, whose wisdom you

now count folly, we had made inoculation compulsory? Your practice, on very many vital matters, has been reversed within recent memory. If we now yield to your request, and make compulsory vaccination more and more stringent, how many years will elapse before your successors ask us to turn right round and make it penal?" All men who have heads and free thought, must see that such interference of law with medical process is fundamentally an illegitimate use of law, fatal to the progress of medical art.

And who can justly deny that it is a most tyrannical invasion of the rights both of parents and of infants? Unless I am a criminal, or am dangerous to the public health, or am needed for the public defence, it is unjustifiable to assault my person. To say that because *I may hereafter* take small-pox, or scarlet fever, or plague, therefore I am *now* to be treated as if I had the plague, is so contemptible an absurdity, that I do not believe there lives a man who would dare to utter it in Parliament. It is only our sapient vaccinators who call healthy infants "foci of infection." These men seem to imagine, that with their medical degree and the patronage of Government they may talk nonsense with impunity. Against the body of a healthy *man* Parliament has no right of assault whatever under pretence of the Public Health; nor any the more against the body of a healthy *infant*. Parliament might indeed forbid a parent, mad with theories, to make cruel experiments on his child, as by inoculating it with syphilis, with plague, with small-pox, or with cow-pox; for to *protect* the health of every citizen is clearly within its legitimate functions. But to *forbid* perfect health is a tyrannical wickedness, just as much as to forbid chastity or sobriety. No lawgiver *can* have the right. The law is an unendurable usurpation, which creates the right of resistance. In the law of compulsory vaccination, the legislators say to every parent, "You shall not keep your child in perfect health. We must give the cow-pox to your child; and with it you must take the chance of everything else. The longer the child is kept in a poxy state, the safer and better. We know that there is danger of vital power being so vigorous, as at length to throw the cow-pox off, and recover the perfect health of infancy; *but we hope better things;* we trust that the force of vaccination will keep up disease far longer than our physicians promise us; therefore, for the present, we postpone a law for Compulsory *Re*-vaccination, which indeed would be disagreeable to ourselves."

Such is the fatuity of physicians and the docility of Parliament

to its medical directors, that neither party listens to the doctrine of Physiologists, which echoes the dictates of common sense. The more perfect our health, the greater our vital power that resists infection. In deadly years the bad constitutions fall first and thickest. When the small-pox, cholera, or plague invade us, those are safest who have purest blood. Against physiology and against morality, modern medical art seems to teach, that artificial impurity of *blood* and *morals* is the state of a nation which the law ought to encourage, and (so far as the legislature dares to defy public indignation) to enforce. The fixed medical officers are certainly doing their best to deserve to be disestablished and disendowed; without this indeed we cannot be safe from their stealthy irresponsible influence on every government: but let our aristocracy well consider how much this medical hierarchy is likely to pull down in its own ruin, when law is rendered detestable. Decorous and admissible language fails me, in alluding to that which might have seemed incredible thirty years ago—the commanding of vaccination on a second child of a family, when vaccination has killed the first; and then sending the father to prison for refusal. Indeed, now that it is notorious that vaccination is sometimes fatal, I should feel it quite right if I were on the jury of inquest on a child thus cruelly killed for the imagined public good, to bring in a verdict, not, "Died by Vaccination," but, "Slain by the poisonous stab of the Vaccinator." In one such case, the Coroner (of course a medical man), to save the credit of vaccination, persuaded the jury to adopt the verdict, "Died from erysipelas." This Coroner must have argued, "Vaccination caused erysipelas; erysipelas caused death; therefore vaccination did not cause death." There was no loophole for denying that the erysipelas had been caused by the vaccination.

Thirdly, I denounce Compulsory Vaccination because the legislators cannot secure the child violently subjected to it from possible evil results short of death. I learn that full twenty years ago the medical faculty was warned, that foul diseases, other than cow-pox, may be transmitted, and are transmitted, by vaccination (so called); but the patrons of vaccination thought it a sufficient reply to call their informants *quacks*. Yet in 1871 they were forced to admit that their informants were right. Who now are the quacks? Of course I refer to the cases brought forward by Mr. Jonathan Hutchinson. Not to encroach on the medical side of the question, it suffices here to state that Mr. Simon, medical adviser of the Privy Council, the man whose

energies eminently support vaccination, was forced, in a debate of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society (April 25th, 1871), to confess that "Mr. Hutchinson's diagnosis must be provisionally accepted as correct, and that several undoubted instances (of the same kind) had occurred in Italy, France, and Germany." He laid down the law dogmatically,—"The blood of syphilitic persons conveys syphilis;" hence, "it is bad practice to take blood in vaccinating:" "*it is quite certain* that [in Mr. Hutchinson's cases] blood became mixed with lymph." This is the usual rash style of men who seem incapable of distinguishing their own theories from facts. Mr. Simon had not *seen* the operator dip his lancet into the blood: he only hears of disease resulting—he *infers* that the lancet went too deep, and then asserts this as a fact. Mr. De Meric and Mr. R. B. Carter (two surgeons who spoke in this debate), were flatly of an opposite opinion to Mr. Simon, and avowed that the lymph, without the blood, would equally communicate the dreaded disease. This difference of surgeons does not immediately concern me now. It suffices to press, that, if Mr. Simon be right, still *Parliament cannot* guarantee a child from syphilis, scrofula, consumption, ulcerations, mutilations, and a long train of other diseases, transmissible in arm-to-arm vaccination by the momentary unsteadiness of a surgeon's hand. Mr. Simon knows this, yet still endeavours to bolster up vaccination, on which his greatness, his patronage, and the salaries of many surgeons largely depend.

Now allow me to read to you how this matter appears from a surgeon's point of view. Mr. Henry Lee spoke first on the adjourned debate, May 9th, 1871. After mentioning various cases known to himself, where vaccination had certainly communicated formidable diseases other than cow-pox, he proceeded to speak of the surgeon, who, without giving to the public his own name, had communicated to Mr. Hutchinson, for publication, his cases of evil vaccination. Mr. Henry Lee did not, as some others, *pity* this anonymous surgeon, but extolled his *courage* (!) in revealing the facts, and believed it would be hereafter admitted that he had done much to make vaccination *safe*. He added, that, in order to make vaccination SAFE, "*some rules must be laid down to guide the profession at large.* Until this was done, and until it was fairly and fully acknowledged what *accidents* might take place, no one could be accused of malpractice in not avoiding the accidents. To do so, would be as if the Government held the captain of a vessel responsible for striking on a hidden rock, which they refused to recognize in their charts. . . . . There

were a number of *inconveniences* connected with vaccination, other than the conveyance of syphilitic animal poison."

Truly said, Mr. Surgeon! It is an *inconvenience* to lose two legs and one arm by vaccine ulcers, as poor Ira Connell of Southport attests. It is an undesirable *accident* to die of vaccine erysipelas. The surgeon desires to avoid personal responsibility; and justly says that if Parliament commands him to vaccinate, Parliament ought to teach him *how* to vaccinate. Why not add, (since without it mere rules are insufficient) Parliament ought to furnish him with *pure* lymph, which, kept in sure tubes, shall never rot and grow poisonous? Another surgeon, Mr. Ballard, demands *absolute* safety for the public from impure lymph. These gentlemen actually are blind to the fact that their own demand of impossibilities from Parliament is a total condemnation of the law. In their efforts to get up a panic concerning small-pox, vaccinators seem to forget that that disease, like every other, must have some cause, which they ought to investigate and teach people to avoid, as Anti-Vaccinators do. They imagine no cause but contagion: an imbecility which refutes itself. Also they expose themselves to the just imputation of incompetence, in treating small-pox as a most intractable disease, when by hot and cold baths, by hot air, and by certain herbs, other men and women, who often have no medical degree, and never have a Government salary, cure it easily. Surely, when legislators enforce the putting in of one devil to keep out another, the least they should do is to get a full and free medical debate on the question,—which devil is the more malignant?

Fourthly then I complain that Parliament, in surrendering its legislative power into the hands of a special medical clique, has made no effort to get free and fair debate among medical men of all schools on this critical subject. It is notorious that from the first introduction of vaccination, when the process so named was far less uncertain and formidable than now, very eminent men continued vehemently opposed to it. What is to me now most striking, is, that precisely the men who were Directors of Small-pox Hospitals for twenty or more years, in some instances have become the bitter foes of vaccination. Common practitioners who follow routine, count for nothing. If ever, in the face of a terrible contagion, it become necessary for Parliament to seek the advice of experts, the least it can do is to summon an assembly, in which the experts of *every school* may freely debate face to face—allopaths of every sect, hydropaths, homœopaths, herbalists, hygienists,—then let Parliament judge, after hearing.

If this had been done twenty years ago, vaccination would never have been made compulsory. If it were done to-day, the laws of vaccination would be indignantly repealed, and perhaps the practice itself would be instantly exploded.

Have we not also here a great lesson to learn concerning the fatuity of irresponsible legislators? When Louis Philippe (who lost his throne, just as the King of Holland lost Belgium, by tenderness for the lives of his insurgent people) heard of the unflinching massacres perpetrated in the name of the French Republic on the insurgents of June, 1848,—he exclaimed, "My faith! this sort of thing no king can do; it is only work for an *anonymous* government." By a frightful abuse, 40 Members of Parliament—about one-sixteenth of the whole House—can pass penal laws; and it is not compulsory on anyone to be present. The country seldom knows who are to blame for an evil law. In the old Roman Senate, all were compelled to attend, unless employed on public duty; even illness was no excuse; moreover, no Act of the Senate, passed after sunset, was valid. When Cicero, after a long sea-voyage, arrived at Rome sick, the Consul threatened to pull down his house over his head, if he did not come to the Senate. We do not wish for so despotic an Executive; but by our opposite extreme—by legislation at midnight, with no compulsion to attend, and a miserably small quorum,—we make law, instead of sacred, contemptible and tyrannical; we make legislators irresponsible even to public opinion; we abandon law to the intrigue of interested cliques and ambitious factions. We are getting into the condition of the expiring Roman Republic, "*In corruptissimâ Republicâ plurimæ leges.*" Our greatest achievements are the repeal of pernicious laws. If England is not to fall into disasters too gloomy to be mentioned, we need far deeper and wider re-organization of Parliament than any leaders of parties, or speakers on hustings, or Chartist orators have dreamed of.

RELIGION AT THE BAR OF ETHICS.

[From Frazer's Magazine, June, 1875.]

Early Religion, as known to us in many nations, was evidently a product of numerous mental influences. It arose before men had definitely and consciously made attempts at *Science*, that is, at systematic and verified knowledge. The idea of Duty—or that which is *due* from each individual to his fellows, to his community, and to its chief—must have been co-eval with human existence. Before it arose, man was not yet man, but only a gregarious animal, performing relative duties by instinct; if really out of this were our beginnings. But instruction in Duty was long a matter of routine, and its rule was custom; hence our name *Morals*, from the "mos majorum," the custom of ancestors. No science of morals was imagined or aimed at. Rights ("jura"), according to ideas so inveterate as to last almost to the present day, depended on custom, so that a man was believed to have rights over slaves, over wild animals, and wild land, by mere habitual acquiescence. Naturally then, the duties which man owes to man were thought essentially different from those which man owes, or can owe, to God. His fellow-man *needs* his help, or his supplies: to withhold them is a harm and an injustice. But God, or the gods, cannot be harmed by us. They want honour, not aid: to withhold it, is not an injustice, but a slight, an insult, which they may be expected to resent and punish. Thus the enquiry, "what are the proper ways of honouring deity?" became quite separate from the other question, "what are the duties of man to man?" nor was it at all to be expected that moral thought should play any large part in shaping the earliest religious doctrine.

Among Hindoos and Assyrians, Egyptians and Greeks, speculations of philosophy necessarily premature and theories concerning the origin of the universe formed the basis of religion. Among the more imaginative and flighty nations poetical fancy exercised an excessive influence on religious thought: among others the *responsibility* of man to God assumed a higher place, so that the Creator was regarded as a Judge, not of great criminals only, but of all men at all times. Here the union was

made between Religion and Morals. Nevertheless, the great mass of the religion remained fantastic, and generally ascribed to the gods the moral weaknesses of men; at the same time, the code of morals was variously defective or erroneous.

As far as known to us in our Western world, both religion and morality continued to be dogmatic—that is, traditional, dictatorial, and unverified—until the era of Socrates, whose whole life was spent in the effort to establish Morals on a scientific basis. Religious doctrine, as a whole, he was satisfied to accept by tradition; but his strong good sense insisted on rejecting from the mythology all the tales which attributed immoral conduct to the gods. He was quite aware that many of them were only efforts at philosophy embodied and materialized by poets, which therefore admitted of a spiritual interpretation, freeing them from grossness. But he insisted that such spiritualizing was too tedious and uncertain a business, and, on the whole, a waste of time. We know that silly tales cannot be sacred. Cut them away boldly from religion, and your religion becomes nobler, simpler, stronger. Such appears the cardinal posture of Socrates' mind towards the current theology. He occasionally practised augury from the flight of birds, and had no objection to offer sacrifice, or to consult the oracle of Apollo; because in none of these things did he find immorality. Even so, he appeared to the vulgar to be impiously incredulous. But his incredulity as to morals was far more alarming, because his search was far more fundamental. Wishing to place the knowledge of Duty on a safe basis, he dug deeper to find solid ground; and to superficial hearers he seemed to undermine everything and establish nothing. To this, indeed a personal peculiarity remarkably contributed. When a hearer, embarrassed by his searching questions, asked him what he thought himself, he made a systematic practice of sham humility, professing that he was quite incapable of answering. Nobody was deceived by this. To expect replies from others, and evade their questions in turn, gave him an unfair advantage in the argument, made him very disagreeable as ever trying to exhibit other men as fools, and filled the public with suspicion of him. Aristotle puts down this quality, Dissimulation (of one's own powers), in the list of vices; in Greek it has the short name *irony;* he regards Socrates as a pre-eminent example of this vice. While such a method could not succeed with the public, (and indeed brought down upon him at last fierce resentment, when two statesmen, who were supposed to be fair specimens of his pupils, were detested as the bane of Athens,) yet

with closer students and profounder minds the method was effectual. Thenceforward Duty was studied with the painstaking accuracy and continuity of men who desired to make it Science. Its Greek name *Ethics* slightly differs from Morals; for although *ēthos* and *ĕthos* probably once both meant the same thing as Latin *consuetudo*, yet *ēthos* in Attic did not mean mere custom, but the temperament and tone of the mind. Accordingly, Ethics takes the inward heart as its main topic, and regards outward action as the manifestation.

Mythology in Greece and Rome long survived the birth of Ethics, because Ethical culture could not reach far into an illiterate community, and because the charm of poetry pre-occupied youthful and ardent minds with religious phantasms. Not the less is it certain, that Ethics, in proportion as the science was cultivated and diffused, was strongly antagonistic to the Greek religion. The followers of Socrates could not continue in his balanced position; but discerned the utter worthlessness of mere tradition. If they retained the outline of national belief, as aiding patriotism, it was chiefly by rationalizing or spiritualizing it. But from the moment it was understood that Ethics rests on a solid basis of human science, and that the national Religion has only a cloud basis, resting on we know not what, no one could stand out for any religious doctrine or sentiment which Ethics distinctly condemned.

Under the Macedonian and Roman Empires the mixture of populations and increase of travelling brought conflicting mythologies into closer juxtaposition. The ancient pious assumption that all were true, if only rightly interpreted, did not stand long against the manifold proofs of error. With the extension of literature something of general cultivation spread far beyond the circles which can be anyhow termed scientific; and it became inevitable for religion to be brought to the bar of Ethics with the whole educated community. Hereby the Hebrew synagogues made proselytes wherever Jews were scattered; since thoughtful Gentiles discerned the superior morality of that creed. Before long the current mythology was attacked on its immoral side alike by accomplished sceptics such as Lucian, and by the earnest vehemence of Christian advocates. Christianity has so uniformly, and in general most successfully, used this weapon against older religions, that no Christian can with decency or plausibility object to its use against his own doctrine, whatever be the form of Christianity to which he may hold. Yet when Garrison, in reply to the assertion that the Bible sanctioned

slavery, replied, "If that be true, so much the worse for the Bible," many shuddered at it as profane who had no sympathies with slavery. It is a hard saying, "With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you." It is pleasant to have a double balance, one to weigh our neighbour's wares in, and another for one's own; but such devices cannot permanently avail. Men accustomed to argue only with those who hold, with them, some acknowledged standard of truth, as the Thirty-nine Articles, the Catechism, or, more vaguely, the Church, are annoyed when any one appeals from these to the Scriptures. Naturally they were annoyed and pained when Garrison appealed from the Scriptures to intrinsic morality—to human Ethics. The appeal made the fact disagreeably prominent, which, in controversy with the heathen, or with any one outside of the Church, appears of itself, that no Scripture can be made the ultimate basis of belief, but there is a higher court before which it must be tried. This, indeed, was from the first virtually asserted in the words, "Unto the poor the Gospel is preached; he that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The poor judge ill concerning alleged physical miracles; they are bad interpreters of ancient prophecies or other ancient writings; they are not cognisant of natural history; in short, of all that very miscellaneous literature and knowledge which by modern Christians is called "theology," the only part of which the illiterate, or little educated, can be good judges, is the purely Ethical part. Moral thought is necessarily the basis of any religion which appeals from the wisdom of the wise to the popular understanding, and glorifies the Spirit of God in the heart of babes and sucklings; the same is certain to be the tribunal before which every creed in the future will have to approve itself. Against any new religion, as Mormonism, we instinctively and unhesitatingly appeal to it; and with popular preachers the commonest and cheapest defence of Christianity is, to make sweeping assertions concerning the moral defects and vices of "infidels." This, again, is an avowal, made unawares, that religion is fitly judged by Ethical free thought.

In presence of the Evangelical Alliance, Professor Theodore Christlier, of Bonn, recently read an elaborate paper in that University, on the "Best Methods of Counteracting Infidelity." The method which he recommended was, to expose the miserable results of "infidelity," as attested in history, in contrast to the wholesome effects of Christian faith. It is interesting to see how the challenge is accepted in the (American) *Index*, a weekly periodical of Boston, which is virtually the organ of the Free

Religious Society. A. W. S., who was recently editor, says, In all kindness, he advises Christians *not* to try this method of defence, for, if they undertake to match man for man, fact for fact, and so compare the *moral* effects of "Infidelity" and Christianity, they will be overwhelmed with discomfiture. "Infidelity" could wish no better vantage given it by Christianity than such a historic comparison would afford. We warn Christians, therefore (says he), not to throw down this glove: *it will be taken up with avidity if they do.*

Thus both parties warmly avow the high value of the moral test; not precisely saying with Pope, "He can't be wrong whose life is in the right," but, that creed cannot be right whose professors' lives are in the wrong. Nevertheless, both writers seem prepared to employ the test erroneously. On the one hand, under the railing appellation "infidelity" (by which is *meant* unbelief of the Christian creed) doctrines most various and adverse are confounded. The entire mass of ancient Greek philosophers were Free Religionists, yet they differed by all that separated Zeno from Epicurus, besides the Acadamicians and others, who debated everything, but decided on nothing. Fully the same vast breadth and depth of chasm exists among those now classed together as "infidels"—nay, Hebrew, Mussulman, and Hindoo monotheism make the diversity greater than ever. To attempt to infer a general result from the lives of such an incongruous mass is simply ridiculous. *A priori*, it is evidently possible that some have risen above the national faith, and others fallen below it. Equally on the other side, the *Index* frequently shows itself unjust to Christianity, by imputing to Christian *doctrine* all the vices, swindlings, and high crimes of Christian professors. Christianity (forsooth) *ought* to keep its professors moral! Even the baseness of the Tammany ring and official roguery is put down to the discredit of Christianity. Of course an old creed which has gained a high reputation and a solid standing in the world attracts into its ranks those who have worldly objects and no very deep religion. Of necessity they dishonour their religious associates, and the more so the purer and nobler the creed. But a small body discarding the national religion is exposed to ill-will or suspicion, and attracts no hypocrites; nay, only men and women earnest for truth. The members of the Free Religious Society have in common, not opinion or belief, but love of truth. It is not closed to avowed Atheists; on the other extreme it contains Jewish Rabbis. No inference here is possible from comparative morality, any more than in the other case; especially

when we add the undoubted fact that the moral conduct of any great mass depends more on national institutions and circumstances than on the creed. It is not in this very vague way that we can get any award from the tribunal of Ethics. Some reasonable and intelligible connection must be pointed out between the tenets and the conduct of the votaries; it must be shown that they have acted in accordance with the religion, not against its most authoritative standard. Thus, when in Grecian Corinth a system of harlotry was founded on the religion, we have a right to charge the moral evils on the creed; but when evils arise in Christendom from priestly celibacy and auricular confession, you can only argue from it against a particular Church, not against Christianity itself: for *we know* that these institutions are an after-growth, without any authority whatever from the earliest doctrine. As between the Free Religionists and Christendom, we may perhaps already discern two topics, which will furnish, to a certain extent, moral tests—their doctrine concerning women and their doctrine concerning humility. Each subject may bear a short discussion.

Women in the Greek world were treated as minors, and in Palestine they did not stand much higher. The woman existed for the man, the man for himself or for God. It is undeniable that in the Christian Scriptures the notions of the age were embodied; were accepted by the apostles, and stereotyped by the Church. A juster appreciation of the *status* of women, both social and political, has now arisen in many centres. In several respects the Quakers took the lead; yet it cannot be pretended that the movement is properly Christian: it came from free thinking, and not from tradition or authority. Free Religionists insist that Christianity, as a traditional creed, has repressed the discussion of women's *rights*, and has aided the maintenance of imperfect and unjust relations. Nevertheless on the other side, it is equally true, that the Apostolic comparison of marriage to the relation of Christ to the Church, though it has been adverse to the woman's right, has refined and spiritualized the sexual relation. The anxious question now arises, whether under Free Religion an equally pure ideal will be maintained. The men and women who take the lead in that American Society are so pure-minded, that to doubt their earnest desire to place the relation of the sexes on the highest and noblest footing would be a causeless insult: yet there is a danger: for, masses of men gravitate to the level of principles, whatever the leaders of a new creed may wish to the contrary. Some of them undoubtedly go

great lengths in desiring *Free* Divorce, and cannot be convinced by the great Roman experiment (so prominently insisted upon by Gibbon) that it will terribly depress, not elevate morality. Others of them, if they do not deny, yet hold with a very loose hand the belief in a personal God. The outlines of national history known to us suggest, that what is called Nature-Worship, which differs little from Pantheism, strongly conduces to sexual licentiousness; and some students have advanced the definite doctrine, that to undermine the belief of a Personal Holy God insures a degradation in sexual morals. There is much to countenance this opinion. On the other hand, however high the Christian theory, its influence over Christian nations has hitherto been deplorably feeble. No people of Christendom has any higher boast, than that it is not so bad as some others, and might be worse than it is; and those which are somewhat better, are better by reason of the political and social institutions, not because of religious doctrine. It therefore remains as an anxious question of the future, whether the higher influence and higher cultivation and greater independence of woman—the more refined, tender, and imaginative of the two sexes—will so modify society as to counteract those evil influences which we may fear from a lapse into Greek or Hindoo Pantheism. At the same time though students of material science may prevalently take this line, there is as yet no indication that any masses of the community will follow them. A Theism akin to that of the Hebrews can alone cement Church union.

But next, as to Christian humility. We have grown up under a belief that, in respect to this quality, Christianity added a great and precious beauty to Virtue, giving it a noble and sweet tenderness which Pagan goodness could hardly obtain. Even the noblest Stoicism is apt to offend us as harsh and proud; and if later, as in Marcus Aurelius, it was softened, some indirect influence of Christianity may not unreasonably be surmised. Assailants have with excellent reason reproached us modern Europeans for unchristian pride and ferocity. Some of us, in deploring the fact, have attributed it to the ingrained temperament of the Northern peoples. Nations long subject to severe despotism are said to gain softer manners, with less of self-assertion; but no law appears on the surface of the facts. Are Spaniards less proud than Englishmen? In the midst of such ruminations one is quite taken aback by the sudden announcement from the centre of the free Religionists, that Christian humility is *not* a virtue, but a despicable vice. In a formal, elaborate assault, Mr. Francis

Ellingwood Abbot,* editor of the *Index*, denounces Christianity, "in the name of human virtue," among other reasons for the following :

> Because it enjoins self-abhorrence as the first condition of the salvation which it offers, makes the denial of all worth or worthiness in mankind the first step in the Christian life, and teaches that Christ will save those alone who have lost all faith in themselves and in their own power to escape the just wrath of God. It thus strikes a deadly blow at the dignity of human nature, extinguishes that noble sentiment of self-respect without which all high virtue is impossible, and smites men with the leprosy of self-contempt. It makes them crawl like reptiles before Christ—"Their hands on their mouths, and their mouths in the dust." It is the very abolition of true manliness among men.

On this passage one may first remark, that it identifies Christian doctrine with that of St. Augustine (which never prevailed entirely in Christendom), and is worded more strongly than a majority of Christians will accept; but let us pass this by. Next, the attack is directed as truly against the Hebrew religion, as the Christian; indeed the Hebrews were the earlier offenders and the Christians have but followed in their track. As to the "self-abhorrence" which a sense of the Divine purity brings into the heart of man, the Book of Job takes the lead, and expresses it in coarser terms than any polished persons now choose to employ. Job is not content with the simple statement, "I have heard of Thee with the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee: *wherefore I abhor myself*, and repent in dust and ashes;" but long earlier in the controversy he asks: "How should man be just before God?.....If I wash myself in snow-water and make my hands ever so clean, yet shalt Thou plunge me in the ditch, and mine own clothes shall make me to be abhorred." Other writers in the *Index* have uttered strong contempt against Christianity for the doctrine, that "all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags,"—strangely unaware that the words are a mere quotation from Isaiah lxiv. 6. As a matter of taste, one may deprecate the metaphor; but the question remains untouched, whether the sentiment is just.

We have a pretty accurate acquaintance with John Knox, Oliver Cromwell, Sir Harry Vane, and many other Puritans who were high Calvinists, and accepted in their fulness, as did Luther and Calvin, the doctrines so offensive to Mr. Abbot; but it does not at all appear to have lessened their manliness, or made high virtue impossible to them: nay, in contrasting them to their

---

* Tract, *The Impeachment of Christianity*, republished by Thomas Scott, 11, The Terrace, Farquhar Road, Upper Norwood. Price 3*d*.

opponents, whether of the Anglican or Tridentine school, who objected to their doctrine, as extreme, it would seem that what we now call their "Calvinism" made them more manly. We need not further press this, than to say, that a part of history in which we have a remarkably full knowledge of men's characters makes Mr. Abbot's assertion very unplausible. If he is right, it must be proved by analysis of the doctrine and its tendency: it will not be proved by history.

Return then to the doctrine itself. Is it reasonable that man should justify himself before God; or, on the contrary, that he should be abashed at the sense of his own moral imperfections? The thought may cross one's mind (but probably it is unjust to Mr. Abbot)—Does not the reasoner who insists that we shall not humiliate ourselves before Deity, think of God as a being who excels us in power only, and *not* in moral goodness? As the late Dr. Arnold of Rugby emphatically said, "To worship power only, is devil-worship:" of course that is debasing. But as it is wholesome for a child who has wilfully transgressed to be humiliated before a wise and tender parent, so in proportion as is our sense of God's rectitude on the one hand, and our own consciousness on the other hand that we are worse than we *might* have been, and *ought* to have been, will be our reasonable abashment. Between equals and fellows dignity may be asserted, but what can be reasonably meant by claiming dignity before God? "To put our hands on our mouths and our mouths in the dust before Him," *not* in dread of punishment, *but* in moral contrition, appears to be the very mode in which aspiration after the highest virtue is combined with the tenderest sympathy for transgressors outwardly more guilty than ourselves. The foundation of this was laid in Judaism; Christianity has signally built upon it. The parable of Jesus about seeking the sheep that is lost; the doctrine of Paul, "By the grace of God I am what I am," and the reference of all Christian virtue to special Divine favour, so that no man can boast; surely tend to all that gentleness and sweetness, forbearance, piety and candid allowance for other men's faults, which we emphatically praise as Christian. As to "high growth in virtue," what can so conduce to it as a definite conviction that this is that for which God created and ordained us, *because it is His own essence?* Yet who can vividly feel this, without being struck dumb, and as it were cast to the ground, by a sense how impure is his best virtue in contrast to the Divine purity?

If Mr. Abbot and others reply, "That may be admitted, provided it be not carried *too far;* but self-abhorrence is an extravagance;"

perhaps we find here a central ground of reconciliation. The fact is, that feelings so intense are not and cannot be continuous; or, if they are, the state becomes morbid. The language too of strong feeling, like that of love, is naturally extravagant, and we must not press it to the letter. Most of the schools of Christendom have discerned this, and have declined to follow Augustine in his extreme doctrine: and though the first Protestant Reformers so formulated their creed, their followers soon softened it in interpretation. Hence it is not just in Mr. Abbot to lay this accusation on all Christendom. The worst that can be imputed is, that too strong confessions of sin put into the mouths of young people *as matter of routine* tend to insincerity and unsound sentiment, and that the rare case of a person tormenting himself (as probably did the poet Cowper) by perpetual self-condemnation is unhealthy and dangerous. Such an admission is far short of justifying the very vehement attack, and is quite consistent with maintaining firmly what is expressed in the preceding paragraph.

Besides, the coarser self-condemnation naturally belongs to the earlier stage of Christian life, when strong passions are unsubdued; or to after-crises which involve new moral struggles. Mr. Abbot avows that the "self-abhorrence" is made a "first condition;" which might have been a clue to him. One is inclined to ask, does he regard himself *never* to have been a Christian, when he studied and preached as a Unitarian? For we cannot think that he is thus bitterly despising and reviling his own past.

But it is instructive to contrast Christian humility with the virtue of Aristotle's most elaborately drawn character, the magnanimous or great-souled man. Let us look into this really sage philosopher's ideal man. "This is the man, who being worthy of great things, also counts himself worthy. But that man is little-souled [or humble?] who thinks too lowly of his own merits: especially if he be in fact highly deserving, so much the worse is his defect. But what the great-souled man deserves, is, external good; and peculiarly that which we allot to the gods, namely, *honor*, which is the greatest of external goods. Of course he must be eminently good to deserve honor, and must be great in each virtue separately; for, honor is the prize of virtue, and is assigned to the good only. With great honors, bestowed by worthy men, he will be moderately pleased, as receiving what is his own or somewhat less than his due; still he will accept it, since they give him what they can (!): but honors offered him by common men he will utterly slight, as he will their

dishonor of him. Towards wealth and power, prosperity or adversity, he will bear himself evenly, being neither very joyful in success nor very sorrowful in disaster. Counting honor itself a small thing, much more will he so count other outward matters: wherefore such men seem to be contemptuous. Yet successes contribute to greatness, by increasing grandeur: but without virtue men cannot bear success gracefully. Such do but foolishly imitate the great-souled man, and while acting unvirtuously look down upon others. But the really magnanimous man justly looks down upon others. He has no fondness for endangering himself in petty causes, but when encountering great dangers is scornful of his own life. He is apt to do benefits, but is ashamed of receiving them (!); for to bestow is the part of a superior; but to receive, of an inferior. When he does receive a favour, he repays it in large surplus, trying to make the other party his debtor, and clear himself of obligation (!). He is quick to remember those whom he has benefited, and apt to forget those who have benefited him (!); for the receiver is less than the giver, and he wishes to be in the higher place (!). And he hears with pleasure the kindnesses he has performed, and with pain the kindnesses he has received (!). He can hardly bring himself to ask a favour, but he is prompt to confer one. Towards men in high station and prosperity he holds himself lofty, but towards men of middle station he is moderate, and is not overbearing to the lowly. He will not easily enter the lists for honor, or where others are pre-eminent; and is inactive and dilatory (!), except where the honor or task is great. In his hatreds and his loves he is open. He cares for truth [or reality] more than for opinion [or appearance]; and he speaks his mind freely, *because he is contemptuous.* But towards the many, instead of being plain-spoken, he rather speaks ironically [i.e. allusively by half truth]. He is indisposed to wonder [or admire]: for nothing is great to him: nor does he remember injuries, but rather overlooks them. Nor does he talk of men, nor care whether they praise or blame him: nor is he inclined to praise others (!), nor yet to revile even his enemies, except on account of some insult [or outrage]. Least of all will he whimper or entreat. He prefers things handsome and unfruitful to things fruitful and useful: for this is the temperament of one who is self-sufficient. His movement seems to be slow, and his voice deep (!), and his utterance steady. The character contrary to this is rather the humble; for that extreme is both commoner and worse (!) than to be empty [or presumptuous] and ostentatious, which is the extreme on the other side."

In order to be thoroughly fair, I have risked being tedious in this extract. The more elaborately the acute philosopher develops his idea of the highest virtue, the more thoroughly unamiable does the picture turn out, because the basis of the character is erroneous. Self, self-esteem, self-honor, self-aggrandizement, ring through the whole: and if this were virtue, virtue would be limited to a select aristocratic few.

How sweet, beautiful, and refreshing is the contrast to all this in the doctrine of not one or two, but *every* writer in the New Testament (to say nothing of the Old) concerning human virtue! "In honor prefer one another." "Charity seeketh not her own." "The wisdom that is from above is pure, peaceable, full of mercy and good fruits." "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble." "Ye are a holy generation, a royal priesthood, partakers of the Divine nature." How can a thoughtful man believe that such doctrine will make us unmanly, smite us with leprosy, and turn us into reptiles? We may here measure a vast improvement on one side of morals attained by Jew and Christian over the excellent and really great Aristotle.

Mr. F. E. Abbot charges on Christian humility that it entails not unmanliness only, but also neglect of justice to other men; but surely the denunciation of humility as a vice led the Greek to unamiable pride, and a devotion to self which must inevitably generate endless strife, quarrel, injustice, and war. It is an interesting speculation, how far the temperament of Alexander the Great may have been built up into that intensity of selfishness and arrogance which had such tragical results, by imbibing this doctrine concerning "magnanimity" from his honored instructor. Even without it he might have accounted Macedonia and his faithful Macedonians as nothing but tools for building up his own greatness, and passing himself off as a son of Jupiter: but such Ethical teaching was all fuel to his natural flame. If the Free Religionists put pride into their religion, instead of humility, they will assuredly make it both unamiable and unjust. If man, having lofty thoughts of God, is not to be lowly before such a Being, it is difficult to expect that he will avoid many unlovely qualities towards his fellow men.

PREAMBLE TO SHAKESPEAR'S RICHARD II.

When I attempted to read aloud Shakespear's *Richard II.*, a lady declared it was unfair to expect hearers to know the history of that juncture so familiarly, as to be able to listen intelligently. She claimed from me a preface. In obedience I compiled the following, but found it impossible to reconcile Shakespear's details concerning the quarrels of the two Earls with the history as I read it, and with probability. A slight incongruity thus remains.

SCENE I.—*A chamber in the Castle of Plassy, in Essex.*

THOMAS WOODSTOCK, DUKE OF GLOUCESTER, *seventh son of* EDWARD III. *converses with his* DUCHESS.

DUCHESS. My lord! why sad and anxious is thy face?
DUKE. How can I not be sad, my dearest one!
When dark disaster scowls upon the land
From strife within and enemies without?
DUCHESS. Strife is, methinks, our English element.
Never, sithence my birth, a year went by,
But brought us glories of devouring war
Or scare of treason and alarms at home,
So much we women know. The common lot
Is woe and wailing. Why recurreth aye
Misery of peasants? This I fain would learn.
DUKE. My love! to sound the bottom of our woes
Is hard. Complex the story, long to tell,
And trying to thy patience. Ask me not.
When shall I finish, once if I begin?
DUCHESS. Nay, grudge me not instruction. Woman-kind
Wonder, while weeping, and desire to know
The primal fountain of our public wrongs.
Count on my patience, and refuse me not.
DUKE. If this thou claim of me, I yield. But where,
Where to begin? and how compress the tale?
Henry the Second, first Plantagenet,
A lion-hearted prince, restor'd to peace
This mangled country. Countless robbers he—
Bishops and Barons or banditti stout,—

Discastled, sending wide with royal pow'r
His law-dispensing judges to the weak,
Himself severely scanning their decrees.
Legitimate his rule, fruitful and grand.
His baser son, Richard of tiger-heart,
Reckless of England, followed. Elder he
Than John, my ancestor of ill renown;
Else haply John less wrongfully had dealt.
But pass we these and come to nearer times.
John's grandson was king Edward first of name,
Edward, the peasant's father: yet, alack!
From Edward we inherit war and hate,
Bloodshed and fire, a cruel legacy.

DUCHESS. To mighty Edward, conqueror of Wales,
Suzerain of Scotland, can such blame attach?

DUKE. As told by men in Rome, king Romulus
Of yore with many a gallant carried off
For bridal Sabine maidens unbespoke.
Such wives, methinks, were hard to pacify.

DUCHESS. How does this tale reprove king Edward's deeds?

DUKE. Hatred, not love, ensues, to force, which hard
And ruthless driveth. Kings desire the love
And loyalty of peoples. Kindly deeds
From dogs and horses win sure gratitude,
Nor less are human hearts by goodness won.
Wisely did Edward wish that Scotland, Wales,
And England should in common rule be knit.
To England strength and glory would accrue;
More solid guerdon to the smaller folk.
Greater to Scots were English rank, than aught
Yielded by Scots to us in countergift.
Our ampler wealth to them much weal would lend.
These Scots, when doubtful whom to count their king,
Themselves took Edward as their arbiter;
Such vantage had he! League of amity
Ere long had blent two peoples into one.
As for the Welshmen, prince Llewellyn's bride
Was Edward's cousin, whom in fervent youth
This foreiner with constant love desir'd.
When friendly dealings would have drawn amain
Scotland and Wales to nestle in our hearts,
Edward, with foot of iron trampling flat
Both nations, planted in them deadly hate

Descending immanent from sire to son.—
Who wastes good chance mars weal of after men:
Do I too dolefully this error wail?

DUCHESS. In truth I know that Scottish border-raids
Spread shrieks and ruin over half the North.
Our stores and cattle bait them, and the speed
Of nags and cars light-laden balks our might.

DUKE. Ay! to my grandsire, Edward's hapless son,
His sire bequeath'd a fatal Scottish war,—
Fatal at last, e'en to his throne and life;—
Surge of an outraged nation, which perchance
His father yet alive had fail'd to stem,
When Bruce the flag of martyr'd Wallace rear'd.

DUCHESS. What? How? I alway heard, the awful fate
Of wretched Edward came as meed of Spite
And Envy glow'ring on his favourites;
Not from the Scots and by his father's fault.

DUKE. Rightly thou judgest: hate of favourites
Fir'd up our English peerage. Whó can bear
Strangers, in field and chamber intimate
With puissant king? These whisper in his ear
Glozing and jesting, slanderous perhaps,
While high they stalk, by royal favour rais'd;
A Gascon made our Regent and our Chief,
Rich by our wealth, bright in our royal gems,
By fraud bestow'd from heirlooms of the Crown!—
The barons' fierce revenge I mildly blame.
Yet weak had been their jealousy and ire,
To tear my grandsire from his father's throne,
Had not the realm collective felt dismay,
Annoy and sick disgust, when Edward, foil'd
By Scottish prowess, desolation brought
On us,—himself in costly pomp and ease
Too softly lapp'd,—evading task of war.
But woe betides a country, if its weal
Hang on a prince in sunny joyance rear'd.

DUCHESS. True! I have heard: seldom is toilsome prince
Sire to a toilsome sagely-ruling son.
Pleasure and ease, not work of State, is sweet.

DUKE. Nay, sweeter far, by days and nights of toil
To earn the blessings of the multitude,
Than aught beside which Rank and Wealth can give.
But to my topic nearer must I drive,—

Our present dangers, tangled miseries.
Foemen without and strife within, I said,
Beset us sorely. Nought is here obscure.
Against us France and Scotland mostly stand.
Scotland is alway fierce, and nigh to strike:
Grim was the carnage, late, at Otterburn.
Ireland, but now insurgent, boils with rage,
Nor crouches sweetly under forein Lords;
Freedom they prize, as we do. Praise to souls
Who freedom love! If sport of war we crave,
(And what beside in Ireland shall we get?)
With equal weapons meet them, hand to hand,
Not with swift arrow from the coward bow.
Did Dick of Clare, or Henry, noble heart,
Take barren rock and widely spreading bog
With churls half-naked, brood of penury,
For cultur'd vales and cities gorg'd with store?
Rebellion soon will call to carnage new
And costly armament of ships and cars,
Horses and gear and victual for a host.
To crush wild freedom, brings to chiefs renown,
Pelf to purveyors; to the many, bale.
For archers thirty thousand borne by sea
Vast was the tale of public moneys wrung
From shires and cities and from thrifty poor.
On villains peel'd new fleece is loath to sprout.
The royal purse,—pit bottomless, I trow,—
Swallows more treasure than the land can yield.
When war from Scotland, France and Wales is slack,
For Ireland English blood must needs be shed.

But now I grieve to whisper words to thee
Which from a son may seem undutiful.
For fifty years my glorious father reigned,
Crown'd on the throne in boyhood. Forty years
Did war triumphant fulminate his name,
Fruitless in substance. For,—his realm he left
Weaker and poorer, rack'd with discontent.
His heir apparent, noblest of his sons,
Was made the scourge of France; then from Navarre
By hardship and by fever sank in death,—
My brother dear, fair flow'r of chivalry.
My sire was nephew to a king of France:

France was his friend: why should it be his foe
And each on other dire disaster fling?
Oh England! too complacent to thy kings
Who torrents shed of unoffending blood,
In sad complicity of guilt we stand
And Murder draw upon our proper heads.
If God forgive us, God will first impose
Fit penalty for riot merciless.

Our present Richard, grandson of my sire,
Reign'd, like to him, in boyhood; but anon
Brave against minor king, did Charles of France
Burn our sea-ports, and waste the Isle of Wight,
Small vengeance for our wild enormities.
Spain join'd with France: the Scots swoop'd down with joy:
Losses and effort strain'd our English nerves.
Taxation crush'd our people: next, behold!
From Kent to furthest mark of Yorkshire flam'd
A peasants' war portentous, angry, fierce;
Yet plunder it forbad for private greed.
That danger Richard bravely pacified
Granting, by royal guarantee precise
And charter'd documents, the churls' demands,
Not overcharg'd, in sooth! Their bands dispersed,
Harmless at once, nor longer breathing ire.
Youth should be generous; the royal pledge
Most sacred: kings should aid the weaker herd.
In princely honor princely strength resides.
Yet did our Richard break his plighted troth,
Bondage for freedom gave; for amnesty,
Ruthless, he hundreds toss'd to savage death,
Sad omen showing of his after-reign:
But of the bondage haply he repents.
With Scotland and with France unceasing war
Draining our coffers, slaughtering our men,
Burnt deep resentment in the vulgar heart.
Chiefly through me its cry to Richard came;
Far other tales to him were musical
From false self-seeking glozing courtiers,
Who taught that kings must no control endure.
When past his twentieth year, at Nottingham
With buxom* judges closeted, he fram'd

* *German* beugsam (flexible).

A code of maxims trampling charters down
And rights, to make him despot over all.
This forc'd us into arms, to save the State.
Thou knowest, I, as England's Constable,
Was bound a leader's post to occupy,
And champion stand for rights of Parliament,
There, without battle, truce we made and peace.
Nay, battle had we, with De Vere alone,
Who raised an army, but was quickly crush'd,
And gladly into Ireland made escape.
No love the king now bears me, nor forgets
My curbing of his young expenditure,—
Thoughtless profusion, sowing discontent,
Too racy seed of new insurgency.
Baffled and driv'n to bay, a king is hard
To bind by parchment. Richard now from France
Hath won a child-princess to be his bride,
A child but eight years old. Encourag'd thus,
In counsel with a French Ambassador,
By threat to sheriffs or by lawyer's craft
A Parliament he gathers right submiss,
Who (so 'tis said) will make his will its law.
A thousand archers feeds he at his call:
Some higher set their tale; that matters not.
I may, my love! his earliest victim be.

DUCHESS. May Heav'n forfend! withdraw that dreadful thought.

DUKE. Calmly survey the tumults of the past.
William the Norman was a robber-chief.
The kings who follow'd, rul'd by might alone,
Till Henry came, our first Plantagenet,
Warmly accepted by the nation's heart.
Yet no Plantagenet hath well endur'd
Restraint of Council or High Parliament.
Had we not arms in hand, no parchment deeds
Or Coronation-oath might much avail.—
In squandering money every king delights
For banquet, pageant, tournament or war,
And claims, o'er churl and yeoman, earl and prince,
Of lands and honor to be arbiter.
Scarce would my father loyal deem a man
Who higher valued Peace than cruel War,
Or brook a Parliament which trammel'd him.
But our good Simon hath united well

Commons and Peers in law-devoted Bond.
Dukes may be slain and Earls, yet never more
Will English lieges yoke of despot own.
DUCHESS. What is the use of kings? if aye they strain
To rule untrammel'd, why sustain their sway?
DUKE. Better one king than twenty petty kings,
Each grasping at his neighbour's gear and soil.
A king we need, as curb to barons bold,
A king, invasion from abroad to stem;
A brave and sturdy king, trustee of right,
Faithful to oaths and arbiter of peers.
A king—protector is to churl and thrall,—
Or, *should* be! Loyal I to loyal chief,
Who in just battle risks his proper life.
Edge-tools are dangerous, and so are kings:
But life without edge-tools were poor and weak.
DUCHESS. May not the Holy Church here succour us?
Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots hold a place
In Parliament, too lofty to despise.
To them the vulgar listen reverently.
DUKE. It may be so: Time soon will much reveal.
Cathedrals, Abbeys, splendid to the eye,
And Churches manifold, attest the wealth
And grandeur of our high prelatic Lords;
Yet doubtfully on Freedom's side they stand.
DUCHESS. Why so? Methinks, the church is Freedom's aid,
Curb on the puissant, champion of the poor.
DUKE. True; when it seeks to bridle earls or kings.
Perhaps the sharp demands on Churchmen's gold
Sharp disaffection in the Church may breed:
But now it dreads the folk's unclosing eye.
My brother, John of Lancaster, upholds
Wickliffe, bold-speaking priest of Lutterworth,
Scholar of Oxford, who in English words
Writes clear the sentences of Holy Christ.
Our Bishops dread his doctrine, which avers
No *idle* Priest hath earned his nourishment,
Nor costly robes nor pompous equipage.
One third of England feed on Wickliffe's lore:
A new embroilment this to social life.
DUCHESS. Thy life is in God's keeping. Rest we there,
And save our foolish hearts from sad despair.

SCENE II.—*The market place in Gloucester.*

CITIZENS *talk.*

FIRST CITIZEN. Ah woeful news! tell me in fuller tale.
SECOND. Such tale I cannot give. Only I hear,
Thomas of Woodstock, our right faithful Duke,
High Constable and Warden of the State,
Who was to Calais' prison late convey'd,
Now (by what death we know not) lives no more.
THIRD. Too well we know, that princes, once ensconc'd,
Seldom come out to light and liberty.
FIRST. What mischief clapt our Thomas into jail?
SECOND. No mischief done by him: mischief there was.
None can to trusty knowledge here lay claim,
But what I heard, I tell. The king was pleas'd
To visit Plassy.—Forth good Thomas came
To greet his royal nephew worthily.
But guards upspringing caught him, and amain
Over the wave to Calais hurried him.
All was in secret done. Before no court
Of solemn trial was a crime alledg'd.
Verdict or sentence of a judge was none.
Prince of the blood and Marshal of the realm,
From England he was torn by lawless deed
To forein prison and to deadly doom.
So much is certain undisputed fact.
When mighty Edward's son such treatment meets,
Who now can call himself a *freeman* born?
THIRD. 'Tis dreadful: oh that horrors ended here.
Have ye not heard of other victims too?
SECOND. I have. The king invited to his board
The Earl of Warwick. When in peace he came,
The prison of Tintagel was his meed.
The king did also call to Conference
The Archbishop's brother, Earl of Arundel.
He, scenting treason, sturdily refus'd,
Unless his highness oath of safety gave.
The oath was given and—instantly profan'd!
First, Arundel in Carisbrook was lodg'd,
Then—to the king's displeasure, *let us say*,
Was murder'd by his faithless Parliament.
FIRST. Yes, yes! the Parliament alone we blame.
"With face of deep devotion to the king,
It slays his brother in the king's despite,

Reckless of royal blood." Such hue of speech
Must varnish every tongue of Earl or Duke,
Where royalty may listen. Hard the fate,
When Statesmen dare not simple truth to speak.
But tell me, how do John of Lancaster
And Edmund Duke of York, behave them now?
Dismal the dirge of murder'd brother's ghost.

SECOND. Their outward conduct many may observe:
What in their hearts is boiling, we may guess.

FIRST. Tell me, what guessest thou? since, guess we may.

SECOND. Not I alone, but others too opine,—
Dismay and sad despair, disgust and shame
Unspeakable, congeal their noble hearts.
To hide resentment and put-on the guise
Of meek submission, self-defence enjoins.
They wait the time of action. Now 'tis night,
Yea, midnight; yet no pow'r the dawn can stay.

THIRD. Surely the morn in God's fit time will rise,
Yet I misdoubt me of the princes' pith.
Old Gaunt I deem a feeble broken man
Outworn by service. Edmund, less unstrung,
Is soft and timid. He, to save himself,
Will cringe and pamper royal wilfulness.
Sterner and bolder stuff is needed here.

FIRST. We can but wait the issue: God will guide.

Enter a FOURTH CITIZEN, *who thus speaks:*

FOURTH. Know ye, good folk, the work at Coventry,
Where I myself was present?

SECOND. Freely speak,
Good sirrah! Me thou knowest well, of old.
No sneak, no spy, I warrant, loiters here.

FOURTH. Too humble I for ear of tattling spies,
Yet bolder speak I unto honest ears.—
Five mighty chiefs, some years ago, stood out,
Appellant Lords entitled, bold to scorn
The garbled lore at Nottingham proclaim'd.
Three of these leaders had by royal might
Been prostrate laid; but two remain'd untouch'd,
Mowbray, and Bolingbroke good son of Gaunt.
Both these the king to bitter exile dooms;
Mowbray for life: six years the other gets.

THIRD. What crime imputes he to these noblemen?

FOURTH. No crime: the royal will alone commands.
They quarrell'd, and then claim'd to fight: so he
Occasion took to play the merciful
And banish both:—a plausible device.
SECOND. But canst thou tell us, what their quarrel was?
FOURTH. One part of this is doubtful: but to me
The other part and chiefer, clear enough.
Hearing of royal treacheries, they quail'd,
And whisper'd words together. This anon
Was noticed and reported to the king,
Who claim'd to know what words betwixt them past.
Such is the common story, true or false.
Then, in sore panic, each excus'd himself;
Perhaps unwittingly the other blamed.
Some say that Bolingbroke denounc'd his friend.
Certes, a deadly quarrel hence arose,
And Bolingbroke appears as challenger,
Each claiming that he dearly loves the king.
SECOND. Oh what a pack of lies this kinghood breeds!
But thou perchance canst further clear the fog.
FOURTH. Well! as in war each movement is a lie,
Each knows the other false, each plays a game,
Masking the true intent, until a stroke,
As swoop of eagle, souses on the foe;
So here, who best dissembles, fights the best.
Haply these dukes to-morrow may be friends;
But hate implacable, suspicion dire,
From both the royal perjury hath earned.
One who by secret guile entraps a Duke,
His faithful Uncle, sage Admonitor,
And to a forein castle smuggles him
For dark destruction, rends all human ties.
No truth, no trust can be: no oath avails
To stablish for such mortal loyal peace.
FIRST. What augury remains for honest men?
FOURTH. God and the People fight against the worse.
Not whom we love the more, but whom we hate
The less, that combatant will victor prove.

SCENE III.—*The Palace.* KING RICHARD *converses with his trusted agents,* THE EARL OF WILTSHIRE, BAGOT, *and* GREEN.

RICHARD. Fitly the men who treated us with scorn
May tremble. Now they learn how vast the odds

Which sever vassals from a crowned king,
Right-royal born, anointed, consecrate.

WILTSHIRE. Sire! you are lord triumphant. No man now
Dares to withstand your will. You sit aloft.
The proudest now must yield obedience,
Though join'd to you in blood; high Regents once.

RICHARD. Needful it was, most needful, painful too,
To teach their arrogance that I am king,
And not a child to be by them rebuked.
Their gang, insurgent, slew my ministers,
My faithful Brember and Tresilian,
Imputing treason! souls to me devote
Were doubtless traitors to the Parliament.
Their death it was my duty to avenge:
But now, since all are quelled, with fearless heart
I hie, my Irish rebels to chastise.

GREEN. Your Highness! By your Seneschal inform'd,
May I his statement and request set forth?

RICHARD. Speak shortly: other task awaits us now.

GREEN. He says, my liege! too few he finds your cooks.
Three hundred had he, when that Parliament
Presum'd about your kitchen to inquire.
More than four hundred has he now; but these
Suffice not to fulfil their daily task.
Your Highness' household they avail to feed,
But not (he says) some thousand archers too.

RICHARD. Go to! allow as many as he needs.

WILTSHIRE. Another topic presses us, my liege!
Your Highness is resolv'd to make display
Of mighty force, to awe these Irishmen.
Prudent your counsel and right merciful,—
Sparing of bloodshed. But, to bear your host,
Transports we need from Chester and the South.
Some vessels Wales can give; but not enough,
Across to carry forty* thousand men:
Such force of archers did your Highness name.

RICHARD. To Chester and the Cinque Ports order send.

BAGOT. My liege! your Chief Purveyor for the trip
Needs sacks not yet computable of flour
And ready cash to buy them; but besides,

* Charles Knight says that Richard actually displayed 40,000 in Ireland. Hard to believe. [I cannot now find the place.]

Five hundred butchers barely may suffice,
If forty thousand archers he must feed
By rape of cattle in a land of foes,
Where butchers hunters' work and drovers' do.
Shall I, to save annoy, give orders blank?

RICHARD. Yes: and hereafter sharply must thou scan
Their charges.—Trouble me no more hereon.
To fill the royal purse is now the task
Most urgent, and to learn the sums amass'd.

WILTSHIRE. Your Highness then agrees to sign for us
Blank parchment, at discretion to be fill'd
With sums incumbent on your Treasury?

RICHARD. No more of this: what you present I sign.
What sums are levied for my purse, I ask.

WILTSHIRE. My liege! your orders duly we perform'd:
To seventeen shires we have the screw applied,
With treason charging them; and gather'd sums,
Price of exemption, fat and numerous.—
On those whose names were foremost in the band
To contravene your Highness, or had store
Which *ought* to aid their king, on such we forc'd
Subscription of their names to parchments blank,
Rich forfeit bearing at your simple will.

RICHARD. So far is good: what of my own domain?

BAGOT. Sire! in the wealthier towns rich men we sought,
And hinted that their stores might ease the State.
Then, when we thought them terrified enough,
We offered mortgage of the royal land
In portions moderate, for large advance
Of gold, or merchants' document secure.
As was your Highness' bidding, such our deed.

RICHARD. 'Tis well: to Ireland shortly must we hie.

BAGOT. But Sire! one matter more. A banish'd man
Cannot by right inherit English lands.
If John of Gaunt, now old and weak of health,
Happen to die, into thy coffers fall
All dues and purtenance of Lancaster.

RICHARD. Good is the hint: more may we talk of this.
Old Lancaster, I trow, is frightened well.
I must not break with him; but if he die,
His gear may rightly fortify the Crown.

FROM THE OPENING OF VIRGIL'S "ÆNEID."

[Written for a Manchester Literary Club. 1887.]

It is impossible to defend in a few words the marks here used, though all are familiar. If one too busy to read a half grammatical tract be enticed by Virgil's name to read this specimen, he will see how little the marks and small changes alter the aspect of the text. Their object is, *to guide pronunciation.*

With *two dots* above a vowel, ä, ë, ï, ö, ü, express the *Name*-sounds of our five vowels, *viz.*, the vowel-sounds of our Hay, He, High, Ho, Hew.

With the *grave accent*, à is as in Càr, Càst, Pàss, Fàther, Gràsp; ò, as in Bròad, Cròss, Lòss, Òff, Shòrt, and ù (Italian short *u*), as in Bùll, Fùll, Pùt, Pùll (in the South).

With the *circumflex*, â=aw, au, as in Âll, Hâll; ê=ä, only in Brêak, Fête, Grêat, Stêak; î (*French*) in Marîne, Machîne; ô in Dô, Whô, Shôe, Tômb, means long oo; û, as in Rûe, Blûe, Frûit, also = long oo.

Thus ô and û have the same sound. So Yôu, Yôur, Yôuth, Sôup.

After W or Qu peculiarly, a has the sound of short *o*.

In many words o̤ is sounded as English *u* in *mud;* as Ho̤ney, Co̤mfort, To̤uch.

In a few words the Scottish utterance of *ear* seems true, as in Pèarl, Èarl, Hèart (which *we* confound with Hart); then I mark the è grave, as in Bèar, Thère.

I borrow c$^{d}_{\cdot}$, w$^{d}_{\cdot}$, sh$^{d}_{\cdot}$, from printers of the last century. *Could* for *Cound*, is a blunder.

The introduction of these marks, being *voluntary*, will never give embarrassment. But I also distinguish *thin th*, by Θ, hard g as in *ĝird, ĝimlet; hard* ch (*Greek*), as in *ĉho, ĉhaos;* soft (French) *ch*, as in *çhaise* with cedilla; French j by inverted j, as in *viſion.* Grammatical rule often bids us sound s as z, but sometimes we need a mark to contrast Absent with Present (*Prezent*), Loose with Lo̤se, Grease (subst.) with Grease (*Greaze*) verb.

The dot under s, to give the sound of z, is seldom needful, yet sometimes urgently; as in (his), lose, cheese, raïse, present; indeed resist, desist, yet not in insist, consist.

I undertake only *half* of Isaac Pitman's problem, *i. e.*, "to enable a child or a foreiner to read correctly a given text." The other half, "to enable a stranger, on hearing English, to write down correctly what he hears," not only needs a total present revolution, but perhaps a change again and again recurring in that which ought to be permanent.

If our *school books* and *placards* on school walls were duly marked, it would be half the battle.

Superfluous letters which *mislead* pronunciation are here dropt. Omission cannot mislead. Silent *h* (for gh) here, as in German, lengthens the preceding vowel.

THE "ÆNEID" OF VIRGIL, BOOK I.

Arms sing I, and the man by Fate outdriv'n
Whô first on Italy from strand of Troy
Debark'd beside Lavïnum. Much did he
From force supernal bèar, on field and flood
Tòst by fell Juno's unforgetting ire.
Much too in war endür'd, strïving the while
A city to uprear and plant his gods
On Lätian border: whence the Latin race
And Alban sires and wâlls of lòfty Rome.

Oh Müse! acquaint me,—for what deed profane
Or what resenting, did the Queen of Hev'n
To many a toil on many a wheel of chànce
A man of signal pïety constrain?
In hev'nly söuls can wrâθ so deep abide?

An ängient city, colony from Tyre,
Stood up confronting Italy afar
And mouths of Tïber; affluent of welθ,
Yet fierce in battle's disciplin'd array,—
Cárθage; which Jûno more than other lands
Cherish't (they say) pecüliar; Sämos' self
Less dëar accounting. Hëre her armory,
Hëre stood her car. The goddess e'en of yore
Purpos'd, and nurs'd the hope (did Fate allow)
That o'er the peoples Carθage shd be queen.

---

1 *The man*, Aineias or Aeneas.

4 Flood, blood, soot, are often in the north sounded with the vowel of southern *book*, *stood*, perhaps correctly.

19 Carthage, Modern Tunis.

Yet had she hèard, "a fölk from Troian blood
Springe*θ*, which wide of sway and proud in arms
Shall march to Libya's utter över*θ*röw
And 'one day raze the Tyrian citadels:
Thus spin the Sisters *θ*ree."—The spell appâll'd
Saturnia, Troy's öld wâr remembering,
Which, for dear Argos, föremost she had wäg'd.
Nor from her söul wère yet the goads of wrâ*θ*
And fierce resentment dropt. Deep in her brest
Recorded lay the häted dynasty;
Th' awârd of Paris and her slihted charms
And fävor shöwn to Ganymëdës rapt.
Stung by such *θ*öht, afar from Lätium
She on the tòssing flood those Troians kept,
Poor remnant, which from Danaï had scäp't
And from Achillës' rancor. Mâny a yëar
Hunted by Fate, the seas around they roam'd,
So stark the toil Rome's families to plant.

Scärce had they lòst the siht of Sicily,
Joyful, with sail outspred—their copper keels
Cleaving the foamy brine; when Jûno, still
Nursing within her brest th' ëternal wôund
Thus ponder'd: "Shall I, baffled in my aim,
Desist, defeated, helpless to avert
Troy's king from Italy?—Ay! Fate forbids.
Miht Pallas burn the Argive fleet, and whelm

29 The Three Fates.

30 Juno, daughter of Saturn.

39 Dánaï, poetical name of the early Greeks.

50 Argives and Archains—portions of the Greeks—frequently used for the whole.

Its warriors on the deep, âll for the guilt
And frenzy of 'one man, Oïleus' son?
She, lanching from the cloud Jove's vivid fires,
Their nävy scatter'd, harried âll the seas,
And him, with brest transpierc'd, outbreathing flame,
She cauht in whirl of wind, and stäk'd on pointed crag.
While I, who môve majestic, Queen of Gods,
Sister and wife of Jove, with 'one sole race
From year to rölling year wäge fruitless wâr.
Henceforθ to Juno's pow'r will any bow,
And supplicant with gifts her âltars crown?"

Such wrongs uprölling in her kindled hèart,
Quick to Aiólia, home of massy cloud,
Birth-issues of mad blàst, the goddess came.
Hëre Aiolus, the king, in cavern vàst
The struggling winds and hooting storms contröls
And curbs with chains and prison. Wraθful they,
With mihty rumbling of the mountain, growl,
Their bars disdeyning. He, with sceptred hand,
Alòft upon a pinnacle enθroned,
Softens their mettle, moderates their ire,
Else wd èarθ, seas, and the profound of Hev'n,
Cauht in their rapid fliht be swept away.
Fearing such wrack, the Sire omnipotent
Wall'd them in gloomy caverns, and abov
Brûte masses överlaid and mountains hih,
And näm'd a king who as Himself miht bid,
Shd by fixt law the reins höld tiht or loose.

---

52 The lesser "Ajax" or Aias of Homer.

Him Jûno thus entreated: "Aiolus!
To thee the Sire of Hev'n and King of Earθ
Haθ giv'n to soothe or rouse the billowy main.
A race in feud with me on Tuscan flood
Now saileθ, bèaring to Italia's shore
Troy and her household train of vanquish'd gods.
Enforce thy gales, scatter or sink the fleet,
And with men's carcases bestud the sea.
Twice sev'n briht nimfs are mine: fairest of these,
Deïopeia, paragon of form,
To thee in wedlock firm will I ünite
And consecrate as thine. For such desérts
She shall with thee the circling years wèar out
And by a beutëus òffspring make thee sire."

To her thus Aiolus: "Thy tàsk it is,
O Queen, thy wishes to unravel; mine
Is, duly to obey, aware that thou
Winnest for me the hèart of Jûpiter
And sceptred miht and âll my royalty.
Thou to the feast of gods admittest me
And sway bestöwest över cloud and storm."

He spake, and with his spear-staff struck amain
The hollow mountain-side. Θrôh bursten gate
As söldiers rush in column, so the gales
Pöur whirling o'er the çhâmpain. On the sea
Next settling,—Eurus, Nötus, and the force
Of squâlly Afrïcus, the lowest deep

---

104 *Eurus* (in poetry) prevalently the East Wind, or nearly so; Notus, the South, Africus, South West.

Upturn, and röll hüge billows to the shore.
For$\theta$with the strain'd ropes creak: man shouts to man.
Clouds from the Troian eyes snatch hev'n and day
Sudden, and o'er the flood Niht gloomy broods.
Hih hev'n θunders, lihtning flashes fâst:
Âll things around to men bode speedy deθ.
At 'ọnce cöld θrills unnerve Aineias' lims,
He moans, and raising öpen pàlms to hev'n,—
"Happy, θrice happy ye" (he cries) "whô èarn'd
A warrior's deθ before your pärents' eyes
Beneaθ Troy's lòfty wâlls! O brävest chief
Of Dánäi,—Tydidës! what forbad
Me by thy mihty arm on Iliac plains
To fâll, and thère to breathe this spirit away,
Whère by the spear of Pëleus' child o'erθröwn
Fierce Hector lïeθ, and whêre hüge of bulk
Sarpëdon; whère our nätal Simöis
Innümerus adown his current röllş
Bucklers and helms and corpses of the brave."

Amid such outcry stormy Áquïlo
Smïtes on his sail and lifts the billows hih.
The oars ar snapt: the vessel sideway turns
Within the surges: then upon her fâlls,
Precipitate, a mountain-heap of wave.
These on the billöw's verge hang pois'd; to those
The yawning brine shöws the hard bottom, vext
By boiling tide. Nötus o'erhending drives

118 The Plains of *Ilion;* as the City of Troas is nämed in Homer.
120 Achilles, sọn of Pëleus.
125 Aquilo, *in Greek*, Boreas, North East wind
132 Overtaking, catching.

Θree ships on rocks,—rocks ambush'd in mid sea,—
Altars th' Italians name them,—ridge immense,
Scärce rising o'er the summït of the flood.
Θree into shallöws hurried (pitëus siht),
Eurus enwraps in quagmire, thère on reefs
Stranded, and with a wâll of sand begirt.
From 'one, which Lycians and Orontës bare,
Their faiθful leader,—in Aineias' view
A monster sea down-plunging on the stern
Washes the màster òff, hedlong; but she,
Θrice by the seething waters twisted round
Founders; in mid abyss quick swallöwed up.
Few, few ar seen, swimming in vàsty deep.
Bucklers of wâr and planks and còstly wares
Float on the billöws. Next, the storm o'erpow'rs
Ilïoneus' stout bark and those which höld
Abas, Achatës brave, Alëthës öld,
And each θrôh yielding junctüres of the ribs
And trecherous chinks, lets in th' unfrendly gush.

Neptüne meanwhile hèard from the wurried sea
Murmurs confused, and felt the storm let loose,
And currents up-ward suck'd from nether pools.
Sorely displeas'd, abov the surge he rear'd
His placid hed to överlook the deep.
O'er âll the main wide-scatter'd, he behölds
Aineias' nävy, and Troy's sons o'erborne
By waves and downfâl of the lòfty sky.
Nor from her brother wère the wiles and wrâθ
Of Jûno hid. He summons to his side

Eurus and Zéfyrus, then thus rebükes:
"Doth hev'nly birθ, ye winds! such pride instil?
Dare ye, without my bidding, to up-heave
Such mass of wâters, mingling Èarθ and Sky?
Whom I—but first the billöws must I quell:
For guïlt hëre-âfter dearer shall ye pay.
Hästen your fliht, and to your king report
This mandate. Not to *him* the trïdent dred
And empire of the deep abyss ar giv'n,
But fâll by lot to *me*. Hüge rocks he hölds,
Thy mansions, Eurus! thère let Aiolus
In his öwn hâll disport him glòrius,
And in the winds' close prison reyn supreme."

He spake; then, quicker than the wurd, allays
The swöllen wâters, drïves to fliht the train
Of clouds embattled, and brings back the sun.
Thèreat Kymóθoë and Trïton strain
And from sharp reef the vessels heave. Himself
Uplifting with the trïdent, cleaves a way
Θrôh the vàst quicksands, pacifïes the sea,
And with liht wheels glides o'er the topmost wave.
As when sedition òft in crowded town
Haθ bläz'd abròad, and senseless hate drives-ón
Th' ignöble fölk; now stones, now torches fly,
(For, fury tools supplies), then, if perchànce
Sọm̀ man for pïety and wurθ esteem'd
Cọm into view, at 'ọnce with ears attent
They stand in sïlence. Hë, by wurd sedate,

162 *East* and *West* winds.

Sòftens their bōsom, curbs their insolence;
So fell th' upróar of wâters, whïle the Sire
O'erlooks his briny relms and rides abròad
Under clear sky, and from auspiçius car
Guides with loose rein his cöursers' happy speed.

Aineias' mariners outwearied strive
The nearest land to reach, and bend their aim
To Libya's border. Hëre in deep recess
A harbor find they, whère, with rocky sides,
A sheltering ïland hurls back every wave,
And drives to sëcret creeks the bröken surf.
On either side hüge cliffs: twin peaks to hev'n
Shoot up, and under them the wâters safe
Ar hush'd. The landscape waves with forest bouhs
Alöft, and càsts a gloomy shade belöw.
Fronting hëretô, by beetling crags is främ'd
A grotto haunted by the Nimfs, whèrein
Sweet wâter rills, and seats of solid rock
Ar nätiv. Thère no leaky vessels need
Mooring, nor hooked bite of ancorage.
Hither Aineias leads, with seven ships
From âll his number gather'd. Then the crews
Outleaping joyful from their vessels, gain
The land with longings vehement desir'd,
And on the sand their lims brine-sodden stow.
First from a flint Achätës struck the spark,
In dry leaves catching it, and plentëus gave
Füel around and snatch'd the wäking flame.

---

198 The harbor of Carθage was celebrated of öld, but is too shallöw for our modern ships.

The gifts of Cërës by the wâters marr'd,
Tools too of Cërës next, the toil-worn men
Hand forθ alert, and quick the rescüed grain
Scorch in the fire and crush with massy stone.
Meanwhile Aineias climbs alòft and scans
The mighty deep wide-stretching, if perchànce
Anθeus with Phrygian barges tòst he see,
Or Capys and Cäïcus' lòfty poops.
No sail in view! but on the shore θree stags
Röving appear: behind them long in train
Follows the herd and browses o'er the vale.
Hëre hâlted he: then the swift shàfts and böw,—
Arms which Achätës trustly bare,—he seiz'd
And first the leaders, bèaring hih their heds
With bränchy antlers, löw on èarθ he lays.
Next on the meaner crowd his arrows fly,
Which rout them scudding θrôh the leafy groves.
Nor stays he, till beneaθ his conquering hand
Sev'n mighty bodies fâll upon the soil,
Equal in number to his galleys' tale.
Thèreon the harbour seeks he, and imparts
This booty to his comrades. Next, the wines,
Which on Trinacrian shore in well-fill'd jars
The good Akestes gave as parting boon,
He shares,—and soothes with wurds their doleful hèart.

"Comrades! no strängers tô calamity!
Wurse in the pàst ye suffer'd: so again
To new disàsters God shall giv an end.
Ye nih to Skulla's outrages hav pàst

240 *Trinacrian i.e.* triangular. Poetical epithet for Sicilian.

Beside her vaults deep-ecĥoing. Trïal ye
Of Cyclopéan rocky dens hav made.
Recâl your cọurage; banish fell dismay.
Haply hëreàfter these distresses too
In memory may please. Persistent we,
Orôh varius chànces, dängers manifòld,
To Latin soil press onward, whère the Fates
Tranquil abodes höld forθ. *Thère* may at length
Troy's royalty revive. Then firm endüre,
And save yourselves for glad prosperity."

Thus spake he, sòrely care-worn: while his face
Glistens with hope, his hèart hides grief profound.
His men bestir them for the dainty food.
Stripping the hides, they lay the inwards bare.
The flesh, chopt small for roast, sọme pierce with spits;
Ọthers beneaθ big cauldrons kindle flame.
Then strengθ recruit they by the viands rich,
And, lounging on the grass, with mellow wine ar fill'd.
Hunger thus banish'd and the trays remôv'd,
In long discöurse for comrades lòst they sih,
Doubtful 'twixt hope and fear, whether to deem
They liv, or meet the wurst, nor longer hear
Câll of their friends. But good Aineias chief
Mörurns for Orontës keen; next too the loss
Of Ámycus, and Lycus' cruel fate,
And Gyas and Cloanθus, valiant böth.

But sorröw found its close, when Jupiter
From hihest ëθer looking o'er the deep
Sail-fluttering, and on lands beneaθ him laid

And shores and peoples wide; in hev'n supreme
Paus'd, fixing on the Libyan relms his gaze:
And while such cares his bosom occupy,
Vënus, with tëars bedimming her briht eyes
Sadly accòsted him: "O thou whôse rûle,
O'er gods alike and men, ëternal sways,
Fierce with the lihtning! what to anger thee
Cd my Aineias or his Troîans dô,
By deθ sore ravag'd? men to whôm is clös'd
Because of Italy the wurld entire.
Sürely 'twas thy behest, my Sire, that hence,
As years röll'd on, from Teucer's blood recâll'd
Romans hëreàfter, an imperial race,
Wêre bound to rise, whôse överswaying gràsp
Âll seas, âll lands shd compass. What resolve
Chänges thee now? To mé thy promis sooth'd
The fâll of Troy and dire calamity,
If fate revers'd wd ëvil fates repay.
Yet the same doom relentless now pursues
Men misery-driv'n. Mihty King! what end
Of toils allottest thou? From Troy of late
Antënor, slipping θrôh Achaian foes,
Safe réfüge found beyond Liburnian relms
In inmost corner of Illyric bay.
Him nòht forbad Timävus' fount to stem,
Whence θrôh nine mouths with rumbling of the hill
A sea of wâter bursts in wâll abrupt

---

283. Any very handsome hero was admired by the phrase, "His mother must have been a goddess." See Homer's Il. viii. 305. The Greek poets turned metaphor into fact. Thus Achilles and Aineias each has a goddess mother.

And whelms the champain in its sounding tide.
Hëre *hé* the city Pádova c^{d} found,
Abodes of Teucri. To the race of Troy
A name he gave, and Troian arms fixt hih.
Now tranquil in the lap of peace he rests.
But *wé*, thy òffspring, destin'd by thy nod
To mount hih hev'n—our fleet destroy'd (dire tale)
Θrôh spleen of 'One—betray'd ar we, and kept
Far from Italia's coast. Is this the meed
Of pïety? Dost thus our throne restore?"

Smiling on her with countenance that calms
The sky and storms, the Sire of men and gods
First sipp'd his dauhter's lip, then thus replied:
"O Kuθeréia, spare thy fears: unchäng'd
Abide to thee thy children's destinies.
The promis't city, wâll'd Lavïnium,
Thine eyes shall see, and to the stars alòft
Magnanimus Aineias shalt thou bèar,
Peer of the gods: unâlter'd my resolve.—
Hé—for to Thee, by care tormented sore,
Fate's deeper sëcrets further will I stir,—
By mihty wâr in Italy shall crush
Fierce nätiv peoples and establish law
By wâlls encàstled; till in Lätium
θree summers view his reyn, and winters θree
Pàss o'er Ritúlians to his sway submiss.
Ascánius, his boy, whô now acquires
Iülus as surnáme ('twas Ïlus 'once,

298 *Liburnia*, now Croatia.
310 'One, *i.e*, Juno.

While royal fortüne stood in Ïlion)—
Shall θirty years grand-circling reyn supreme,
Then from Lavïnium tràns fer his θrone
And with hih miht Long Alba fortify.
Hëre for θree hundred years complete shall kings
Of Hector's race preside, till Ïlia,
Priestess and Queen, to Mars, her sëcret mate,
Shall yield twin òffspring at a single birθ.
Then, proud in tawny wölf's hide, Römulus,
By she-wolf suckled, shall to pow'r succeed,
Raise martial wâlls, and found the Röman name.
To them no meṣure and no time I fix;
Sway without bound I gràant. Yea, Jûno's self,
Whô now in wrâθ Sea, Èarθ, and Hev'n alarms,
Shall better her resolves, and nurse with me
Römans, the gownèd fölk, lords paramount.
Such my decree. In register of Time
On-gliding, shall an ëra cọm, whèrein
Chieftains from öld Assáracus deriv'd
Shall make of Fθïa and Mycënë briht
Vassals, and över Argos domineer.
From Troy, fair source! shall Troian Kaisar spring,
Whôse sway thë Oçean, fame the Stars, shall bound,
From grêat Iülus titled Julius.
Him, laden with the spoils of Eastern relms,
Thou, free from care, shalt welcome to the sky,
Sọme day: hé too by vows shall be invök'd.
Wârs laid aside the age shall mïlder gröw.

349—351 Assaracus (an ăncient king of Troy) carries the mind to Chaldea and Assyria, Fθïa, city of Achilles; Mycënë, city of Agamemnon; Argos, city of Diomëdes.

Antîque Fidelity and Vesta then,—
Quirïnus to his brǫther Rëmus join'd,
Shall rihts awârd. The dredful gates of Wâr
With clamps of iron tihtly shall be shut.
Within brûte Rage, on savage wepon θrön'd,
Knotted by hundred links of brass behïnd,
In vain from gory mouθ will horrid growl."

This utter'd, Maià's son from hih he sends
Kïnd welcome to prepare for Teucrian fölk
In Carθaginian lands, and rïsing tow'rs,
Lest Dïdo, witless of the Fates, forbid
Admission.—Θrôh the vàst expanse he flies,
Oar'd by his wings, and quick on Libyan soil
Alihts, nor fails his mission to fulfil.
At 'ǫnce the Pünes, concordant with the God,
Harsh θòhts renounce; and chief, herself the Queen,
Kïnd feeling to the sea-worn men admits.

But good Aíneías, θòhtful âll the niht,
So soon as balmy liht is giv'n, goes forθ
Strängе places to explore. Fain wd he lèarn
Whither the winds hav borne him; what abodes
Of beasts or men they be (for âll is wïld),
And to his comrades tïdings süre report.
The fleet beneaθ a hollöw cliff he hides,
Within a leafy nook, enclos'd around
With trees and awful shadöws. Forθ he steps,

---

354. The poet means Augustus Cæsar, then alive, who had been adopted from the Octavian to the *Julian* family.

366. Maià's son, Mercury.

373. Pünes (*i. e.* Phœnicians) was the Roman name for the whole Carθaginian confederacy.

Achätës önly by his side. Twô wands
Arm'd with bròad ïron, quiver in his hand.
Him in mid forest did his mother dear
Confront; in dress and arms and countenance
Like Spartan maid or Θräcian Amazon,
Whôse steeds in gallop swift the wind outstrip.
For from her shöulders hung a handy böw
In huntress' fashion: by the breeze her hair
Was freely tòst. Näked her knee, beneaθ
Her flöwing lappets gather'd in a knot.
"Ho! youths!"—commencing tâlk, she cries—"impart,
If of my sisters any ye hav seen
This way or that way röving, girded each
With quiver and with hide of spotted lynx;
Haply in hot pursuit of foaming boar."
So Vënus spake, and Vënus' son replied:
"None of thy sisters hav by mé been seen,
Or hèard, O—hów may I address thee? Maid?
Not mortal is thy face, nor doθ thy voice
Proclaim thee hüman. Sure! a Goddess thou,
Sister of Phoebus haply, or in race
A Nimf. Whate'er thou art, be blest,
And pity our distresses. Teach us first
Beneaθ what sky, in what abodes of Èarθ,
Alike of men and pläces ignorant,
We wander, hither tóst on mihty waves
And driv'n by winds. On âltar hih to thee,
Slain by my hand, shall many a victim fâll."

To him then Vënus: "Sürely not to me
Deem I such honor düe. We maids of Tyre

Ar wont with quiver at the back to ride
While purple boots hih case the nether lims.
Tyre and Agënor's people hëre upraise
A Pünic royalty. The lands ar claim'd
By Libyans, a räce untam'd in wâr.
But Dïdo, Tyrian ôffspring, hölds the sway,
Shunning her brǫther. Lengθy wère the tale,
Complex the maze of guilt. The chief events
Lihtly I tǫuch. Her spouse Sychaius was,
In breadθ of acres richest of his peers
And lǫv'd intensely by the hapless wife.
To him her fâther by first auspices
Gave her as virgin bride. But över Tyre
Pygmälion her brǫther kingship held,
A man before âll ǫthers hüge in guilt.
Betwixt the twô came Frenzy. Impius hè,
Blïnded by lust of göld, with stelθy blade
Before the âltar stabs him unaware,
Reckless to wôund his sister's hèart. The deed
Long he conceal'd; and forging mäny a lïe
With vain hope cheated he the lǫv-sick wife.
But in her dreams the image of her lord
Unburied cǫms, raising its pallid face
Marvel of wöe, and âll the crime lays bare,
The murderus âltar and the mangled brest.
Then urges hë in sudden speed to quit
Her nätiv land; and, aidful to her fliht,
Tréfures of göld and silver, weiht untöld,
Beneaθ the soil deep buried, hë reveals.

---

426 First wedding with augurs in attendance.

Then Dïdo, goaded by the viſion, plans
Voyage and comrades. Whômso keen alarm
Or fierce abhorrence of the tyrant môves,
These join her. Galleys they pick úp, whate'er
Redy is found, and lade with göld. The welθ
For which Pygmälion hanker'd, o'er the deep
Is carried: such emprize a Woman leads.
The spot they reach'd, where mihty ramparts now
Of rïsing Carθage shall thine eyes behöld.
Land too they bòht,—how much a hide of bùll
Miht compass: *Bursa* therefor câll'd they it.
But ye! whô ar ye? from what rëgion com,
And whither tend ye?" . . . To such questions he
With sih and deepdrawn utterance replied:
"If from the first, O goddess! I retrace
The annals of our toil, and thou to hear
Hav lëiſure—surely o'er Olympus hih
The star of Eve will sooner close the day.
From ängient Troy (if haply to your ears
Rûmor of Troy hav reach'd) o'er dïverse seas
A random tempest càst us hëre adrift
On Libyan border. I Aineias am,
Hih of repüte and pïus, whô with mé
My Larës carry, rescüed from the foe.
My ängient country Italy I seek:
My pedigree I trace to hihest Jove.
With twenty galleys on the Phrygian deep
I ventür'd, trusting to responses hih,
My goddess mother guïding. Scärcely now

---

454 Probably *Busra*, *i.e.*, *Bozra* of our Hebrew,—a stronghold.

Dô sev'n remain by storm and billöws torn.
Hëre âll unknöwn and needy, doom'd am I
Θrôh Libyan wilderness to roam at large,
From Europe and from Äsia driv'n aloof."

Such plaint no longer miht his mother bèar,
But interposing, thus his grief assuaged.
"Whôe'er thou art, that now this Tyrian seat
Approachest,—not unfävor'd by the gods,
Thou vïtal air inhälest. Forward go,
And on the royal θreshold shöw thyself.
Thy fleet and comrades by reverse of gale
Announce I wàfted safe, unless in vain
My erring parents tauht me augury.
Lo! yon twelve swans in troop exultant, whôm
Jove's bird down-glïding from hih æθer scar'd
In öpen sky; but now in lengθy train
Sọm upon èarθ aliht, sọm hover near.
As these, returning, sport with whirring wings,
Circle in flock and scream responsivly,
So of thy sailor-lads and galleys, sọm
The port have reach'd, and sọm sail proudly in.
Onward! and follöw whère the pàθ may lead."

Speaking, she turn'd away, with rösy neck
Resplendent. From her crown ambrosial hair
Shed hev'nly ödor: to the feet belöw
Her raiment stream'd, the while her gaït reveal'd
The genuin goddess. He his mọther knew,
And with remonstrance her departüre plain'd.

---

467 *Lares*, gods of the hearth or home.

"Ah! why so òften mockest thou thy sọn
In fâlse disguïses? Cruel too art thou.
Why thus forbiddest hand in hand to join,
And löving wurds to utter and recëiv?"
Thus chiding, tow'rd the wâlls he forward steps.
Them, as they môv'd, did Vënus screen in mist,
Abundant shedd around, that nọn miht see
Or tọuch them, or delays contrive or àsk
What causes bròht them. She alòft departs
Joyful to Päphos borne, her öwn abodes;
Whère stand her hundred âltars, and her shrine
Reeks with Sabaean fümes and garlands fresh.
Meanwhile, dïrected by the pàθ, they march.—
A hill's bròad mass abọv the city hangs,
And överpeers the càstles: this they climb.
The prince admires the buildings, whïlom huts;
Admires the gates, the noise, the streets well-päv'd.
Eager the Tyrians hästen. Ramparts sọm
Mark out, and plan a fortress; massy stones
Up the ascént they heav. For men's abode
Sọm fix a spot and close it with a trench.
Sọm bisied ar, judges and mágisträtes
And sénätors augúst, by vote to choose;
Docks sọm ar scooping: sọm for θéäters
Lay deep foundätions, and from cliffs hew out
Tâll pillars, ornaments of fütüre scënes.

As in new summer θrôh the flowery field
The sun to èarnest labor câlls the bees,
When first the yọung brood swarms, or when they pack

---

512 Frankincense of Sheba.

The liquid honey and distend the cells;
They burdens bèar alternate, or in ranks
Serried expel the drones, ignöble fölk;
The wurk ferments; frägrant the honey breathes:
"O happy ye, whôse wâlls âlrédy rïse,"
Aineias moans, and to the city's tops
His eye uplifts: then in θick haze begirt,
He pàsses (strànge to tell) amid the fölk,
Lôst in the crowd; seeing and yet unseen.

In the mid city rose a grove, of shade
Delihtful; whère, by gales and billöws tòst
The Pünes on first arrïval dug from èarθ—
Ömen of good, by royal Jûno shöwn—
A horse's hed, töken of brilliant wârs,
And food θrôh äges to their race assür'd.
Hëre Tyrian Dido wd to Jûno rear
An ample shrine with gifts and statüe rich.
Bräzen the θreshöld-steps; with bràss the beams
Wère clamp'd; on bräzen hinges creak'd the döors.
First in this grove a novel siht allay'd
Aineias' fears and gave him bölder trust
Of säfety, and good hope mid ëvil lot.
For while, the Queen awaiting, he surveys
Whate'er the temple hölds, and wondering cons
The artist's skill, the city's fütüre lot,
Pictür'd he sees the feats at Ïlion
In wâr now brûited θrôh the wurld entire.
Prïam and Ätreus' sons and fierce to böθ
Achillës, hëre ar shöwn. Then tearful hé

Says: "What abodes, Achätës, under hev'n
Knöw not our toil? See Prïam! ëven hëre
Is paid düe meed to Virtue. Hüman wöe
Touches the söul, and tears responsiv start.
Fear not! söme säfety θrôh our fame will cöm."
Thus speaking, he on empty cölors feeds
His moaning hèart, the while a flood of grief
Wâters his cheek: for on the wâll he sees
How, wârring around Troy, the Achaians fled
By Troians chäs'd; but these, repuls'd in turn,
Crested Achillës in his car pursües.
Hard by,—the tents of Rhësus snöwy white
Too well he knöws, which, in first sleep betray'd,
Tydïdës stain'd with gory massacre,
And drives the cöursers to his camp, before
Troy's pàsture or Troy's river they may täste.
Another tablet pictüres Tröilus
Ill match'd against Achillës. Hapless boy!
His shield is dropt: he hangs behïnd the car,
Borne by the fleeing steeds, yet hölds the reins,
Face upward: hed and hair on èarθ ar dragg'd:
A spear inverted writes upon the dust.—
Elsewhere to hostïle Pallas' fane the dames
Of Ïlion, with hair dishevell'd, bèar
A veil foot-reaching. Supplicant and sad,
They beat their brests for mercy; but her eyes
Averse the goddess fixes on the ground.—
Achillës θrice around the wâlls of Troy
Haθ Hector's body dragg'd, and now for göld

572 The text has *vastabat*, but the pictüre seems to need *vastarat*.

Will sell it lïfeless. Limn'd too faiθfully,
The spoils, the car, the image of his frend
And Prïam vainly stretching hands unarm'd,
O'ercame Aineias. Bitterly he groans.
Himself too sees he fïhting in the van
And Eastern troops and dusky Memnon's arms.
Fierce in the θrong Penθesileia leads
The bands of Ámazons with moony targe.
Göld belts one pap confine. The warrior maid
Dares ardent to conflict with wârring men.

With blank amäzement riveted, in gaze
Unchäng'd, the Dardan chief admires the scene.
Meanwhile Queen Dïdo, θrong'd by yôuθful gards,
Fairest of wimen, to the temple môv'd.
Such on Eurötas' banks or Kynθus' ridge
Dïána mid her mountain nimfs is seen,
Training their dànces. They, from every side
By hundreds clustering, her pàθ attend.
Upon her shöulder she the quiver bèars,
And, as she steps, outpeers the hev'nly band.
Joy θrôh Latöna's sïlent bosom θrills.
Such then was Dïdo: joyful in the crowd,
She guides her wurks and kingdoms yet to be.
Then in mid nave upon a lôfty θrone
Within the portals, ĝirt by arms, she sits.
Awârds she givs and ëdicts; düties just
In wurks assïgns, or portions them by lot.

---

599 A *Dardan* and a *Troian* probably differed no more than a Yorkist and a Lancastrian prince.

608 Latöna, mother of Dïána.

Sudden Aineias sees in-θronging cọm
Anθeus, Sergestus and Cloanθus brave,
And ọther Troians, whôm tornädos dark
Had scatter'd, hurling them to shores afar.—
Awe-struck he stands: Aċhätës too is pierc'd
With joy and fear. But, longing hand with hand
To clàsp,—θrôh strängeness of events they pause,
Dissembling. Hid in hollöw mist, they guess,
What chànces säv'd them? Whère the fleet they leave?
Why hither cọm they? for from every ship
Sped chösen men, offence to deprecate
Submissiv, and with hum the temple sòht.
They enter, and when leav to speak is gained,
Calmly the tall Ilïoneus began:
"O queen! allow'd by Jove new relms to found
And curb by justice tribes untractable,
We, helpless Troians, victims of the sea,
Pray thee,—from fire inhüman save our ships.
Pity a pïus band and lèarn our case
More clösely. Not to ravage Libyan homes
Cọm we steel-arm'd, nor cattle to the shore
Drive we as captur'd spoil. To vanquish'd men
Not such the spirit elate nor pride of miht.
An äncient land thère is, by Graiï câll'd
Hesperia, strong in arms and rich of soil.
Oenötrians wère its tillers; now (we hear)
Giv'n from sọm chief, its name is Italy.
Hither our cöurse was steer'd, when sudden rose
Stormfùl Orïon o'er the swelling flood.
His squalls perverse and waves with hih-flung surf,

Drïving to shoals unseen, mid bars of rock,
Θrôhly our nävy scatter'd. Now, behold!
We, scanty number, to your shores have swum.
What race, what land the barbarus rûle allows
Which warns us òff the hospitable sand?
Wâr Θrétens, if the outmost edge we tọch.
If ye mankïnd despise and mortal arms,
Yet Gods (be süre!) remember Riht and Wrong.
Our king Aineias was. Not 'one more just,
More pïus knöw we, nor in arms more trïed.
Him if the Fätes preserve,—if still he feed
On breeze from hev'n, nor yet in crûel shades
Lïe prostrate, never wilt thou rûe the deed,
If foremost thou befrend him. Sicily
Haθ cities on her soil with äcres bròad
And fämed Akestes, sprung of Troian blood.
Our shatter'd fleet allow us up to haul,
Spars from the woods to hew and oars strap on.
If we recọver king and comrades, then
Forθwith to Italy and Lätium
Take we our cöurse. If rûin'd ar our plans,
If thee, grêat Fàther of our tribe! the deep
Of Libya hölds, nor of Ïulus hope
Longer remains, then to Sïcänian strand
Return we, whence we came. Thère safe abodes
Good King Akestes öpen hölds to us."

---

646 I join *penitus dispulit*, till I lèarn something better.

647 *Swum*—their only way of landing. See v. 650.

657 Yet rûe it *she did!* This is the sad funereal incurable blot in the pöem.

668 The Sicäni wére an Iberian (*Basque*) people, whò dwelt in Sicily, èarlier than the Siculi.

He spăke, and âll his comrades buzz'd assĕnt.
Dĭdo brief ànswer gave, with downcast eye:
"Troians! from fear and căre your hèarts relieve.
Hard tĭmes, new royalty, compèl of me
Stern orders and wĭde gard of my frontier.
Troy's city and Aineias' nŏble folk,—
Whô knŏws them not? The men, and their exploits,
And springs of wâr far-reaching? Hèarts so dull
Not in us Pünes are born, nor yokes the sun
His steeds so distant from our Tyrian town.
Whether ye seek Hespèria's wĭde domains
Or Eryx and Akestes' royal seat,
Garded and well provĭded shall ye go.
Or wish ye ràther hĕre with *mé* to stay?
This city shall be yours. Haul up your ships:
Troian and Tyrian ĕqual rihts shall hŏld.
Wᵈ that yôur king Aineias hĕre wère com,
Driv'n by the săme rufh wind! Along the coast
Spies will I send, and bid them to explore
The furthest bounds of Libya, if perchànce
In woods or town he wander, càst ashore."

Stirr'd by such wurds, alĭke Achătës brăve
And sĭre Aineias long the cloud to burst.
Achătës èarlier speaks: "O goddess-born!
What purpos in thy mĭnd arĭseθ now?
Âll safe but 'One thou sĕest,—men and ships:
That 'One beheld we swallŏwed in mid sea:
The rest accords with âll thy mother said."

---

682 Eryx, a mountain of Sicily overlooking *Drepanum*, now Trapani.

Scärce had he utter'd this, when âll around
The cloud is melted into liquid air.
Aineias stands, refulgent in pure liht,
God-like of face and shape. With comely hair
Vënus had deck'd him, breathing on his cheek
Blithe majesty, with roseate glöw of yôuθ.
Such grace on ïvory the skilfùl hand
May lavish; such whère haply yellöw göld
Silver enfrämes or Parian marble pure.
Addressing then the queen and âll around,
He unexpected speaks: "The man ye seek,
Behöld him in your presence; chief of Troy,
Aineias, rescued from your Libyan waves.
O thou, from whôm alöne is pity hèard
For Troy's atröcius wöes! Queen! whô, with *ús*,
Willest thy city and thy home to share;
Us, wholely stript,—relics of Argive wâr,
By sea and land in countless misery spent,—
Dïdo! just thanks to pay no pow'r hav we,
Nor other Dardans scatter'd θrôh the wurld,
To thee may Gods whô watch o'er Pïety
Bring fit reward, if Justice anywhère
And upriht Conscience trûe existence höld.
What äge so blessed gäve thee to the wurld?
With such a chïld what must the parents be?
Whïle rivers seek the sea; whïle on the hills
The shadöws play; whïle stars the æθer feed;
Âlway thy honor, name, and praise shall liv,
Whatever countries claim me." Thus he spake.

---

707 Milk-white marble.

Then with the riht hand clàsps Ilïoneus,
Sergestus with the left; next Gyas brave
And brave Cloanθus, and the rest in turn.

The hërö's presence struck queen Dïdo müte,
Next, his disàsters; but at lengθ she spake:
"What fate calámitus pursües thee thus?
What force has θrust thee on our crûel shore?
Art thou Aineias, whôm beside the wave
Of Simoïs briht, all-fostering Vënus bare,
Dardan Anchises' chïld? so ran the tale.
In sooθ remember I that Teucer came
Whïlom to Sïdon, from his fàther's home
Expell'd. By help of Bëlus new abodes
He hop'd to win. Bëlus, my sïre, just then
Victorius held rich Cyprus in his pow'r.
From Teucer's mouθ Troy's overθrow I lèarnt,
Thy name with ọthers, and the Achaian kings.
He, late yọur foe, hih praise to Troians gave,
And from a Troian Teucer claim'd descent.
Beneaθ our roofs then, yọung men, réfüge take,
Mé too, like Fortune wrack'd with many a toil,
Yet on this land haθ planted me at lengθ.
Not strànge to wöe, I lèarn the wöe-begòne to aid."

Äfter such wurds she to the palace leads
Aineias, and in säcred cöurt commànds
That honors to the gods be düly paid;
Nor less meanwhile sends for his comrades' cheer
Gifts to the shore, joy of the festiv day,
Fat lams a hundred with their dams; of swïne

A hundred bristling chïnes, and twenty bùlls.
The inner rooms are royally array'd
Splendid and dainty, fit for banquet hih.
Clòθ rich with crimson, artfùl wurk, is seen.
Hüge silver on the bòard and carvèd göld,
Whère brave exploits of änçïent sïres are träc'd
In long succession from the nätion's birθ.

Aineias, anxious with paternal lo̤v,
Sends back in speed Ac̆hätës to his so̤n,
To tell the news and bring the boy himself:
On *him* is fix'd âll the fond parent's care.
Gifts âlso, rescüed from expïring Troy,
He bids him to bring úp;—a mantle stiff
With figur'd göld, and veil with yellow leaves
Wöven around, which Argive Helen wore,
Her mo̤ther Lëda's gift riht marvellus.
These Helen carried òff, when she to Troy,
Voyage wd take for unpermitted lo̤v.
Besides a scepter, which Ilïonë,
King Prïam's eldest dauhter, bare of old:
A necklace too of pèarl, and dïadem
Of göld, with jewels rich. Commission'd thus,
Ac̆hätës sped him to the Troian ships.

STEVENSON, BAILEY, AND SMITH, PRINTERS, NOTTINGHAM.

LIST OF WORKS

BY

F. W. NEWMAN,

PUBLISHED BY

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., LIMITED,

LONDON.

MISCELLANIES: Essays, Tracts, and Addresses, Moral and Religious. 8vo. Vol. I., 7s. 6d; Vols. II. and III., 12s. each; Vol. IV., 10s. 6d.

CONTRIBUTIONS CHIEFLY TO THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LATE CARDINAL NEWMAN. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

REMINISCENCES OF TWO EXILES (KOSSUTH and PULSZKY) AND TWO WARS (Crimean and Franco-Austrian). Crown 8vo. Cloth. 3s. 6d.

ESSAYS ON DIET. Small 8vo, cloth limp. 2s.

ANGLO-SAXON ABOLITION OF NEGRO SLAVERY. 8vo. 5s.

EUROPE OF THE NEAR FUTURE. Crown 8vo. 2s.

THE ILIAD OF HOMER. Faithfully Translated into Unrhymed English Metre. Royal 8vo. 10s. 6d.

THE ODES OF HORACE. Translated into Unrhymed Metres, with Introductions and Notes. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 4s.

HOMERIC TRANSLATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. A Reply to MATTHEW ARNOLD, ESQ. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

COMMENTS ON THE TEXT OF ÆSCHYLUS. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.

MATHEMATICAL TRACTS. Pt. I., 8vo. 5s.; Pt. II., 8vo. 4s.
[MACMILLAN & BOWES, Cambridge.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY, especially those which concern the Straight Line, the Plane, and the Theory of Parallels. Demy 8vo. 5s.

ELLIPTICAL INTEGRALS. 8vo. 9s.
[Macmillan & Bowes, Cambridge.

A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ARABIC. 1. Anglo-Arabic Dictionary; 2. Anglo-Arabic Vocabulary; 3. Arabo-English Dictionary; Two vols. Crown 8vo. £1 1s.

A HANDBOOK OF MODERN ARABIC. Consisting of a Practical Grammar, with Numerous Examples, Dialogues, and Newspaper Extracts, in a European Type. Crown 8vo. 6s.

KABAIL VOCABULARY. Supplemented by aid of a New Source. Crown 8vo. 5s.

LIBYAN VOCABULARY. An Essay towards Reproducing the Ancient Numidian Language, out of four Modern Languages. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH. Crown 8vo. 1s.

CHRISTIANITY IN ITS CRADLE. 2s. Second Edition, enlarged. 5s. 6d.

THEISM, DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL; or, Didactic Religious Utterances. Crown 4to. 4s. 6d.

PHASES OF FAITH; or, Passages from the History of my Creed. New Edition. With Reply to Professor Henry Rogers, Author of the "Eclipse of Faith." Crown 4to. 3s. 6d.

A REPLY TO THE "ECLIPSE OF FAITH." 6d.

THE SOUL: Her Sorrows and Aspirations. An Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology. Tenth Edition. Post 8vo. 3s. 6d.

MORNING PRAYERS IN THE HOUSEHOLD OF A BELIEVER IN GOD. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

A HISTORY OF THE HEBREW MONARCHY, from the Administration of Samuel to the Babylonish Captivity. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.

HEBREW THEISM. The Common Basis of Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedism. Royal 8vo. 4s. 6d.

CATHOLIC UNION: Essays towards a Church of the Future. as the Organization of Philanthropy. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

LIFE AFTER DEATH: Palinōdia. Second Edition. Demy 8vo, sewed. 1s.

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY WITHOUT CHRIST? 1s.

RELIGION NOT HISTORY. 1s.

A DISCOURSE AGAINST HERO-MAKING IN RELIGION. 1s.

THE RELATION OF FREE KNOWLEDGE TO MORAL SENTIMENT. 1s.

THE RELATION OF PHYSIOLOGY TO SEXUAL MORALS. 1s.

ORTHÖEPY: A Simple Mode of Accenting English. 1s.

FOUR LECTURES:—

ON FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 6d.

THE RELATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL TO LIBERAL KNOWLEDGE. 1s.

THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF LAW. 3d.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ENGLISH INSTITUTIONS. 6d.

THE TEXT OF THE IGUVINE INSCRIPTIONS. With Interlinear Latin Translation and Notes. 2s.

HIAWATHA. Rendered into Latin. With Abridgment. 2s. 6d.

TRANSLATIONS OF ENGLISH POETRY INTO LATIN VERSE. 6s.

REBILIUS CRUSO: Robinson Crusoe in Latin. 5s.

These three Books are designed to assist learners in Latin.

BINDING SECT. APR 29 1958

AC
8
N4
v.5

Newman, Francis William
Miscellanies

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY